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This project responds to a need for new theoretical tools for understanding law as a site for the 
intersection of rhetoric and philosophy. In advancing the concept of “models of judgment” as a 
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unique perspective on the rhetorical commitments undergirding prominent judicial theories. 
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PREFACE 
 
 In Meditations XVII, John Donne beautifully wrote: “No man is an Iland, intire of 
itselfe; every man is a peece of the Continent, a part of the maine.” The pursuit of an advanced 
degree can be a lonely and isolating experience, which I find particularly true for theorists 
writing about theory. Yet, following Donne, even the most solitary of theorists is not an island. I 
would be remiss if I did not offer my profound gratitude to the many individuals who have 
provided support as a walked down this lonely road.  
 First, I wish to thank my advisor, John Lyne, for his many years of mentorship and 
friendship. Hours upon hours of meandering through the streets and parks of Pittsburgh 
discussing everything from the nature of justice to a 20-year-old Simpsons episode (“I’m seein’ 
double… four Krustys!”) were some of the most subtly formative pedagogical experiences of my 
life in that they illustrated how a brilliant mind and sharp wit can draw insight from just about 
anything. Thanks also to John Poulakos, Gordon Mitchell, and Nicholas Rescher for their 
guidance and support throughout my years in Pittsburgh (and beyond). Each of them introduced 
me to unique and nuanced insights as a student in their respective courses, and that same 
intellectual spirit came to bear on this dissertation project in immeasurable ways. Although they 
were not part of the dissertation committee, I would also like to extend my sincerest gratitude to 
the rest of the department’s faculty, especially Lester Olson, Brent Malin, and Bill Fusfield, who 
helped me to become a better thinker and writer, and to the department staff – Mary Hamler, 
Brandi McClain, and Julie Rosol – who tolerated me despite my incessant absentmindedness. 
 Thanks to my family for their enduring love and unwavering encouragement; without 
their bedrock of support, none of this would have been possible. And thanks to the Pitt graduate 
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students, who I consider family. As I was interviewing at various graduate programs before 
making a decision, it was the Pitt graduate students who became the deciding factor. A constant 
theme throughout my time in the program was a rich sense of community. They made my 
courses more interesting, my writing stronger, my thinking sharper, and my delight in the life of 
the mind more profound. In particular, I would like to thank my early mentors, Damien Pfister, 
Steve Llano, Michele Kennerly, Cate Morrison, Carly Woods, and Michelle Gibbons for their 
guidance and illustrating by example what it means to be a phenomenal scholar and educator. 
Thanks also to those with whom I had countless conversations and arguments inside and outside 
of the classroom. John Rief, Matt Brigham, Brent Saindon, Takuzo Konishi, Liangyu Fu, Brita 
Anderson, David Landes, Josh Beaty, Joe Packer, Tom Dunn, and Matt Gayetsky – you made 
my experience at Pitt profound and delightful. Special thanks to Katie O’Neill, whose 
unwavering friendship and encouragement have made my life better in immeasurable ways.   
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
 
 On July 1, 2005, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor announced her retirement from the United 
States Supreme Court after 25 years in the robe. Widely considered the court’s swing vote on 
divisive cases, O’Connor’s vacancy offered President George W. Bush an opportunity to shape the 
court for years to come. On July 19, Bush nominated a young, dashing circuit court judge – John 
Roberts. Following the abrupt death of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Roberts became Bush’s 
nominee for the esteemed Chief Justice position.1 Much has been made of the Senate’s political 
handling of the Supreme Court confirmation process, especially after Justice Clarence Thomas’ 
troubled experience. Roberts faced no such trouble. His confirmation was unspectacular, in the 
best sense of the term. Although the hearing addressed a number of pertinent issues, his especially 
notable opening remarks merit attention. 
 After thanking the Senate Judiciary Committee, the President, and his family, Roberts 
described his view of the judicial role. “Judges and justices are servants of the law,” he argued, 
“not the other way around.” In a distinctly American metaphorical turn, Roberts made a now 
famous analogy: “Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules; they apply them. The 
role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules. But it is a 
limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire.” He continued, asserting that he 
has no “agenda” and “will decide every case based on the record, according to the rule of law, 
                                                 
1 Following Bush’s failed nomination of Harriet Myers, Justice Samuel Alito eventually filled O’Connor’s 
position. 
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without fear or favor, to the best of my ability. And I will remember that it’s my job to call balls 
and strikes, and not to pitch or bat.”2  
 The metaphor is simple yet clever and has been utilized ad nauseam ever since the hearing. 
Upon further reflection, however, a student of law (let alone a fan of baseball) might be given 
pause by Roberts’ comparison. The judge-as-umpire in this scenario purports to know what the 
law is – a collection of rules and statutes (the strike zone) that are applied to a particular case (the 
pitch/ball). If a case falls within the bounds of the legal strike zone, yer out! The judge-as-umpire 
calls balls and strikes as they are. The rules of the game, in baseball as in law, are already set. The 
ontological status of the pitch is concrete – the ball was either in the strike zone or it wasn’t, there 
is no middle ground. Like the shrewd judge, the good umpire cultivates a keen and attentive eye 
that is able to discern between the two and act accordingly.  
 I am not sure whether Roberts actually watches baseball, but the umpire who claims to call 
pitches as they are is making a bold assertion. Pitches are whizzing toward him3 at upwards of 100 
miles per hour. How much time does an umpire have to decide? A fastball traveling at 90 miles 
per hour reaches the catcher’s glove a mere .458 seconds after it leaves the pitcher’s hand. That is 
roughly the same amount of time it takes to blink your eyes. Keep in mind that the home plate 
umpire is wearing a thick chest protector, full face mask, and helmet as he watches a blurry white 
orb speeding toward him. Throw into the mix all the other pitches at a pitcher’s disposal – cutter, 
splitter, forkball, curveball, slider, slurve, screwball, changeup, palmball, circle changeup – and 
the ability to know with certainty the location of the ball as it crosses an invisible threshold that 
                                                 
2 U.S. Senate, Hearing 109-158: “Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be 
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court,” Washington, DC: GPO (Sept. 12, 2006). Retrieved from 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg23539/content-detail.html.  
3 Bewilderingly, professional baseball has employed precious few women in its history (six, to be precise). 
None of these women made it to the MLB and only one rose to the triple-A. 
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changes depending on the size and stature of the batter is nigh impossible. Baseball is also a 
summer sport, so games may be played in exceptionally hot and humid weather. And we must not 
forget that every moment outside the timeframe of the pitch builds up the anxiety of the batter, the 
pitcher, the catcher (who, by the way, may move his glove in an attempt to mislead the umpire 
into thinking the pitch fell within the strike zone), the other players, the tens of thousands of fans 
in attendance, and the millions watching from home. Is this really how Roberts conceives of a 
judge and the process of judgment?  
 Right before Roberts made his umpire analogy, he spoke of “a certain humility [that] 
should characterize the judicial role.” I would wager that the umpires who agree would adopt 
another model of umpiring. Rather than calling them as they are, the second model of umpire is 
more humble and claims to call them as he sees them. Some pitches are obvious and the “right” 
call is made without question. We see this all the time at the Supreme Court, even in its 
ideologically divided state. Roughly one third of all Supreme Court cases are unanimous 9-0 
decisions.4 Some cases are easier to decide, just as some pitches are easier to call. But good 
pitchers do not throw obvious pitches. If they did, then the batter would know what was coming 
just as well as the umpire. This is why pitchers “paint the corner” – they want their pitches to 
barely make it in the strike zone. The most adept pitchers will begin the game by painting the 
corner and, as the game continues, “stretch the strike zone” by continuing to pitch a little bit closer 
to the batter or a little bit further out. After seven innings, the strike zone no longer represents the 
official definition of what it should be, but rather illustrates a tacit negotiation between the pitcher 
and the umpire. The umpire who calls them as he sees them realizes this, but uses his best 
                                                 
4 See Pamela C. Corley, Amy Steigerwalt, and Artemus Ward, The Puzzle of Unanimity: Consensus on the 
United States Supreme Court (Stanford: University of Stanford Press, 2013). 
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judgment to make an appropriate call. Ultimately, good judgment is a bit of a gamble and bad calls 
will be made, but time and experience minimize the risk. 
 The judge who calls them as she sees them is quite similar. She, too, can easily decide 
simple cases with a “right” decision. Such cases receive little or no attention because they rarely 
make it beyond the initial trial and to a court of appeals, let alone the Supreme Court. After all, 
why would simple cases make it so far up the chain? Like the umpire being tested by a skilled 
pitcher, judges also realize that skilled lawyers, political organizations, and changing public 
opinion can stretch or shrink a law’s strike zone. The Civil Rights Movement illustrates this 
phenomenon quite well. The arguments advanced in the early 1900s are significantly different 
from the arguments advanced in the middle of the century, which are quite different from the 
arguments made today. Imagine if a contemporary advocate for civil rights made the same 
arguments 100 years ago. Needless to say, the results would be significantly different. They may 
share similar general themes of liberty and equality, but the same arguments would not and could 
not be made at each time period with equal success. Now apply this perspective to nearly every 
important legal issue. Women’s rights, LGBTQ rights, environmental law, privacy, corporate 
personhood, and even marijuana legislation illustrate the expansion and contraction of legal 
possibilities.  
 The Warren Court provides a strong case for the importance of timing. Just as the pitcher 
cannot get away with a called strike outside of the strike zone until he has sufficiently stretched it 
out, the judge may struggle to justify a decision unless the context allows it. Consider, for 
example, some of the decisions made by the Warren Court regarding civil rights. At the time, 
public opinion was beginning to favor an expanded conception of civil rights and an end to 
segregation. Some states had already passed legislation to this effect. Although the Warren Court 
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is usually characterized as “liberal,” “progressive,” and “activist,” it was responding to a particular 
context that made their arguments fitting. Questioned about his opinion of stare decisis, Roberts 
claimed that Brown v. Board of Education did not represent judicial activism because it was 
righting a wrong. Yet, as Condit and Lucaites aptly note, the Plessy v. Ferguson decision 
represented the pulse of the nation at the time.5 It is a precarious position for a judge to claim he is 
“righting a wrong” while simultaneously claiming his decisions are timelessly correct. 
 Furthermore, the inherent ambiguity of language makes the exactness of the “call-it-as-it-
is” approach extremely complicated if not impossible. Justice Potter Stewart captured this 
sentiment well in his famous description of pornography: “I know it when I see it.”6 Can the same 
be said for what Kenneth Burke described as the “generalized wishes” of the Constitution?7 Do we 
know liberty when we see it? Or equality? What about privacy, which has been read into the 
Constitution but does not appear in the text? One of Laurence Tribe’s most recent books, The 
Invisible Constitution, makes a strong case for a number of these “invisible” influences that are 
part and parcel of any judicial decision.8 Roberts’ conception of judgment is looking a little shaky. 
 A third, more controversial model of umpiring exists as well, which parallels the legal 
realist movement that was prominent in the United States throughout the early 20th century (and, 
depending on whom you ask, continues to linger). This model of umpire asserts that a pitch isn’t 
anything until he calls it. For any fan of baseball that has disagreed with an umpire’s call, this may 
be a harsh reality. Egregious calls are made every once in a while, but, much like egregious 
                                                 
5 Celeste Michelle Condit and John Louis Lucaites, Crafting Equality: America’s Anglo-African Word 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). 
6 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). Stewart would later remark that he feared this phrase would be 
etched into his tombstone. 
7 See Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives, 2d ed (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 
particularly Part III, Chapter I: “The Dialectic of Constitutions.” 
8 Laurence H. Tribe, The Invisible Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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judicial decisions, there is little recourse unless foul play or gross ineptitude is suspected.9 In the 
judicial world, this type of judgment is often associated with the aforementioned school of legal 
realism. Rather than understanding law as an autonomous and objective set of rules that can be 
applied in a given case, the legal realist views law as inherently subjective. Most scholars cite 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s germane contribution to American jurisprudence, The Common Law, 
and subsequent essays such as “The Path of Law” as the spark that would eventually ignite the 
legal realist movement in the 20th century. In 1921, Benjamin Cardozo authored The Nature of the 
Judicial Process wherein he accepts that “judge-made law as one of the existing realities of life.”10 
An appeals court judge during the book’s initial publication and eventual successor of Holmes’ 
Supreme Court seat, Cardozo believed that legal terms like liberty and equality were “fluid and 
dynamic.” Consequently, the most important elements of law did not and could not crystallize 
until a judge applied his “creative energy” to a decision, thus giving abstract ideas a particular 
shape and form. “Much must be left to that deftness in the use of tools which the practice of an art 
develops,” writes Cardozo. “A few hints, a few suggestions, the rest must be trusted to the feeling 
of the artist.”11 As an artist using a diverse set of tools – first and foremost experience – the judge 
must not only interpret, but she must also create. This creative act is at the heart of legal realism. 
The extreme form of legal realism is largely untenable, but at its best, legal realism affords the 
judge enough creativity to clarify and give meaning to vague language and an ever-changing 
political and legal climate.  
 Yet, the quality of decisions is not the focus of scholars who subscribe to the legal realist 
perspective because, they argue, it only serves to describe how the law actually works. A judge 
                                                 
9 Only eight federal judges have been successfully impeached in the history of the United States.   
10 Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (Lexington, KY: Feather Trail Press, 2009). 
11 Ibid., 13. 
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can have a bad case of the Mondays just like any of us. As academics grading qualitative essays, 
can we honestly say that our mood never influences any grade we have ever given, even if it was 
to a student’s benefit? The great worry, captured by Karl Llewllyn’s 1940 essay “On Reading and 
Using the Newer Jurisprudence,” lies in something as insignificant as what a judge ate for 
breakfast becoming the determining factor in a case.12  
 Whereas legal realism includes a degree of rhetorical creativity, Roberts’ “call-it-as-it-is” 
approach seems confined to two bases for judgment: the law (including the Constitution, statutes, 
precedents, etc.) and the facts of the case. This stark view of the judge and his process of judgment 
might envision these two resources as a Venn diagram: when the two overlap, legal intervention is 
warranted. At first glance, this idea of law seems quite appealing. X committed Y act. A city 
ordinance exists that prohibits Y act. X is guilty. This is the judge’s “limited role” that Roberts 
referenced in his opening remarks. Interestingly, the act of judgment is hardly present in Roberts’ 
depiction of law. The judge is not really judging, but sorting.  
 But is it so simple? More importantly, should it be so simple? Extraneous circumstances 
arise all of the time and greatly affect the outcome of legal decisions. What about mercy? If it is 
the role of the judge to simply apply the rules, then mercy would have no place in our legal world, 
yet that is certainly not the case. Does a judges’ political ideology matter? Even a glance at the 
landmark decisions of the past 50 years suggests that judges often have a political agenda even if 
they are tethered to the Constitution, statutes, and precedent. Does public opinion matter? 
Although judges and justices like to consider themselves above such petty issues as popularity, the 
cases they decide to hear and the manner by which they craft their decisions suggest otherwise. 
                                                 
12 Karl N. Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1962). See also Alex Kozinski, “What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial Decision 
Making,” Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 26 (1993), 993-999. 
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The phrase “a government of laws, and not of men” is bandied about as if the law could be 
detached from the vicissitudes of human judgment, but that is not the case. Of course, questions 
like these generally remain unanswered in Supreme Court confirmation hearings as judges deftly 
evade questions about their legal philosophies. Roberts’ analogy nonetheless underscores the fact 
that a judge’s decision-making process carries with it a particular conception of judgment that 
operates within an overarching model of justice. Different models of justice and of judgment rely 
upon different judicial resources and, consequently, a different set of rhetorical appeals. 
 My attention has been trained on judges and justices, but legal judgment is not reserved for 
the privileged few who don the black robe. Public culture is consumed with issues of justice. 
During the summer of 2012, the country awaited the Supreme Court’s decision regarding 
President Obama’s health care legislation. Stephen Colbert’s ingenious creation of his own Super-
PAC parodied the Citizens United decision, which allows unlimited corporate donations to 
political campaigns, and captured widespread media attention and public engagement. So much 
so, in fact, that the Annenberg Public Policy Center claims that he “is doing a better job than other 
news sources at teaching people about campaign financing.”13 Currently, the country is abuzz an 
array of upcoming cases concerning same-sex marriage, another challenge to the Affordable Care 
Act, and “true threats” and digital expression. People are thinking and talking about Constitutional 
law, even though the discussions may not include nuanced technical arguments.  
 The content of film and television also help to shape the public’s conception of law. The 
television program 24, for example, portrays a protagonist, Jack Bauer, who uses torture to derive 
immediate life-saving information. Characterized as the “Jack Bauer Syndrome,” public 
                                                 
13 Bruce Hardy, “Stephen Colbert’s Civics Lesson: Or, How a TV Humorist Taught America about 




 - 9 - 
conceptions of torture and national security issues have been shaped by the show.14 The program’s 
reach is alarmingly far. Steven Keslowitz notes, “Justice Antonin Scalia referenced fictional super-
agent Jack Bauer from the television show 24 when debating the legal defensibility of torture with 
a group of judges in Ottawa, Canada in June 2007.”15 Judicial decisions are no doubt important to 
public conceptions of justice, especially those at the Supreme Court level, but the public does not 
wait for judges to tell them what justice is.  
 As legal and political theorist Mary Ann Glendon argues, “Legal discourse has not only 
become the single most important tributary to political discourse, but it has crept into the 
languages that Americans employ around the kitchen table, in the neighborhood, and in their 
diverse communities of memory and mutual aid.”16 Law, for good or ill, has been infused into 
contemporary discourse and goes well beyond its disciplinary bounds, but with different 
parameters of accountability. Law may be a technical discourse, but it faces non-technical 
resistance when it enters a changing, contingent public discussion.  
 This all leads to one question that has been driving this project from the beginning: what 
constitutes good legal judgment? Such a question can be approached from any number of angles. 
The philosopher might attempt to discern the right and good and true model of judgment. The 
sociologist may look at the systemic social issues that give rise to particular legal problems and 
decisions. The economist could juxtapose the various costs of the legal system against their 
outcomes. The neurobiologist might map the various electrical charges emitted by the brain in an 
                                                 
14 See Tung Yin, “Jack Bauer Syndrome: Hollywood’s Depiction of National Security Law,” Southern 
California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 17 (2009), 279-300; and John Downing, “Terrorism, Torture and 
Television: “24” in Its Context,” Democratic Communiqué 21.2 (2007), 62-82. 
15 Stephen Keslowitz, “The Simpsons, 24, and the Law: How Homer Simpson and Jack Bauer Influence 
Congressional Lawmaking and Judicial Reasoning,” Cardozo Law Review (2008), 2788.  
16 Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (New York: Free Press, 
1991), 3. 
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attempt to measure the level of compassion or logic a judge exhibits when making a decision. The 
law can be interpreted from different perspectives. As a rhetorician, I am interested not only in 
how these different perspective play out but also in the rhetorical investments that direct a judge 
toward one disposition rather than another. “To conceive of law as a rhetorical and social system,” 
writes the legal scholar, James Boyd White, “a way in which we use an inherited language to talk 
to each other and to maintain a community, suggests in a new way that the heart of law is what we 
always knew it was: an open hearing in which one point of view, one construction of language and 
reality, is tested against another.”17 Legal theorists attempt to convince their readers – be they 
fellow academics, sitting judges, practicing lawyers, law school students, politicians, or the lay 
public – that their perspective of law is superior. In doing so they must delineate good legal 
judgment from bad legal judgment, and they must be able to articulate how one can arrive at the 
former and avoid the latter.  
Recognizing the multitude of rhetorical resources available when responding to 
challenging legal issues, the goal of this project is to understand how competing conceptions of 
legal judgment shape and are shaped by philosophers contributing to academic and public 
discussions on important legal issues. In order to do so, I advance the “models of judgment” 
approach and use it to analyze the legal philosophies of three prominent philosophers of law: 
Richard Posner, Martha Nussbaum, and Cass Sunstein. By “models of judgment,” I mean the 
idealized judge who embodies the jurisprudence advanced by the author. Approaching their 
respective philosophies in such a way provides a unique perspective and serves to illustrate the 
rhetorical commitments undergirding their theories. Posner, Nussbaum, and Sunstein provide 
compelling case studies because their legal theories are distinct, yet emerge in relationship to one 
                                                 
17 James Boyd White, When Words Lose Their Meaning: Constitutions and Reconstitutions of Language, 
Character, and Community (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 273. 
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another. In addition to serving as faculty members at the University of Chicago School of Law (at 
times co-teaching courses), they are prominent public intellectuals and respond to one another’s 
work in their scholarship. Unlike previous scholarship on the rhetoric of law, which tends to focus 
on particular cases (often Supreme Court cases) or legal issues, my contribution fills a noticeable 
gap by addressing the philosophy of law and the rhetoric therein. I hope the “models of judgment” 
approach provides a new theoretical resource for understanding law as a site for the intersection of 
rhetoric and philosophy that can be applied to other legal philosophers.  
The United States is in many ways a legal culture, but one that does not have any single, 
guiding philosophy. Law is an important, if not the most prominent, way in which the public and 
philosophers engage one another. Complex legal cases beget complex philosophical problems, 
which affect and are affected by public discourse. Their rhetorical constructions and discursive 
turns are not born of immaculate conception, but emerge from, respond to, and transform a long, 
ongoing tradition of philosophical explication and negotiation. The public philosophers addressed 
offer distinct argumentative discourses that help to shape how readers understand good legal 
judgment; but to isolate one and label it our fixed star ignores the many ways in which it is 
situated in a greater constellation. By addressing the ways in which these philosophers use 
rhetorical strategies to situate and promote their philosophies, particularly the ways in which they 
construct rhetorical tropes to direct attention one way rather than other, their conceptions of good 
judgment come into better view. 
  
1.1 RHETORIC AND PRACTICAL REASON 
Rhetoricians have been concerned with the idea of good judgment as long as rhetoric has been 
theorized. Moreover, the connection between legal theory and rhetoric turns (in part) on the idea 
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of practical reason, a particularly important concept that enjoys a rich history in law and rhetoric. 
Aristotle argues in the Rhetoric that judgment is a distinctly rhetorical concept. Because judgment 
requires the weighing of competing arguments, he reasons, it must deal with uncertainty and that 
which can be otherwise. Whereas philosophy is traditionally characterized as the pursuit for truth, 
rhetoric is often characterized by the negotiation of probabilities and contingencies. As Aristotle 
aptly notes, “there is no further need of speech on subjects that we know and have already 
judged.”18 In so far as truth is available and known, on this view, then there is no need for rhetoric 
or for judgment. What, then, creates the need for rhetorical judgment, and how is it constituted? 
For this would appear to hold the key to understanding legal rhetoric, which most (perhaps even 
Justice Roberts when in another setting) would regard as not simply a matter of announcing what 
is “true.” 
 Arguably the most robust and richly nuanced aspect of rhetorical and legal judgment, 
practical reason has been featured prominently in philosophy, rhetoric, and law for as long as they 
have been around. At its most basic, practical reason concerns the process by which an individual 
determines how to decide in a given situation where there can be significant ramifications. 
Because it operates within contingencies and considerations of timeliness, rhetoric has been 
closely associated with practical reason rather than theoretical reason. Rhetoric requires one to act 
without complete knowledge while facing pressures that fall beyond the scope of most logical 
inquiries including, but not limited to, one’s emotional state and the emotions of others, 
reputation, social expectations, credibility, perceptions and beliefs, ideology, complexity of ideas, 
experience, intentions, and, of course, factual data.  
                                                 
18 Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans. by George A. Kennedy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 1391b.  
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 Aristotle was the first philosopher of note to expound systematically upon the difference 
between these two realms of thought and utilized legal examples to illustrate their similarities and 
differences. Whereas Plato prized the theoretical over the practical, Aristotle found value in both. 
In the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle offers a compelling argument for and defense of practical 
reason. Noting the gradual cultivation of practical reason (phronésis) through experience, 
reflection, and habit,19 Aristotle claims that, unlike theoretical reason (sophia), practical reason is 
concerned with particulars as well as universals. An individual utilizing sound practical reason 
will be able to assess a given situation and act accordingly in order to produce particular desired 
ends that also fall under the auspices of eudaimonia (the “flourishing life"). Aristotle’s 
characterization of practical reason closely parallels his characterization of rhetoric, the latter 
defined as the ability to understand the available means of persuasion in a given situation.20 Like 
rhetoric, practical reason is knowledge and experience in action and interaction. It is never quite 
settled, nor is it moving so quickly that we cannot see where it is or where it is going.  
 Importantly, rhetoric and law are not only concerned with an individual’s practical reason, 
but with the judgments of audiences. As Thomas Farrell argues,  
Rhetoric is the only art which evokes the capacity for practical reason from a situated 
audience. Therefore, alone among the arts, it presents a public audience with the possibility 
of becoming, for a time, an accountable moral agent. The process of elaborating the 
equalities of a developed rhetorical ethic also allows us to underscore certain norms for 
                                                 
19 Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1999), 1142a. 
20 For a more detailed analysis of Aristotelian practical reason, see Joseph Raz, ed., Practical Reasoning 
(Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 1978); David Charles, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Action (London: 
Duckworth Press, 1984); Norman O. Dahl, Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of the Will 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984); Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); and Michael E. Bratman, Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason 
(Cambridge: Center for the Study of Language and Information, 1999). 
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rhetorical competence: chiefly those aspects of ethos, agency, practical reason, and civic 
friendship which help to foster reciprocal measures of responsibility and belonging in the 
advocates and audiences of civic life.21 
For Aristotle, the rhetorical inducement to judgment must be guided by prudence. Aristotelian 
scholar Terence Irwin notes that “The ‘prudence’ in ‘jurisprudence’ comes closer to Aristotle’s 
definition of phronésis.”22 Such prudence includes thoughtful deliberation about what might be 
the case and realizing that no true, all-encompassing answer is ascertainable. A jury’s deliberation, 
for example, requires good practical reasoning, especially in cases wherein both the prosecution 
and defense have provided compelling arguments. A jury weighs these arguments against one 
another, deliberating about what is possible rather than what is true. Only in the movies will a 
guilty defendant go through a trial, only to break down at the last minute and confess to 
everything. And only in television will a crooked cop see the error of his ways and confess to 
setting up the defendant to take the fall. Alas, real life is not like Perry Mason. 
 The early Stoics were fairly rigid in their depiction of practical reason and embraced a 
model of action more closely associated with Plato than with Aristotle. Later Stoics, such as 
Cicero and Seneca, were more sympathetic to the ebb and flow of human experience. Seneca’s 
articulation of the stoic judge who embodies “wise moderation” provides a paradigm of the 
practical reasoning required for a judge issuing a judgment. In an ill-fated attempt to advise Nero, 
Seneca’s De Clementia articulates the need for mercy by juxtaposing blind rigidity and mindful 
flexibility. Whereas the stern judge will follow the letter of the law (as opposed to the spirit of the 
law), the wise judge acknowledges the inevitability of wrongful acts. "We have all sinned,” notes 
the wise judge, “and not only have we done wrong, but we shall go on doing wrong to the very 
                                                 
21 Thomas B. Farrell, Norms of Rhetorical Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 10. 
22 Terence Irwin, ed. and trans., Nicomachean Ethics, 345. 
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end of life. Even if there is any one who has so thoroughly cleansed his mind that nothing can any 
more confound him and betray him, yet it is by sinning that he has reached the sinless state."23 
Unlike the stern judge, who is unlikely to “escape conviction under the very law which they cite 
for the inquisition,”24 the wise judge recognizes the process of moral growth and development. 
Mercy is not required in every occasion, but given the circumstances and offending party, “there 
are a great many people who might be turned back to the path of virtue if [they are released from 
punishment]."25 Instead of rigidity, Seneca urges wise moderation – an anthem shared by 
Aristotle.  
This balancing act is far from an exact science with explicit rules for when and how to be 
merciful; instead, it requires a kind of artistry. Like the ideas of balance and proportionality, the 
act of judging hard cases requires a keen sensitivity to contextual nuances while still embracing 
measured reason. Judgment in an official capacity not only requires a thorough knowledge of the 
particular case at hand, but also the ramifications the decision could produce. In our own time, 
James Boyd White argues that such acts of judgment select particular discourses from which a 
community constitutes (and reconstitutes) itself and encourages certain actions.26 An especially 
harsh decision may inspire revolt, whereas a merciful decision may encourage cooperation. 
Seneca’s wise judge, an emblem in the Stoic “progressor,” makes that line of argument public and 
possible.  
                                                 
23 Seneca, De Clementia, in Seneca: Moral Essays, v. I, trans. John W. Basore (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1979), 1.6.3-4. 
24 Ibid., 1.6.3. 
25 Ibid., 1.2.2. 
26 See James Boyd White, When Words Lose their Meaning. White makes similar arguments in many of his 
other works, including Justice in Translation: An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism (Chicago:  
University of Chicago Press, 1990) and Heracles’ Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of the Law 
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989). 
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 Seneca’s idea of “wise moderation” and the gradual and conscientious cultivation of the 
good habits essential for good practical reason carries on the Aristotelian tradition and illustrates 
its vital place in law. Several medieval philosophers also make important contributions in this 
regard, most notably Thomas Aquinas, who builds on Augustine’s weaving together of 
Aristotelian virtue ethics and Christian doctrine.27 With the advent of the Age of Reason and the 
Enlightenment, however, practical reason and rhetoric have faced great pressure at the hands of 
scientific reasoning. Demanding precision and certainty, analytic philosophy since Descartes has 
had a complicated relationship with practical reason, with rhetoric sharing a similar fate. 
Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason offered some room for phronésis to breathe, but 
still held it to rigid standards with the categorical imperative.28  
  At present, practical reason, like rhetoric, is enjoying a revival in interest. Alisdair 
MacIntyre’s After Virtue, a significant contribution to ethical judgment, sets practical reason as a 
cornerstone of his theory.29 Stephen Toulmin has written about the uses of argument and their 
variance according to fields.30 Contemporary rhetoricians have similarly contributed to our 
understanding of practical reason, especially its relationship to expertise.31 Given the exigencies 
                                                 
27 See, for example, Ralph McInerny, “Thomistic Natural Law and Aristotelian Philosophy,” in St. Thomas 
Aquinas and the Natural Law Tradition: Contemporary Perspectives, eds. J. Goyette, et al. (Washington, 
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 25–42; Daniel Westberg, Right Practical Reason: 
Aristotle, Action, Prudence in Aquinas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). 
28 His famous statement that one must never lie was and continues to be a highly contested area of 
disagreement among moral philosophers. For all its intrigue, the categorical imperative fits the Platonic 
model of practical reason more than the Aristotelian model. His Critique of Judgment is more sympathetic 
to a rhetorical understanding of practical reason, but he limits such judgments to aesthetics and not ethics or 
law. 
29 Alistair McIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1981). Subsequent works, most notably Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, take an unnecessary turn 
toward Christian dogma that, in my opinion, undermine his humanistic revival of virtue ethics found in 
After Virtue. 
30 Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958). 
31 For example, see Michael Calvin McGee and John Lyne, “What are Nice Folks Like You Doing in a 
Place Like This?: Some Entailments of Treating Knowledge Claims Rhetorically,” in The Rhetoric of the 
Human Sciences: Language and Argument in Scholarship and Public Affairs, ed. John S. Nelson, Allan 
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that arise out of contemporary problems – be they related to public policy, governmental research 
funding, or legal cases – there exists an imperative to decide and act, which can never assume 
absolute, complete, unanimous knowledge. Experts are often asked to contribute their nuanced 
perspectives, but they operate in contingent situations and must negotiate amongst fellow experts 
proposing competing, sometimes antithetical arguments. Like science and economics, law is a 
bastion of such experts offering their arguments on the proper course of action. “Credible experts,” 
write McGee and Lyne, “on the rhetorical model of authority, must facilitate the act of judgment – 
that is, they must speak that language of knowledge which translates easily into the language of 
action and promotes a fusion of the two.”32  
 As this project stresses, public philosophers of law offer an array of expert arguments that 
are culturally grounded and emerge from similar resources of judgment (e.g. the Constitution, 
statutes, precedent, an ever-changing public, etc.). I argue that legal philosophers do not 
necessarily differ regarding which resources are used, but rather how they are used. Sometimes 
these differences are specific, such as the incorporation of literature in legal education and 
judgment, whereas others are differences in definition and perception, such as the idea of common 
sense. At the end of the day, philosophers of law construct different ways of viewing the world, 
which necessarily means different ways of judging the world, and this is especially prominent in 
authors who write for a broader, public audience.  
 Consider, for example, two extralegal elements of legal judgment that must be negotiated 
by sitting judges: context and audience. Given practical reason’s attention to the normative and 
                                                 
Megill, and Donald N. McCloskey (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987); the special issue of 
Social Epistemology (3) 2011, which spotlighted “Rhetorics and Expertise,” ed. Damien Pfister; E. Johanna 
Hartelius, The Rhetoric of Expertise (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010); and Harry Collins and Robert 
Evans, Rethinking Expertise (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
32 McGee and Lyne, 391. 
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ever-changing elements of human experience, context plays a vital role in judgment, especially 
when legal issues are involved. They become especially clear in times of war. One compelling 
example is in the history of the sedition in the United States. As legal scholar Geoffrey Stone 
notes, the most significant cases have arisen during “perilous times.”33 The first great breach of 
First Amendment rights occurred during the notorious “XYZ Affair” and led to the Alien and 
Sedition Acts of 1798 (only seven years after the Bill of Rights was ratified!). Abraham Lincoln’s 
suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War had notable ramifications for free speech. 
Woodrow Wilson and a supporting congress passed another round of acts criminalizing sedition 
during World War I (which are still in place and have recently been used as the legal grounding to 
pursue Edward Snowden). Franklin Delano Roosevelt instituted notorious internment camps. 
Throughout the Cold War, numerous individuals were penalized, fired from their jobs, and 
imprisoned due to their “communist tendencies.” During the Vietnam War, a number of news 
agencies opted for self-censorship in fear of governmental retribution. Most recently, the so-called 
“war on terror” has instigated the much-debated Patriot Act and a number of executive orders that 
have curbed expression. “Free speech zones,” which are basically fenced corrals often stationed 
well offsite during large political gatherings like national political conventions and international 
economic summits, are now commonplace and egregious acts like wearing a “give peace a 
chance” T-shirt can get an individual evicted from a shopping mall.34 
 Although some commentators on the First Amendment claim that times of war require the 
most freedom to criticize the government, our history tells another story. Unlike times of peace, 
                                                 
33 Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime from the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on 
Terrorism (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004). 
34 See Kembrew McLeod, Freedom of Expression ®: Overzealous Copyright Bozos and Other Enemies of 
Creativity (New York: Doubleday, 2005); John Durham Peters, Courting the Abyss: Free Speech and the 
Liberal Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
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the liberty to speak freely and the issues of security raised in times of war come into open conflict 
with the latter often winning out. Kenneth Burke described the aspirations toward liberty and 
security as “generalized wishes,” which would also include such prized political aspirations as 
equality and privacy.35 Although we may subscribe to all of them and be willing to defend them at 
any given moment, they nonetheless come into conflict depending on the context in which one is 
making an argument. Judges have a far easier time appealing to safety in times of war than they do 
to liberty or privacy or even equality, as Korematsu sadly illustrates. The same socio-political 
context can elicit distinct and nuanced rhetorical approaches depending on how practical reason 
blends with legal judgment.  
 Public philosophers of law recognize the importance of context and the ever-changing 
landscape of contingency. As they craft their different models of judgment, each must rhetorically 
situate an approach that is flexible enough to respond to different contexts and contingencies, 
while also maintaining a certain level of consistency (after all, what good is a model of justice if 
nobody knows how it will play out?). To borrow from Jean de La Fontaine, “Je plie, mais je ne 
romps pas” – these approaches must bend, but not break, in order to maintain relevance in the 
public and legal spheres. 
 Context also involves another important rhetorical concept present in law: timeliness 
(kairos). Like practical reason, one cultivates an ability to acknowledge and respond to an 
opportune moment. Although Aristotle notes the importance of kairos in the Rhetoric, Isocrates’ 
treatment of the idea is arguably more robust and useful. A key element of his approach to 
education (paidea) and central to is overall rhetorical model of philosophy (philosophia), Isocrates 
envisions the virtuous orator as able to address an audience at the most opportune time. Regarding 
                                                 
35 See Burke, A Grammar of Motives, particularly part three, “On Dialectic.”  
 
 - 20 - 
Isocrates and kairos, Haskins argues, “The impulse to speak is therefore both external and internal. 
It is external insofar one perceives in a situation the compelling force of necessity (ananke); it is 
internal insofar one has a grasp of discourses that are fit to address the situation in question.”36 A 
kairotic moment, when virtuous oratory is needed to respond to an immediate problem, requires 
an individual skilled enough to bide her time when others would act too quickly, yet not be 
numbed into inaction. For the sitting judge, timeliness comes in a number of forms. The Sixth 
Amendment in the U.S. Bill of Rights highlights one of the most recognized forms, given “the 
accused enjoys the right to a speedy and public trial.” Unnecessarily dragging out a case places 
added pressure on the legal system and often creates an undue burden for defendants, especially if 
they are spending time in jail awaiting the conclusion of a case.  
 As we climb up the legal ladder to the Supreme Court, timeliness continues to be important 
but takes a markedly different and noticeably political form. In order to have a case heard by the 
Supreme Court, it must be raised in conference by the justices and receive at least four votes 
supporting its hearing (colloquially known as the “rule of four”). The Supreme Court receives 
upwards of 10,000 or more petitions per year. Of these petitions, roughly 100-150 cases will be 
heard.37 I am no statistician, but even I can tell those are terrible odds. What, then, determines 
whether or not a case is heard? Sometimes the Supreme Court is rectifying the gross negligence of 
a lower court or tending to an issue of immediate concern. Quite often, however, the justices 
choose high profile cases based on the political and ideological climate, even though the court 
pretends to be above or beyond politics. One sometimes hears it said that the court was “waiting 
for a case like this,” meaning that the timing and extra-legal circumstances happened to be ripe for 
                                                 
36 Ekaterina Haskins, Logos and Power in Isocrates and Aristotle (Columbia, SC: University of South 
Carolina Press, 2004), 73. 
37 For detailed statistics on the Supreme Court’s process of granting certiorari, see their webpage: 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/.  
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the picking. The most noticeable examples can be found in landmark decisions that overturn 
precedent.  
 Brown v. Board of Education’s overturning of Plessy v. Ferguson did not just happen; it 
was part of a long process by which advocates for racial equality slowly built up enough support 
to make the decision possible. The political and ideological landscape needed to be amenable to 
desegregation. If Plessy was simply a poor decision, the court would have overturned it in 1899 
when it heard Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education,38 but the Supreme Court upheld 
segregation unanimously. Several social, cultural, and political elements needed to be in line 
before the Court would eventually overturn Plessy. For example, the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People created a strategy for legally challenging school segregation in 
the mid-1930s, which continued to gain political force. Following World War II, the Court also 
struggled to justify segregation after battling for equality half way around the world. These 
historical events created a larger and more formidable set of rhetorical resources that were 
available to the court. The opportunity for the court to make its arguments in Brown v. Board of 
Education and have those arguments resonate with the American public became increasingly 
appropriate.  
 Another element of contingency and timeliness involves the changing composition of the 
court, which greatly influences the judgments issued and the arguments offered therein. Chief 
Justice Earl Warren was set on expanding civil rights from the beginning of his appointment.39 
Along with fellow justices such as Hugo Black, William Douglas, and Tom Clark,40 the court had 
                                                 
38 Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 (1899) 
39 President Dwight Eisenhower lamented that appointing Warren was “the biggest damned-fool mistake I 
ever made.” 
40 Presidents seem to have a tradition of regretting their judicial appointments. Regarding Clark, President 
Harry Truman once remarked, "It's not that he's a bad man; it's just that he's the dumbest sonofabitch I ever 
met." 
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a solid liberal bloc, which would garner even more power with the appointment of William 
Brennan and, at the very end of Warren’s tenure, Thurgood Marshall. With these elements in play, 
the kairotic moment had arrived and Warren was able to jump at the opportunity to overturn the 
(now) notorious Plessy decision.  
 The aforementioned elements of context involve events that occur at particular times and 
lead to particular ramifications. In his description of the rhetorical situation, Lloyd Bitzer notes 
that various forms of restraint (and, correspondingly, possibility) mark such events. Unlike 
timeless theoretical reason, practical reason and the judgments that issue forth are greatly 
influenced by human agents. In other words, audience matters – a running theme in rhetoric. 
Depending on the backgrounds and expectations of audience members, a rhetor must sculpt a 
message accordingly.  
 Audience serves as a central concern for rhetoric, but has also been one of its most 
significant points of contention with philosophy and science. Plato’s caustic criticisms of rhetoric, 
most notably in the Gorgias, Protagoras, and Pheadrus, stress the speciousness of catering to an 
audience. In the Gorgias, Plato claims this amounts to flattery. Tell the audience what they want to 
hear, rather than what they should hear, and you will be a successful, if unjust, orator. Rhetoric, 
under this characterization, manipulates the soul. Plato’s ancient criticism continues to hold sway 
against rhetoric, as popular contemporary usage of the term still carries a pejorative connotation. 
Seedy politicians use “mere rhetoric” to obfuscate and distort, whereas intrepid journalists channel 
Nietzsche and speak “truth to power.”  
 Isocrates and Aristotle respond to Plato’s denunciation of rhetoric by pointing out that real-
life judgments are not so easy. Much like Seneca, Isocrates offers advice to the powerful elite in 
Greece and the surrounding areas. In a letter to the Macedonian King Phillip, Isocrates needs to 
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adeptly navigate the ego of a powerful ruler while still getting his message across. Whether we 
like it or not, people have interests, experiences, and biases that sculpt their perspectives. This 
connects rhetoric to practical reason because it asserts that an audience as an amalgamation of 
different, sometimes conflicting perspectives that must be adeptly navigated in order to produce 
the desired outcome. The people composing an audience may share much in common, but none of 
them look at a speaker (or an idea or an issue) with an unclouded view. The job of the skilled (and 
hopefully virtuous) rhetor is to guide individuals through the haze together. Against Plato’s 
loftiest hopes, she cannot act the part of the sun and burn the fog away to show how things really 
are.  
 Aristotle more succinctly characterizes the importance of an audience for the rhetor. 
Depending on the type of speech - epideictic, deliberative, or judicial – a rhetor needs to sculpt the 
message in a particular way in order to be most effective. Imagine that a man is on trial for animal 
abuse and his defense attorney is trying to build his case. Would not a jury composed of pet-
owning animal lovers merit a different rhetorical approach than that of a jury composed of citizens 
who endured traumatic experiences with animals? Consider a different case involving a defendant 
with a history of drug abuse. A jury composed of holier-than-thou teetotalers would certainly 
require a different set of arguments than one with citizens who had similarly struggled with drug 
addiction or witnessed a close friend or relative experience such addiction. Even in an ideal world, 
would we want to be able to make the same arguments to markedly different audiences that elicit 
the same response? Can we simply set aside our own experiences? 
 The U.S. court system, especially the Supreme Court, carries with it a mythical notion of 
apoliticism. Although this impression of the court is fading, the expectation that the courts will 
decide cases based on the law and that judges will check their political ideologies at the door out 
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of respect and integrity for the institution continues to exist. As a recent poll by the New York 
Times indicates, “Just 44% of Americans approve of the job the Supreme Court is doing and three-
quarters say the justices’ decisions are sometimes influenced by their personal or political 
views.”41 Citing Bush v. Gore and Citizens United, in addition to a growing distrust in U.S. 
governmental institutions across the board, the authors note that criticisms of the court span the 
ideological spectrum. Yet, when asked what constitutes a good judge, the response is often that 
“they will do their job within the parameters of the law.” At the very least, people are still upset 
with the Supreme Court when they believe a decision was made on political grounds because they 
still expect the court to be apolitical.  
 In The New Rhetoric, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca reproach analytic reasoning in favor 
of practical reasoning, arguing that “it is in terms of an audience that an argumentation 
develops.”42 Expanding upon the Ancient Greek and Roman preoccupation with oratory to include 
all manner of argumentation, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca remain attentive to the effects an 
audience has on argumentative structure and judgment. Noting that audiences are “almost infinite 
in their variety”43 yet still hold to a number of general characteristics, they theorize a “universal 
audience.” They are not asserting that there exists some all-encompassing, purely rational 
audience, which they claim philosophers tend to do. Rather, the universal audience exists as a 
fiction created by the rhetor to help facilitate the construction of arguments, which, in turn, shape 
the judgments of the rhetor and the audience. “Everyone constitutes the universal audience from 
what he knows of his fellow men, in such a way as to transcend the few oppositions he is aware 
                                                 
41 Adam Liptak and Allison Kopicki, “Approval Rating for Justices Hits Just 44% in New Poll,” The New 
York Times (June 7, 2012), retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/08/us/politics/44-percent-of-
americans-approve-of-supreme-court-in-new-poll.html. 
42 Chaïm Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, trans. John 
Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971), 5. 
43 Ibid., 26. 
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of,” argue Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. “Each individual, each culture, has thus its own 
conception of the universal audience.”44 
 Unlike scholars writing for fellow scholars, judges address a wide, ever-changing 
audience. Judges are certainly writing for a legal culture that carries certain expectations and 
limitations, but the higher up the court food chain one goes, the more public attention and 
criticism a judge’s decision will elicit. Major decisions are headline stories and garner significant, 
sometimes incessant, media attention. The most adept judges and justices create a universal 
audience that includes legal experts and the lay public, law professors and law transgressors.  
 Given the judge’s position, she must address the particular audience of a particular case, 
while also attending to the universal audience she constructs while crafting a decision that will 
enter the public sphere. Consequently, both particular and universal audiences influence judgment. 
Consider, for example, Plato’s legitimate charge against rhetorical flattery and pandering. 
Returning to Chief Justice Roberts’ testimony before Congress, it is clear that he was catering his 
responses to his audiences – both the members of Congress sitting before him and the general 
public watching at home (with bated breath, no doubt). Neither liberals nor conservatives want an 
over-reaching judge. Neither liberals nor conservatives want a “legislator in robes.” Like all of the 
Supreme Court nominees since at least Robert Bork, Roberts chose his words very carefully in 
order to appeal to multiple constituencies. Anticipating questions about the role of precedent in the 
judiciary, which is often a thinly veiled way to ask about Roe v. Wade, Roberts claimed that 
judges must “operate within a system of precedent, shaped by other judges equally striving to live 
up to the judicial oath.”45 He claimed that a Roberts court would be dedicated to narrow decisions 
and avoid stepping beyond the previously established bounds of the judiciary. We can never know 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 33. 
45 U.S Senate, Hearing 109-158. 
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the earnestness of these assertions, but we do know that this is what the Senate Judiciary 
Committee and Congress want to hear, not to mention the majority of the American public.  
Furthermore, his metaphor of choice, comparing judges to umpires, bespeaks of a desire to 
appease a general public that remains disinterested in technical legal jargon. He could have rattled 
off a long list of judges whom he admires or decisions he thought were particularly adept (or 
inept). Instead, he chose baseball: “America’s pastime.” He could have just as easily compared 
judging to baking an apple pie: you need to follow the instructions closely, you need to mix all of 
the ingredients together well, and you need to be mindful of the oven because once in a while you 
might get burned.  
 A second important way in which an audience shapes legal judgment has already been 
addressed, albeit tangentially. Timeliness, when a case gets heard and a decision issued, is of great 
importance because the characteristics of the American public change. Condit and Lucaites make a 
strong argument for the slow, methodical expanse of equality as an ideograph.46 If the history of 
American public address is any indication, the idea of equality has gone through significant 
change in the short history of the United States. Condit and Lucaites note that the early arguments 
for equality were few and far between47 and were mostly focused on equal representation and 
equal property rights for white, propertied men.48 Even after the Revolution and during the 
creation of the Constitution the term equality was rarely associated with the expansive, humanistic 
definition traditionally used today. Rather, equality in early American political oratory and essays 
was more attentive to the equality between states, between the branches of government, and merit 
                                                 
46 See Condit and Lucaites, Crafting Equality. 
47 Notably, Stephen Lucas’ Portents of Rebellion hardly addresses the arguments for equality. See Stephen 
E. Lucas, Portents of Rebellion: Rhetoric and Revolution in Philadelphia, 1765-76 (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1976). 
48 This conception of equality parallels Aristotle’s notion of equity as articulated in the Rhetoric, 
Nichomachean Ethics, and Politics. 
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based equality between citizens (again, “citizens” being confined to only one part of the 
population). Even though several authors and statesmen lamented the existence of slavery, most 
hoped for its natural nullification. They thought it would go away on its own because it would no 
longer be economically viable, which was thwarted, to a certain extent, by the invention of the 
cotton gin. 
 Not until orators and activists like Frederick Douglass, Angelina and Sarah Grimke, 
Elizabeth Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, Lucretia Mott, Booker T. Washington, and W.E.B. DuBois 
did equality rhetorically shift closer to our contemporary understanding. And this took decades of 
work and did not gain broad popular support until well into the 20th century. The arguments made 
in Brown v. Board of Education could not have been made with much, if any, success until the 
idea of equality had expanded.49 In other words, the audience needed to be ready to accept the 
arguments issued in the decision. This does not undermine the moral outrage that was felt before 
the Plessy decision was overturned, but instead emphasizes the idea that judges must be attentive 
to the American public as an audience. 
 The audience also plays a role in deciding which justice will author a decision. A 
somewhat cyclical process for authorship no doubt exists, ensuring that no justice authors a 
substantial or insubstantial amount of the decisions being issued in a given term. In important 
cases, however, the choice often responds to the needs or demands of the general public. Consider 
the 1919 First Amendment cases. Until his dissent in Abrams v. U.S., Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr. was asked to write every single decision upholding prosecution. Why? Was Holmes 
the most adept First Amendment scholar of the group? Was he somehow more qualified than his 
                                                 
49 Michael Calvin McGee argues that social change is best understood through these shifts in meaning 
(“movement as meaning) as opposed to, say, new legislation (“movement as phenomena”). See “‘Social 
Movement’: Phenomenon or Meaning?” in Readings on the Rhetoric of Social Protest, ed. Charles E. 
Morris, III and Stephen H. Brown (State College: Strata, 2001), 125-136.  
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peers? (Rarely humble, Holmes would have likely said, “Yes,” to both of these questions.) Holmes 
authored the decisions in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs not because he had a particularly acute 
interest in these cases; rather, Chief Justice Edward White selected him because he was the most 
sympathetic to the defendants and the protection of sedition. The Court hoped that opposition to 
the decisions would be subdued because even Holmes, a purported ally, remained unconvinced of 
the defendants’ innocence.50 Just as a liberal critiquing liberalism or a conservative critiquing 
conservativism carries more rhetorical force, so too does a judge sympathetic to a cause.  
 Not too long ago, the Supreme Court issued their much-anticipated decision regarding the 
Affordable Care Act. In the 5-4 decision, was a bleeding heart liberal justice asked to author the 
opinion? No. Chief Justice John Roberts took it upon himself to write the monumental decision. 
Speculation abounds regarding the “true” reasons behind the choice and we may not know the full 
details until Roberts’ notes and papers are released decades from now. Perhaps we will never 
know. I believe, however, that Roberts chose to write the decision because it would be more 
persuasive to the conservatives who had been lambasting the bill for the previous two years. If 
everything about the decision was exactly the same, but the author had been Justice Ginsberg or 
Justice Breyer instead of Chief Justice Roberts, the political fallout could have been devastating. 
 Finally, we must also consider the important role that the public opinion of a judge can 
play in their decision-making process. Again, we like to consider judges as beyond the petty 
vicissitudes of public opinion. We do not like to think that judges hold their positions because they 
are popular, but rather because they are adept legal scholars.51 Alas, judges have egos, too, and 
                                                 
50 Confiding to friends, most notably Harold Laski, Holmes would later claim that he regretted writing the 
Debs decision. See Mark DeWolfe Howe (ed.), Holmes-Laski Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice 
Holmes and Harold J. Laski 1916-1935 (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1953). 
51 This belief has met significant resistance in recent years, as judges are being voted out of their positions 
due to unpopular decisions, rather than the merit of their arguments in the confines of law. Only two years 
ago during the 2010 midterm elections, Iowans ousted three Supreme Court justices who joined in the 
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they want to leave the bench with a favorable legacy. The two previous examples involving 
Holmes and Roberts help to illustrate this point as well. In the interim between the Schenck, 
Frohwerk, and Debs cases and the Abrams case wherein he issued a landmark dissent, Holmes had 
a serendipitous encounter with Judge Learned Hand.52 Considered the “tenth Justice of the 
Supreme Court,” Hand was a highly regarded second circuit appeals court judge and influential 
progressive jurist. Two years before Abrams, Hand issued his most famous decision in Masses 
Publishing Co. v. Patten. The case involved the publication of articles and cartoons that were 
highly critical of the United States’ involvement in World War I. After the postmaster of New 
York City refused to deliver the publication to its subscribers, Masses sought an injunction. 
Authoring the court’s decision, Hand defended the right of Masses to distribute their publication 
and famously crafted the “incitement test,” which would serve as benchmark for future cases.  
By sheer happenstance, Hand and Holmes were aboard the same train traveling between 
Boston and New York City. They were familiar with and admired one another’s work and struck 
up a conversation about the limits of sedition in times of war.53 A few short months later, Holmes 
(with Justice Louis Brandeis concurring) issued his famous dissent in Abrams v. United States. 
Yet one meeting, the exact details of which remain lost to history, does not constitute a 
noteworthy pressure from public opinion. Several scholars, however, have argued that this event 
along with the criticisms he faced by such noted legal contemporaries such as Zachariah Chafee 
and Holmes’ desire to maintain popularity with fawning young progressives weighed on his ego.54 
                                                 
unanimous decision to legalize same-sex marriage. Here we see the conflict between the wariness of 
“legislators in robes” and the need for an independent judiciary. 
52 See Erin Rahne Kidwell, “The Paths of the Law: Historical Consciousness, Creative Democracy, and 
Judicial Review,” Albany Law Review 62.1998 (2001), 91-146. 
53 G. Edward White, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: Law and the Inner Self (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993), 424.  
54 See White, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes; G. Edward White, “Justice Holmes and the Modernization of 
Free Speech Jurisprudence: The Human Dimension,” California Law Review 80.391 (1992): 391-467; 
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Holmes may be a special case as his vast correspondence has been preserved and indicates the 
importance he invested in his legacy. But who in such an honored position does not think about 
his or her legacy? Even people with more humble lots in life care about how they will be 
remembered. Judges respond to their public just as the public responds to judges. 
Arguably, Chief Justice Roberts serves as a contemporary example of this phenomenon. 
Again, we will not know whether this argument carries its weight for a number of years, but I do 
not think it is too far reaching. When Roberts was undergoing congressional scrutiny before his 
appointment, he repeatedly defended a restrained judiciary. He advocated for narrow decisions and 
was wary of intervening in the acts of Congress. Subsequently, campaign finance reform and 
affirmative action cases have undermined this position and as a result he has experienced intense 
backlash. Branded a judicial legislator in most liberal circles, and even some moderate circles as 
well, Roberts’ legacy has been shrouded by his more boisterous conservative colleagues. When 
Roberts had the choice to side with the conservative wing and strike down the entire Affordable 
Care Act, which is the most significant contribution to U.S. health care policy since Medicare 
nearly 50 years ago, or side with the liberal wing in upholding the politically charged law, he 
opted for the latter. Surely a significant element of the decision was the legality of the policy 
within the confines of constitutional law and historic precedent. And there was room for the act to 
survive within these confines, which Roberts articulated through the federal government’s ability 
to tax. But judges are conscientious of their influence on public culture. A student of history, 
                                                 
William W. Fisher, “Interpreting Holmes,” Harvard Law Review 110.1010 (1997): 1010-1012; Mark 
DeWolfe Howe, “The Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes,” Harvard Law Review 64.4 (1951): 529-546; Erin 
Rahne Kidwell, “The Paths of the Law: Historical Consciousness, Creative Democracy, and Judicial 
Review,” Albany Law Review 62.1998 (2001): 91-146; Frederic R. Kellogg, “Holmes, Pragmatism, and the 
Deconstruction of Utilitarianism,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 23.1 (Winter 1987): 99-
120; Joseph A. Russomanno, “‘The Firebrand of My Youth’: Holmes, Emerson and Freedom of 
Expression,” Communication Law & Policy 33.5 (2000): 33-59; Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times. 
 
 - 31 - 
Roberts knew the long road it took to reach the landmark act and likely realized that to strike down 
the law in its entirety would inevitably delay a governmental response to the crisis that is U.S. 
health care. His decision highlighted his belief that this is not a good law, but it is adequate for the 
time being. Countless members of the public, his audience, had suffered through nightmarish 
experiences with an insufficient and expensive health care system. The tragic anecdotes of 
pregnant women and sick children being denied coverage kept stacking up. Sensitive to the 
situation, Roberts responded. As a result, he was being portrayed as an essential fulcrum balancing 
between the conservatives and the liberals. Only time will tell what Roberts will do in his newly 
granted spotlight, although I don’t think we should hold our breath.  
As James Boyd White aptly notes, “Every legal speech is made from a defined position, to 
a defined audience, in a defined language. The law always assumes a speaker and audience located 
in the context it defines. This is how it makes a world and makes it real.”55 Yet, these arguments 
never remain in the realm of the particular for very long. Perhaps the most miraculous and 
compelling element of the rhetorical function of legal culture is its ability to constantly fluctuate 
between the particular and the general, rooted in the moment yet always poised to transcend it. 
Again, James Boyd White captures this notion beautifully:  
[I]t is the constitution of a world by the distribution of authority within it; it establishes the 
terms on which its actors may talk in conflict or cooperation among themselves. The law 
establishes roles and relations and voices, positions from which and audiences to which 
one may speak, and it gives us speakers the materials and methods of a discourse. It is a 
way of creating a rhetorical community over time. It is this discourse, working in the social 
                                                 
55 White, When Words Lose Their Meanings, 266. 
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context of its own creation, this language in the fullest sense of the term, that is the law. It 
makes us members of a common world.56 
The process of judgment involves particular audiences as well as universal audiences, both of 
which require rhetorical insight and nuance in order to be successful. Public philosophers of law 
argue in a manner similar to judges, although they are much more overt in their attempts to 
influence the public. An article for Harper’s or The New Republic carries a different set of 
expectations than an article written for the American Journal of Philology or the Journal of Law & 
Economics. Given the demographics of readership, the ability for a story to get picked up by a less 
sympathetic organization, and the significant cultural, economic, religious, political, and 
ideological differences within the American populace (not to mention global readership), these 
authors must create an audience in their mind’s eye that shares some common generalizations. To 
argue to and for a narrow, particular audience would only preach to the choir and these 
philosophers are more interested in spreading the good word. They are less pastors and more 
proselytizers. 
 
1.2 OVERVIEW OF RHETORIC AND LAW 
Surprisingly, there is not much research examining the rhetoric of contemporary jurisprudence, 
even though there has been a swelling interest in the interdisciplinary study of law. Contemporary 
rhetoricians, including Clarke Rountree, Omar Swartz, Marouf Hasian, Sean O’Rourke, and James 
Aune, have made insightful contributions to the rhetoric of law, but the vast majority of their work 
and that of others roughly falls into one of four categories: 1) the rhetoric within legal opinions 
(e.g. Citizens United); 2) the rhetoric of a judge or justice (e.g. Chief Justice John Marshall); 3) the 
                                                 
56 Ibid., 266. 
 
 - 33 - 
rhetoric surrounding particular legal issues (e.g. “free speech” or “privacy”); and 4) tracing a 
rhetorical trope, figure, or concept as it is used across cases and issues (e.g. enthymemes). As one 
would expect, the growing body of literature does not fit so neatly into these categories, as some 
work dabbles in two, three, or all four of these areas. Nonetheless, this loose categorization will 
serve as an overview of what scholarship has been produced and where my contribution fits into 
the mix. 
  By focusing on landmark opinions or unearthing long-forgotten yet rhetorically significant 
decisions, rhetoricians of law working within the first category highlight the ways in which 
decisions are stylistically crafted, catered toward particular audiences, and invested with rhetorical 
impact. Examples abound in rhetoric scholarship and each scholar brings in her or his distinct 
approach. As one would expect, particularly significant and rhetorically robust landmark cases get 
the most attention and are returned to repeatedly with each scholar attempting a new take an 
established piece of American public culture. Marbury v. Madison,57 Dred Scott v. Sandford,58 
                                                 
57 See Bjorn F. Stillion Southard, “Prudential Argumentation and John Marshall’s Opinion in Marbury v. 
Madison (1803),” Argumentation & Advocacy 44.1 (Summer 2007), 1-17; William L. Benoit and J. 
Michael D’Agonstine, ““The Case of The Midnight Judges” and Multiple Audience Discourse: Chief 
Justice Marshall and Marbury v. Madison,” Southern Communication Journal 59 (Winter 1994), 89-96; 
and Per Fjelstad, “Legal Judgment and Cultural Motivation: Enthymematic Form in Marbury v. Madison,” 
Southern Communication Journal 60 (Fall 1994), 22-32. 
58 See Todd F. McDormon, “History, Collective Memory, and the Supreme Court: Debating ‘the People’ 
through the Dred Scott Controversy,” Southern Communication Journal 71.3 (Sept. 2006), 213-234; David 
Zarefsky, “Turning Points in the Galesburg Debate,” Argumentation & Advocacy 46.3 (Winter 2010), 140-
149; Condit and Lucaites, Crafting Equality. 
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Brown v. Board of Education,59 and Roe v. Wade60 represent the tip of the iceberg within the field 
of Communication, not to mention the significantly larger body of literature present within legal 
studies. Although scholars continue to return to landmark decisions, they often introduce a distinct 
rhetorical lens through which to view a number of cases spanning numerous areas of law. Clarke 
Rountree, for example, often utilizes a Burkean framework to understand landmark cases, 
including Korematsu v. United States,61 Brown v. Board of Education,62 and his expansive 
analysis of Bush v. Gore.63 This attention to landmark Supreme Court cases is often a point of 
criticism used against the academic community,64 but that should not be used to minimize the 
important contribution this type of research continues to produce. After all, landmark cases are 
particularly noteworthy for the very reason we call them “landmark” cases – they represent a 
distinct rhetorical moment in legal and public culture. One of the great benefits to emerge from 
                                                 
59 See Martin A. Bartness, “Achieving Unanimity in Brown v. Board of Education,” Journal of the 
Northwest Communication Association, 24 (Spring 1996), 49-61; James M. Jones, “From Racial Inequality 
to Social Justice: The Legacy of Brown v. Board and Lessons from South Africa,” Journal of Social Issues 
62.4 (Dec. 2006), 885-909; David B. Strother, “Polemics and the Reversal of the ‘Separate but Equal’ 
Doctrine,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 49.1 (Feb. 1963), 50-56; Susan Weill, “Conserving Racial 
Segregation in 1954: Brown v. Board of Education and the Mississippi Daily Press,” American Journalism 
16.4 (Fall 1999), 77-99; David M. Hunsaker, “The Rhetoric of Brown v. Board of Education: Paradigm for 
Contemporary Social Protest,” 43 (Winter 1978), 91-109; Clarke Rountree, ed., Brown v. Board of 
Education at Fifty: A Rhetorical Perspective (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2005). 
60 See Katie L. Gibson, “The Rhetoric of Roe v. Wade: When the (Male) Doctor Knows Best,” Southern 
Communication Journal 73.4 (Sept. 2008), 312-331; Mary Ziegler, “The Framing of a Right to Choose: 
Roe v. Wade and the Changing Debate on Abortion Law,” Law & History Review 27.2 (Summer 2009), 
281-330; Mary M. Lay, “Midwifery on Trial: Balancing Privacy Rights and Health Concerns after Roe v. 
Wade,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 89.1 (Feb. 2003), 60-77; Michael R. Hagan, “Roe v. Wade: The 
Rhetoric of Fetal Life,” Central States Speech Journal 27.3 (Fall 1976), 192-199; Edward Schiappa, 
“Analyzing Argumentative Discourse from a Rhetorical Perspective: Defining ‘Person’ and ‘Human Life’ 
in Constitutional Disputes over Abortion,” Argumentation 14.3 (Aug. 2000), 315-332. 
61 Clarke Rountree, “Instantiating ‘The Law’ and its Dissents in Korematsu v. United States: A Dramatistic 
Analysis of Judicial Discourse,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 87.1 (Feb. 2001), 1-24. 
62 Clarke Rountree, “Setting the Stage for Brown v. Board of Education: The NAACP’s Litigation 
Campaign against the “Separate but Equal” Doctrine,” in Brown v. Board of Education at Fifty: A 
Rhetorical Perspective, ed. Clarke Rountree (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2004). 
63 Clarke Rountree, Judging the Supreme Court: Constructions of Motives in Bush v. Gore (East Lansing: 
Michigan State University Press, 2007). 
64 This argument will be elaborated upon in the following chapter focused on Richard Posner’s 
jurisprudence. 
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such analyses is the ease with which they bridge the gap between rhetoric and legal studies, a 
seemingly obvious relationship yet one that had nonetheless faded away with the growing success 
of social scientific approaches to law. Within the legal community, Francis Mootz and others 
argue that there has been a growing interest in the rhetorical tradition within law schools and law 
journals.65 Although “interdisciplinary” has become an increasingly popular buzzword used by 
university administrators, one must not shrug off the strengthened ties between legal studies and 
rhetoric as a mere fad. The connection has always been there, only now is it slowly coming out of 
hiding. Scholars have also resurrected neglected or forgotten decisions in order to underscore their 
rhetorical significance and historical/cultural importance. Recent examples include Romer v. 
Evans,66 United States v. Amistad,67 Modrovich v. Allegheny Country,68 and Commonwealth v. 
                                                 
65 Mootz has made numerous contributions to this argument, most notably Francis J. Mootz III, Law, 
Hermeneutics and Rhetoric (London: Ashgate Publishing, 2010); “The Irrelevance of Contemporary 
Academic Philosophy for Law: Recovering the Rhetorical Tradition,” in On Philosophy in American 
Law, Francis J. Mootz III, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Rhetorical Knowledge 
in Legal Practice and Critical Legal Theory (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2006). See also 
Kate O’Neill, “Rhetoric Counts: What We Should Teach When We Teach Posner,” Seton Hall Law Review 
39 (2009), 507-557; Jack L. Sammons, “Reflections on Legal Writing: Legal Writing Scholarship, Making 
Strange, and the Aesthetics of Legal Rhetoric,” Mercer Law Review (Spring 2010), 925-942; Stephanie A. 
Vaughan, “Persuasion Is An Art … But It Is Also an Invaluable Tool in Advocacy.” Baylor Law Review 61 
(Spring 2009), 635-682; Kristen Konrad Robbins, "Philosophy v. Rhetoric in Legal Education: 
Understanding the Schism Between Doctrinal and Legal Writing Faculty," Journal of the Association of 
Legal Writing Directors 3 (Fall 2006), 108-128. 
66 Marouf Hasian, Jr. and Trevor Parr-Giles, “‘A Stranger to its Laws': Freedom, Civil Rights, and the 
Legal Ambiguity of Romer v. Evans,” Argumentation & Advocacy 34.1 (Summer 1997), 27-42; and Sean 
O’Rourke and Laura K. Lee Dellinger, “Romer v. Evans: The Centerpiece of the American Gay-Rights 
Debate,” in Anti-Gay Rights: Assessing Voter Initiatives, ed. Stephanie L. Witt and Suzanne McCorkle 
(Santa Barbara: Praeger, 1997), 133-140. 
67 Sean O’Rourke, “Cultivating the ‘Higher Law’ in American Jurisprudence: John Quincy Adams, Neo-
Classical Rhetoric, and the Amistad Case,” Southern Communication Journal 60 (1994), 33–43. 
68Ann Sinsheimer, “The Ten Commandments as a Secular Historic Artifact or Sacred Religious Text: 
Using Modrovich v. Allegheny Country to Illustrate How Words Create Reality,” University of Maryland 
Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender, and Class 5 (Fall 2005), 325-349. 
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Pullis.69 A smaller subset ignores judicial opinions in favor of the arguments delivered during the 
trial or the public rhetoric surrounding a particular case or person.70 
 Closely connected to yet distinct from the first category, the second area of rhetoric and 
law turns away from specific opinions and toward the individuals writing these opinions. The 
history of the Supreme Court has had many luminaries, some of whom have garnered reputations 
of mythical proportion. (Case in point: Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. was dubbed the 
“Yankee from Olympus” – only Ronald Dworkin’s fictional judge “Hercules” could compete with 
such a title.) James Aune’s work represents some of the best scholarship in this area. In addition to 
analyzing the rhetoric of historic justices such as Hugo Black71 and the aforementioned Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr.,72 Aune’s attention has also focused on contemporary judges like Richard 
Posner.73 Much like the first category, scholars are eager to focus on widely known figures, such 
as the judicial firebrand Justice Antonin Scalia,74 as well as reviving the long forgotten like Judge 
                                                 
69 Omar Swartz, “Defending Labor in Commonwealth v. Pullis: Contemporary Implications for Rethinking 
Community,” Holy Cross Journal of Law and Public Policy 8 (2004), 79-94.  
70 See, for example, Marouf Hasian, Jr. “Cultural Amnesia and Legal Rhetoric: Remember the 1862 United 
States-Dakota War and the Need for Military Commission,” American Indian Culture and Research 
Journal 27.1 (2003), 91-117; Marouf Hasian, Jr. and Lisa Flores, “Mass Mediated Representations of the 
Susan Smith Trial,” Howard Journal of Communications 11.3 (Jul-Sep. 2000), 163-178; Marouf Hasian, Jr. 
“O.J. Simpson and the Rhetoric of Law,” Review of Communication 3.1 (Jan. 2003), 60-63; Kathryn 
Palmer and Stephen E. Lucas, “On Trial: Conflicting Versions of Emma Goldman’s Address to the Jury,” 
Rhetoric & Public Affairs 11 (Spring 2008), 47-88; Angela G. Ray and Cindy Koenig Richards, “Inventing 
Citizens, Imagining Gender Justice: The Suffrage Rhetoric of Virginia and Francis Minor,” Quarterly 
Journal of Speech (2007), 375-402; and Marouf Hasian, Jr. “Canadian Civil Liberties, Holocaust Denial, 
and the Zundel Trials,” Communications & the Law 21.3 (Sep. 1999), 43-56. 
71 Martin Carcasson and James Arnt Aune, “Klansman on the Court: Justice Hugo Black’s 1937 Radio 
Address to the Nation,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 89.2 (May 2003), 154-170. 
72 James Arnt Aune, “Justice Holmes’s Rhetoric and the Progressive Path of the Law,” in Rhetoric and 
Reform in the Progressive Era: A Rhetorical History of the United States, Volume VI, ed. J. Michael Hogan 
(East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2002), 145-184.  
73 James Arnt Aune, “On the Rhetorical Criticism of Judge Posner,” Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 
23.3 (Spring 1996), 658-670. 
74 See Jeffrey M. Shaman, “Justice Scalia and the Art of Rhetoric,” Constitutional Commentary 28.2 (Fall 
2012), 287-292; and Stephen A. Newman, “Political Advocacy on the Supreme Court: The Damaging 
Rhetoric of Antonin Scalia,” New York Law School Law Review 51.4 (2006/2007), 907-926. 
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Miles Welton Lord.75 Even Judge Judy (yes, that Judge Judy) has had her day in rhetorical court.76 
Although the judicial figures addressed and rhetorical lenses utilized run the gamut, the research in 
this scholarly vein shares a similar goal: illuminating the rhetoric used by people who like to think 
of themselves as arhetorical. 
 The third area of rhetoric and law focuses less on particular legal cases and more on 
particular legal issues. This is arguably the most robust site of rhetorical scholarship as it allows 
for those less well versed in the particulars of legal argumentation to contribute to the literature. 
This comment is not a slight against those writing on legal issues without an expertise in law qua 
law. Quite the contrary, in fact - these contributions often shed light upon problems and 
possibilities a legal framework habitually neglects or (erroneously) considers irrelevant. These 
studies may be contemporary or historic, or combine the two in order to connect the rhetorical dots 
so as to arrive upon our present rhetorical situation. A survey of recent literature reveals an 
abundance of work examining the rhetoric of broad legal issues including, but certainly not limited 
                                                 
75 See Verna C. Corgan, “Controversy, Courts, and Community: The Rhetoric of Judge Miles Welton 
Lord,” Contributions in Legal Studies 79 (1995), 175-196. 
76 Christina R. Foust, “A Return to Feminine Public Virtue: Judge Judy and the Myth of the Tough 
Mother,” Women’s Studies in Communication 27.3 (Fall 2004), 269-293. 
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to, affirmative action,77 personhood,78 same-sex marriage,79 freedom of speech and the press,80 and 
judicial activism.81 Scholars often follow the pulse of the public sphere as each of these issues 
plays a prominent role in contemporary public discourse. The insights they advance are not 
necessarily the introduction of something altogether new, but rather new takes on ideas that 
continuously resurface. Take personhood, for example. Roe v. Wade highlighted the immensely 
                                                 
77 See David G. Holmes, “Affirmative Reaction: Kennedy, Nixon, King, and the Evolution of Color-Blind 
Rhetoric,” Rhetoric Review 26.1 (2007), 25-41; Christopher A. Bracey, “The Cul de Sac of Race 
Preference Discourse,” Southern California Law Review 79 (Sept. 2006), 1231-1325; Cecil J. Hunt II, “The 
Color of Perspective: Affirmative Action and the Constitutional Rhetoric of White Innocence,” Michigan 
Journal of Race & Law 11 (Spring 2006), 477-555; Marouf Hasian, Jr., “The Aesthetics of Legal Rhetoric: 
The Ambiguities of Race in Adarand v. Pena and the Beginning of the End of Affirmative Action,” 
Howard Journal of Communications (1997), 113-127; and Lolita Buckner Inniss, "A Critical Legal 
Rhetoric Approach to African-American Slave Descendants Litigation," St. John's Journal of Legal 
Commentary 24.4 (Summer 2010), 649-96. 
78 See Chris Kaposy, “Proof and Persuasion in the Philosophical Debate about Abortion,” Philosophy and 
Rhetoric 43 (2010), 139-162; Glen A. Halva-Neubauer and Sara L. Zeigler, “Promoting Fetal Personhood: 
The Rhetorical and Legislative Strategies of the Pro-Live Movement after Planned Parenthood v. Casey,” 
Feminist Formations 22 (Summer 2010), 101-123; Terri Beth Miller, “‘Reading’ the Body of Terri 
Schiavo: Inscriptions of Power in Medical and Legal Discourse,” Literature and Medicine 28 (2009), 33-
54. 
79 See Allison L. Collins, “‘I Will Not Pronounce You Husband and Husband’: Justice and the Justice of 
the Peace, ” Alabama Law Review 61 (2010), 847-867; Amy L. Brandzel, “Queering Citizenship? Same-
Sex Marriage and the State,” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 11 (2005): 171-204; Debra L. 
DeLaet and Rachel Paine Caufield, “Gay Marriage as a Religious Right: Reframing the Legal Debate Over 
Gay Marriage in the United States,” Polity 40 (2008): 297-320; Kenneth K. Hsu, “Why the Politics of 
Marriage Matter: Evaluating Legal and Strategic Approaches on Both Sides of the Debate on Same-Sex 
Marriages,” BYU Journal of Public Law 20.2 (2006), 275-312. 
80 Free speech and its related topics (e.g. free press, copyright) is almost certainly the legal issue that has 
received the most attention by rhetoric and communication scholars. It is the only specific legal issue to 
have its own dedicated division and journal (Free Speech Yearbook) within the National Communication 
Association, even though its popularity is waning. Recent contributions include Clay Calvert and Robert D. 
Richards, “Gay Pornography and the First Amendment: Unique First-Person Perspectives on Free 
Expression, Sexual Censorship, and Cultural Images.” American University Journal of Gender, Social 
Policy & the Law 15 (2007), 687-731; McLeod, Freedom of Expression; Peters, Courting the Abyss; Jack 
L. Sammons, “A Rhetorician’s View of Religious Speech in Civic Argument,” Seattle University Law 
Review 32 (Winter 2009), 367-387; Nadine Strossen, et al., “Left Out in the Cold? The Chilling of Speech, 
Association, and the Press in Post-9/11 America: A Symposium,” American University Law Review 57 
(June 2008), 1203-1271; Ronald Kahn, “The Meaning of Liberalism/Conservatism on the Mature 
Rehnquist Court: First Amendment Absolutism and a Muted Social Construction Process,” The Good 
Society 14 (2005): 50-58. 
81 See Neil S. Siegel, “Interring the Rhetoric of Judicial Activism,” DePaul Law Review (Winter 2010), 
555-599; Craig Green, "An Intellectual History of Judicial Activism," Emory Law Journal 58.5 (May 
2009): 1195-1263. 
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complicated and politically treacherous territory of defining fetal personhood in 1973. The 
prolonged legal battle surrounding Terri Schiavo that eventually ended in 2005 underscored the 
challenges posed to personhood in relation to brain function and “death with dignity.” (Belgium’s 
recent introduction of child euthanasia will likely stoke this fire.) Most recently, Citizens United 
and Hobby Lobby have reintroduced the problems and possibilities associated with corporate 
personhood, ensuring the public debate on the topic rages on for years to come. These new 
elements of a legal issue are introduced at the same time as advances in rhetorical theory and 
criticism develop new frameworks for viewing and interpreting the world.  
 The fourth dimension of the rhetoric of law attends to particular rhetorical concepts and 
traces them through anything from a single decision to the entire institution of law. Anyone with a 
passing knowledge of rhetorical terminology knows that it does not suffer from a lack of 
specificity. Rhetoricians have a name for every rhetorical trick in the book, from accumulatio to 
zeugma and everything in between. Some of this work is descriptive, pointing out the use of a 
particular device,82 whereas other scholarship uses an example in law to expand our theoretical 
understanding.83 Narrative has been especially popular given the story-telling component at the 
heart of law in addition to the emergence of the “law and literature” movement sparked by James 
Boyd White.84 
                                                 
82 See David S. Caudill, "On the Rhetorical Invention of a Failed Project: A Critical Response to Skeel's 
Assessment of Christian Legal Scholarship," Seton Hall Law Review 40. 3 (2010), 971-90; Victoria Wohl, 
“A Tragic Case of Poisoning: Intention Between Tragedy and the Law,” Transactions of the American 
Philological Association 140 (Spring 2010), 33-70. 
83 See Nancy Struever, “Rhetorical Definition: A French Initiative,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 42 (2009), 
401-423; Mitchell Gordon, “Adjusting the Rear-view Mirror: Rethinking the Use of History in Supreme 
Court Jurisprudence,” Marquette Law Review 89 (Spring 2006), 475-540; Brian Pinaire, "The Essential 
Kafka: Definition Distention, and Dilution in Legal Rhetoric" University of Louisville Law Review 46.1 
(Fall 2007), 115-156. 
84 The law and literature movement and the role that narrative plays therein will be examined in greater 
detail in the chapter on Martha Nussbaum.  
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 There exists a fifth category, however, which includes rhetoricians examining the 
rhetorical dimensions at play within jurisprudence. Some of Marouf Hasian’s work stands out as a 
good example of such scholarship. One of the precious few legal rhetoric scholars to address the 
work of the philosophers I will be analyzing throughout the coming chapters,85 Hasian has 
developed a rhetorical framework that borrows from Critical Legal Studies (CLS) and Critical 
Race Theory (CRT), projects advanced in the 1990s by Richard Delgado, Andrea Dworkin, and 
Catherine MacKinnon, to name a few. In short, Hasian’s approach peels back the veneer of the 
objectivity of law (e.g. Chief Justice Robert’s “call-them-as-they-are” umpire) in order to 
underscore the vagaries of race, class, and gender in legal theory. His book length project, Legal 
Memories and Amnesias in America’s Rhetorical Culture, expands upon the growing literature in 
collective memory scholarship and examines the rhetorical figures at play in the strategic 
forgetting that accompanies a lot of legal history, both its theory and its practice.86 He is also wont 
to analyze specific legal theories, such as the aforementioned law and economics approach, natural 
law theory,87 and even his own CLS framework and the rhetoric therein.88 Perhaps his most 
                                                 
85 See Edward M. Panetta and Marouf Hasian, Jr., “Anti-Rhetoric as Rhetoric: The Law and Economics 
Movement,” Communication Quarterly 42.1 (Winter 1994), 57-74. I will examine and build upon the 
arguments articulated in the article in the chapter on Richard Posner. 
86 Marouf Hasian, Jr. Legal Memories and Amnesias in America’s Rhetorical Culture (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 2000). See also “The Advent of Critical Memory Studies and the Future of Legal Argumentation,” 
Argumentation & Advocacy 38.1 (Summer 2001), 40-45; “The Domestication of Legal Argumentation: A 
Case Study of the Formalism of the Legal Realists,” Communication Quarterly 46.4 (Fall 1998), 430-445; 
“Remembering and Forgetting: A Postmodern Interpretation of the Origins of the ‘Right of Privacy,’” 
Journal of Communication Inquiry 19.2 (July 1995), 33-49; “Judicial Rhetoric in a Fragmentary World: 
`Character' and Storytelling in the Leo Frank Case,” Communication Monographs 64.3 (Sep. 1997), 250-
269; “Legal Argumentation in the Godwin-Malthus Debates,” Argumentation & Advocacy 37.4 (Spring 
2001), 184-97; Marouf Hasian, Jr., "Critical Memories of Crafted Virtues: The Cadbury Chocolate 
Scandals, Mediated Reputations, and Modern Globalized Slavery," Journal of Communication Inquiry 32. 
3 (July 2008): 249-270. 
87 Marouf Hasian, Jr., “Jurisprudence as Performance: John Brown's Enactment of Natural Law at Harper's 
Ferry,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 86.2 (May 2000), 190-214. 
88 Marouf Hasian, Jr. “Critical Legal Theorizing, Rhetorical Intersectionalities, and the Multiple 
Transgressions of the ‘Tragic Mullata,’ Anastasie Deserzant,” Women’s Studies in Communication 27.2 
(Summer 2004), 119-148; “Myth and Ideology in Legal Discourse: Moving from Critical Legal Studies 
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important contribution is the way in which he articulates the performativity that happens 
throughout law – from individual cases being argued by attorneys, judges, and the press to the 
broad level of legal theory. The arguments and analyses I articulate in the subsequent chapters take 
a page from Hasian’s playbook in that I similarly approach jurisprudence as a public performance. 
Where I differ, however, is by articulating and examining the “models of judgment” that serve as 
symbolic avatars for different legal theories. 
 Although Hasian is one of the most prolific scholars of legal rhetoric, he is certainly not 
the only scholar to address the rhetoric within jurisprudence. Omar Swartz has similarly turned a 
critical rhetorical eye toward legal theory in his analysis of positive law.89 This work similarly 
explores an element of performativity; namely, the use of “persona” as it was (ab)used in North 
Carolina’s slavery laws. Positive law and natural law theories are the most frequent targets of 
rhetoric scholars,90 perhaps because these do not tend to play nicely with the rhetorician’s interest 
in the contingencies of context and audience. Even law journals are beginning to pay more 
attention to the rhetoric of legal theory, although most of this work is directed at the constitutional 
jurisprudence of Supreme Court justices, thus blending with the second category discussed 
earlier.91  
                                                 
toward Rhetorical Consciousness,” Legal Studies Forum (1993-1994), 347-363; Marouf Hasian, Jr. and 
Earl Croasmun,“The Legitimizing Function of Judicial Rhetoric in the Eugenics Controversy,” 
Argumentation & Advocacy 28.3 (Winter 1992), 122-133. 
Celeste Michelle Condit, John Louis Lucaites, and Marouf Hasian, Jr., “The Rhetorical Boundaries of `the 
Law': A Consideration of the Rhetorical Culture of Legal Practice and the Case of the 'Separate But Equal' 
Doctrine,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 82.4 (Nov. 1996), 323-342. 
89 Omar Swartz, “Codifying the Law of Slavery in North Carolina: Positive Law and the Slave Persona,” 
Thurgood Marshall Law Review 285 (2003-2004), 285-310. 
90 For example, see Jeffrey J. Maciejewski, “Justice as a Nexus of Natural Law and Rhetoric,” Philosophy 
and Rhetoric 41 (2008), 72-9; Francis J. Mootz III, "Perelman's Theory of Argumentation and Natural 
Law," Philosophy and Rhetoric 43.4 (2010), 383-402 
91 For example, see Wilson Ray Huhn, “The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Sandra Day O’Connor: A 
Refusal to ‘Foreclose the Unanticipated,’” Akron Law Review 39 (2006), 373-414; Jesús Rodriguez-
Velasco, “Theorizing the Language of Law,” Diacritics 36 (Fall-Winter 2006), 64-86. 
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The preceding taxonomy does not do justice to the compelling and important work 
produced by scholars of rhetoric and law, but, then again, taxonomies are often the enemy of 
nuance. Rather than distilling their work into single categories, this overview of contemporary 
contributions to legal rhetoric is better understood as a means to situate my own work. Much like 
the aforementioned scholars, I do not believe my work can fall squarely in one category or 
another, but when push comes to shove I like to think of it as mostly concerned with the final 
category (the rhetoric of jurisprudence) approached by way of the third (the rhetorical tropes and 
figures used in law). Whereas the scholarship in this final category focuses on an entire theory, 
such as natural law, or the jurisprudence of a particular judge as deduced from opinions and 
dissents, my contribution hopes to fill a gap by tending to particular leading theorists who have 
been driving the public conversation. In doing so, I am attempting to address some important 
elements of law that have not received sufficient attention, especially considering the impact that 
public philosophers of law are trying to have through their theories. My emphasis on public 
philosophers of law is not intended to minimize the work of legal theorists writing for fellow legal 
theorists (and others “in the know”), but rather stresses the significant role that law has in shaping 
public culture.  
 
1.3 PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 
Up to this point, I have been utilizing a phrase that merit further explanation: “public philosophy.” 
Although attempts have been made to distance the philosopher from the social context wherein 
s/he is writing, practical philosophies are always wedded to their cultural and intellectual 
environments, especially when such philosophies bear on the questions of law. Discussion of 
public philosophies must inevitably engage the problems and possibilities of public sphere theory. 
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Jürgen Habermas serves as a useful starting point given the prominence of his project and the 
many responses it has elicited. Tracing the history of “publicness” from its feudal origins92 and the 
subsequent transformation initiated by “the traffic in commodities and news created by early 
capitalist long-distance trade,”93 Habermas argues that greater access to and distribution of 
political and social information by the bourgeois “reading public” cultivated an increased 
awareness of one’s place in the socio-political stratum.94 Citing the late 17th through early 18th 
centuries as the high tide of the public sphere (manifested in its purest form by the French salon), 
a key feature of Habermas’ ideal public sphere is the “public use of reason.”95 Habermas later 
summarizes what this idealized version must entail: “A domain of our social life where such a 
thing as public opinion can be formed [where] citizens… deal with matters of general interest 
without being subject to coercion… [to] express and publicize their views.”96 Alas, the existing 
public sphere is far from ideal (a fairly obvious point to which opponents of Habermas’ theory 
continually give voice). Expanding mass culture and state power, argues Habermas, have limited 
the capabilities of the public sphere, mutating it into a vulgar imitation. 
The decline of the public sphere is a common theme amongst contemporary scholars. Alan 
McKee notes five specific lines of argument that have been charged against the public sphere: 
trivialization, commercialization, spectacle, fragmentation, and apathy.97 Rhetoricians have been 
                                                 
92 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989). Habermas argues, “This publicness (or publicity) of 
representation was not constituted as a social realm, that is, as a public sphere; rather, it was something like 
a status attribute, if this term may be permitted. In itself the status of the manorial lord, on whatever level, 
was neutral in relation to the criteria of ‘public’ and ‘private’; but its incumbent represented it publicly” (7). 
93 Ibid., 15. 
94 Ibid., 23. 
95 Ibid., 32-43. 
96 Jürgen Habermas, “The Public Sphere,” in Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit, ed., Contemporary 
Political Philosophy: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 105, as cited in Alan McKee, 
The Public Sphere: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 4. 
97 Alan McKee, The Public Sphere: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
McKee defines the crux of these arguments in the following ways: 1) Trivial – “[S]ome people worry that 
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quick to take up these issues and others as they investigate this purported decline. David 
Levasseur and Diana Carlin cite a predominance of egocentric arguments as the most significant 
contributing factor to a deficient public sphere.98 Contrasting such pessimism, some rhetorical 
scholars are also quick to promote the hopeful possibilities of the public. Gerald Hauser, for 
example, acknowledges such civic potential in Vernacular Voices: The Rhetoric of Publics and 
Public Spheres and cites both the discursive shifts that have occurred and also the possibility for 
extended engagement regarding contemporary issues.99 The public may be lost, but that does not 
presuppose it cannot be found. Lying dormant in the citizenry resides neither an unwieldy 
leviathan nor a timid shrew, but rather a healthy and resilient pride. 
The discussion of public sphere scholarship thus far presumes that there is a singular 
sphere for social and political engagement, that there is the public sphere. Several scholars have 
argued, however, that there are a plurality of publics and counterpublics coming in and out of 
existence. Their arguments nonetheless rely upon similar discursive turns and argumentative 
structures, suggesting publics and counterpublics share a common rhetorical grounding. Michael 
Warner describes counterpublics as emerging in response to and often in spite of dominant publics 
                                                 
the public sphere is currently too full of trivia. Consumers, they suggest, are more interested in unimportant 
news about celebrities, diets, and sex tips than about really important, serious political issues,” (2); 2) 
Commercial – “[T]here’s a concern that the media don’t care about the quality of material in the public 
sphere. They simply want to make money, and so dumb down to the lowest common denominator,” (2); 3) 
Spectacle – “Audiences have short attention spans. They only want flashy visuals and superficial 
distractions – not serious, in-depth discussions about important issues. People do not read enough – they 
are passive couch potatoes in front of the media,” (2); 4) Fragmented – “Niche audiences and the demands 
of various identity groups are breaking up the common national cultures that we once enjoyed. We can no 
longer be confident that everybody will be interested in, and informed about, the same things,” (3); 5) 
Apathetic – “Citizens no longer want to engage with politics or their own governance. They become lazy 
and passive. They don’t care about issues any more” (3). McKee’s book is an attempt to respond to these 
five critiques and restore the public sphere, or rather the view of the public sphere, to good health. 
98 David G. Levasseur and Diana B. Carlin, “Egocentric Argument and the Public Sphere: Citizen 
Deliberations on Public Policy and Policymakers”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs 4.3 (Fall 2001), 407-431. 
99 Gerald Hauser, Vernacular Voices: The Rhetoric of Publics and Public Spheres (Columbia: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1999). 
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and are keenly aware of their own “subordinate status.”100 In attempting to “supply different ways 
of imagining stranger sociability and its reflexivity”101 they “will be transformative, not replicative 
merely.”102 Contrasting Nancy Fraser’s “subaltern counterpublics,”103 Warner’s counterpublic 
“enables a horizon of opinion and exchange; its exchanges remain distinct from authority and can 
have a critical relation to power; its extent is in principle indefinite, because it is not based on a 
precise demography but mediated by print, theater, diffuse networks of talk, commerce, and the 
like.”104  
If taken at face value, the opinions and exchanges within counterpublics are seemingly 
incompatible with conscientious, democratic discussion across such a vast political landscape. 
Yet, publics and counterpublics share a common and vital component in their origins: they are 
rhetorically created and maintained. Warner aptly describes the process: 
There is no speech or performance addressed to a public that does not try to specify in 
advance, in countless highly condensed ways, the lifeworld of its circulation: not just 
through its discursive claims – of the kind that can be said to be oriented to understanding 
– but through the pragmatics of its speech genres, idioms, stylistic markers, address, 
temporality, mise-en-scène, citational field, interlocutory protocols, lexicon, and so on. Its 
circulatory fate is the realization of that world. Public discourse says not only “Let the 
public exist” but “Let it have this character, speak this way, see the world in this way.” It 
then goes in search of confirmation that such a public exists, with greater or lesser success 
                                                 
100 Michael Warner, Publics and Counterpublics (New York: Zone Books, 2005), 119. 
101 Ibid., 121-2. 
102 Ibid., 122. 
103 Ibid., 118-9. See Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of 
Actually Existing Democracy,” in Craig Calhoun, ed., Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1992), 109-142. 
104 Ibid., 56-7. 
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– success being further attempts to cite, circulate, and realize the world understanding it 
articulates. Run it up the flagpole and see who salutes. Put on a show and see who shows 
up.105 
Echoing Hannah Arendt’s notion of the public as a world-making endeavor,106 Warner captures 
the truly rhetorical process of making and remaking a public. It is this notion of discursive world 
making that my project seeks to illumine, albeit oriented toward the legal aspects and implications. 
Each of the public philosophers and their philosophies attempt to create a rhetorical world they 
wish others to enter. Their endeavors, however, are not done in solitude. A counterpublic approach 
is one way of framing some of the issues and complexities that go on in a pluralistic culture. By 
acknowledging the rhetorical constitution of both publics and counterpublics, one must also 
acknowledge a point at which the public is a rhetorical space with various aspects that are up for 
grabs.  
Acknowledging, implicitly or explicitly, that they cannot simply rely on expertise alone, 
public philosophies are inevitably altered when they enter the public discourse. “Once the public 
sphere is entered,” argues G. Thomas Goodnight, “the private and technical dimensions of [a] 
disagreement become relevant only insofar as they are made congruent with the practices of public 
forums.”107 Law may be a technical discourse, but it faces resistance when the technical becomes 
imbued with the philosophical and enters a changing, contingent public discussion. Public 
philosophers are entering ongoing conversations not only with the past, but also reflect on the 
present, hoping to direct others toward a particular future. Highlighting the rhetorical function of 
                                                 
105 Ibid., 114. 
106 See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958). 
107 G. Thomas Goodnight, “The Personal, Technical, and Public Spheres of Argument: A Speculative 
Inquiry into the Art of Public Deliberation,” in Contemporary Rhetorical Theory: A Reader, ed. John Luis 
Lucaites, Celeste Michelle Condit, and Sally Caudill (New York: Guilford Press, 1999), 255. 
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public-making, Michael Calvin McGee argues that “the people” are created in a speech act: 
“When ‘one man stands up as the proclaimer of a general will,’ what he says, at the time he 
originally says it, is a fiction, for it is his personal interpretation of his ‘people’s’ history. Though 
he warrants his argument with abundant examples, he creates, not a description of reality, but 
rather a political myth.”108 By first articulating and then legislating a moral perspective, a 
document like the U.S. Constitution creates a distinct “people.” Thus, the idea of a public sphere 
wherein a public intellectual advocates for a particular public philosophy must acknowledge the 
important of place law as a tool for creating and recreating a public. 
The rhetorical dimensions of public sphere theory illuminate the distinction between, on 
the one hand, academic philosophies that address questions pertaining to the public and its 
characteristics and problems, and, on the other hand, the discourses of public intellectual work that 
move within broader, non-academic publics and provides, following Isocrates, philosophical 
“equipment for civic life.” 109 Interestingly, some of the most interesting writers on the public 
philosophy of law resist disciplinary containment. The three figures I will be examining qualify as 
members in good standing of the first category; but they all cross the disciplinary lines that 
separate philosophy from other fields, and all have readership and followings inside and outside 
the academy. And, significantly, each aspires to influence public understanding and discourse 
                                                 
108 Michael Calvin McGee, “In Search of ‘the People’: A Rhetorical Alternative,” in Contemporary 
Rhetorical Theory: A Reader, ed. John Luis Lucaites, Celeste Michelle Condit, and Sally Caudill (New 
York: Guilford Press, 1999), 344. 
109 Takis Poulakos, “Isocrates’ Civic Education and the Question of Doxa,” in Isocrates and Civic 
Education, ed. Takis Poulakos and David Depew (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), 45. One may 
be reminded of Kenneth Burke’s description of literary works and rhetoric as “equipment for living,” which 
parallels the philosophia of Isocrates. See The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action. 2d 
ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967) and Attitudes Toward History. 3d ed. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984). 
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about what law is and what law should be, which then influences how the public comes to 
understand it. 
There has been a burgeoning academic interest regarding public philosophy, and in this 
literature one finds an assortment of definitions, orientations, and aspirations. Drawing from 
traditional philosophical areas, including ethics, political philosophy, jurisprudence, and 
epistemology, as well as from the fields of sociology, economics, history, medicine, political 
science, cultural studies, literature, and, of course, rhetoric, the expanse of public philosophy 
continues to swell. Although the thrust of this project is primarily concerned with public 
philosophers’ relationship with rhetoric and law, other contributions and movements are important 
in understanding the various philosophers and philosophies. Importantly, the idea of a public 
philosophy is rhetorically expanded and contracted by public intellectuals in response to their 
respective exigencies. For example, my analysis will begin with Richard Posner and his creation 
of and contributions to law and economics. Why? Because the law and economics “movement” 
has been one of the most powerful forces in contemporary legal theory. It is taught in virtually 
every law school across the nation unlike, say, law and literature or critical legal studies. As such, 
other scholars tend to situate their work in relation to Posner’s in order to illustrate the 
inadequacies of law and economics while simultaneously proposing their own approach as 
superior. Moreover, the economization of non-economic discourses can be seen across virtually 
every discipline. 
The public intellectual has a social and rhetorical obligation to his or her community, an 
obligation that encourages thoughtful reflection on public affairs, insightful commentary on social 
problems, and the ability to guide one’s fellow citizens rather than retreating to the Ivory Tower 
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and chastising the public for their stupidity without seeking to effect change.110 There is an 
assumed obligation for the scholar to reflect upon, contribute to, and often criticize issues and 
ideas that impact the citizenry, especially when one’s research interests are concerned with social 
issues. Their contributions, however, must not be totalizing; instead, following McGee and Lyne, 
they must both express and cultivate phronésis, which is “more respectful of faith and power than 
episteme, more stable and reliable than doxa.”111 
The role of a public intellectual is, at its very core, a highly rhetorical endeavor. 
Addressing the rhetorical disposition necessary for the public intellectual, Nathan Crick astutely 
argues for a well balanced blend of techné, episteme, and praxis as a way to “move beyond the 
form/content distinction that continues to separate theory from practice, thought from action, 
intelligence from passion, and philosophy from rhetoric.”112 He continues,  
This redefinition neither collapses the important distinctions between the varied 
disciplines, nor claims that there is no difference between those who publish in obscure 
academic journals and those who actively engage public audiences. Rather, it rejects the 
notion that directly engaging in public audiences is what makes one a public intellectual. It 
forces us to consider that while intellectual work may be intellectual, it is nonetheless work 
– it is an effort to change the world through the transformative power of ideas.113 
Although I am not prepared to disregard the relationship between the public intellectual and the 
public, I recognize Crick’s important argument regarding the material production of the public 
intellectual. One need not be working the beat or hitting the streets to be an effective and 
                                                 
110 For an extensive treatment of Dewey’s public philosophy, see Alan Ryan, John Dewey and the High 
Tide of American Liberalism (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1997). 
111 McGee and Lyne, 395. 
112 Nathan Crick, “Rhetoric, Philosophy, and the Public Intellectual,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 39.2 (2006), 
127. 
113 Ibid., 127. 
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influential public intellectual; philosophical impact can come from anywhere. I do argue, however, 
that public intellectuals are to a large extent tethered to their nuanced contextual situations and, as 
a result, often speak to/on the prevailing ideas of the time with particular audiences in mind.  
 For those whom I am characterizing as public philosophers of law, discursive shifts must 
address the present moment, while still connecting it to such historically elaborated concepts as 
dignity, personhood, equality, liberty, autonomy, and the limits of reason. And here it is important 
to note that concepts such as these have ideological and political, as well as philosophical, 
histories.114 Public philosophers of law seek to persuade with limited resources and amidst 
competing rhetorics. They must be able to translate their ideas such that particular audiences can 
follow without feeling alienated or patronized. Given their various juridical perspectives, 
disciplinary loyalties, and intellectual heritages, the way in which they conceive of themselves as 
public philosophers of law will likely bear on the rhetorical strategies they employ and the various 
audiences they are attempting to influence.  
 Important to note, the most interesting thing I came to realize is that these theories are not 
separate from the rhetorical choices made by their respective authors. Legal theorists must make 
rhetorical choices about how they structure their arguments, just as anyone making any argument 
must. As I will argue throughout the rest of this dissertation, the most important rhetorical turns 
are part and parcel with their ideas. To remove these appeals is to alter their theories. Rhetoric is 
not just the medium, but also an important part of the substance of their ideas. In particular, 
prolific authors tend to congeal around a particular set of rhetorical faculties and figures. As a 
result, they articulate different models of legal reasoning that rhetorically shape and reshape 
                                                 
114 Michael Calvin McGee’s germane work on the “ideograph” highlights the rhetorical connections of such 
broad, yet potent terminology. See Michael Calvin McGee, “The ‘Ideograph’: A Link Between Rhetoric 
and Ideology,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 66.1 (Feb. 1980): 1-16. 
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judgment. These models may come from an array of sources, but I am most interested in those 
produced by contemporary public philosophers of law – namely, Richard Posner, Martha 
Nussbaum, and Cass Sunstein. Ultimately, I hope to offer a compelling and useful way to 
approach and analyze legal theory through a rhetorical lens. Much has been written on the 
relationship between rhetoric and law given their longstanding and intimate connection, yet the 
vast majority of this work overlooks the philosophy of law and the rhetoric therein.  
 
1.4 PREVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
As I will argue, each of the public philosophers of law I address must negotiate a range of issues 
that are at play when constructing a legal theory, especially one intended both for professional and 
lay audiences. Richard Posner’s economic model of judgment, for example, treats the context of 
law quite differently than does Martha Nussbaum’s literary approach. Similarly, Cass Sunstein’s 
deliberative model utilizes the same legal resources as the other two, but the rhetorical resources 
and framing techniques they use differ greatly. But this is true of every philosopher of law, so 
what makes these theorists different or worthy of special attention? One reason is that they often 
write for and speak to the general public. True, they are all well published in academic journals, 
but these works rarely get exposure beyond a select group of learned scholars. These three 
scholars strive to go beyond nuanced journals and esoteric arguments in order to influence 
individuals beyond academia. Cass Sunstein’s popular books are often short, clearly written, and 
tap into current popular public interests, such as the Internet and the “blogosphere.” Until recently, 
he was also a member of the Obama administration, which means the force of his ideas and 
arguments had a more immediate impact than the vast majority of his peers. Richard Posner and 
Martha Nussbaum are both tapped for public interviews quite often and both are regularly listed in 
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the top 100 public intellectuals. Until Gary Becker’s passing, Posner regularly contributed to a 
popular blog, “The Becker-Posner Blog.” Although she does not host a blog, Nussbaum remains 
active in public deliberations. Like Sunstein, she writes books intended for popular audiences that 
are often distillations of her more nuanced philosophical arguments.115 Nussbaum was also a 
research advisor for the World Institute for Development Economics Research in Helsinki, playing 
an important role in countries such as India. More importantly, these three want to inform and 
influence public deliberation. The random person on the street may not know their names, but that 
is not due to a lack of effort on the scholars’ parts.  
 These three are notably active in the public sphere, but they go beyond mere participation 
in their attempts to project an embodied idea(l) of judgment. This is the distinctive rhetorical 
process that will be the main focus of my argument. Each of these theorists rhetorically frame 
what constitutes good judgment. What differentiates them, and what gives each approach a 
distinctive rhetorical force, are their respective attempts to invoke and rhetorically embody a 
model judge. These public philosophers of law are attempting to convey to a general audience 
what it means to have sound legal judgment and what resources such judgment requires; and 
toward that end they help us imagine not just rules and other legal considerations, but the kind of 
person rendering judgment. The ideal of good judgment becomes in that sense an embodied one, 
such that precedents, principles, considerations of context, and so on, converge in the judging 
intelligence. As Seneca sought to personify judgment in the form of the wise Stoic judge, so too 
these philosophers have turned to conceptions of what the good judge might be. As we will see, 
these rhetorical models may be looking at the same processes, yet reaching very different 
                                                 
115 Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities, for example, distills many arguments found in 
the longer and more complex Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education, 
and Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach does something quite similar to Woman 
and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach and Sex and Social Justice. 
 
 - 53 - 
conclusions. By training our attention to how the exercise of legal judgment is envisioned, we are 
better able to see how different public philosophers of law are able to construct competing models 
of legal judgment and the rhetorical faculties they ascribe to their respective avatars.  
 Given Richard Posner’s dominating presence in legal studies since the 1970s and the fact 
that subsequent scholars have had to respond to his work, either directly or indirectly, my analysis 
will begin with his model: the economic judge. Posner’s most significant contribution to 
jurisprudence has been under the auspices of the “science” of economics as he promotes “wealth 
maximization” as the most viable rubric for understanding how legal decisions ought to be made. 
As a theorist who also works in the day-to-day world of law as a judge in the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Posner wants to advance the clearest and most efficient process 
for deciding cases. If the economic model can be more fully understood, legal reasoning will be 
more stable and, following his jurisprudential hero Holmes, more people will be able to know how 
judges will (and ought) to decide cases.  
There is much rhetorical work needed to make his position viable, which he has been 
developing through voluminous writing and through others by proxy (he’s the most cited 
contemporary legal philosopher). In order to make headway, Posner relies on “pragmatism” to do 
some of the heavy lifting. But this isn’t your grandfather’s pragmatism. Posner goes to great 
lengths to distance himself from his philosophical forefathers (Holmes aside) and position his 
perspective as “everyday” pragmatism, which is primarily passionate about the practical. He 
stresses facts and consequences, which offer what he describes as an “unillusioned” view of 
human nature. In the public sphere, his bare-bones pragmatism can get traction with his American 
audience given the long history of pragmatic thought defining the intellectual landscape (whether 
explicitly or implicitly).  
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With a judicial interpretation of economics and his everyday pragmatism in tow, Posner’s 
economic judge is invested with a number of rhetorical faculties that set him apart from competing 
models. Drawing from Posner’s considerable scholarship, I contend that the defining 
characteristics of this judge are a sense of economic objectivity, the ability to find balance 
amongst competing legal interests, and common sense adjudication. These rhetorical faculties 
work in concert with traditional legal resources such as statutes and precedent as the economic 
judge strives for wealth maximization. A significant aspect of the economic judge’s rhetorical 
allure is his ability to make economic adjudication seem natural and feel inevitable. Through his 
public scholarship, including general-audience books, public lectures, and other various 
engagements with the public, Posner attempts to convince everyone from legal practitioners to the 
lay public that his model of judgment is not only superior, but what good judgment is supposed to 
be. After all, who doesn’t value the kind of objectivity that science has to offer? Who doesn’t want 
a judge to issue well-balanced decisions? And who is going to be against common sense? Posner 
weaves these rhetorical appeals throughout his vast work as he describes what constitutes good 
judgment and how the economic judge succeeds where others fail. Yet, as I will argue, each of 
these rhetorical faculties is refracted through an economic discourse that ultimately ignores 
important elements of law and adjudication. Posner advances a particular kind of objectivity, 
balance, and common sense that are predisposed toward economic judgment. 
 Set in stark contrast to Posner’s economic judge, Martha Nussbaum advances the literary 
judge. As a way of seeing the world and the resources it offers for legal judgment, the economic 
judge neglects the fragility of human experience that Nussbaum finds essential to eudaimonia – 
the flourishing life. It is this life that law must understand, defend, and actively cultivate. Law’s 
priority is not about the standards of judgment, as with the economic judge, but rather the 
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outcomes of judgment. Nussbaum’s conceptions of law and justice are deep and broad. Unlike 
many of her contemporaries, she will eagerly draw ideas from Cicero and Rawls in the same 
breath, or apply Aristotelian virtues as they pertain to modern legal quandaries. The sweeping 
nature of her writing certainly has disadvantages when it comes to public reception, but her 
expansive interests also allow her to notice consistent gaps in intellectual history – in particular, 
the relationship between capabilities and disabilities. Critiquing Rawls’ contractarian approach (as 
well as his predecessors - Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau), Nussbaum asks, “Who decides the 
standards of justice? Who participates in the construction of law?” As it turns out, most 
philosophies start with a preconceived notion of normalcy that excludes issues pertaining to 
women, the LGBTQ community, those with disabilities, and just about every other group that is 
marginalized based on their difference (which are, as a result, used to mark them “abnormal”).  
 The literary judge gives voice to the voiceless. Instead of speaking for others, she is 
dedicated to providing the means by which others can speak for themselves. Viewing law as a 
corrective and progressive force in society, the literary judge has a duty to ensure citizens are able 
to cultivate robust, value-laden lives - especially the traditionally marginalized and 
disenfranchised. Whereas Posner’s economic judge relies on the rhetorical strategies of balance, 
Nussbaum’s literary judge invests in the power of a literary imagination and its ability to refine 
rhetorical invention. Whereas the economic judge has an economically imbued common sense, the 
literary judge has an attuned emotional intelligence that can navigate through perils of 
unintelligent emotions like shame and disgust in order to arrive upon compassionate judgment. 
Whereas the economic judge seeks wealth maximization, the literary judge utilizes the constitutive 
power of law to advance human capabilities. As Nussbaum describes them, these resources of 
legal judgment provide a textured response to the social and cultural realities at play. This 
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demands a sensitivity to the lived reality of others. One turns to great literature and drama, as well 
as to philosophical traditions to develop the requisite sensitivities. Affirming social justice does 
not equate with ratifying what a majority of citizens may think is just; rather, it requires an active 
engagement with prevailing social practices in order to detect blind spots caused by ungrounded 
emotions, prejudices, and the unawareness of the lives of those different from us. All of this is not 
to say that the literary judge lacks standards just as the economic judge is not entirely blind to 
outcomes. The ultimate goal of judgment, however, is not standardized uniformity but an 
aspirational telos that demands that all citizens have the means to cultivate their capabilities in 
order to live a flourishing life.  
Rounding out the trio of contemporary public philosophers of law is Cass Sunstein and his 
avatar: the deliberative judge. Unlike the contrast between Posner’s economic judge and 
Nussbaum’s literary judge, Sunstein’s deliberative judge is not markedly in conflict with the other 
two. In fact, the ideal deliberative judge forges many of the same rhetorical alignments, including 
the economic judge’s application of cost-benefit analysis to Constitutional law, and the literary 
judge’s insistence on inventive imagination. Yet, the deliberative judge is wary of any single 
perspective dominating the decision-making process, because civic discourse embraces many 
perspectives. Based on Sunstein’s extensive writings, I contend that the defining features of this 
judge are public engagement, open deliberation, and a keenly attuned sense of kairos.  
In line with the sensibility of civic attentiveness, the deliberative judge must also consider 
the impact of his or her decisions and the ways in which they can shape public discourse. In this 
model, the judge’s role is not just to be a spectator of public discourse; rather, there is some 
responsibility to think proactively about how decisions might affect that discourse, and to render 
judgments with that in mind. At his or her best, the deliberative judge knows when to nudge. 
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Accordingly, there is a timeliness to court decisions, and a corresponding sense of the appropriate 
that reflects the realities of the surrounding socio-political climate. On this model, good decisions 
are not good simply because they were arrived upon through open deliberation. They are not good 
because they follow an algorithm for “wealth maximization,” nor because they cultivate the 
flourishing life. Good decisions consider these elements, to be sure; but – more importantly – good 
decisions arrive at just the right time and adjudicate in a way that fits the particular discursive 
environment so as to take steps, not leaps, forward.  
A good is useless if it cannot be put into practice, a point of agreement between Posner, 
Nussbaum, and Sunstein. Their agreement, however, is short lived. As an appendix illustrates, the 
rhetorical faculties of each judge draw forth different elements from a given situation. The 
economic judge views a case through the lens of wealth maximization, seeks balance amidst 
competing legal interests, and utilizes a common sense notion of economic adjudication. 
Antagonistic to the economic judge, the literary judge finds the translation of incommensurable 
ideas a dangerous practice. Instead, the literary judge draw upon her literary imagination to refine 
the process of rhetorical invention by offering an opportunity to experience the “other.” A literary 
attitude also expands the literary judge’s capacity for emotional sensitivity and works toward 
minimizing the influence of anti-rhetorical emotions, a central concern for the literary judge but of 
little interest to her economically minded counterpart. The deliberative judge acknowledge the 
benefits to be gained from open deliberation and frank engagement with their peers. The 
deliberative judge attempts to negotiate the interests of the state, which invokes a form of the 
precautionary principle, and the interests of the citizenry, who deserve to be informed. 
Although each chapter offers various examples illustrating how the model judges approach 
and decide cases, there is little overlap in the cases addressed by the aforementioned philosophers 
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of law save a handful of landmark decisions. Given their different orientations to law, each scholar 
focuses on different types of cases in order to frame their respective positions in the best light. In 
order to avoid imbalanced attention in their scholarship and yet another analysis of Brown v. 
Board or Roe v. Wade or Citizen’s United, an appendix will apply the different models of 
judgment to a fictitious, yet not unlikely case: Concerned Citizens v. NSA. As the American public 
grows increasingly concerned over the ongoing wiretapping and data mining by the National 
Security Association, a three-member federal court agrees to a hear the case. Composing the 
panel, the economic judge, the literary judge, and the deliberative judge must decide whether or 
not the expansive NSA wiretapping unveiled in 2013 violates the Fourth or Fifth Amendments. 
The judges draw from the same legal resources – the amendments, legal precedent, statutes like 
the Patriot Act, the checks and balances outlined in the Constitution – but their rhetorical faculties 
bring forth markedly different concerns, arguments, and conclusions.  
 Overall, this project does not seek to advocate a particular philosophical worldview, even 
though I may be partial to certain interpretations of the Constitution and the legal philosophies 
underlying such arguments. Rather, my goal is to develop the idea of models of judgment as a 
useful and insightful lens that allows legal philosophers, rhetorical theorists and critics, and the lay 
public a robust, nuanced way in which to engage jurisprudence. The United States is in many 
ways a legal culture, but one that does not have any single, guiding philosophy. Law is an 
important way in which the public and philosophers engage one another. Complex legal cases 
beget complex philosophical problems, which affect and are affected by public discourse. The 
public philosophers addressed in this work offer distinct argumentative discourses that help to 
shape how a public views itself in relation to law; but to detach them from one another ignores the 
many ways in which they interact. By addressing the ways in which these philosophers use 
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rhetorical strategies to situate and promote their philosophies, specifically the ways in which they 
establish rhetorical capacities embodied by model judges that direct attention one way rather than 
other, such interactions become clearer and more salient. 
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2.0 RICHARD POSNER AND THE ECONOMIC JUDGE 
 
“Science is the great antidote to the poison of enthusiasm and superstition.” 
 
-Adam Smith, A Wealth of Nations 
 
 
In 1961 Guido Calebrisi and Ronald Coase published two articles that would reshape the 
landscape of American jurisprudence. Both Calebrisi’s “Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution 
and the Law of Torts”1 and Coase’s “The Problem of Social Cost”2 introduced an intimate 
relationship between law and economics, suggesting the latter as the most useful and efficient 
means by which to analyze the former.3 Their seminal work, however, failed to catch the 
attention of the legal academy writ large. With the 1973 publication of Economic Analysis of 
Law, Richard Posner succeeded where they had not as he brought law and economics to the 
forefront of legal theory and legal education.4 Emerging out of the highly influential “Chicago 
School,” Posner’s casebook, now in its eighth edition, is mainstay in law schools across the 
country, educating future lawyers and judges in the ways of economic adjudication for over 40 
years. Drawing insights from sources old and new, including classic economists such as Adam 
Smith as well as fellow Chicago School economist Gary Becker’s Nobel Prize winning 
application of economics to non-market behavior,5 Posner’s sweeping work covers everything 
                                                 
1 Guido Calebresi, “Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution on the Law of Torts,” Yale Law Journal 70 
(1961), 499-553. 
2 Ronald Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics 3 (1961), 1-44. 
3 Although Calabresi and Coase are often cited as the earliest advocates for law and economics, 
prototypical arguments can be traced as far back as John R. Commons’ 1924 publication Legal 
Foundations of Capitalism (New York: MacMillan, 1924) and Robert Hale’s Freedom Through Law: 
Public Control of Private Governing Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952). 
4 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little Brown, 1973). 
5 See, for example, Gary S. Becker, The Economics of Discrimination (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1957); Gary S. Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special 
Reference to Education (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); Gary S. Becker, “A Theory of the 
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from eminent domain to traffic congestion to surrogate motherhood to pay television. Rather 
than limit the economic analysis of law to traditionally economic issues (market regulation, for 
example), Posner argues that the entirety of law can be viewed, analyzed, and assessed through 
an economic lens.  
Since the law and economics movement began, Posner has been the leading figure in the 
burgeoning field, authoring dozens of books, hundreds of articles, and thousands of cases. In 
keeping with the common law tradition of his hero, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Posner’s 
blend of neo-classical economics and “everyday” pragmatism eschews traditional theories of 
judgment in favor of a practical approach that values “efficiency” and “wealth maximization.” 
Along with the great success Posner and the law and economics movement enjoys, he has also 
garnered significant criticism. Liberals question the value of wealth and efficiency as the guiding 
principles of law,6 radicals challenge the strength of neo-classical economics on which the law 
and economics approach is built,7 communitarians worry about the disruption that incentivizing 
individualism and consumption to the detriment of society writ large,8 and legal realists remain 
skeptical of the reality of his claims.9  
Despite the criticisms, Posner’s influence has been far-reaching (according to the Journal 
of Legal Studies, he is the most cited legal theorist ever10). For Posner and his fellow law and 
economics advocates, the tools of economics prove invaluable for a judge. With proven methods 
                                                 
Allocation of Time,” Economic Journal 75 (1965), 493-517; Gary S. Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An 
Economic Approach,” The Journal of Political Economy 76 (1965), 169-217; and Gary S. Becker, The 
Economic Approach to Human Behavior (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976). 
6 Ronald Dworkin, “Is Wealth a Value?,” Journal of Legal Studies 9.2 (Mar. 1980), 191-226. See also 
Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986). 
7 Mark Kelman, “Legal Economists and Normative Social Theory,” from A Guide to Critical Legal 
Studies (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 114-150. 
8 Steven Kelman, “Ethical Theory and the Case for Concern about Charges,” from What Price Incentives? 
Economists and the Environment (Boston: Auburn House, 1981), 27-91. 
9 Arthur Alan Leff, “Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism about Some Nominalism,” Virginia Law 
Review 60 (1974), 451-482. 
10 Fred R. Shapiro, “The Most-Cited Legal Scholars,” Journal of Legal Studies 29.1 (2000), 409-426. 
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such as the Pareto Criteria and Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency, judges would have an easier time 
issuing better judgments if they follow the guidelines set out by economics. In addition to the 
legal and economic resources available, Posner also utilizes an array of rhetorical appeals that 
give character to his judicial approach. I believe that in order to understand how Posner’s 
economic analysis of law conceives of judgment is to advance the notion of the “economic 
judge.”  
Dedicated to economic objectivity, balance, and common sense adjudication, the 
economic judge draws inspiration from the growing expanse of economic theory as the most 
efficient and effective way to render good legal judgment. Working toward “wealth 
maximization,” the economic judge clothes his arguments in the science of economics to make 
his arguments appear natural and inevitable. In constructing an economic model of adjudication, 
Posner attempts to elevate the prestige of law and economics by making it appear anti-rhetorical 
(or, at the very least arhetorical). Building on Edward Panetta and Marouf Hasian’s adept study 
of Posner’s jurisprudence, I argue that even though Posner has a more nuanced notion of rhetoric 
than they suggest, he nonetheless clothes his arguments in the “scientific” discourse of 
economics. In order to do so, the economic judge translates the complicated discourse of law into 
economic formulae, which serves two key rhetorical purposes: 1) gaining credibility by making 
subjective choices as to which elements of law translate into economic formulae appear to be 
objective; and 2) eschewing responsibility for decisions by deferring to an economic process, in 
effect claiming “my hands are tied” by the process.  
The second section articulates the ways in which economic judgment is promoted as a 
balance between seemingly dichotomous legal problems. Focusing on three important legal 
binaries that Posner addresses throughout his work – legality and morality, theory and practice, 
and past and future orientations – the economic judge is positioned as a necessary fulcrum that 
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takes the useful elements of each while abandoning that which is deemed useless, misguided, or 
harmful. Posner strategically places the economic model of judgment as distinct from but 
nonetheless related to an array of legal theories. Much like his more general “everyday” 
pragmatism, Posner’s rhetorical savvy emerges as he characterizes competing arguments by 
positing them as extreme binaries to which he offers a balanced middle way.  
Third, as he frames his theoretical appeals as pragmatic and economic, Posner positions 
his project as the most reasonable, the most useful, and the most efficient approach to law. In 
order to do so, Posner articulates a connection between economics and common sense, 
suggesting the former is simply a codified version of the latter. Good judgment requires common 
sense, which is economic judgment by his definition. In addition, Posner is able to counter 
arguments that admonish common sense for being anti-scientific or hegemonic by drawing on 
the quasi-scientific ethos that comes with economics.  
The economic judge wields common sense in an interesting way. In addition to 
adjudicating cases with it, common sense is also used to defend economic judgment from 
criticism. His economically imbued notion of jurisprudence allows him to “call down” 
academics for their abstract and impractical ideas about legal judgment. Common sense is used 
to admonish abstract legal theory, particularly those that differ from and disagree with the 
economic model of judgment. At the same time he “calls down” academics, he also uses 
common sense to “call up” the general public. Legal common sense comes after years of proper 
training and experience. When the public gets upset with a decision, especially one issued by the 
economic judge, they lack the common sense necessary to understand the decision as it functions 
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in the legal world. Whereas academics are called down with appeals to common sense because of 
their hubris, the public is called up with common sense because of their obtuseness.11 
 My turn toward the embodied ideal of economic judgment is certainly not unique, as the 
“rational man” worldview has played a pivotal role in economic analysis, utilized by advocates 
and detractors alike. Specific attention has also been paid to Posner’s contributions, which 
Arthur Allen Leff likened to a “picaresque novel” like Tom Jones or Don Quixote. “Richard 
Posner’s hero is also eponymous,” claims Leff.  
He is Economic Analysis. In the book we watch him ride out into the world of law, 
encountering one after another almost all of the ambiguous villains of legal thought from 
the fire-spewing choo-choo dragon to the multi-headed ogre who imprisons fair 
Efficiency in his castle keep for stupid and selfish reasons. In each case economic (I 
suppose we can be so familiar) brings to bear his single-minded self, and the Evil Ones 
(who like most in the literature are in reality mere chimeras of some mad or wrong-
headed magician) dissolve, one after another.12  
Yet, precious little attention has been given to the rhetorical elements of his jurisprudence. 
Given the success of the law and economics movement in and Richard Posner specifically, the 





                                                 
11 I must give due credit to John Lyne for the idea that common sense can be used to “call up” and “call 
down,” which emerged from our many conversations. Lyne’s approach, however, stresses the tone of the 
speaker, asking how the voice is used differently when calling up or down. My approach differs in that I 
am interested in rhetorical position, instead asking how the rhetor crafts a particular niche that allows 
them to call up or call down groups. 
12 Arthur Allen Leff, 452. 
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2.1  THE RHETORICAL POWER OF ECONOMIC OBJECTIVITY  
Unlike the vast majority of his contemporaries, Richard Posner specifically addresses the idea of 
rhetoric and its role in judgment. In a generous reading of his work, the economic judge 
negotiates between the greatest hopes of rhetoric, including conscientious deliberation, honest 
persuasion, and mutual understanding, and the greatest fears of rhetoric, including manipulation, 
deceit, and the perversion of truth. In a less generous reading, the economic judge is – for lack of 
a better term – slippery. Posner is quick to disparage rhetoric and rhetorical scholarship, but then 
considers himself and other similarly minded judges sympathetic to rhetoric. He readily 
describes the “mereness” of rhetoric and brushes it aside in favor of economic logic, but then 
praises the force with which it can crystallize and reinforce an idea. He often adopts Plato’s 
arguments against rhetoric, but then defends the sophists and Aristotle. In short, he 
acknowledges the prevalence of rhetoric and positions the economic lens as capable of reflecting 
away bad rhetoric and focusing the power of good rhetoric. 
 Panetta and Hasian argue that this is indicative of the “economic man’s” anti-rhetorical 
posture, an effective rhetorical turn in the legal and public spheres alike. Their argument is apt 
but incomplete. Since the 1994 publication of their article, Posner has published an array of 
articles and chapters that carve out a space for judicial rhetoric, even in economic judgment. The 
economic judge is undoubtedly rhetorical, but a conception of rhetoric that is limited to Posner’s 
narrow definition. Whereas numerous rhetorical scholars articulate the role that rhetoric plays 
throughout the entire process of judgment (including the idea of judgment itself), Posner limits 
the scope of good, useful rhetoric to composition and its criticism. Economics is the method of 
judgment. Rhetoric is employed afterward as a way to increase its impact. In doing so, Posner 
ignores the various ways in which the economic judge makes rhetorical choices at the outset of 
judgment, even before a specific case crosses the bench.  
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 In Overcoming Law, Posner dedicates an entire chapter to rhetoric and its implications 
with and impact on legal reasoning. Characterizing contemporary rhetorical scholarship as “of 
limited variety and low average quality compared to the literature of its traditional rival, 
philosophy,”13 Posner claims that little progress has been made since Aristotle’s Rhetoric. If he 
were to tell the tale, rhetoric started with the sophists, met its greatest challenger in Plato, and 
was reconciled by Aristotle. Subsequent years have been filled with quibbles about Ancient 
Greek arguments or, worse yet, pretentious deviations.14  
 His trivialization of contemporary rhetoric and rhetorical scholarship is by no means 
limited to Overcoming Law. In Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy, Posner associates rhetoric 
with “highfalutin” language, implicitly arguing it is empty and caters to the whimsy of an 
audience.15 In the same work he notes rhetoric as deception,16 unnecessarily flowery,17 inflated,18 
and nonsubstantive sugarcoating.19 Stressing his pragmatically minded economic interpretation 
of law, Posner offers a glimmer of hope by hinting at an appreciation for rhetorical 
perspectivism. He claims that formalism and pragmatism have their own rhetorics, which is more 
balanced than blanket statements castigating rhetoric writ large.20 However, he is quick to label 
                                                 
13 Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 499. To support his 
argument, he offers his reader little more than his word, which, given the target audience, most readers 
are willing to accept and move on. Granted, I have a vested interest in rhetoric, especially the various 
twists and turns it has taken in the 20th century, but to suggest that no substantial contributions have been 
made since Aristotle illustrates either Posner’s naïveté or his ineptitude. Nowhere does he cite Kenneth 
Burke and dramatism; nowhere does he cite Michael Calvin McGee and the ideograph; nowhere does he 
cite Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and feminist rhetoric. Nowhere does he cite any “contemporary” rhetorician. 
Although he addresses some of the literary arguments that have crept into law, the few citations he 
provides suggest a lack of knowledge rather than a strong argument.  
14 This chapter would undoubtedly qualify as a pretentious deviation by Posner’s standards. 
15 Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism, Law, and Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 
12. 
16 Ibid., 221. 
17 Ibid., 222. 
18 Ibid., 67. 
19 Ibid., 49. 
20 Ibid., 19. 
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his approach a “strategy rather than merely a rhetoric.”21 A strategy possesses a specific plan 
with an expected outcome. “Mere” rhetoric is the opposite, or at the very least a less efficient 
process than a Posnerian strategy. Method, efficiency, and outcome are key for Posner, whereas 
the “mere” rhetoric surrounding these core ideas often serves as a diversion.22 
 Other works contain similar charges against rhetoric. In one of his more recent books, 
How Judges Think, Posner again acknowledges rhetoric’s “mereness”23 and likens it to 
superficial window dressing.24 One can be “taken in by it,” he claims, recognizing its ever-
present danger and allure.25 In The Problems of Jurisprudence, he distances rhetoric from “cool 
reasoning,” again suggesting rhetoric deals with unwieldy passions, not rational agents.26 Citing 
the impact of the law and economics movement in legal scholarship, he differentiates rhetorical 
“flourish” from quantifiable, objective data.27 “We have a better understanding of the legal 
system as a result of economics than we used to have,” which is a marked improvement over the 
“most superficial, rhetorical level” that preceded the introduction of economics to law.28 A 
recurring theme is developing: rhetoric is a danger, one in which many are susceptible, even the 
most learned judges and scholars.29  
 It is this conception of rhetoric that inspires Panetta and Hasian’s criticism of Posner’s 
law and economics movement. One of the few rhetorical examinations of law and economics 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 49. 
22 Ibid., 86. 
23 Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 226.  
24 Ibid., 250. 
25 Ibid., 104. 
26 Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 149. 
27 William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, “The Influence of Economics on Law: A Quantitative 
Study,” Journal of Law and Economics 36.1, Part 2 (Apr. 1993), 385-424. 
28 Richard A. Posner, “The Future of Law and Economics: Looking Forward,” University of Chicago Law 
Review 64.4 (Autumn 1997), 1146.  
29 Posner’s disparaging commentary on rhetoric is by no means limited to the books and articles cited at 
length. See also Anthony Niblett, Richard A. Posner, and Andrei Shleifer, “The Evolution of a Legal 
Rule,” The Journal of Legal Studies 39.2 (June 2010), 350.  
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generally and Posner’s jurisprudence specifically, Panetta and Hasian argue that his economic 
analysis of law postures as “anti-rhetorical” in order to gain credibility and appear efficiently 
impartial. Describing an anti-rhetorical stance as “any foundational quest for truth that privileges 
itself as the only or primary ‘rational,’ ‘objective,’ and ‘neutral’ means of acquiring epistemic 
knowledge,”30 they contend that “anti-rhetorical appeals are woven into our discursive social 
fabrics and occupy the attention of both academics and citizens in the public sphere.”31 Focusing 
on “the rule of law” and “wealth maximization” as Posner’s guiding rhetorical appeals, Panetta 
and Hasian claim that he has constructed a theoretical perspective that attempts to eschew 
rhetoric while simultaneously benefitting from it.  
Framing efficiency as “wealth maximization,” Posner argues that decisions must yield the 
greatest increase to the aggregate wealth of society.32 Attempting to distance himself from 
utilitarianism and its focus on happiness, Posner claims that wealth maximization offers a 
“blend” of utilitarianism’s attention to the collective and Kantianism’s protection of individual 
autonomy33 that offers “a more defensible moral principle” on which to ground adjudication 
compared to competing legal theories.34 Guided by wealth maximization, law “alter[s] 
incentives,” utilizes a “rational structure,” is “public,” and “ascertain[s] the facts necessary [for 
the] correct application of the law.”35 As Posner depicts wealth maximization, it is something 
that everyone desires (or should desire) and it is “out there” to be systematically achieved.  
                                                 
30 Panetta and Hasian, 58. Given Posner’s vested interest in pragmatism, one must not characterize his 
conception of objectivity as akin to Plato’s. Posner defines objectivity in a third, “conversational” sense, 
“as merely reasonable – that is, as not willful, not personal, not (narrowly) political, not utterly 
indeterminate though not determinate in the ontological or scientific sense, but as amenable to and 
accompanied by persuasive though not necessarily convincing explanation” (The Problems of 
Jurisprudence, 7). 
31 Ibid., 59. 
32 Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 61. 
33 Ibid., 63-4. 
34 Ibid., 69. 
35 Ibid., 75. 
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In her germane contribution to the rhetoric of inquiry, Dierdre McCloskey begins The 
Rhetoric of Economics by analyzing Posner’s arguments defending efficiency and wealth 
maximization. “Posner,” she writes, “is urging us to see the common law as economically 
efficient. That’s the philosophical way of reading the passage, seeing through. But look at the 
surface, the rhetoric.”36 She goes on to critique his economic discourse, which attempts “to 
evoke Scientific power, to claim precision without necessarily using it.”37 Her brief analysis 
concludes, “Posner wants us to read philosophically, which is good. But he does not want us to 
read rhetorically, which is bad.”38 The economic judge utilizes this “scientific power” in order to 
make economic judgment appear objective, natural, and a-rhetorical, but not necessarily anti-
rhetorical.  
 Whereas Panetta and Hasian cite efficiency as one of Posner’s rhetorical masks, legal 
scholar Michael Murray inverts their position and argues that efficiency is an important 
contribution from the law and economics movement to the contemporary field of rhetoric. An 
element of the “four rhetorical canons of Law and Economics,” efficiency draws from the 
classical rhetorical canons of invention, arrangement, and style. Murray argues,  
Law and economics advocates elegance and efficiency in the form, structure, and 
composition of economic discourse. This lesson from the canons of Law and Economics 
teaches legal authors to follow a prescription to make their discourse clear, concise, 
succinct, and elegant in form. The formal use of the term efficiency benefits clarity and 
promotes comprehension of meaning over confusion and frustration.39 
                                                 
36 Dierdre N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economics, 2nd ed. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1998), 3. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 4. 
39 Michael D. Murray, “Law and Economics as a Rhetorical Perspective in Law,” Law Faculty 
Publications (2011), Paper 8. 
 
 - 70 - 
In Murray’s sympathetic analysis of law and economics, the bulk of its rhetorical force comes 
from the efficiency it espouses. 
 Although Murray makes an interesting argument for the rhetorical possibilities of law and 
economics, Posner is not wont to label his approach as inherently rhetorical. It uses rhetoric – it 
must – but it is not in and of itself rhetorical. Responding to the growing interest in the rhetoric 
of inquiry, which includes the rhetoric of economics, Posner acknowledges and casts aside a 
broad understanding of the rhetoric of economics. Describing Dierdre McCloskey’s scholarship 
as “exaggerated,” Posner claims that McCloskey “is too much an ‘everything is rhetoric’ person 
for my taste, and is particularly unconvincing when arguing that economics would improve if 
only economists would recognize that they are really rhetoricians.”40 The implicit challenge is 
that if rhetoric is everywhere, it is nowhere. Dilip Goankar wages a similar attack arguing that 
rhetorical theory possesses a “thin” vocabulary and the “globalization” of rhetoric into an ever-
expanding array of other disciplines (including law, economics, and the sciences) “severely 
undermines rhetoric’s self-representation as a situated practical art.”41 Posner and Goankar 
share a similar concern about the proliferation of rhetoric ad infinitum. 
 Responding to Goankar (and, implicitly, Posner), McCloskey simply asks, “If most 
speech has a persuasive perlocutionary force, ‘mere’ rhetoric, what exactly is the problem? So 
what?”42 Big rhetoric – or that which makes McCloskey an “everything is rhetoric” person – 
need not be a mark of failure, but rather one of success. Posner, however, argues such breadth 
ultimately undermines rhetoric’s “distinctness and utility.”43 Citing Thomas Cole’s The Origins 
                                                 
40 Posner, Overcoming Law, 525. 
41 Dilip Parameshwar Goankar, “The Idea of Rhetoric in the Rhetoric of Science,” in Rhetorical 
Hermeneutics: Invention and Interpretation in the Age of Science, Alan G. Gross and William M. Keith, 
eds. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 25-88.  
42 Deirdre N. McCloskey, “Big Rhetoric, Little Rhetoric: Gaonkar on the Rhetoric of Science,” in 
Rhetorical Hermeneutics: Invention and Interpretation in the Age of Science, Alan G. Gross and William 
M. Keith, eds. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 107. 
43 Posner, Overcoming Law, 503. 
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of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece, Posner calls into question “neorhetoricians” such as Burke and 
Perelmen as representative examples of rhetoric gone awry. “The average scientific paper is less 
‘rhetorical,’ in a perfectly intelligible sense of that word, than the average political address or the 
average closing argument to a jury.”44 According to Posner, the highly subjective concerns of 
politics share little in common with the sturdy objectivity of science. The latter produces 
evidence, not argument. 
 This is a common theme in economic discourse. Economists align themselves with 
science in order to gain credibility from the latter’s values, including, as economist Arjo Klamer 
asserts, “quantification, empirical testing, and rigorous formulation, preferably in mathematical 
symbols, and believe that only economists, among all the social scientists, can live up to these 
values.”45 Economists claim to describe that which motivates human judgment, and this is made 
all the easier when economics is viewed as a branch of the natural sciences. By borrowing from 
(and attempting to participate in) a pseudo-scientific discourse, economics presents its 
assumptions as inherent drives, natural dispositions that can be documented and analyzed in 
order to yield predictions about future scenarios. Yet, the act of description carries with it a 
number of assumptions whether it is done by a physicist, an economist, a psychiatrist, or a poet.  
 Arguably the most important assumption for the economist is the extent to which people 
can and should pursue their own interests, which is embodied by the “economic man” - homo 
economicus. What the economists tend to ignore – save McCloskey, Klamer, and other rhetoric-
sympathetic economists – is the fact that economic discourse creates a conception of human 
drives while it describes them. Neo-classical economists begin with the shaky premise that all 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
45 Arjo Klamer, “As If Economists and Their Subject Were Rational,” in Rhetoric and the Human 
Science: Language and Argument in Scholarship and Public Affairs, ed. John S. Nelson, Allan Megill, 
and Donald N. McCloskey (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), 166. 
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people want to and will act in their own self interests as a means to maximize their wealth. In 
societies that value individualism, such as the United States, such a premise goes relatively 
unchallenged. Doing so ignores the vagaries of different human cultures and the myriad of 
individual experiences that eventually shape a decision. From the “objective” standpoint of the 
economist, these differences have little if any impact on the conclusion that should be reached in 
a given scenario. Such a perspective, however, removes the depth and vibrancy that animate each 
individual. By shirking the more complicated social and psychological dimensions of human 
experience, including emotions and the desire/capacity for altruism, economists present human 
agents as “one-dimensional” and “solipsistic.”46 “One of the preconditions for economizing,” 
argues Richard Harvey Brown, “is that different ends are seen as comparable alternatives. The 
universalization of economizing therefore requires in practice the elimination of cultural barriers 
to the comparability of ends.”47  
 Given Posner’s penchant for legal realism, denouncing rhetoric writ large and supporting 
a complete and absolute science of law does him more harm than good. Just when you think you 
have Posner pegged as a rhetoric-hating, Plato-loving absolutist, he goes and defends the 
sophists and Aristotle. Describing legal pragmatism – an approach he finds more or less 
synonymous with law and economics – Posner claims that it “is sympathetic to the sophistic and 
Aristotelian conception of rhetoric as a mode of reasoning.”48 Never mind that he conflates the 
sophists and Aristotle, he extends an olive branch to rhetoric in his law and economics approach. 
Rhetoric, in this positive, Aristotelian connotation, serves as a mode of discursive engagement 
that provides a necessary, practical, and limited function. For better or worse, one must learn to 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 179. 
47 Richard Harvey Brown, “Reason as Rhetorical: On Relations among Epistemology, Discourse, and 
Practice,” in Rhetoric and the Human Science: Language and Argument in Scholarship and Public 
Affairs, ed. John S. Nelson, Allan Megill, and Donald N. McCloskey (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1987), 190. 
48 Posner, Pragmatism, Law, and Democracy, 60. He makes similar comments on pages 83 and 85. 
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play by a particular set of rules in a given situation in order to be effective.49 Effectiveness and 
the efficient means by which it is produced are the key ideas here, which serve as the vital point 
of reconciliation between his economic approach to law, his “everyday” pragmatism, and 
classical rhetoric. Rhetoric, in this narrow formulation, has little to do with the method of 
judgment – that contribution comes from economics. Instead, the economic judge turns to 
rhetoric after the economic process has already produced a conclusion. Rhetoric-as-composition 
satisfies a necessary, practical, and limited function. Under Posner’s characterization, rhetoric is 
ornamentation for economic judgment.  
 As a result, Posner is able to detach the decision-making process from the decision-
writing process. Under his characterization, rhetoric – which is more-or-less synonymous with 
“style”50 – is distinct from the “conceptual content” of a judicial opinion. Whereas the former 
reflects the individual voices and characters populating the court, the latter constitutes an 
opinion’s “paraphrasable content, the part of the opinion’s meaning that is not lost when it is put 
into different words from those employed by the author.”51 According to this perspective, there 
exist certain absolutes that cannot be altered or diminished unless as the result of gross 
negligence or misrepresentation. This is the economic side of a judgment: it provides a method 
for collecting the conceptual content of a particular case and interpreting the “data” into an 
economic formula in order to achieve wealth maximization. In doing so, the economic judge 
attempts to place method out of reach for non-economic interrogation. Panetta and Hasian claim 
that economic judgment is anti-rhetorical, which is true in part. The method of judgment is 
distinctly anti-rhetorical, but its articulation is not.   
                                                 
49 Ibid., 67. 
50 Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 331. See 
also James Arnt Aune, “On the Rhetorical Criticism of Judge Posner,” Hastings Constitutional Law 
Quarterly 23.3 (Spring 1996), 658-670. 
51 Posner, Law and Literature, 331. 
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 As McCloskey notes, Posner attempts to mask the rhetorical appeals operating within his 
work with a scientific discourse.52 This is most evident when Posner turns to cost-benefit 
analysis and economic formulae to help the economic judge make good decisions. Drawing from 
neo-classical economic concepts such as the Coase Theorem and Paretto Efficiency, Posner 
constructs a number of formulae in order to achieve wealth maximization. Articulating an 
economic approach to copyright law, for example, Posner advances the “optimal level of 
copyright protection”53 as W = f(N)w – E(N, z), where wealth maximization (W) is achieved 
through a function that considers the total cost of creating works (E), the number of works 
created (N), the consumer and producer surplus per work before deducting the cost of creating 
the work (w), and the index of copyright protection (z). To the lay audience – or even an astute 
yet not economically minded group of legal experts – this formula appears to be no more than 
chicken scratches. Certainly elements such as the cost of creating a product (a movie, for 
example) and its availability are important considerations, but can they be quantified so easily? 
Moreover, can one quantify the impact such copyright protections will have on future works? If 
Kembrew McLeod’s scholarship is any indication, copyright has run amok in large part due to 
the impossibility of quantifying creativity and imagination.54  
 Copyright law is by no means an exception; Posner advances similar formulae for nearly 
every field of law including the law of evidence,55 legal rulemaking,56 product liability,57 legal 
                                                 
52 See McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economics. 
53 William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law,” The Journal of 
Legal Studies 18.2 (Jun., 1989), 341-343. 
54 McLeod, Freedom of Expression. 
55 Richard A. Posner, “An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence,” Stanford Law Review 51.6 (Jul, 
1999), 1477-1546. 
56 Isaac Ehrlich and Richard A. Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking,” The Journal of 
Legal Studies 3.1 (Jan., 1974), 257-286. 
57 William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, “A Positive Economic Analysis of Products Liability,” The 
Journal of Legal Studies (Dec., 1985), 535-567. 
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procedure and judicial administration,58 criminal law,59 religious freedom,60 sexual 
discrimination,61 and just about everything in between. Posner even advances formulae in order 
to understand non-legal issues. Not even rhetoric is outside the scope of economic analysis. 
Claiming that “selling an idea to selling a good,” Posner argues that persuasion boils down to 
EUj = (1 – p)Bj - pLj.. According to Posner, persuasion amounts to this formula. Allow me to 
decode: EUj: “the expected utility of good j”; B: “the benefit to the buyer of the good works,” 
wherein the “‘good’ might be an idea”; L: “the loss if [the good] fails”; p: “the probability that 
[the good] was a false or bad idea.” Prioritizing the “costs of information” as a primary concern 
for rhetoric,62 Posner argues that arguments contain an implicit recognition of the “economic 
structure of the problem of persuasion.”63 Claiming that rhetoricians have reached too far beyond 
their discipline, he asserts that “the economic approach to rhetoric implies that a speaker will 
appeal to his listener’s self-interest.”64 Yet, when applied, is the formula useful? For example, 
let’s say the “good” (j) is the idea of unrestricted free speech. Already we face some obstacles. 
The “expected utility” of such a “good” is highly subjective. A random collection of citizens 
would likely contain a group that finds it highly valuable, another that finds it highly harmful, 
and yet another indifferent to either argument. Ought we average these opinions? I can only 
imagine the horrible survey that would come out: “On a scale from 1 through 10, one being the 
lowest and ten being the highest, how useful is unrestricted free speech?” Ought we consult 
                                                 
58 Richard A. Posner, “An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration,” The 
Journal of Legal Studies 2.2 (Jun., 1973), 399-458. 
59 Richard A. Posner, “An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law,” Columbia Law Review 85.6 (Oct., 
1985), 1193-1231. 
60 Richard A. Posner, “An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom,” The University of 
Chicago Law Review 56.1 (Winter, 1989), 1-60. 
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62 Posner, Overcoming Law, 502. 
63 Ibid. Posner uses no less than the proposition “God exists” to illustrate his point.  
64 Ibid., 504. 
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actuary tables? Ought we cater each formulation to a particular individual? What constitutes a 
benefit? A loss? A bad idea? These are highly flexible concepts that are subject to any number of 
extraneous factors. Furthermore, Posner offers little insight into the footwork of rhetoric. The 
hope is that the formula will guide the way as realism takes a backseat to method. 
 In an attempt to comprehend the economics of homosexuality in Overcoming Law, he 
claims that “a homosexual act will be chosen over a heterosexual one if (B1 – C1) > 0, (B1-C1) > 
(B2 – C2) where B1 and B2 are the benefits of the homosexual and the heterosexual act, 
respectively, to a particular person and C1 and C2 are the respective costs to him.”
65 Granted, 
Posner has a few years on me, but I have not met anyone – homosexual, heterosexual, bisexual, 
or transsexual – who approaches his or her sexuality in such a detached, almost sanitized 
manner. More alarming is his economic deconstruction of rape: 
Suppose a rapist derives extra pleasure from the coercive character of his act. Then there 
would be no market substitute for rape and it could be argued therefore that rape is not a 
pure coercive transfer and should not be punished criminally. But the argument would be 
weak: (a) . . . The prevention of rape is essential to protect the marriage market . . . and 
more generally to secure property rights in women's persons. Allowing rape would be the 
equivalent of communalizing property rights in women. . . . (b) Allowing rape would lead 
to heavy expenditures on protecting women, as well as expenditures on overcoming those 
protections. The expenditures would be largely offsetting, and to that extent socially 
wasted. (c) Given the economist's definition of value . . . the fact that the rapist cannot 
find a consensual substitute does not mean that he values the rape more than the victim 
disvalues it. 
                                                 
65 Ibid., 557. 
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Asserting that economists like to think about the “unthinkable,”66 it is no wonder why his critics 
consider him “bloodless and ultimately cruel.”67 As Robin West notes, Posner’s view of rape 
ignores the roles of power and subordination. “Rape,” according to Posner, “is simply a 
substitute for consensual sex, engaged in by normal…heterosexuals for whom the cost of 
consensual heterosex is simply too high.”68 With his sights set on efficiency and wealth 
maximization, one wonders what Posner is leaving out of the equation. 
 Whether one buys into the formulae or not is beside the point; of present concern is the 
rhetorical turn Posner takes to justify his position. With the introduction of these formulae, the 
economic judge is engaging in the act of rhetorical translation. Steeped in economic discourse, 
he translates legal statutes, homosexual desires, rape, rhetoric and just about everything else into 
economic terminology. In doing so, he necessarily narrows these issues down to easily 
interchangeable data that can be represented by a symbol. Unlike James Boyd White’s 
conception of translation, which accepts the impossibility of a universal meaning in law,69 
Posner translates from one expert discourse (law) into another (economics) and back again 
without reservation. Moreover, he posits these formulaic translations as distilled versions of how 
things are, not simply what they appear to be. Expectedly, the translation favors his own 
                                                 
66 See John J. Donohue III and Ian Ayres, “Posner’s Symphony No. 3: Thinking about the Unthinkable,” 
Stanford Law Review 39 (1986), 791-812. 
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discourse of law and economics because, like translating one language to another, there is no 
one-to-one ratio and choices must be made.  
 Addressing the rhetoric of translation, Peter France notes that translation imposes “a 
variety of constraints” in order to “perform all kinds of ‘unnatural’ operations” in order to yield 
their desired result.70 Consequently, translation “is not a scientific procedure but a personal 
initiative akin to that of the orator situated between a subject and a public.”71 The translator 
carries with him or her a wealth of personal experiences and a perspective that ultimately shapes 
one discourse or language as it is translated into another.72 Those who are sympathetic to 
Posner’s formulae may claim that it provides an efficient means of understanding how law 
functions (or ought to function) in society. For those less sympathetic, the math does not add up 
as some issues and concepts are incommensurable. Certainly, the economic judge can translate 
rape into economic terminology and doing so would probably make the law more efficient in 
terms of expediency. The complex, emotionally draining elements that surround rape are either 
pushed aside or quantified. Yet, the overriding question is whether or not the economic judge 
should do so. What happens as a result? What is left out? What is added? By prioritizing method 
and establishing the telos of law as wealth maximization, Posner ignores what his economic 
discourse does to our conceptions of law when we think in these terms. Rather than serving an 
entirely descriptive function, we must ask what sort of perspective is law and economics 
creating. What happens to our conceptions of the law when we think in these terms? At the very 
least, we must be cognizant of the fact that words work on us as much as we work on them.  
                                                 
70 Peter France, “The Rhetoric of Translation,” The Modern Language Review 100 (2005), 257. 
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 Posner insulates his position against criticisms by claiming one must thoroughly 
understand both legal discourse and economic discourse before one has the requisite expertise 
necessary to critique economic adjudication.73 Ignoring the fact that Posner regularly criticizes 
scholarship well beyond the scope of law or economics, there is some merit to his argument. One 
should seek to understand an idea before criticizing it, but that does not mean one must be an 
economist or a judge in order to criticize them. Admittedly, some of Posner’s more advanced 
formulae confuse me almost as much as Hegel’s “inverted world” or the appeal of the 
Kardashians. As such, my criticisms could be brushed aside as the ramblings of a rhetorician 
with an axe to grind. As Arjo Klamer notes, this is part of the “tribalism” that takes place within 
economics (and arguably legal studies). “Becoming an economist implies more than making a 
choice for a particular subject; it signifies the adoption of a ‘cultural frame that defines a great 
part of one’s life.’”74 Every field falls prey to such tribalism and rhetoric is certainly no 
exception. The danger lies in remaining uncritical of your tribe’s assumptions. Posner 
characterizes economics as “the instrumental human science par excellence”75 and capable of 
“furnish[ing] the indispensible theoretical framework for the empirical research that law so badly 
needs.”76 If one takes a step back and views law and economics as a discourse rather than as an 
methodology, then its anti-rhetorical/a-rhetorical posturing and formulaic translations become 
more than a tools for the economic judge. The belief that law can be understood in neoclassical 
economic terminology changes one’s attitude about the role and power of adjudication. By 
aligning himself with economic objectivity, Posner is able to present the economic judge as a 
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neutral figure applying descriptions of natural human motivations. The neutrality that Posner 
espouses is also a key element of the economic judge’s second rhetorical faculty: balance. 
 
2.2 BALANCING EXTREMES 
Balance has long been an important concept for law. Lady Justice, holding a sword in one hand 
and a scale balancing truth and fairness in the other, is an iconic figure representing honor, 
mercy, retribution, and, above all, integrity. The Eighth Amendment makes illegal the 
disproportionate or exaggerated forms of punishment. Judges and juries are implored to ensure 
“the punishment fits the crime.” Old Testament justice encourages “an eye for an eye.” Even on 
the international political scene, the United States often advocates a “proportionate response” to 
hostile attacks. In one of his very own decisions, Posner asserts proportionality as a 
“cornerstone” of rational law.77 
Important for his balancing strategy, Posner suggests law and economics is neutral and 
natural, a default position with no influence on the scales of justice. The economic judge’s 
balancing act is most easily seen in relation to the legal binaries Posner advances throughout his 
work. After more than forty years, absolute consistency is a figment of the imagination. 
Nonetheless, I will attempt to reign in his expansive oeuvre by focusing attention on three 
guiding binaries in Posner’s characterization of legal theory and the role that economic judgment 
plays therein. The first, the divide between legality and morality, is as longstanding as the idea of 
law itself. The second, theory and practice, stresses the divide between academic treatments of 
law and the everyday decision-making process of judges. Finally, law’s debt to the past 
(backward-looking) and its obligation to the future (forward-looking) form the third binary. 
                                                 
77 Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Center v. Hellenic Republic, 980 F.2d 449, 455 (7th Cir. 1992). 
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These three binaries illustrate how Posner frames the economic judge as a healthy, balanced, 
middle way between extremes.  
The idea of balance in rhetoric is as old and ubiquitous as the idea of law, with historians 
noting its presence as early as the Ancient Egyptians.78 Contemporary rhetorical research 
recognizes balance in a diverse array of interests, including organizational communication,79 
presidential rhetoric,80 sermonic oratory,81 as a unifying point for prudence and decorum,82 and 
design and aesthetics.83 Star Muir argues balance is a key term for Kenneth Burke and “reflects 
his distress at the industrial ‘habits’ exceeding the limits of ecological capacity, and it also 
reflects Burke’s concern with the rigidity of linguistic and philosophical perspectives that cannot 
mediate between realms, or even recognize the vitality of ambiguity in human symbolism.”84 In 
The New Rhetoric, Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca cite balance as a sign of impartiality.85 Still 
others have noted an implicit call for balance within existing rhetorical scholarship.86 
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As a rhetorical strategy, the notion of balance should not be taken lightly. For example, 
Robert Patterson and Ronald Lee note the substantive, strategic use of balance in environmental 
rhetoric, arguing that balance serves as a god-term that runs rampant throughout American 
political discourse: “Yet, like all condensation symbols, the potent affect and cognitive 
ambiguity of ‘balance’ are the sources of its rhetorical power. ‘Balance’ evokes the powerful 
American value of pluralism without designating any mechanism for weighing competing 
claims.”87 Balance, whether real or constructed, serves as a powerful rhetorical appeal and draws 
from longstanding American ideals, making its allure in the legal world all the more enticing.  
Addressing the rhetorical strategy behind balance, Sharon Downey argues that it is an 
inherent element of feminist dialectical tension. Negotiating between “feminist 
reconstructionism” and “gender diversity,” Downey argues that an either/or approach sacrifices 
too much. Her “dialectical feminist perspective” takes a both/and approach that negotiates 
spaced between these competing ideas. “This idea of rhetoric as a balancing act does not negate 
rhetoric as persuasion, violence, or invitation because just as surely as balance is possible (most 
likely through invitation or persuasion), so too can it spiral out of whack (most likely through 
coercion or violence).”88 Here understood, balance is a precarious yet highly sought position. 
Balance is a consequence of conscientious rhetorical engagement, a dialectic that finds 
equilibrium. In the legal setting, mediation represents this type of balance well. At its best, two 
parties, mediated by a legal representative, articulate their concerns and work toward agreement. 
As Posner responds to competing legal theories, he positions himself as the mediator looking for 
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common ground between two antagonistic sides that are reluctant to budge. Conveniently, 
economic judgment just so happens to represent the delicate balancing point. 
The first of our binaries, morality and legality, is arguably the most long standing and the 
most divisive. The line between the two has always been blurry and it serves as a constant point 
of contention for theorists, practitioners, and the lay public. Do laws convey a moral standard? 
Should moral norms become law? Or is legality separate and distinct from morality? Murder, for 
example, carries with it a powerful moral justification for punishment, but we nonetheless 
recognize various degrees of severity when it comes to murder. Furthermore, punishing murder 
is tautological in that murder is morally and legally wrong, but killing in the name of self-
defense is not. One can also imagine scenarios in which a murderer elicits public sympathy. The 
grieving parent of a raped and murdered child who takes revenge and shoots the perpetrator 
outside of the courtroom will likely have a number of supporters. Or the abused wife who flees 
her violent husband only to return and kill him in his sleep is, technically, committing murder, 
but may receive a lighter legal penalty (if any penalty at all).  
Laws concerning self-regarding or consensual acts underscore the blurred line between 
legality and morality. Presently, marijuana prohibition and same-sex marriage are hot topics in 
legislatures, courtrooms, and around office water coolers. Laws regarding these issues often exist 
in a swirl in moral arguments, especially same-sex marriage. Before issuing his scathing dissent 
in Windsor v. United States, Justice Scalia was questioned about his views on same-sex 
marriage. “Homosexual sodomy?” he questioned, “Come on. For 200 years, it was criminal in 
every state.” Later questioned about the implications of such a position, Scalia responded with 
questions of his own: “If we cannot have moral feelings against homosexuality, can we have it 
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against murder? Can we have it against other things?”89 For those who want to include moral 
justifications as legitimate legal appeals, the struggle lies in which appeals make the cut. But how 
far are we willing to offer moral justifications for laws? Pro-life groups argue that abortion is a 
grievous moral wrong meriting legislation or the intervention of the Supreme Court. Pro-choice 
groups claim that the more pressing moral obligation is to the impregnated woman, especially 
when a pregnancy is the result of rape or incest or when the life of the woman is at risk. What 
about less heated issues? Littering? Jaywalking? Leaving shopping carts in the middle of a 
parking lot when the cart corral is only ten feet away?  
Utilizing Sophocles’ great tragedy Antigone as a paradigm example, Posner argues that a 
dichotomous divide between morality and legality has always been present in legal theory.90 
Ought we follow our moral conscience, like Antigone, or follow the written law, like Creon?91 
Two of the most prominent and contested legal theories represent the poles of these competing 
notions of justice: natural law and legal positivism. Many natural law theorists argue that there 
exists a set of guidelines that supersede human conventions or beliefs. Roman Catholic doctrine 
serves as a prime example. God, not man, deems that which is morally good and, consequently, 
legal. Such a position, when argued in a contemporary context, is likely to receive little if any 
broad acceptance (although Germain Grisez makes an interesting case92). Yet, natural law is 
embedded in the Declaration of Independence (“We hold these truths to be self evident…”) and 
the Bill of Rights. Natural law also has a prestigious philosophical pedigree with supporters 
ranging from ancient philosophy (Plato, Aristotle, Cicero) to modern philosophy (Hobbes, 
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Locke) to contemporary philosophy (Ronald Dworkin, Robert George, John Finnis). Although 
not legally binding, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international charters 
and covenants also reflect natural rights theory. Even the American common law tradition is 
rooted in a rich history of morality wedded to law as articulated in William Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Laws of England.93  
The opposing perspective is legal positivism, which views law as the product of 
governmental processes that produce rules backed by the power of the state. Early critics of 
natural law such as Jeremy Bentham and Edmund Burke highlighted the logical inconsistencies 
behind so-called natural or inalienable rights. John Austen, Hans Kelsen, and H.L.A. Hart 
refined these criticisms in the construction of their positivist theories of law. According to the 
positivistic view, law emerges from social agreements, which may echo moral concerns, but 
those moral concerns are not the source of law. Whether murder, rape, theft and the like are 
moral wrongs is certainly important, but it should have little to do with how a law is adopted, 
implemented, and upheld. The legal penalties against littering, for example, are the result of a 
human process that is not guided by moral intervention.  
For Posner, the natural law position falters because it cannot stand on fact.94 In The 
Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, Posner’s lengthiest treatment of the morality/legality 
binary, he claims that contemporary appeals to natural law are thinly connected to metaphysical 
moral realism. Natural law, he argues, is a difficult position to hold in a heterogeneous society, 
instead rooting their moral claims in an ethical tradition.95 Laws coming out of strict religious 
groups serve as cultural markers for those groups, but non-group members are difficult to 
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persuade because they lack a similar cultural tradition. As a result, natural law can only work in a 
small, homogeneous society and even then it is susceptible to numerous challenges.96  
Even deontological moral justifications face a number of problems when transitioning 
into the legal realm. Kantian moral philosophy, which was revived in its political and legal form 
in large part due to John Rawls’ seminal A Theory of Justice, roots morality in human dignity, 
not God’s will. As ambitious and influential as Rawls’ project was, Posner notes that law 
inherently treats people as objects of social control rather than ends in themselves.97 Even if one 
was to adopt a Kantian perspective – or any established moral theory – Posner claims that they 
cannot adequately respond to specific legal problems or difficult cases.98 Such theories are, for 
better or worse, too abstract for law.99  
Few, however, subscribe to such a severe version of natural law and Posner recognizes its 
“strong” and “weak” formulations. Describing Ronald Dworkin as the most prominent and 
prolific “weak” natural law theorists given his position that even the most complicated legal 
problems have a “right answer,”100 Posner is critical of any position that attempts to claim moral 
certitude. He argues that Dworkin’s principled approach “take[s] the place of the Form of Justice 
or the law of God.”101 Consequently, Dworkin “has created a rich vocabulary for masking 
discretionary, political decision making by judges.”102 According to Posner, appeals to morality 
such as Dworkin’s rely on a particular vocabulary, but this vocabulary is a façade obscuring the 
fact that judges must use their personal discretion from time to time. Sanctioning these 
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97 Ibid., 176. 
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judgments as morally correct, natural law judges attempt to avoid charges that they are 
“legislating from the bench.” But whereas natural law judges don a mask to cover their true 
intentions (even from themselves), the economic judge shows his or her face to the world. 
Although Posner would not deny that the economic judge also relies upon a particular 
vocabulary, it is a vocabulary that recognizes ethical traditions without adopting them wholesale.  
Due to the ambiguity of moral arguments and the diversity of moral positions, Posner is 
skeptical of morality’s place in law, but acknowledges that it is an inevitable presence in a 
practice that deals with regulating societies. Ever the economist, Posner realizes that if efforts to 
root out morality from law are inevitably futile, then moral assertions must be put to good use. In 
a critique of “The Path of Law,” Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s landmark essay in legal realism 
that attempted to separate the moral from the legal, Posner claims that Holmes missed the mark 
in two important regards:  
The first is that the more law conforms to prevalent moral opinions, including the moral 
opinions of relevant subcultures such as the commercial community, the easier it is to 
understand and comply with it just by acting the part of well-socialized members of their 
community. The second point…is that the maintenance of a moral veneer in the law’s 
dealing with the people subject to it, especially the antisocial people subject to it, offers a 
first line of defense against excesses of official violence.103 
Rather than embrace morality in law as an end in itself, Posner positions morality in the service 
of efficiency and wealth maximization. He resigns himself to a legal world wherein moral 
justifications are inevitable, yet such claims need not be entirely useless or distracting. They are, 
in many ways, instinctual and tacit,104 an unavoidable part of the legal process.105 The goal is not 
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to be at the mercy of an all-encompassing moral theory or moral intuitions, but one must not (and 
cannot) simply ignore them. They serve as additional resources to be considered when deciding a 
case in the courts of law and public opinion. 
 Although Posner is indignant toward academic moral theorizing, he suggests the impetus 
behind general moral beliefs provides a bulwark against the dangerous elements in legal 
positivism, particularly its oft-criticized lack of humanity. Posner turns to Nazi law to illustrate 
his point. Throughout the Nuremberg Trials and in endless discussions, articles, and books since, 
a driving question about the Nazi regime has been, “Was Nazi law legitimate?” From a strict 
legal positivist position, the answer is a reluctant, “Yes.” Morally imbued legal theory, even if it 
is weakly imbued, succeeds where legal positivism fails in its ability to delegitimize the idea of 
Nazi law by connecting law to a set of human desires and expectations that go beyond a mere set 
of rules established by a state. True, moral claims are subject to a litany of criticisms, which 
Posner discusses throughout his various works, but they can also unite a people around a shared 
concern for humanity. Indicative of Posner’s rhetoric of balance, moral claims, such as those 
advocated by natural law theorists, allow for a flexibility often lacking in positive law.106 For 
Posner, morality is important for law because it gives his economic judge a heart (even if, 
following Nussbaum’s criticism, it is a cold and mechanical one). Moral criticism also offers a 
type of critical lens that legal positivism lacks. “It helps us spot the weaknesses in ambitious 
social theories that might be used to generate or validate or overthrow legal obligations, and thus 
it reinforces the lesson of skepticism.”107 Ill-fated projects such as early eugenics initiatives may 
have been conceived with good intention, but the implementation of such initiatives tended to 
marginalize minorities, the poor, and women.  
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 Posner’s interest in “moral intuition” is another attempt to preserve morality in law, 
although a notion of morality that continues to work toward his benefit. Recognizing the 
impossible task of deciding difficult cases solely based on written law (i.e. statutes and 
precedents), the economic judge does not believe every case can be decided on the original intent 
or language of lawmakers. When the law does not provide the necessary and sufficient 
information for deciding a case, Posner claims that the economic judge must rely on moral 
intuitions, such as empathy. Stressing the importance of empathy, which he suggests is an 
important facet of law and economics,108 Posner claims that law cannot be an entirely rational, 
logically regulated institution.109 Depending on the facts of the case, judges, juries, lawyers, and 
the lay public may feel particularly strongly for a plaintiff or a defendant.  
In 2007, for example, Ben Odierno was acquitted of second-degree murder charges after 
he had stabbed his wife to death. The defense positioned Odierno’s actions as the result of a 
“decade-long period of psychological warfare”110 and attempted to have the jury empathize with 
his emotional distress. Post verdict interviews indicate that these appeals had a lasting effect for 
many jurors. “Putting him on the stand was a big, big, big factor,” claimed juror Joanne 
McGrath, “because he turned out to be a likable guy.”111 Another juror, Miri Samuel, echoed the 
empathic likability of Odierno: “He was a simple, decent man who tried to live a simple, happy 
life.”112 Emotional appeals also play a significant role in sentencing hearings, particularly in 
victim impact statements. Victims of crimes (or their families, if the victim is deceased) are 
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offered an opportunity to address the court prior to sentencing but after the defendant has been 
found guilty113 - a key moment in the decision-making process.  
On first glance, Posner’s defense of empathy reverberates with Martha Nussbaum’s legal 
philosophy. Both support empathy in judicial decision-making, but their similarities end there. 
Whereas Posner acknowledges emotion as unavoidable and thus obligates a judge to 
acknowledge its presence, Nussbaum wants it to hold a place of privileged esteem. Posner also 
wants to turn to emotions that Nussbaum argues are more detrimental than helpful. For example, 
Posner offers a series of arguments that encourage the use of disgust and shame in the law.114 
Nussbuam highlights the dangers of relying on such emotions, even if they are prominent in 
human development. Her book length treatment of the subject, Hiding from Humanity: Shame, 
Disgust, and the Law, stresses the many ways in which arguments from disgust and shame have 
been used against vulnerable populations and disenfranchised groups (a point that will be 
elaborated upon in the next chapter).115 Posner, conversely, sees disgust and shame as similar to 
any other emotional intuition (e.g. fear, anger) used to decide or justify a case, stressing the 
broad public support for disgust.116  
Legal positivists and originalists pressure Posner’s defense of emotion and moral 
intuition, arguing that emotional detachment is a hallmark trait of sound adjudication. Similar to 
challenges issued against early 20th century legal realists, opponents fear decisions may pivot on 
the whim of a judge or justice when moral intuition is granted a place in the process. Rekindling 
an old adage, they worry that when judges are not sufficiently detached from their judgments, 
something as simple as what they ate for breakfast may sway their decision. When the demand is 
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for a “government of law and not men,” the moral intuition of a judge can be a cause for 
concern. While acknowledging these worries, Posner believes they are blown out of proportion. 
Immersed in a well-established professional history and illustrating concern for their reputations, 
judges are not likely to be so haphazard with their judgments. Even the liberal Warren Court 
sought to ground their decisions in long-standing precedent rather than solely relying upon 
morality. Again illustrating his desire for balance, Posner claims judicial detachment and 
emotions like empathy are not mutually exclusive and need not be in tension.117  
Throughout his work, Posner chastises the morality-saturated natural law and the 
morality-absent legal positivism, recognizing a place for both arguments without wholly 
subscribing to either. Such a balancing act places Posner in an interesting rhetorical position. He 
is able to call out the extremes of both poles, which he often represents as Ronald Dworkin and 
Martha Nussbaum on the moral end and H.L.A. Hart on the amoral end. In effect, he is playing 
academic extremes against one another and offering a seemingly moderate center as the 
reasonable alternative. “In the view I am expounding,” argues Posner,  
the masculine outlook is that of legal positivism, the feminine that of natural law. At the 
“masculine” end of the spectrum of legal conceptions, law is monstrous, inhuman; this is 
a common layperson’s conception of law and one well represented in imaginative 
literature. At the “feminine” end, law turns into the anarchy of “popular justice,” 
symbolized by the trial of Socrates and by the kangaroo courts of totalitarian regimes, 
such as Mao’s “people’s courts. A mature legal system rejects both extremes in favor of a 
mixture of rules and discretion, law and equity, rule and standard, positive laws and 
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ethical principles (corresponding to natural law), logic and practical reason, professional 
judges and lay judges, objectivity and subjectivity.118 
By playing off the extremes on both sides of his binary, Posner is able to simultaneously 
delegitimize those positions and portray the economic judge as the reasonable, balanced middle 
way.  
The different rhetorical situations represented by academics and acting judges move us to 
the second major binary Posner attempts to balance: theory and practice. Evident in his treatment 
of academic moralism, Posner is irked by theorists more interested in discerning and arguing for 
a legal ideal without giving due consideration to the practical, real-life implementation of their 
ideals. Consider Plato’s highly ambitious ideal city articulated in his Republic. Whether or not 
the city would unfold as he argues is moot because it would be impossible to implement. Kant’s 
moral theory serves as another example. Are we really not allowed to lie? Even if the Kantian 
moral life is good, is it possible? Contemporary theories are not in the clear, either. John Rawls’ 
A Theory of Justice attempts to establish the requirements necessary to ensure a fair and just 
society. Even if his germane thought experiment, the veil of ignorance, introduces a set of issues 
society ought to address, it provides little insight regarding implementation.  
Much like the morality/legality binary, Posner weaves commentary regarding theory and 
practice throughout most of his book length works. Recently, he has written a work focused 
precisely on this issue, How Judges Think, which serves as a useful starting point for addressing 
the balance Posner hopes to strike. Setting the tone of his contribution early in the work, his 
argument “emphasizes positive rather than normative analysis – what judges do, not what they 
should do.”119 Posner’s bare bones emphasis on everyday judicial decisions extends to his 
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broader concept of law: “‘Law’ in a judicial setting is simply the material, in the broadest sense, 
out of which judges fashion their decisions.”120 Theoretical pursuits, such as those articulated 
and advocated by academic scholars, tend to focus on an ideal and not the day-to-day legal 
process. “My complaint,” Posner argues, “is that the current academic critique of the judiciary is 
unrealistic about judges, unhelpful to them, and indeed rather uninterested in them unless they 
happen to be Supreme Court Justices.”121 But what does Posner’s attention toward the day-to-day 
have to offer? What contribution does it make amongst competing arguments? Let us consider 
Posner’s arguments against the prioritization of theory over practice. 
One of Posner’s main targets is the academic popularity of “legalism,” which Posner 
defines broadly as theories “[hypothesizing] that judicial decisions are determined ‘by law,’ 
conceived of as a body of preexisting rules found stated in canonical legal materials, such as 
constitutional and statutory texts and previous decisions of the same or a higher court, or 
derivable from those materials by logical operations.”122 Painting with such broad strokes allows 
him to group seemingly disparate theorists like Scalia and his fellow conservative originalists, 
liberal “right answer” theorists like Dworkin, and the Marxist school of Critical Legal Studies. 
Posner continues, characterizing the “ideal legalist decision [as] the product of a syllogism in 
which a rule of law supplies the major premise, the facts of the case supply the minor one, and 
the decision is the conclusion.”123 Such rules may be derived from the “original intent” of the 
Constitution, humanistic moral appeals, citizenship, or an ephemeral notion of the “flourishing 
life.” Although the substance of these approaches may be different, their forms are quite similar: 
they are all driven by an abstract set of rules that serve to guide the decision-making process. 
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While legalist claims are abundant amongst academic theorists,124 Posner considers such 
positions, whether liberal or conservative, indicative of legal theory’s systemic woes.125 Their 
penchant for abstraction removes the practical act of judgment and the character of the individual 
judge. Consequently, “Academic critique thus perpetuates a false notion of judicial behavior.”126 
He continues, 
Academic lawyers are terrific at taking apart the formal grounds of a judicial decision, 
and those are the grounds that take up most of the space in most opinions. But the 
academics have (or express) little understanding of how cases are actually decided, where 
the judges who decided a case were coming from, and what really made them alter 
existing doctrine as distinct from what they said made them change it.127 
Not only is the judge detached from the decision, but the law student or newly minted lawyer 
learning to brief and argue cases is also at a disadvantage. The scholarly process of pouring over 
a case and examining it from every angle may illuminate a nuanced, perhaps previously 
unaddressed issue, but such a process is markedly different than the judge making a decision 
with a limited amount of time, a growing caseload, and the fact that lives will be directly 
effected. 
 Even if a judge is sympathetic to academic arguments, the impossibly high standards of 
such arguments make them useless in adjudication. Consider, for example, the arguments 
supporting a strict constructionist interpretation of the Constitution. Robert Bork and Antonin 
Scalia, the theory’s most prominent and vocal proponents, advocate against the “living 
Constitution” and “judicial policy-making,” but Posner suggests that they cannot meet their own 
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standards.128 When put into practice, idealistic theories can never be sustained. Posner also 
asserts that Critical Legal Studies, a more recent addition to the theoretical scene, is similarly 
misguided by holding judges to a standard that no judge could ever satisfy adequately.129 
  Posner notes an important rhetorical element behind the detachment of the academic and 
judicial spheres: the roles of their respective audiences.130 Academics writing for fellow 
academics are able to abstract ad nauseum, which is celebrated in many circles. Scholars 
deconstruct and reconstruct every element of landmark cases such as Dred Scott v. Sanford, 
Plessy v. Ferguson, Brown v. Board of Education, Roe v. Wade, and Bush v. Gore. Certainly 
these cases serve as important cultural markers, but Posner believes the attention given to them 
distracts from more pertinent, contemporary, and practical concerns. In Posner’s judge-oriented 
framework, judges have neither the time nor resources to dig as deeply as academics insist.131 
Consider, for example, the definition of personhood. In Howard Fineman’s The Thirteen 
American Arguments: Enduring Debates that Define and Inspire Our Country, he lists this 
problem as one of the most crucial issues in the whole span of American history.132 There are 
certainly important points when the debate over personhood reaches a fever pitch, most notably 
slavery, the civil rights movement, the several waves of women’s rights, and abortion rights. The 
debate, however, has never come to a conclusion and even the most optimistic theorist would 
likely see no end in sight. With a host of new aspects of personhood coming to the fore, 
including advances in genetic testing, “death with dignity,” and corporate personhood, Posner 
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encourages his readers to ask a simple question: Can we really expect judges to be the final 
arbiters on highly complicated, culturally influenced, and ever changing metaphysical and moral 
problems?  
Judges and lawyers, Posner stresses, do not enjoy the same luxuries as their academic 
counterparts. Their audiences consist not of academics with the time and resources to spend 
years working on an argument. Rather, judges and lawyers deal with defendants, prosecutors, 
juries, families, and law enforcement, all of whom seek swift justice in one way or another. 
Spending a significant amount of time on one case means spending less on others. With cases 
piling up and prisons bursting at their concrete seams, Posner views increased attention to an 
individual case as indicative of the law of diminishing returns: judgment will not become 
remarkably more accurate when a judge has three years to decide a case rather than three 
months. 
Posner argues that law has been divided into two separate discourses that rarely overlap 
one another in any meaningful way. Academic law clothes itself in abstractions and high-minded 
legal theory. Courtroom law, while still adopting an esoteric “legalese,” nonetheless orients itself 
toward practicality and efficiency. While the practitioners and advocates of academic, theoretical 
discourse are aware of their practical counterparts, Posner suggests that they infrequently attempt 
to understand the other. As new legal theories emerge and attempt to define what the law is (or 
ought to be), judges and lawyers carry on. Posner laments, “Each generation succumbs to the 
siren song of abstraction."133 Rather than building up a useful framework that judges can utilize, 
Posner bemoans academics who swap abstractions in and out, thus creating theories that are of 
little use to a judge.134 
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While these differing audiences and discourses are problematic, perhaps the most 
regrettable element of academic legalism’s orientation toward unrealistic idealism is, for Posner, 
the way in which it makes the best the enemy of the good. Abstract theories distract from good 
(but not perfect) ideas. Given the multitude of competing theories, Posner attempts to bolster his 
balancing act by suggesting “good enough” ought to be sufficient for the courts, a task in which 
his pragmatic, economic analysis of law is proficient.135 This notion of good-but-not-perfect is a 
popular rhetorical characterization;136 it grants him the ability to recognize errors without placing 
direct or significant blame on the decision-makers (provided they follow Posner’s guidelines). 
Typical of his economic approach, Posner uses cost-benefit analysis to ascertain an adequate 
balance between the two. Illustrating this balancing act between costs and benefits, Posner likens 
adjudication to safety measures taken by a company. “If the judge knows whether the case is 
nearer the left [i.e. more beneficial than costly] or the right [i.e. more costly than beneficial], he 
knows which party has the better case. He does not have to be able to determine the optimal level 
of precaution in order to make a correct decision.”137 This act of translating legal ideas into 
economic terminology is vital to Posner’s rhetorical project and places law and economics in a 
privileged position. Competing legalist theories do not and cannot adequately capture the 
realistic limitations that are placed on acting judges as Posner describes them.  
Building on his arguments against academic legal theory’s unrealistic and utopian 
expectations, Posner’s second strike at legalism concerns the process of decision-making. To 
subscribe to and follow a legalist theory places “unrealistic demands on judges.”138 Even if one 
were to subscribe to a theory, Posner argues that such a theory provides no practical solutions 
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and cultivates no useful skills necessary for deciding difficult cases. “[J]udicial philosophies 
have little causal efficacy,” writes Posner, stressing the ineffectiveness and unproductiveness of 
legal theory.139 Because we live in a pluralistic society, any theoretical argument is inevitably 
dissatisfying because it cannot settle disagreements in difficult cases.140 Consequently, “much of 
what these first-rate interdisciplinary scholars do makes no contribution to the work of a judge or 
a practitioner.”141 Academic legalism is akin to a book about how to be funny. You can list all 
the necessary requirements – audience, timing, topic choice, vocal inflection, pacing, 
appropriateness, optimal whoopee cushion inflation levels, etc. – but no book could ever guide 
the drab to the fab, the boring to the soaring, and the bland to the grand in a single attempt. 
Humor and law are more akin to geology in this regard: they require persistence and time.  
Even the most robust theory with deep roots in logic tend to be impractical to the 
economic judge. “Logic will not decide the most difficult cases,” argues Posner. “Logic the 
destroyer is not logic the creator. To show that an opinion is illogical is not to show that the 
outcome is incorrect – a particularly pertinent observation when both the majority and the 
dissenting opinions in a case are illogical.”142 Again, Posner is indicating the need to accept 
“good enough” as a necessary and justifiable position. The highly contested decision in Citizens 
United may be interpreted in any number of ways depending on the theoretical lens through 
which one views the case. The logics of originalists, “right answer” theorists, civic republicans, 
Critical Legal Theorists, and feminists legal scholars may all reach a different conclusion, or, at 
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the very least, different justifications. For Posner, such arguments are ineffective and 
unproductive.143 
 Posner claims that one of the important reasons why academic legalism is so out of touch 
with actual adjudication is the “compartmentalization of knowledge,” which he labels “so 
conspicuous a feature of the modern world” that it “may have condemned philosophy to 
irrelevance at the level of practice.”144 “Compartmentalization of knowledge” can more easily be 
read as “specialization.” As academia continues to grow, scholars tend to focus on narrower 
interests. Psychology, for example, contains specialties focused on clinical, community, 
counseling, developmental, educational, environmental, experimental, family, forensic, geriatric, 
health, organizational, physical, positive, psychometric, psycho-analytic, rehabilitative, social, 
sport, and therapeutic psychology, just to name a few. Within these areas one may seek further 
specialization. Psychology is not unique in its multiplicity. English, Philosophy, Economics, 
History, Communication, and even natural sciences like Biology, Chemistry, and Physics all 
contain highly specialized areas wherein scholars may spend most if not all of their careers. By 
secluding themselves within such finely nuanced, highly esoteric spheres, their contribution to 
law cannot be appropriated by practicing judges. 
 Posner utilizes Robin West’s feminist jurisprudence as one such ineffective approach. A 
leading advocate within Critical Legal Studies, he cites her earnest defense of women’s rights 
and the need for the legal profession, broadly understood, to “at least try to understand women’s 
distinctive experience, just as they should try to understand the experiences of blacks or Jews, 
Asians or Mormons.”145 Noting her call to have empathy serve as a “guiding light” for 
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individuals “affected by judicial decisions,” Posner’s criticism is one of practicality: “judges lack 
the time and emotional energy to enter deeply into the feelings of the litigants, let alone others 
who might be affected by the judge’s rulings.”146 Telling a judge to be more empathic toward 
those affected by a ruling gives her little guidance on how one goes about the process, let alone 
doing it adequately.  
Moreover, Posner claims that such academics are “self-popularizing” and “own-field 
policy proposing.”147 Rebuking Martha Nussbaum’s contribution to law and literature, Posner 
claims her work is a “distraction”148 that evokes a rhetorical jeremiad to advance her own brand 
of social reform.149 Her call to incorporate literature in legal education (well, all education, but 
she makes a special point of citing legal education in Poetic Justice) serves her own ideological 
ends, which she asserts “without qualification.”150 Posner agrees with Morris Dickstein’s review 
of her work as “bracingly utopian and immensely heartening… Poetic Justice is less of a study in 
literature than a lay sermon for beleaguered liberals.”151 Even if her approach were adopted, 
Posner fears, “Literature has too feeble a grip on the modern mind…and the specific values of 
cosmopolitan egalitarianism that Nussbaum propagates are too rigorist to be effectively 
inculcated.”152  
Elsewhere Posner is much more direct in his criticisms of academia’s interest in legal 
theory: 
Academic lawyers are terrific at taking apart the formal grounds of a judicial decision, 
and those are the grounds that take up most of the space in most opinions. But the 
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academics have (or express) little understanding of how cases are actually decided, where 
the judges who decided a case were coming from, and what really made them alter 
existing doctrine as distinct from what they said made them change it. The academic 
emphasis on the formal grounds of a decision conveys to law students and the bar the 
impression that every judge is a thoroughgoing legalist who can therefore be “reached” 
only by ceaseless iteration of legalist slogans such as “plain meaning” and by barrages of 
case citations.153 
Again, we see the idea of two mutually exclusive legal discourses creeping in. One emerges from 
academics in an endless array of disciplines and specialties, the other is the day-to-day discourse 
utilized by judges. The former is highly critical, often deconstructive, whereas the latter must 
operate within time constraints and amidst uncertainty, but is nonetheless productive.  
As a result of the unrealistic expectations from legalist theories and the lack of practical 
advice they offer, academia continues to have little influence on judges, much to academia’s 
chagrin. The criticisms that academics lay on the judiciary (and there are many) are more or less 
ignored. Posner notes two reasons why: “One is that although judges indeed care about whether 
they are doing and are thought by certain others (other judges, for example) to be doing a good 
job, they do not care greatly what law professors think of them.”154 No matter the field, a 
significant part of academic scholarship is criticizing the work of others. Within a given 
discipline, these criticisms can greatly affect one’s prestige within the field, making or breaking a 
career. For someone outside of the field, such as a sitting judge or justice, these criticisms have 
little if any effect on their own work or ego. I’m sure Chief Justice John Roberts could care less 
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about the arguments I’ve produced that criticize his decisions. Posner wouldn’t even bat an eye 
at this entire chapter of my dissertation. Why? Because my criticisms do not matter to them.  
“The other reason,” Posner continues, “is that law professors are not much interested in 
evaluating individual judges, except Supreme Court justices – who are the last judges to care 
about how they are thought of in the groves of academe.”155 A quick look at scholarly treatments 
of law, especially those from outside of law journals, will verify Posner’s claim. We are, for 
better or worse, enamored with the Supreme Court: the justices and their eccentric 
characteristics,156 the fascinating history behind the “least dangerous branch” of government, and 
the immense gravitas carried by Supreme Court decisions. Posner’s criticism acknowledges at 
least two flaws resulting from the academic focus on the Supreme Court. First, the bulk of 
judicial decision-making is made in the lower courts. Presently, there are 13 judicial circuits, 
each with their own court of appeals, and more than 90 federal district courts. Whereas the 
Supreme Court hears roughly 75 cases a year (only 1-2% of the number submitted for review), 
appellate and federal courts hear hundreds of thousands of cases per year. Solely focusing on the 
Supreme Court may allow scholars to sink their intellectual teeth into theoretically nuanced 
issues, but simultaneously neglects the exponentially larger scope of the U.S. judicial system. By 
focusing on the Supreme Court, one is also implicitly hoping that interesting and important cases 
make it through the immensely difficult process of being heard. I’m no mathematician, but the 
Supreme Court to lower court ratio of 75 to 300,000 does not provide much hope. The Supreme 
Court can easily ignore cases and the justices may choose to ignore a particular issue until other 
circumstances change (including the ideological composition of the court, shifting public 
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opinion, or even the sitting president/composition of congress). “The irony,” writes Posner, “is 
that Supreme Court Justices pay even less attention to academic criticism than lower-court 
judges do, though more to the reactions of legislators, the general public, and the media.”157 
The second major flaw can be summarized as an error in timeliness. “[S]cholarly interest 
in the issues rarely perks up until the issue has not only reached the Supreme Court but been 
decided by it,” writes Posner. “So mesmerized are constitutional scholars by the Supreme Court 
– which is to say by power, because few constitutional scholars have an inflated opinion of 
Supreme Court Justices – that often they delay too long in writing to have a chance of having an 
impact on constitutional law. By the time they reach the battlefield, the battle is over.”158 
Rhetoricians will recognize Posner’s criticism as academia’s failure to acknowledge and respond 
to a kairotic moment. By waiting for the Supreme Court to decide a case, the ability to affect 
change has already passed, at least for the moment. The Court rarely hears a case of a similar 
kind shortly after making a decision. If they do, they are also much more likely to follow the 
precedent previously established unless the composition of the court has shifted or public 
opinion has swung in the other direction. Posner’s reproach of academia’s ex post facto response 
to Supreme Court decisions leaves little room for timely intervention. He notes that academics 
occasionally submit amicus briefs to the Supreme Court, such as Yale’s response to the Solomon 
Amendment.159 Nonetheless, Posner finds such attempts to influence the Supreme Court as 
ultimately futile. Again, he returns to the detachment of academics from the practice of law and 
the disconnect between theory and practice.160 What, then, can rescue the legal mind from the 
trappings of legalist rhetoric and the abyss of unrealistic, unattainable theory?  
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Posner claims that we ought to look at the practice of judges rather than any systematic, 
all-encompassing legal theory. Paying attention to what judges do when they decide cases may 
provide insights into improving the process and remedying the problems produced by abstract 
theory. Generally, Posner’s arguments for practice over theory attempt to cultivate a realistic 
perspective that considers the entire spectrum of law (although significantly downplaying the 
academic), allows for flexibility in decision-making, and is an inevitable consequence given 
temporal limitations and the imperative to act.  
Unlike theoretical legalisms, Posner claims that the practice of judges must cater to 
realistic expectations both for the judges and the decisions they issue. However, his focus on the 
reality of practice serves as another way in which he can situate his economic, pragmatic position 
as the default position of balance. “Pragmatists,” argues Posner, referring to his own brand of 
“everyday” pragmatism and not philosophical, academic pragmatism, “want the law to be more 
empirical, more realistic, more attuned to the real needs of real people.”161 Rhetorically, Posner’s 
argument for “realistic” practice is antagonistic to theory. Theorists, under his characterization, 
are inherently unrealistic and, even worse, do not care about the needs of real people.  
 Perhaps disheartening to the individual who wants to view judges as heroic protectors of 
law, Posner argues that judges want to make their professional lives easier.162 “Our judges are 
strongly motivated to adhere to precedent,” writes Posner, “not only because they want to 
encourage adherence to the precedents they create, but also – and this is more important to most 
judges – because they want to limit their workloads.”163 The economic judge wants to lessen his 
workload and make the entire work process more efficient. Following the implicit norms of 
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judging, loosely guided by precedent, a judge’s decision is less likely to be reversed by a higher 
court.164 Rhetorically, Posner’s attention toward the realistic elements of judicial decision-
making allows him to return the discussion to economic terminology. Posner’s attention to 
workload, efficiency, and consequences reframes the idea of a judge away from the stoic 
defender of justice and toward the labor-market participant. 
 Generally, judges “are laboring to be good judges,”165 but “good” is frustratingly 
ambiguous. Whether we like it or not, Posner suggests, judges operate on a “judicial utility 
function.” In Overcoming Law, Posner highlights six factors that affect a judges’ decision-
making process beyond the particularities of individual cases.166 These factors include 
popularity, prestige, public interest, avoiding reversal, reputation, and voting. These are the 
professional characteristics judges attempt to “maximize” throughout their careers. Falling back 
on his default economic position, Posner describes the economic judge as one who weighs the 
costs and benefits of her position and chooses to act according to the greatest potential for wealth 
maximization. Wealth, however, must not be viewed in entirely monetary terms, but rather the 
aforementioned utility functions. Being highly regarded in the field increases one’s “wealth,” 
which “requires conformity to the accepted norms of judging.”167 Often, being a trailblazer does 
not pay, at least not in one’s lifetime.168  
The comfort of detachment allows scholars to criticize from afar without the pressures of 
actually deciding cases and facing public and political scrutiny. Consider, for example, the recent 
upheaval in the Iowa Supreme Court. Responding to the 2009 decision in Varnum v. Brien, 
which unanimously struck down a ban against same-sex marriage as unconstitutional, the voting 
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public ousted three justices associated with the decision. Charges of “judicial activism” aside, 
Posner would draw attention to the consequences judges face in their professional lives.  
One may argue against Posner’s focus on the hard reality of judicial decision-making, 
especially the desire to follow implicit judicial norms, by highlighting the progressive Warren 
Court. Known for its role in expanding civil rights, police arrest procedure, freedom of speech 
and of the press, and the separation of church and state, the Court arguably broke new judicial 
ground. True, rights and liberties were significantly expanded and defended, but the way in 
which the Warren Court articulated their arguments fell in line with the legal tradition. Citing 
precedent, rooting arguments in the Constitution, paying attention to the ebb and flow of public 
opinion, and building off of legislation all take a similar form of judicial opinions. Examined 
through a Posnerian lens, the decisions produced by the Warren Court were quite similar to their 
predecessors. The only difference is the strength of their arguments (he finds many of them 
weak) and the conclusions reached. 
By paying more attention to the realistic practice of judges rather than an abstract, 
unrealistic theoretical aspiration, the decision-making process of judges and even the law itself 
becomes more accessible to those outside the judicial sphere. Illustrating his desire to balance 
seemingly disparate groups, Posner writes, “My hope is to make [legal theory] more accessible 
and useful to practitioners, students, judges, and the interdisciplinarians themselves, and to 
bridge the conventional academic boundaries that have made legal theory sometimes seem a 
kaleidoscope or even a heap of fragments rather than a unified quest for a better understanding of 
the law.”169 Posner suggests that a realistic (read: economic) approach to law will succeed where 
so many previous iterations of legal theory have failed - namely, fostering a stasis point amongst 
an array of competing perspectives. 
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 Building off of the arguments for realistic expectations, Posner’s second major point 
supporting pragmatic practice over abstract theory stresses the inevitability of the former. When 
push comes to shove, every judge will stray from his or her theory if the situation necessitates a 
break. Posner cites the originalist’s arguments in Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, a 2007 antitrust 
decision wherein Justice Scalia and his ilk failed to follow their own legalist creed. “Right or 
wrong,” Posner concludes, “the decision in Bell Atlantic was pragmatic rather than legalist.”170 
He similarly exposes Bork to be an “uncertain” pragmatist, citing the ways in which he strayed 
from his own dogma.171 Under Posner’s reading, originalism and other academic legalisms are 
less a methodical legal theory and more of a malleable rhetorical position.172 Whether you are a 
practicing judge or a scholarly theorist, Posner earnestly believes you will inevitably succumb to 
his brand of pragmatic, economic adjudication. In concluding How Judges Think, he claims, 
“Legalists are closeted pragmatists.”173 Judicial legislation is an unavoidable consequence of the 
legislative and judicial processes,174 but enough constitutional provisions and professional norms 
exist to prevent a judge from going rogue.175 Try as they might, judges cannot completely detach 
themselves from their respective ideologies176 or emotional investments177 in particular cases or 
issues. Again, the default position is an economically imbued pragmatism, which just so happens 
to be Posner’s stance.  
 One of the important factors catering to Posner’s balancing act is his dual role as theorist 
and judge. A prolific writer, Posner has been arguing for his law and economics theory since the 
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1970s. However, unlike the majority of his academic competition, he has been a circuit court 
judge for nearly three decades. This unique rhetorical position allows him to make judgments 
about theory and professional practice with a degree of authenticity few others possess. 
Consequently, the former lets him extend his arguments, often quite broadly, whereas the latter 
prevents intrusion from outsiders. In other words, Posner is able to wax philosophic on his theory 
and the inadequacies of competing theories, but then criticize others for doing the same because 
they are not part of the judge club. His arguments for balance gain an air of legitimacy given his 
dual roles.  
 The final binary Posner constructs and strikes a balance between concerns law’s 
relationships with history. How much of the past ought to be used to determine present cases? 
Does the law have an obligation to cultivate a better future? While we are warned against being 
ruled by the “dead hand of the past,” we must nonetheless know history lest we are doomed to 
repeat it. Some theories, such as originalism, are deeply invested in history. Others, such as 
critical legal studies and some forms of radical feminist jurisprudence, argue that all law is 
inherently political, thus changes need to take place in order to ensure future equality and 
fairness. Furthermore, stare decisis continues to be a central tenet in the American common law 
tradition. As with the previous two binaries, Posner strikes down the extremes on both ends and 
proposes his economic perspective as an appropriate balance between the two. In The Frontiers 
of Legal Theory, Posner offers his most extensive treatment of the subject, which serves as a 
useful starting point. 
 Rather than beginning his discussion of the past/future binary by introducing legal 
instantiations, Posner starts with the root of the problem: the study and use of history itself. Wary 
of Foucault’s critical-cultural project, which he believes “breeds a cynicism that is quietistic, 
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even paralyzing,”178 Posner uses Nietzsche to frame a critique against arguments from history. If 
these two appear to be strange bedfellows, Posner considers the great cultural antagonist’s “On 
the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life” to be “a founding document of pragmatism.”179 
Posner advances three arguments: first, academic history is disillusioning and sometimes we 
need illusions; second, history breeds complacency; finally, significant attention to the past 
belittles the present.180 These three general critiques help establish Posner’s economic analysis of 
history and law. 
 The most prominent intersection between history and law is the use of precedent to 
decide cases. In every judicial confirmation hearing in the last 40 years, the candidate is 
inevitably questioned on his or her stance on stare decisis. How much influence ought past 
decisions have when deciding present cases, which inevitably produce future ramifications? In 
many ways, questions about precedent in such hearings are thinly veiled inquiries into 
controversial landmark cases, Roe v. Wade being the most prominent. Posner, however, wants to 
step back and question the usefulness of precedent rather than its coding for political ideology. 
From their uselessness in writing an opinion that will “survive” to the non-legal reasons why a 
judge may follow or break from precedent, Posner considers a system deeply rooted in stare 
decisis produces an imbalance between the consideration of the past and the future.181  
 One of the great dangers of arguments from history, Posner claims, is their malleability. 
The past can be worked and reworked to defend just about any position. “Judges rewrite 
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history,” writes Posner, “like commissars.”182 As a result, “Much of what passes for constitution 
law is a modern construct, but is defended by reference to ancient (as Americans measure 
historical time) texts to which it is tenuously and often only opportunistically linked.”183 After 
over 200 years of judicial decisions, American jurists are not lacking in material to craft just 
about any argument within reason (and sometimes without it). History, as law uses it, does not 
shine an illuminating beacon of light; instead, law’s use of history is a rhetorical “disguise.”184 
 The rhetorical use of history is a key feature of Posner’s deprecation of rooting 
arguments on the edicts of the past. Philosophers like Ronald Dworkin, a long-time theoretical 
sparring partner, and even scholars with whom Posner has some affinity, such as Cass Sunstein, 
all create an “historical pedigree” for rhetorical effect. Even more blatant are the originalists, a 
group he chastises for promoting historical argumentation when they suffer from the same flaws 
as their antioriginalist opposition: “But let us be clear that what they are doing is indeed rhetoric, 
and not historiography.”185 The danger is not that history is taking a rhetorical posture, but the 
fact that the theorists and judges using history in their arguments are deifying it. If the 
Constitution is the defining document in our civil religion, as Robert Bork advocated, to go 
against it is heresy. Describing history as a rhetorical flair rather than the substance of 
jurisprudence allows Posner to recognize its presence in legal scholarship and judicial-decision 
making, but still retain the more prestigious argumentative form for his law and economics 
model. 
 Law’s rhetorical use of history, however, is only half of the problem; Posner also tends to 
the problem of history’s use of law. Bruce Ackerman’s germane scholarship on American history 
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and its relationship to law (especially the Constitution) serves as Posner’s example of the 
past/future scale getting out of balance. Dividing the political-legal process into two distinct 
forms, ordinary politics and revolutionary politics, Ackerman’s project attempts to articulate how 
and why the Constitution has gone through significant changes in seemingly disparate eras. 
While Posner applauds the motivation behind Ackerman’s work, he nonetheless finds it flawed. 
Much like the law’s use of history, Posner charges Ackerman with crafting historical pedigree to 
build up his argument, which Posner finds inadequate.186 Furthermore, Posner echoes one of his 
strongest arguments against theory over practice; namely, to view and use history the way in 
which Ackerman does would “place upon the courts the unsupportable burden of identifying 
constitutional ‘moments’ and determining which aspects of them should be deemed of 
constitutional dignity.”187 To follow a historicist line of argument is ultimately impractical and, 
thus, an irrelevant addition to the law. Ackerman’s work is history and ought to be evaluated on 
those terms.188 
 One of the interesting turns Posner takes against Ackerman’s model of historical 
argumentation is a critique against its purported naturalness, which is, ironically, an argument he 
utilizes to characterize his own approach. After describing Ackerman’s work as a “radical 
proposal,” Posner attempts to peel back the layers and show his readers what is really going on: 
“Ackerman does not believe that the past is normative or want to return us to the original 
understanding of the Constitution-amending process. His aim is to make his radical proposal 
seem natural by presenting historical analogies to it and desirable by identifying historical 
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crises that might have been averted had something like his proposal been in effect.”189 Again 
attacking the rhetorical form over substance, Posner is wary of rhetorics in which a position is 
deemed “natural.” Yet, throughout his characterizations (and deprecations) of other legal 
theories, he continuously posits his brand of economic pragmatism as a default, natural position.  
In the subsequent chapter after Posner criticizes Ackerman, he characterizes American 
lawyers and jurists as possessing a natural bent toward pragmatic adjudication.190American legal 
pragmatism, which is almost indistinguishable from law and economics as Posner describes 
them, is something lawyers and judges inevitably are. As it applies to Posner’s attempt to 
balance between extreme and unappealing binaries, proposing a single perspective as “natural” 
attempts to set the scale to zero. Other theorists add weight to one side of the scale or the other, 
throwing the scale of in their favor. They add a few ounces to one side of the three binaries. 
While Posner takes off the weight put on other legal theories, he engages in a rhetorical slight-of-
hand to keep the balance tipped in his favor. While the scale reads 0.0, we must look to see if 
Posner’s thumb is on it while he points out the flaws of other theories with his other hand.  
Ever the pragmatist, Posner does not disregard arguments from history out of hand; they 
are simply inadequate on their own. After all, sometimes a pragmatist needs to be a formalist in 
order to be a pragmatist.191 At their best, historic analogies can serve as a useful frame and 
limitation for present decisions, yet “do not dictate…the outcome of today’s cases.”192 The past, 
through this view, is a tool in the judge’s toolbox. Sometimes it will be the right tool for the job 
and sometimes it won’t. Most of the time it will play its role while other tools play theirs until 
together they have crafted a decision.  
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History-as-tool helps illuminate another point Posner makes supporting historic 
arguments: they must be used to create something.193 Again borrowing from Nietzsche, Posner 
advocates a view of history that is fluid and moving, as opposed to a stagnant “truth.” History 
does not just exist; it is used to make and remake identities. These identities may be at the 
individual level or on the much grander national stage, such as the identity of the Constitution. 
Importantly, history may play this role in abstentia. A key element of Nietzsche’s essay is 
strategic forgetting. Sometimes it is not helpful to remember everything. “Truth is good,” Posner 
writes, “but there are other goods, which forgetting or even forging the historical record might 
promote.”194 Although he does not cite any particular cases that ought to be forgotten, Posner 
notes the meteoric expanse of privacy rights and freedom of speech in the mid-20th century as 
examples of strategically forgetting history in order to produce decisions with a particular 
outcome.195 
Even without the idea of history as one tool amongst many, Posner acknowledges the 
strong pull such arguments have with the general public.  
Commitment, reliance, information, even inertia are reasons for standing by decisions 
made in the past. But to call the past itself normative is a mystification. It might be an 
indispensible mystification if the general public believed it, because then the legitimacy 
of judicial decision might depend upon the judges’ accepting the yoke of history. The 
general public believes something like this, that decisions must be “rooted” in 
authoritative sources of law, but is pretty casual about the sources. Uninterested in and 
uninformed about history, the public is unlikely to demand that modern cases be decided 
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consistently with ancient texts and precedents. Otherwise Robert Bork would have been 
confirmed as a Supreme Court Justice.196 
Posner’s claim addresses at least two important points. First, one cannot simply disregard the 
public’s conception of law. What the capricious and ill-informed public believes and advocates 
may not be systematic, but it is a powerful force nonetheless. Ignoring them is a dangerous 
gamble that failed Supreme Court nominee Bork knows all too well. Second, although the public 
wants some connection with dated authorities, they are quite relaxed in their expectations. Why? 
Unlike theorists who want a systematic theory to encapsulate the entirety of law, most people 
just want to know what will get them into trouble, they want to know how the law will effect 
them in their day-to-day routine. If there is a history of a particular act going unpunished for a 
number of years and all of the sudden a previously unenforced law is being used against citizens, 
their will likely be a public outlash. Posner wants as much history in law as citizens do: just 
enough to get by. 
 Finally, arguments from history, as flawed as they may be, nonetheless cultivate 
stability, a vital element in any healthy judicial system.197 When a citizenry does not know how 
courts are going to decide cases, problems ensue. True, legislators create statutes, which are 
public record, but a) these laws may be implemented without the knowledge of citizens (last I 
checked, C-SPAN’s ratings were not topping the charts), and b) these laws may be vague, over-
reaching, or inapplicable to highly complicated cases. As a result, such laws may produce a 
chilling effect wherein citizens do not engage in acts that are legal because they believe they 
might be illegal. The paradigmatic goody-goody, Ned Flanders, exhibits this position well. When 
suffering a series of personal tragedies a la the biblical Job, Flanders pleads with God and asks 
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why he’s being punished: “Why me, Lord? Where have I gone wrong? I've always been nice to 
people. I don't drink or dance or swear. I've even kept Kosher just to be on the safe side. I've 
done everything the bible says, even the stuff that contradicts the other stuff.” Unpredictable 
courts may lead to an unnecessarily restrained citizenry full of worrisome Neds. Yet, the 
opposite is also possible: when courts are unpredictable, chaos and upheaval may result.  
  Balancing on the other end of the spectrum opposite the past is, of course, the future. 
Similar to the theory/practice binary, on the surface Posner appears to greatly favor a future-
oriented legal theory. Once again calling upon his judicial hero, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 
Posner associates pragmatism with forward-looking, progressive law.198 “For Holmes,” Posner 
writes fondly, “the best legal thought is modern, because only a modern thinker can come to 
grips with modern problems.”199 This does not mean the past is irrelevant, just not useful in 
isolation. Posner continues, “[Holmes] is a legal paleontologist, identifying doctrines and 
practices that exist in modern law not because they are functional but because the struggle for 
survival that powers evolution has somehow failed to weed them out.”200 At its worst, precedent 
inhibits the evolutionary progress of law and preserves statutes to the detriment of present and 
future societies. 
 Posner’s economic judge embraces change as long as it marks improvement or a more 
adept response to contemporary problems, both of which he frames as forms of wealth 
maximization. Statutes are no longer unwavering dicta, but rather “resource[s] for coping with 
the problems of the present, which is to say the statute’s future.”201 In this regard, Posner aligns 
closely with “living constitution” advocates: statutes are not written in stone, they must be 
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flexible enough to deal with unforeseeable problems. Proponents of the living constitution, 
however, lack a sound method and are subject to the ebb and flow of political ideology. Posner 
places himself in a compelling rhetorical position by criticizing the formalists for their naïve 
view of language and interpretation while also distancing himself from living constitutionalists 
by criticizing their methodology. The economic judge is able to fill the void he creates by 
embracing a future-oriented jurisprudence while still promoting a supposedly stable 
methodological framework. 
But why so much attention to the future? One of the main reasons is the economic focus 
on consequences: the consequences of a law or statute have little to do with the past. 
Consequences occur in the present and their ramifications echo into the future. Citing the 
normative element of law and economics, Posner argues “it also tries to improve law by pointing 
out respects in which existing or proposed laws have unintended or undesirable consequences 
and by proposing practical reforms.”202 Nonetheless, too much attention to the future has its 
problems as well. Critical Legal Studies, for example, deems all law and judicial decision-
making as political. They also want to acknowledge and respond to consequences, but for 
different reasons. Unlike law and economics, CLS promotes a much more activist, sometimes 
radical, posture. As Posner characterizes their position, if judges across the country were to adopt 
a CLS attitude, stability would be forfeited. Attempting to craft a particular future is one thing, 
but to do so with swift and sweeping changes in the courts is a recipe for political and social 
disaster. Law and economics succeeds where CLS and other future-minded theories fail by 
tending to the past and keeping decisions narrowly focused. Again, Posner’s law and economics 
attempts to function as the balance between the deification of the past and the overzealous 
preoccupation with the future.  
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 With these three binaries now described, we must step back and ask: what is the 
economic judge’s balancing act doing? I have already noted several implications. First, the 
posture of balance carries with it significant sway in American ideology. We like the idea of 
balance. It presumes harmony amidst strife and an ability to set aside cultural and political 
allegiances to find a middle way. As Robert Patterson and Ronald Lee aptly note, balance 
functions as a god-term.203 Nobody wants to be against it and it is terribly difficult to pin down. 
But balance is not a thing to be discovered; rather, it is rhetorically constructed and deployed. 
Those individuals able to define the balanced position for any given idea hold a formidable 
advantage over their competition. This is especially potent in law where balance is already 
reinforced as a point of integrity.  
Second, balance is stable. A well-balanced legal philosophy, much like a well-balanced 
breakfast, has a little bit of everything and leaves you full and satisfied. Posner rightly argues 
that stability is important for law. By characterizing competing legal philosophies as falling into 
a set of dichotomous positions, Posner is able to imply that subscribing to them would yield 
chaos and catastrophe.  
Third, balance is neutral. Although Posner claims he is skeptical of any legal philosophy 
that describes itself as neutral, he nonetheless characterizes his own law and economics project 
in such terms. Posner presents his philosophy as a zeroed-out scale with the philosophy adding 
no pressure to the ultimate decision.  
Finally, balance is natural. Consider, for example, the typical description of an 
ecosystem. Aside from human intervention, ecosystems are often described as thriving in a 
delicate balance. If one element increases, (e.g. predators), the rest of the ecosystem responds 
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accordingly and adjusts the system to keep an even keel. Economic adjudication provides 
homeostasis wherein all the cogs of the judicial system are working together to yield efficient, 
effective, wealth maximizing judgments. These benefits of balance – harmony, stability, 
neutrality, and naturalness – reinforce the second faculty of judgment touted by Posner: common 
sense.  
 
2.3 ECONOMIC COMMON SENSE 
Throughout Posner’s work, he imbues law and economics with a vague, yet powerful notion of 
common sense. In doing so, the economic judge holds a privileged position between out-of-touch 
legal academics and the legally ignorant hoi poloi. The economic judge is situated in a rhetorical 
position that allows him or her to “call down” academics from the Ivory Tower, arguing that 
their theories that are too detached from the realities of adjudication. Their lack of common sense 
might be summed up as being “too smart for their own good.” While criticizing “high theory” for 
its obtuseness and irrelevancy, the economic judge also “calls up” the general public who remain 
uneducated about the scope, procedure, and purpose of law. They may have the “street-smarts” 
that academics tend to lack, but they lack the sufficient “book-smarts” required for sound 
judgment. By aligning the idea of common sense with the process of economic rationalization, 
the judgments rendered by the economic judge are de facto common sense judgments.  
 With all of this talk of common sense, a question remains: what is common sense? 
Perhaps the best characterization parallels Justice Potter Stewart’s famous description of 
pornography: “I know it when I see it.”204 Some scholars are reluctant to define common sense 
even if they utilize the concept in their work, instead assuming it is something “out there” that 
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can legitimate or undermine arguments.205 There are many historic definitions and uses of 
common sense and these definitions tend to snowball on to one another rather than replace 
previous definitions. This is not to suggest that judgments rendered from common sense would 
take the same form in different time periods. What constitutes common sense today is markedly 
different than 1950s common sense, or 1850s common sense, or 50s common sense. One of the 
reasons why common sense is so rhetorically appealing is its ephemeralness; all the definitions 
of common sense are accurate in some way or another. Although it is neither my goal nor my 
intention to offer an all-encompassing definition of common sense, the historic definitions 
underscore some shared assumptions about what common sense “is,” why it is useful (or 
harmful), and how it is rhetorically effective. 
 Historically, there have been a number of different invocations of common sense for 
various reasons. Whereas many scholars point to the Aberdeen Philosophical Society as the 
origin of a systematic and engaged common sense philosophy, others note that the tradition 
reaches as far back as Aristotle. They stress Aristotle’s response to Platonic idealism and note the 
former’s attention to the physical senses (e.g. sight, touch, taste) as the means by which humans 
gain a shared knowledge of their surroundings.206 Emanating from Aristotle’s work in the natural 
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sciences, this characterization represents a physical definition of common sense. The Scottish 
Enlightenment would adopt, in part, a similar definition responding to philosophical skepticism 
and the subjectiveness of human experience. In addition, Aristotle’s Rhetoric suggests another 
notion of common sense in the rhetorical topoi. 207 Drawing from Aristotle’s Topics, Perelman 
and Olbrecths-Tyteca note that  
Common sense admits the existence of unquestioned and unquestionable truths; it admits 
that certain rules are “beyond discussion,” and that certain suggestions “do not deserve 
discussion.” An established fact, a self-evident truth, an absolute rule, carry in themselves 
the affirmation of their unquestionable character, excluding the possibility of pro and con 
argumentation. Unanimous agreement on particular propositions can make it very 
difficult to question them.208 
The topoi – or commonplaces – constitute an array of general argumentative appeals that are 
effective with all audiences. Unlike the “special” topoi, which focus on the commonplace 
arguments available in forensic, epideictic, and deliberative rhetorics, common sense is a one of 
the “general” topoi that can be deployed in virtually any rhetorical situation. Herein, we have the 
definition of common sense as a rhetorical trope. 
 Cicero’s conception of common sense builds off of Aristotle’s second characterization 
and runs closer to its contemporary use. A vital element for the successful orator, sensus 
communis is composed of two distinct yet connected formulations. The first is the ability to 
know the general disposition of the crowd – how they think and what they think about. What sort 
of language caters to all (or at least most) of them? What sort of cultural influences have they 
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had? This element of sensus communis concerns the persuasive power of shared discourses and 
experiences when a specific audience has them in common and a rhetor deploys them 
effectively.209 The second form is much more general and cosmopolitan. Echoing Aristotle’s 
topoi, this formulation situates sensus communis as a natural process of judgment that any 
audience would find appealing.210 For the successful orator, possessing both forms is necessary 
for effective persuasion.  
 These classical notions of common sense were reintroduced and built upon in two key 
periods in the Enlightenment, one at the beginning and one at the end. The first was Vico’s 
incorporation of sensus communis in his humanist response to the growing influence of scientific 
reason and discourse.211 For Vico, sensus communis was not only a type of shrewd knowledge 
characteristic of Aristotle’s topoi and Cicero’s two formulations, but also an objective to pursue 
through rhetoric. Vico saw scientific reason intruding on civic life, undermining the common 
beliefs and values that unite society. A humanist, Vico argued that human history and poetic 
narratives grounded and maintained a healthy society, which is one of the reasons he celebrates 
rhetoric throughout his work. For Vico, rhetoric is the art that cultivates and maintains sensus 
communis while also working toward it.  
 More prominent, however, are the philosophical and political uses of common sense that 
emerged in the late 18th century, including the Scottish common sense tradition, Kant’s Critique 
of Judgment, and Thomas Paine’s revolutionary Common Sense. Scottish common sense 
philosophy emerged, in part, as a response to Hume’s skepticism and his (in)famous argument to 
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debunk causality.212 Unwilling to accept such an upheaval of practical and philosophical thought, 
the members of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, including Thomas Reid, George Campbell, 
and James Beattie responded with arguments grounded in a “universally accessible”213 common 
sense. Reid claimed that common sense is an imperative and inevitable element of inquiry, not a 
base or suspect form of knowledge. Instead of focusing on the abstractions of philosophy, 
common sense tends to the everyday resources of judgment.214 “I despise Philosophy, and 
renounce its guidance” proclaims Reid, “let my soul dwell with Common Sense.”215 Arguably 
more influential, was George Campbell and his treatment of common sense and rhetoric. 
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Campbell argued in Philosophy of Rhetoric that common sense is a necessary element for any 
knowledge acquisition, expression, or judgment, and is also key feature of rhetoric.216  
 Whereas Reid and Campbell turned to epistemological common sense, Flavio Comim 
argues that Adam Smith incorporated a psychological notion of common sense that ran 
throughout his economic theories “which works as a first principle of analysis.”217 Citing Smith’s 
appeals to “sympathy,” the “plain man,” and his characterization of the “impartial spectator,” 
Comim claims that Smith’s economic theory maintains a basic assumption of a psychological 
common sense in order to function well.218 If one wants to understand and predict how the 
Scottish people will behave – a pretty important question for a Scottish economist – then one 
needs to know the habits and norms that frame their judgments. 
 Immanuel Kant similarly united judgment and rhetorical appeal in common sense, 
particularly in judgments of taste. Unlike his first two Critiques, Kant’s Critique of Judgment is 
exhibits a humanistic tendency within which common sense serves as an argumentative 
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groundwork for aesthetic judgment.219 In many ways, Kant’s use of common sense is the 
application of Cicero’s notion but limited to the aesthetic world, as common sense here 
construed functions as a form of social knowledge and a vital element of rhetorical engagement. 
 The most recognizable American contribution to the rhetoric of common sense was 
Thomas Paine’s famous and appropriately-titled pamphlet, Common Sense. Unlike the 
aforementioned philosophical treatises, Paine was not interested in defining common sense or 
explicating its epistemological functions. Rather, Paine tapped into its rhetorical power as a trope 
and used it to stir revolution. Much has been made of the rhetorical merits of Paine’s work and 
rightfully so. Stephen Lucas cites Common Sense as the argument that tipped the scales in favor 
of colonial revolution.220 In part due to the rhetorical style221 and charisma222 of Paine’s 
argument, Common Sense received unprecedented recognition. With “enormously fortuitous 
timing”223 and “published in just the right place,”224 Paine balanced a “literary style that 
combined the rough poetry of the public house with the righteous zeal and vivid imagery of a 
preacher, and that set out a grand political vision in familiar words and elegantly simple 
sentences.”225 Important for our discussion is the way in which Paine’s articulation of common 
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sense was immensely persuasive and was able to speak to seemingly disparate groups within the 
colonies. He does not define common sense explicitly, for to do so minimizes its rhetorical 
power. Instead, Paine makes a set of arguments that allow individual readers to bring in their 
personal experiences, to graft their notions of common sense onto Paine’s arguments, thus 
joining speaker and audience. In doing so, Paine illustrates its enthymematic potential. 
 These philosophical and rhetorical invocations of common sense during the 18th century 
stress what Michael Billig calls the concept’s two forms: “There is an anthropological, or 
restricted, sense which confines particular versions of common-sense to particular communities 
or audiences. Then there is an unrestricted use, which implies that there is a common-sense to 
which all audiences subscribe.”226 Billig notes how the 18th century invocations of common 
sense, such as George Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric, draw on the unrestricted form: 
common sense as universal and accessible to everyone. The unrestricted form, however, neglects 
the many ways in which culture contributes to common sense. The rhetorical tradition often opts 
for the restricted use: “Each community possess its own common-sense, expressed in common-
place, but nevertheless potent, symbols. It is these common-places which the orator is advised to 
invoke, even when seeking to criticize the audience.”227 Nonetheless, the restricted appeal to 
common sense rarely acknowledges it as such. A rhetor is unlikely to implore an audience to act 
based on their common sense; rather, she or he will use a restricted notion of common sense, but 
deploy it in unrestricted terminology.  
 John Brewer stresses this often unrecognized element, noting that individuals share a 
similar process by which they construct common sense, but the results can differ significantly. 
Yet, individuals perceive a shared stock of common knowledge. “In short,” Brewer argues, “ the 
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social world becomes ‘real’ and ‘factual’ not because of shared or common stocks of beliefs, 
maxims, ideas and types but because of the assumption of shared and common beliefs, maxims, 
ideas and types. The assumption of their universality and actual universality are two completely 
different things.”228 Brewer’s analysis suggests that “common sense” constitutes an important 
“ideograph.” Defining the ideograph as “a high-order abstraction representing collective 
commitment to a particular but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal,”229 Michael Calvin 
McGee suggests words like “liberty” and “equality” (and, I propose, “common sense”) are 
culture-bound and have the ability to affect social consciousness.230 Furthermore, the only way to 
understand such abstract concepts is to address how they are used,231 which reflect upon 
historically situated collectivities.232 McGee references “popular history” (i.e. film, current 
events, literature, music, etc.) as points at which ideographs may be implemented and, as a result, 
traced.233 In addition to its 2500-year-old philosophical and rhetorical history, common sense 
currently holds a prized place in rhetoric and social knowledge. One quick search of “common 
sense” brings countless news results citing the need for, presence of, or noticeable lack of 
common sense, yet offer little indication as to what constitutes the common sense from which 
they are composing their arguments. Gun laws, immigration, environmental legislation, and 
firework regulation inspire common sense responses – all of which invoke a vague notion of 
common sense used to justify their position. As a result, groups with competing interests vie to 
be on the side of common sense. The way in which different groups, such as Intelligent Design 
and evolution, assert that common sense is on their side highlights its paradoxical yet powerful 
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use. Returning to Michael Billig, he notes how two mutually exclusive arguments attempt to 
stake their claim, such as the prosecution and defense in a trial.234 Each contends that their side 
reflects common sense whereas the opposition clouds the issue. Rather than being problematic, 
the paradoxical invocation of common sense is useful for the rhetor:  
Both logoi and anti-logoi are presumed to co-exist within common-sense, and we can 
assume this state to be quite normal and not associated with the presumed angst of 
cognitive dissonance… The ordinary person, whose mind is filled with the contrary 
tendencies of common-sense, will resemble the desk-bound orator: each possesses 
contrary common-places, which are lurking within the mind, awaiting the call to be to be 
used in one-sided advocacy.235 
Because common sense functions as an ideograph rather than a logic, it lends itself to all manner 
of invocations and interpretations, all of which are beneficial to the rhetor.  
 Billig’s approach to common sense suggests a practical orientation that examines how the 
concept is used and he avoids arguing about its intrinsic merits. Critics in sociology and cultural 
studies are not so sympathetic. Drawing inspiration from Gramsci’s critique of hegemony, 
sociologists and cultural studies scholars lament what they consider to be part of an oppressive 
ideology. “For Gramsci,” writes Daniel Linger, “hegemony springs not only from the explicit 
ideological, moral, and philosophical underpinnings of power but also from less fully conscious, 
transparent realms of thought - the experientially insistent world of common sense.”236 Common 
sense serves as an understated yet extremely powerful mode of ideological maintenance, creating 
a false sense of normalcy amidst socio-political power imbalances. Linger continues, “This 
taken-for-granted portion of culture, the fragmented ‘“spontaneous philosophy” of the 
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multitude’, muddies perceptions of injustice, inducing political passivity. In short, common sense 
makes revolution hard to think.”237 John Brewer adds, “[Gramsci] argued that ideologies 
percolate down to common sense and that ‘official meanings’ became a part of common 
sense.”238 This hegemonic conception of common sense suggests it is an unreflective form of 
social knowledge that is easily susceptible to exploitation.  
 One of the important aspects of common sense’s hegemonic power comes from its 
appearance of constancy, which Stuart Hall argues makes it “a site of struggle (between 
competing definitions) and a stake - a prize to be won - in the conduct of particular struggles."239 
For rhetoricians, this notion of common sense as a struggle over definition is particularly 
important. Noting the potential dangers of losing this battle, Errol Lawrence characterized 
“common sense racism” as a set of taken-for-granted assumptions legitimated by personal 
experiences, social relations, and a belief system that presumes permanence.240 Although 
common sense itself is not bad or manipulative, it can be used to reinforce and maintain skewed 
and socially damaging perspectives.  
 Pierre Bourdieu shares a similar skepticism of common sense. Describing Bourdieu’s 
characterization of common sense, Richard Terdiman writes, 
For inevitably it reproduces precisely the common assumptions and understandings… 
whose misperceptions and inadequacies any in- depth research seeks to uncover. In putting 
this common sense to the test by challenging its fundamental assertions and 
presuppositions, writing like Bourdieu's also tests and challenges plain, "common-sense" 
writing styles because they tacitly assume precisely what Bourdieu wants to call into 
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question: that reader and writer share a comfortable and unproblematical understanding of 
the meaning of words, of categories, and of social practices themselves, that we already 
know the truth about the very things which on the contrary Bourdieu claims need to be 
brought to light.241 
Again, we see the recurring theme of common sense as an untested set of principles that often 
reinforces an overpowering status quo. Even the commonality of language comes into question 
because of the different experiences each individual brings to bear on a given idea. 
 The contemporary relationship between common sense and sociology can be equally 
inhospitable. Examining the various ways common sense is addressed in sociology, particularly 
introductory textbooks, James Mathisen notes that a running theme characterizes common sense 
as an unreflective and often dangerous form of social knowledge. Listing negative depictions in 
rapid succession, Mathisen calls attention to the invocation of science.242 The author’s of several 
textbooks attempt to distinguish common sense from science and then align sociology with the 
latter. Because it has not gone through intense scrutiny (and would presumably falter if it were 
scrutinized), common sense lacks the legitimacy necessary to advance quality arguments. “The 
‘remedy’ for common sense in many texts,” writes Mathisen, “apparently is a positivistic 
scientism in which students place their trust.”243 The problem, Mathisen later notes, is that 
“students are urged to trade in their commonsense myths for various myths of how sociology as a 
science operates.”244 As we will see, Posner attempts to avoid the friction between common 
sense and science by reframing common sense as an economic science. 
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These arguments against common sense have done little to impact its role in the public 
sphere. Public audiences are less likely to have the time and resources needed to scrutinize 
arguments. Instead, they utilize their own experiences to tell whether or not a common sense 
argumentation is really all that common and makes any sense. The economic judge is able to tap 
into the rhetorical wealth of common sense by distancing him or herself from academic 
philosophy and reframing economic judgment as a form of common sense. At least since Paine’s 
pamphlet, common sense has played a prominent role in American political and philosophical 
history, including what has been described as the only truly American philosophy: pragmatism. 
The role of common sense in pragmatism is especially important given our attention to Richard 
Posner, who continuously aligns himself with the pragmatist tradition. Charles Sanders Peirce, 
often cited as the father of pragmatism, advocated a “critical common-sensism,” which imbued 
Thomas Reid’s approach with Kant’s critical project.245 William James was similarly interested 
in the relationship between common sense and science, although adopts a less critical edge. 
Dividing knowledge into three spheres – common sense, science, and philosophy – James writes, 
“Common sense is BETTER for one sphere of life, science for another, philosophic criticism for 
a third; but whether either be TRUER absolutely, Heaven only knows.”246 He encourages 
suspicion of common sense, but nonetheless recognizes its prominent place. Not to be left out, 
John Dewey also addressed science and common sense, arguing that neither can survive on their 
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own. Rather they are frames of reference, two ways of looking at the world that can benefit one 
another.247  
 Posner breaks from his pragmatic lineage by connecting good and useful common sense 
as inherently economic and rooted in cost-benefit analysis. Common sense without an economic 
mindfulness for consequences suffers from the same challenges sociologists and cultural studies 
theorists have also posed – it is ideological and unreflective. “[C]ommon-sense does not provide 
a unitary discourse,” warns Posner, “for it overflows with numerous bits and pieces, creating and 
recreating endless ‘ideological dilemmas.’”248 “[P]olitics shades into ideology,” he argues 
elsewhere, “which in turn shades into common sense, moral insight, notions of sound policy, and 
other common ineradicable elements of judicial decision making.”249 Posner’s suggests that 
economics quells these fears by being a neutral analytic tool.  
 Posner blends common sense into economics by stressing what he considers to be their 
points of intersection: cost/benefit analysis and practical usefulness. For example, discussing the 
law of evidence, Posner argues that Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which deals with 
incontestable facts, is “obviously sound as a matter of economics as well as common sense” as 
determined by the cost-benefit ratio.250 Later in the same article he links common sense with 
economic usefulness.251 Similar themes appear in his analyses of consumer commerce,252 
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negligence,253 religious freedom,254 and antitrust law.255 Economics becomes the standard by 
which the quality of common sense is determined by imbuing it with a scientific method and 
resisting political or ideological influence. As a result, Posner presents the economic judge as a 
paradigm example of good common sense.  
 Distancing the economic judge from academic pragmatism and offering his own 
“everyday” pragmatism in its stead serves as the first of his rhetorical constructions and grants 
him the ability to call academics down from their Ivory Tower. Under this view, the 
aforementioned academic “legalist” theories focus too much on complicated abstractions and 
advocate for legal idea(l)s that simply cannot be put into practice. Moreover, they are written for 
a narrow academic audience, making their application all the more difficult for sitting judges. 
Common sense serves as a bulwark against endless and often specious theorizing. In many ways, 
Posner’s characterization of academia echoes Aristophanes’ early criticism of philosophy. In 
Clouds, Aristophanes caricatures the paralyzing assiduousness of Platonic philosophy, labeling 
Socrates a “priest of pedantic prattle.”256 In his desire to learn “philosophy,” the character 
Strepsiades vehemently protests against an interest in practical affairs: “No, no, no! I’m not 
interested in politics and carrying on in the assembly.”257 Depicted here, philosophy is not simply 
hair spitting, but also a harmful disassociation from the world of everyday experience.  
Posner, too, characterizes academic philosophers as overscrupulous, countering their 
persnickety disposition with common sense: “To practical people, however, including judges and 
lawyers and even many law professors, philosophy is an exasperating subject. Philosophers seem 
                                                 
253 Richard A. Posner, “A Theory of Negligence,” The Journal of Legal Studies 1.1 (Jan. 1972), 29-96. 
254 Richard A. Posner, “An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom,” The University of 
Chicago Law Review 56.1 (Winter 1989), 1-60. 
255 Richard A. Posner, “A Program for the Antitrust Division,” The University of Chicago Law Review 
38.3 (Spring 1971), 500-536. 
256 Aristophanes, Clouds, trans. Peter Meineck (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), 359. 
257 Ibid., 432. 
 
 - 133 - 
preoccupied with questions that no one with a modicum of common sense and a living to earn 
would waste a minute on.”258 Notice how Posner characterizes philosophers (and, implicitly, 
other theorists) as consumed by irrelevant problems that have nothing to do with how “real” 
people live their lives. Although common sense remains vague and undefined, he situates it as a 
useful source of practical knowledge that can call these highfalutin’ thinkers down from the 
clouds.  
Much like Aristophanes’ acerbic portrayal of Ancient Greek philosophers, Posner’s 
prioritization of common sense serves an important rhetorical function by associating his 
perspective with the lay public. Posner is less interested in getting in picking a fight with 
academics about the nature of law and more interested in convincing an audience of his judicial 
peers and the learned public that good adjudication is economic. Building broad appeal, Posner 
claims that common sense emanates from the general public and serves as a useful bulwark 
against bad policies: “The people are the repository of common sense, which, dull though it is, is 
a barrier to the mad schemes, whether of social engineering or foreign adventures, hatched by 
specialists and intellectuals.”259 This characterization of common sense serves at least three 
rhetorical purposes. First, Posner is able to gain broad public support by praising the nebulous 
“people” as sage guides, in effect calling them into being. Their collective intuition serves as an 
adequate tool used to discern good from bad, right from wrong, and useful from useless. Do they 
know specialized, technical, and nuanced arguments for a particular policy or law? No, but their 
naïveté is actually a strength:  
People don’t want to be lectured to by their intellectual superiors about needing to 
become informed about esoteric political issues, to participate actively in political and 
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ideological deliberation, to subordinate their interests to some abstract public interest, and 
to allocate previous time to the political arena. But they do want to be heard concerning 
their interests by those who have power to do anything to protect or advance those 
interests.260 
By praising the enduring wisdom of the people, Posner’s rhetorical strategy is not to describe the 
public, but instead call a particular public into being as audience. 261 It is a way of constituting a 
particular audience that is predisposed toward his economic interpretation of law. Labeling his 
view “everyday,” Posner is simultaneously calling into question other legal theories (he 
considers most of them vacuous) while also positioning the economic judge as the voice of 
common sense, as “of the people.” In many ways, Posner is telling the people who they are: 
rational deliberators capable of sound decisions.  
Second, Posner strategically ignores both the many ways in which public opinion is 
grossly under/misinformed and the many instances of their “intellectual superiors” initiating a 
positive social cascade. A 2005 study illustrated the staggeringly low aptitude Americans have 
for basic scientific information.262 History and politics fare little better. Americans are more than 
twice as likely to know two family members from the television show The Simpsons than two of 
the five freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment.263 Consider also the growing number of 
citizens who believe President Obama is a Muslim (18%)264 and believe he was probably born 
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out of the country (26%).265 The people, to which Posner ascribes a sage-like common sense, are 
less of a barrier against “mad schemes” than they are siphons channeling it into public discourse. 
 Finally, and most importantly, Posner is able to cast doubt on scholars and recast the 
legal system, particularly judges, as bastions of common sense wisdom set to protect the lay 
public from intellectual elitism. Rather than “slumming” it with common sense discourse as John 
Lyne suspects scientists must do,266 Posner embraces the discourse as a way to garner rhetorical 
appeal with his two target audiences – the legal community (judges, lawyers, etc.) and the lay 
public. Theorists and critics from other disciplines (philosophy, rhetoric, sociology, political 
science, history, literary studies, etc.) are outsiders looking in, many of whom serve as a 
distraction from the practice of law. Common sense lets Posner call down the academics to a 
level of reasonableness his audiences already understand. As I will argue, Posner plays a similar 
trick but in the other direction, instead aligning common sense with expertise in order to call up 
the lay public. 
 By associating law and the lay public by way of common sense, Posner is able to build up 
the publicness of his philosophy. His appeal may be most effective because of the many ways in 
which people talk the language of law in their everyday discourse. U. S. discourse is brimming 
with legalisms. Noting Tocqueville’s early recognition of such American discursive habits,267 
Mary Ann Glendon argues that legal vocabulary has become increasingly influential for the 
citizenry: “This ‘legalization’ of popular culture is both cause and consequence of our increasing 
tendency to look to law as an expression and carrier of the few values that are widely shared in 
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our society: liberty, equality, and the ideal of justice under law.”268 She continues, “Legal 
discourse has not only become the single most important tributary to political discourse, but it 
has crept into the languages that Americans employ around the kitchen table, in the 
neighborhood, and in their diverse communities of memory and mutual aid.”269 Law, for good or 
ill, has infused itself with contemporary discourse and goes well beyond its disciplinary bounds. 
As a result, the ways in which the public philosophizes about itself are similarly imbued with 
law. By positioning his economic judge as synonymous with (or, at the very least, sympathetic 
to) the common sense of the public, Posner is drawing on the public’s already present discursive 
tendencies.  
 To rely on the public’s amorphous common sense, however, is a dangerous gamble. 
Unwilling to put all his chips on calling down academics in favor of the people, Posner relies 
equally on a cultivated common sense and the need to call up the uninformed public. Posner 
recognizes the dual roles of common sense, noting its public and judicial manifestations: 
Common sense is what ‘everybody knows’ without having to think hard about the 
subject. So it is elliptical, like intuition. And it is culturally specific. But within a culture 
it is a valid though flawed source of knowledge. It operates in judicial decision making as 
a set of policy judgments that everyone agrees on and so are not thought political at all. A 
lawyer’s position in a case in the open area that violates common sense is a strong 
candidate for rejection. The doctrine that a literal reading of statute is to be rejected when 
it would lead to an absurd result illustrates the use of common sense as judicial 
technique.270 
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Here marks the tipping point where Posner recognizes many of the attributes of common sense 
addressed by Billig while simultaneously etching a special form of common sense for the 
economic judge. Throughout much of Posner’s extensive work, he speaks as an experienced 
judge and attempts to characterize law as what judges do. As we saw earlier, he uses this position 
to call down philosophers and other academics. But common sense as public opinion is a poor 
guide. Consequently, he must cultivate a refined conception of common sense that caters to the 
sitting judge, one that reinforces the common law tradition as a special (and necessary) kind of 
common sense.  
Justice Oliver Wendell, Jr. began his seminal book The Common Law by flipping the idea 
of law on its head. “The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience… The law 
embodies the story of a nation’s development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with 
as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.”271 The experience to 
which Holmes is referring concerns judges who must deal with ill-defined laws, a socially 
evolving society, and unexpected nuances present in the most difficult cases. The common law, 
as Holmes characterized it, is a narrative; an unfinished story that grows within a culture. In 
many ways, judges serve as the chief storytellers. They must sculpt decisions that define and 
redefine the culture, but their decisions are only moments in an enduring chain. Some of these 
moments are lost or forgotten (and rightfully so), whereas others serve as pivotal points that are 
constantly brought into the nation’s grander narrative. Marbury v. Madison, Dred Scot v. 
Sanford, Plessy v. Ferguson, Gitlow v. New York, Brown v. Board of Education, Gideon v. 
Wainwright, Griswold v. Connecticut, Roe v. Wade, Bush v. Gore, Citizens United v. FCC – 
these cases mark important moments in our judicial and national narrative. All, however, are 
subject to alteration. Through their experience in the judiciary, judges become better storytellers, 
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which suggests a growing rhetorical acumen. Yet, their role utilizes a particular discourse and set 
of experiences that is unique to them. It is this privileged position that Posner taps into when he 
attempts to call the public up. 
Characterizing the law as a distinct discourse, Posner objects to lay common sense within 
adjudication. In Overcoming Law, he claims, “It soon becomes clear that one of the most 
important duties of judges is to resist the pull of common sense and laymen’s justice. Even a lay 
person should be able to understand that judges have not been given a blank check on which to 
write their personal an political preferences and call them the Constitution.”272 Here, a particular 
type of common sense is criticized in favor of the cultivated sense of duty and obligation 
associated with the role of judge. Recall Billig’s discussion of the paradox of common sense. 
Whereas his discussion highlights two distinct and competing sides, Posner is embodying both 
and deploying their arguments at key moments. This Janus approach allows him to cater 
particular messages to particular audiences. 
 Common sense, under this interpretation, must be cultivated and blended with other 
forms of knowledge in order to be useful to the judge. After all, common sense tells us that the 
world is flat. Although critical of some elements of legal education, Posner nonetheless considers 
it an essential part of the judge’s refined common sense. Building off of Holmes’ arguments 
regarding law and experience, Posner notes that “one had to know something about society to be 
able to understand, criticize, and improve law.” That “something,” Posner continues, is an 
amalgam of “a good general education and common sense,” but could also be developed through 
“the legal texts themselves… or, failing these sources of insight, would acquire naturally in a few 
years of practicing law.”273 As it applies to law, common sense is no longer unrestricted and 
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egalitarian. Rather, legal common sense is developed over time in association with the legal 
culture. As Posner characterizes legal common sense this way, he must pull up the lay public to 
his level so they can understand how and why his common sense decisions differs from theirs.  
Part of a legal specialization stresses the long and complicated history of law in the 
United States (and beyond). In large part due to stare decisis, cases are not always decided by the 
contemporary social and political landscape alone. Judges often reach back in history, sometimes 
centuries, in order to justify their positions. Posner argues, “The legal core is not a body of 
principles validated by scientific method or by robust common sense; it is a set of policy 
decisions, some made long ago under different social conditions.”274 Not only are legal training 
and experience necessary, but also a sense of history and timeliness are required. The standards 
for Posner’s common sense are becoming increasingly uncommon. 
In How Judges Think, he notes how “intuition” is vital to the decision-making process, 
“along with its cousins common sense and good judgment.”275 The judge’s ability to balance 
competing interests and act with practical wisdom is reinforced later in the same text: 
The judge is wont to ask himself in such a case what outcome would be the more 
reasonable, the more sensible, bearing in mind the range of admissible considerations in 
deciding a case, which include but are not exhausted by statutory language, precedents, 
and other conventional materials of judicial decision making, but also include common 
sense, policy preferences, and often much else besides.276 
Sound judgment is marked by its ability to negotiate a multitude of perspectives and discourses, 
ultimately arriving upon a good decision. As Posner notes, this includes the materials of law, 
politics, and common sense. Given the distinct role judges play, law and politics help shape and 
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refine an otherwise clumsy and cursory common sense. Unlike his aforementioned charges 
against academia, he is now trying to position himself above the rabble, holding court in law and 
public opinion. Posner reinforces this point in one of his own decisions. In Schmidt v. Sullivan,277 
a fairly hum-drum case concerning social security medical benefits, Posner claims, “Common 
sense can mislead,” especially when “lay institutions” attempt to contest the arguments from 
experts.  
 Reinforcing the idea that the economic judge must mediate an array of legal, political, 
and social forces, Posner claims: 
The weighting is the result of a complicated interaction – mysterious, personal to every 
judge – of modes of reasoning (analysis, intuition, emotion, common sense, judgment), 
political and ideological inclinations, personality traits, other personal characteristics, 
personal and professional experiences, and the constraints implicit in the rules of the 
judicial “game.”278 
This defense of practical wisdom and the specialized common sense of the judiciary are found 
throughout numerous works. In The Problems of Jurisprudence, Posner asserts that a judge’s 
practical reason is a “grab bag that includes anecdote, introspection, imagination, common sense, 
empathy, imputation of motives, speaker’s authority, metaphor, analogy, precedent, custom, 
memory, ‘experience,’ intuition, and induction (the expectation of regularities, a disposition 
related both to intuition and to analogy).”279 Again we see the invocation of common sense but in 
concert with an array of other “modes of reasoning,” which the economic judge alone can 
balance and act upon.  
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 Noted earlier, Posner wants to split his bet between calling down academics and calling 
up the lay public. Yet, he takes one more crucial step when he invokes common sense. Posner 
attempts to differentiate between the quality of different common senses and associate good and 
useful common sense with a scientific, economic model. One step in this process is to criticize 
the many ways in which common sense has failed, often due to its lack of a scientific method. In 
The Problems of Jurisprudence, Posner makes notes that “[c]ommon sense and intuition support 
the discredited geocentric theory.”280 Common sense defenses that have turned out to be 
completely off the mark are numerous throughout the history of science, and his argument sets 
the stage for a more critical common sense akin to that which C. S. Peirce championed. Peirce 
was an advocate of science as a methodical approach, lauding its ability to upend misplaced 
beliefs and entrenched dogmatisms. Dewey, too, praised the scientific method and argued for its 
role in public culture. Not until pragmatism’s second generation revival was science scrutinized 
by some pragmatists, most notably and voraciously by Richard Rorty.281 While not 
philosophical, Posner’s pragmatism nonetheless attempts to call back to the earlier appreciation 
and invocation of science. His approach, however, attempts to scientize common sense via 
economics, thus reframing common sense to cater to the economic judge. 
 For Posner, everyday pragmatism and economics are virtually synonymous, and both 
cultivate good common sense. Important to note are the many instances in which Posner 
associates a good common sense with consequences, which then leads him to economics. “The 
significance of economics for the study of judicial behavior lies mainly in the consilience of 
economics with pragmatism. The economist, like the pragmatist, is interested in ferreting out 
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practical consequences rather than engaging in a logical or semantic analysis of legal 
doctrines.”282 What will be the particular consequences of an act? Of a piece of legislation? Of a 
judicial decision? The good pragmatist, the good economist, and the good common sense judge 
ask these questions. Defining the rules of the game, Posner wants to be the house. As we all 
know, the house always wins.  
 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
As this chapter attempts to illustrate, Richard Posner’s economic model of adjudication draws 
upon a number of rhetorical faculties in addition to the standard resources of legal judgment. 
These faculties – economic objectivity, a balanced perspective, and common sense – animate 
Posner’s ideal judge: the economic judge. Although Posner presents the economic judge as a 
neutral and natural arbiter of the law, his judgment is nonetheless refracted through an economic 
discourse. The economic judge may utilize a pseudo-economic method to reach conclusions, but 
the act of translation it requires is inherently rhetorical. The economic judge may strike balance 
in his decisions, but it is a balance that is predisposed to an economically minded outcome. The 
economic judge may have common sense, but it is a particular kind of common sense that only 
the he possesses. 
 Despite criticisms, the economic judge continues to enjoy great success. Posner is quick 
to note the success of the law and economics movement in his work and his self-praise is well 
deserved. Law and economics is one of the most widely taught courses throughout American law 
schools, quickly becoming one of the most ubiquitous legal theories by the end of the 20th 
century. As a model of judgment, the economic judge set the standard against which the next to 
models of judgment are responding. 
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3.0  MARTHA NUSSBAUM AND THE LITERARY JUDGE 
 
“That is part of the beauty of all literature. You discover that your longings are universal 
longings, that you're not lonely and isolated from anyone. You belong.” 
 
- F. Scott Fitzgerald, quoted in Beloved Infidel: The Education of a Woman  
 
 
 As the previous chapter explicates, Richard Posner’s law-and-economics approach is the 
latest contribution in this vein of standardized jurisprudence, even going so far as to provide 
equations for determining the wealth maximization of a given legal scenario. His economic 
model of judgment continues to play a prominent role in shaping legal education, judicial 
decision-making, and the public conception of law. His embodied ideal, the economic judge, 
represents an approach to legal judgment that relies upon the rhetoric of common sense, balance, 
and expertise, all three of which are framed in economic terms. Since the law - according to 
Posner - is what judges do, the best approach to law is one that tries to universalize their 
approaches so that citizens, lawyers, and other judges know what to expect. Considering the 
ubiquity of law and economics in law schools and legal journals, his approach has been quite 
successful. His popularity is not without its detractors as a number of adroit scholars have 
advanced legal theories that operate in direct opposition to Posner’s economic model of 
judgment. Martha Nussbaum is perhaps the most highly regarded public intellectual offering 
such a competing model of legal judgment. The greatest elements of human life and experience, 
argues Nussbaum, cannot be distilled into economic formulae, universal procedures, or abstract 
principles. For all his purported common sense, the economic judge lacks, in a word, heart.  
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 Trained as a classicist yet quickly branching out to a wide array of philosophical interests 
that relate to the public good, Nussbaum condemns the growing interest in utilitarian and 
economic models of rational-choice theory. Critical of the “economist’s way of thinking,”1 
Nussbaum worries about the dangers inherent to economizing the non-economic, including 
issues pertaining to the family, sexuality, and human capabilities. “[T]he economic mind is 
blind,” claims Nussbaum.  
Blind to the qualitative richness of the perceptible world; to the separateness of its 
people, to their inner depths, their hopes and loves and fears; blind to what it is like to 
live a human life and to try to endow it with human meaning. Blind, above all, to the fact 
that human life is something mysterious and extremely complicated, something that 
demands to be approached with faculties of mind and resources of language that are 
suited to the expression of that complexity.2 
As a way of seeing the world and the resources it offers for legal judgment, the economic judge 
neglects the fragility of human experience that Nussbaum finds essential to eudaimonia – the 
flourishing life. It is this life that law must understand, defend, and actively cultivate. Law’s 
priority is not about the standards of judgment, as with the economic judge, but rather the 
outcomes of judgment. As such, Nussbaum advances a jurisprudence embodied by the literary 
judge. 
 The literary judge is dedicated to those who lack a powerful position in society and uses 
her judicial role to disrupt the many ways in which groups and individuals have been 
disenfranchised. Collapsing the divide between legality and morality, the literary judge uses law 
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as a therapeutic, rehabilitive force to mend social ills. In order to do so, she must cultivate an 
attuned literary imagination that allows her to call upon the power of rhetorical invention to 
acknowledge and amend social, cultural, and political blindspots. As such, she must have a 
highly cultivated emotional intelligence that allows for sympathy and empathy while still 
remaining true to the law. Drawing from the great works of literature and moral philosophy, 
Nussbaum’s approach reaffirms the innate dignity of human agents as they work toward 
achieving the flourishing life. 
 In order to achieve such lofty goals, Nussbaum must craft a robust conception of the 
literary judge that can adequately fulfill the requirements of justice while avoiding the pitfalls 
she sees in competing theories, especially the economic way of thinking. In this chapter, I 
highlight the most important and salient elements of her rhetorical project and the ways in which 
Nussbaum situates her jurisprudence as a direct response to Posner’s economic model. Much like 
Posner, her appeals are not solely directed at and intended for fellow scholars or judges. Instead, 
Nussbaum’s philosophy is intended to address and shape public conceptions of justice, a point 
she articulates and reinforces throughout her diverse and prolific work. I address three broad and 
interconnected rhetorical appeals that constitute the literary judge. First, I articulate the role of 
the literary imagination and its ability to cultivate a nuanced approach to rhetorical invention. 
Second, I address Nussbaum’s claim that the literary judge has a finely tuned emotional 
intelligence that is able to negotiate between emotions that draw communities together (e.g. 
compassion) and those that drive them apart (e.g. shame and disgust). Finally, I illustrate the 
rhetorical function of Nussbaum’s “capabilities approach” as it applies to the literary judge, 
arguing it serves a constitutive function in her jurisprudence. In doing so, I propose that the 
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literary judge, as characterized by Nussbaum, acts as a therapeutic doctor of society’s collective 
soul.  
 The first element – the literary imagination - borrows from and builds on the “law and 
literature” movement and illustrates the necessity of rhetorical invention in legal adjudication. 
The second element – intelligent emotion – responds to the longstanding criticisms instigated by 
Plato and sustained by numerous philosophers and legal scholars who argue against pathos in 
persuasion and judgment. Nussbaum argues that emotions play a necessary and formative role 
for any good judgment and need not be discarded as merely subjective and relativistic. Quite the 
opposite, in fact: judges must have an expanded perception of emotions, their function in human 
motivation, and the role they play in practical judgment. Finally, given the literary judge’s 
critical role in society, she relies upon the constitutive power of law to play a formative role in 
shaping social norms. In doing so, the literary judge does not focus on what is, which is the 
domain of the economic judge, but on what could be. Given the critical role judges play within a 
society, especially a democratic one, Nussbaum claims that they have a duty to nurture human 
flourishing. 
 
3.1  LAW AND THE LITERARY IMAGINATION 
Law is composed, in large part, of stories and storytelling. Even before litigation begins, clients 
tell their lawyers the stories that made them seek (or require) professional legal aide. In their 
closing remarks, lawyers both for the prosecution and the defense craft competing narratives that 
draw attention to particular elements of the case in order to entice judges and juries to agree with 
them. Decisions issued by judges often establish the facts of a case and the legal issue being 
contested through a narrative form that caters to their conclusions. As decisions become 
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precedent, these narratives are told and retold with new characters and new scenes being added 
whenever it is revisited. Perhaps more than legal professionals, the lay public also understands 
the law through stories and narratives with heroes and villains, plot twists and climactic 
conclusions. These narratives are reinforced throughout popular entertainment with courtroom 
dramas from Twelve Angry Men to My Cousin Vinny. Every year, a new slew of television 
dramas are set in legal practices while John Grisham churns out yet another New York Times 
bestseller. Even classic texts such as Plato’s Apology and Isocrates’ Antidosis utilize narratives in 
a courtly setting. And who can blame any of them: the stakes in a courtroom are high when 
justice is on the line. 
 While dramatic authors have turned to legal settings for millennia, the academic interest 
in the literary elements of law has been percolating for only a handful of decades. Responding to 
the detached reasoning prevalent in analytic jurisprudence, constitutional originalism, and law 
and economics, disenchanted legal scholars and interdisciplinary academics have turned to 
literature and literary studies for insight into the purpose and practice of law. Ignited by James 
Boyd White’s publication of The Legal Imagination in 1973 – coincidentally, the same year that 
Richard Posner introduced The Economic Analysis of Law casebook – the law and literature 
movement has proved to be a compelling counter to the systematization and standardization of 
legal discourse. Rather than view the law as a set of rules and cases as sets of facts, law and 
literature stresses the aforementioned narratives that operate under the auspices of law.  
 Although several different manifestations of what a literary approach to law entails, Paul 
Gewirtz captures the general spirit of the movement well: “[T]reating law as narrative and 
rhetoric means looking at facts more than rules, forms as much as substance, the language used 
as much as the idea expressed…It means examining not simply how law is found but how it is 
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made, not simply what judges command but how the commands are constructed and framed.”3 A 
simple turn of phrase can mean all the difference in the world. Is Cohen’s infamous “Fuck the 
Draft” jacket an act of political dissent or is it juvenile obscenity?4 Did socialists distributing 
pamphlets during WWI compose a “clear and present danger” or were they, as Holmes described 
them in Abrams v. U.S., “silly little leaflets” that were doing little harm?5 Is Edward Snowden a 
“whistleblower” or a “traitor”? The language and arguments deployed throughout all levels of 
law tell particular stories in an attempt to draw an audience’s attention in particular ways and 
arrive upon particular conclusions. The success or failure of these appeals certainly relies upon 
the facts of a case as they relate to existing statutes and precedent, but strategic, rhetorical 
choices are made at every turn. 
 As a vocal advocate for the important relationship between philosophy and literature, 
Martha Nussbaum has been championing the benefits of literature for law for nearly three 
decades. Drawing from (and arguably improving upon) an Aristotelian conception of practical 
judgment, she claims that literature is not only a comparative lens through which one may assess 
law (i.e. a hermeneutic approach), but also as a vital resource for legal training and the process of 
cultivating good legal judgment. Whereas other approaches to law and literature focus on law in 
literature, law as literature, and literature in law, Nussbaum proposes a literature for law 
approach rooted in the idea of the “literary imagination.”  
 The competing approaches to law and literature tend to fall into one of the three 
aforementioned categories: law in literature, literature in law, and law as literature. The law in 
literature approach focuses on those works of literature that incorporate law as part of the 
                                                 
3 Paul Gewirtz, “Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law,” in Law’s Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, 
ed. Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 3. 
4 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) 
5 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) 
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dramatic narrative. These courtroom dramas, argues Margaret Atwood, are “inherently dramatic” 
because they capture “our own fears about trial and judgment.”6 Book Twelve of Dostoevsky’s 
The Brothers Karamazov, for example, chronicles the murder trial of Dimitri Karamazov.7 The 
impassioned testimony of Katerina and the fervent closing remarks made by the prosecution and 
defense heighten the intensity of the narrative. The growing suspense is part and parcel of 
courtroom drama – especially a salacious murder trial – with Dostoevsky utilizing passionate 
speeches to intensify the story. The setting also allows Dostoevsky an opportunity to reflect upon 
the purpose and process of law amidst the lives of his characters. Dostoevsky’s magnum opus is 
but one of many examples wherein literature utilizes the inherent drama of law to drive the 
narrative forward. Sophocles’ Antigone interrogates the age-old divide between the spirit and the 
letter of the law. Herman Melville’s Billy Budd illustrates the challenges of legal formalism. Few 
American students can escape from reading To Kill a Mockingbird in high school, which 
underscores how bias and racism infect a trial and the judgments produced therein. And, whether 
you consider it quality literature or not, John Grisham’s courtroom dramas continually top the 
New York Times bestsellers list. 
 Robin West’s research captures the law in literature approach nicely, especially its 
antithetical position in regard to law and economics. In a well-known 1985 article in the Harvard 
Law Review, West draws upon Franz Kafka’s works, especially The Trial, to illustrate the 
inadequacies of Posner’s economic adjudication. Challenging Posner’s “simplistic and false 
psychological theory of human motivation,”8 West utilizes Kafka’s work to examine the “dark 
                                                 
6 Margaret Atwood, “Justice in the Literary Tradition,” in Justice Beyond Orwell, ed. Rosalie S. Abell and 
Melvin L. Rothman (Les Editions Yvon Blias: Montreal, 1985), 505. 
7 Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (New 
York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1990). 
8 Robin West, “Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political 
Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner,” Harvard Law Review 99 (Dec. 1985), 385. 
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underside of Posner’s argument.”9 “Kafka’s fictional world,” she continues, “provides a dramatic 
enactment of Posner’s normative claim: Posner argues that consent morally legitimates all; 
Kafka illustrates what a world so legitimated might look and feel like.”10 Law in literature here 
understood serves as a useful opportunity to explore the implicit assumptions that undergird law 
and legal theory. It places the reader in a world that pushes an idea to its extreme with West 
exhibiting the moral and juridical hazards inherent to economic judgment.  
Commenting on the value of the law in literature approach, Paul Gewirtz argues that at its 
best, such work can help to illuminate the legal world in distinctive ways by drawing attention to 
literature’s narrative particularity, its focus on varieties of human understanding beyond reason 
alone, its capacity for provoking an empathic understanding of others’ inner life, its forms and its 
self-consciousness about language, and its critical perspective (or at least perspective of 
ambiguity) toward the phenomena it represents.11 This is an aspirational account of law, to be 
sure, as proponents of law in literature stress the dimensions of human experience that are 
traditionally ignored or undermined in legal decisions. Critics of the approach, however, claim 
that such scholarship “constitutes a kind of remedial reading” that is ultimately unhelpful for the 
practicing judge or lawyers.12  
 The inverse of the law in literature approach, the literature in law vein of research, tends 
to the various ways in which judges incorporate literature in their decisions. The most sparse of 
the all the angles of the law and literature movement, partly due to the rare occasions when 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 386. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Gewirtz, 3. 
12 Robert Weisberg, “Proclaiming Trials as Narratives: Premises and Pretenses,” in Law’s Stories: 
Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, ed. Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1996), 70. See also, Richard Posner, Law and Literature, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2009), particularly chapter one, “Reflections on Law in Literature.” 
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literature is evoked in a legal decision, the driving motivation behind this approach is to 
understand when judges incorporate a citation to a literary text in a decision and to what end. 
Justice William Brennan cited Orwell’s 1984 in Florida v. Riley.13 Justice Harry Blackmun 
called upon Charles Dickens’ Pickwick Papers to criticize debtors in Overmyer v. Frick Co.14 
And in order to evoke sympathy for whales, Justice Thurgood Marshall turned to Moby Dick in 
Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society.15 Such invocations, however, are few 
and far between. In “Citing Fiction,” Todd Henderson notes that a mere 543 references to works 
of fiction have been employed in over two million federal appellate decisions, about one in every 
10,000.16 Although the Supreme Court is roughly five times more likely to cite literature,17 these 
occasions are still rare. Interestingly enough, despite his aversion to the law and literature 
movement, Richard Posner is one of the judges most likely to cite literature in his decisions.18  
 Unlike the law in literature and literature in law approaches, the law as literature 
approach takes a step back and assesses the role of hermeneutic interpretation inherent both to 
law and to literature. Acknowledging the fact that law and literature draw from a shared language 
that lends itself to ambiguity and evolves over time, proponents of this approach examine the 
ways in which legal texts – particularly judicial decisions – function within a “culture of 
argument.”19 The interpretive methods developed in literary studies are “imported into the study 
of law.” 20 These scholars attempt to pull back the curtain of professional, technical language in 
                                                 
13 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) 
14 D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 .S. 156 (1972). 
15 Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221 (1986), Justice Marshall 
dissenting. 
16 M. Todd Henderson, “Citing Fiction,” The Green Bag 11.2 (Winter 2008), 171. 
17 Ibid., 185. 
18 Ibid., 176. 
19 Gewirtz, 5.  
20 Peter Brooks, “The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric,” in Law’s Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the 
Law, ed. Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 15. 
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order to see the (all too human) wizard pulling the argumentative strings. Judicial decisions are 
not divined from the gods and their conclusions are hardly inevitable, especially in unique, 
complicated, and unforeseeable cases. Judges utilize linguistic devices and rhetorical turns in 
order to make a conclusion appear inevitable.21 Drawing from the rich theories of interpretation 
and hermeneutics developed in literary studies and rhetoric, the law as literature approach 
attempts to peel back these layers in order to understand the multifaceted meanings embedded in 
legal decisions. 
 This species of the law and literature movement is by far the most prolific and 
theoretically nuanced, with scholars from law, literary studies, rhetoric, critical and cultural 
studies, women’s studies, psychology, and numerous other disciplines contributing to the wealth 
of scholarship. Consequently, there are numerous arguments as to what law as literature entails 
with many voices offering competing definitions and expectations. Indeed, there are no uniform 
approaches for assessing the merits of literature. What, then, does it mean to view law through a 
literary lens? While a detailed examination of these arguments could fill another dissertation, a 
number of recurring themes tend to emerge. The relationship between the author and the text, for 
example, is brought to the fore. Judges often metonymically detach their names and their 
individual perspectives from a majority opinion, instead speaking for “the court.” Dissenting 
opinions offer more leeway and individual discretion, in part due to the fact that the arguments 
advanced are intended to criticize rather than to create precedent, but even these judicial 
moments are often framed as speaking “on behalf of” the law as “the voice of reason” which 
                                                 
21 As Robert Ferguson notes, “The only thing the judge never admits in the moment of decision is the 
freedom of choice. [The opinion] must instead appear as if forced to the inevitable conclusion.” See 
Robert Ferguson, “The Judicial Opinion as a Literary Genre,” Yale Journal of Law 2 (1990), 207, cited in 
Sanford Levinson, “The Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion,” in Law’s Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in 
the Law, ed. Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 189. 
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they hope will be vindicated in time. Only on rare occasions do judges and justices expose their 
individuality. A literary approach to law disrupts this pattern of thought and argument. Why this 
judge? Why now? Residing somewhere in between the author is dead and the author is all, a law 
and literature approach questions the elements of authorship that goes into writing about 
complicated and nuanced issues.  
Similarly, law and literature also takes into account the audience. For whom are decisions 
written? Certainly the parties involved in the case are (or should be) primary audience members. 
If the case is being heard by a panel of judges rather than just one, then one’s peers are no doubt 
important audience members as well. But what about judges who are not involved with case? For 
lower court judges, this issue is less important, but for higher courts – most notably the Supreme 
Court – their decisions create precedent that must be followed by lower courts. Breaking out of 
the judicial branch, the legislative and executive branches of government also follow the goings 
on of the courts. And when a decision is issued on a case surrounded by controversy such as 
abortion or same-sex marriage, then judges often surreptitiously speak to the general public as 
well. Not only are the individual audiences an important element in law and literature, but also 
how a judge negotiates between these different audiences.  
Another running theme throughout law and literature is the context-embeddedness of 
legal issues and the mutability of legal ideas, a point shared with advocates of the “living 
constitution.” Legal ideas, especially the complex ones like liberty and equality, have undergone 
numerous evolutionary iterations. By most accounts, this is a fairly banal point (just don’t tell the 
originalists). Often, however, law and literature scholars take it one step further and ask what 
happens in that moment of creation when a new legal idea takes shape within a decision. This act 
of creation is a central concern for James Boyd White. In Heracles’ Bow, he calls attention to the 
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“acknowledgement of inconsistency and tension, the openness to ambiguity and uncertainty,”22 
suggesting law is a creative practice of composition with many interrelated aspects combining to 
produce something akin to a work of art, rather than mere dogmatic rules. White perceives law 
and language to be “living material” that is used to create meaning;23 a community practice of 
defining and redefining itself through the law.24 In this regard, legal discourse provides a vital 
constitutive function that shapes and reshapes a communal identity, a point that I examine in 
greater detail later in this chapter. Briefly, however, legal and political institutions, whether they 
are embodied in an Ancient Greek polis, the Roman republic, or contemporary judicial bodies, 
are an important rhetorical lens through which a society views and creates a shared community. 
The essential yet fragile role of judges is to produce a strong foundational discourse that balances 
between the pragmatic needs of a given society while simultaneously illuminating a path for 
moral and cultural development. More importantly, it does so through argumentation and 
discourse, rather than force, for “only persuasion, and persuasion of the sincere and authentic 
kind by which community is established, can work.”25 As I argue below, this constitutive 
function is an important aspect of Nussbaum’s literary judge. 
 These elements of law as literature are neither universal nor complete, but they 
nonetheless underscore some of the broad themes at play. Along with law in literature and 
literature in law, these three approaches compose the bulk of scholarship and overlap one another 
in many ways. While Nussbaum recognizes these different approaches, borrowing from and 
contributing to them in various ways, her most compelling contribution strays from the pack, and 
begins with a seemingly simple question: what does literature – particularly the novel – do for 
                                                 
22 James Boyd White, Heracles’ Bow, 124. 
23 Ibid., 126. 
24 Ibid., 225. 
25 Ibid., 20 
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the act of legal judgment? Borrowing from Walt Whitman’s depiction of the “poet-judge,” 26 
which hearkens back to “a normative conception of equitable judgment” advanced by Aristotle, 
Nussbaum argues that literature helps a judge to address a “diverse population” while negotiating 
issues of fairness and historic precedent.27 More importantly, a judge steeped in good literature is 
able to “read the contrast between being an ‘arguer’ and being ‘judgment’” by providing 
“equitable judgments, judgments that fit the historical and human complexities of a particular 
case."28 Like the economic judge, the literary judge prizes judicial neutrality, but Nussbaum 
moves the idea of neutrality away from “remote generality” and “quasi-scientific abstractness” 
and toward “rich historical concreteness” and “a vision of the human world.”29 Stressing the 
importance of the novel over academic and theoretical texts, Nussbaum contends that good 
novels provide an engaging style and level of depth absent in other discourses. Literature offers 
both “horizontal” and “vertical” extensions of life; horizontal in its ability to “[bring] the reader 
into contact with events or locations or persons or problems he or she has not otherwise met,” 
and vertical in its ability to “[give] the reader experience that is deeper, sharper, and more precise 
than much of what takes in life.”30 Simply put, good literature improves judgment, something 
that should pique the interest of all judges. Its ability to induce readers to critically reflect upon 
the struggles of achieving the flourishing life is especially important for the literary judge. 
Most importantly, good literature reflected upon thoughtfully cultivates a “literary 
imagination.” Nussbaum argues that both the form and the content of narrative literature 
                                                 
26 Nussbaum also refers to the literary judge as the “poetic judge,” which she borrows from Walt 
Whitman. Given Nussbaum’s inclination toward literature rather than poetry, I find the literary judge a 
more apt characterization of her judicial outlook.  
27 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 80-1.  
28 Ibid., 81. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Martha C. Nussbuam, Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 48. 
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illuminate the robust complexity and profound vulnerability of human life more accurately than a 
strictly theoretical approach like utilitarianism (which Nussbaum considers synonymous with 
Posner’s law and economics approach) or Kantian deontology understood without the aid of 
literature. Nussbaum claims that literature returns practical philosophy, especially moral and 
legal philosophy, to its roots by focusing on what it means to live a good life by “being human 
and speaking humanly.”31 As Nussbaum argues in one of her earliest defenses of literature’s role 
in moral philosophy and practical reason, The Fragility of Goodness, “Literature, with its stories 
and images, enters in as an extension of our experience, encouraging us to develop and 
understand our cognitive/emotional responses.”32 Literature grabs our “moral attention”33 and 
exposes us to the lives of others in moving and meaningful ways that are simply unattainable in 
theoretical or academic writing. By attaining and directing our moral attention, it is also highly 
rhetorical: “the novel… is a morally controversial form, expressing in its very shape and style, in 
its modes of interaction with its readers, a normative sense of life. It tells its readers to notice 
this and not this, to be active in these and not those ways. It leads them into certain postures of 
the mind and heart and not others.”34 Echoing the classical definition of a rhetorical trope, 
Nussbaum values literature’s ability to direct attention in particular ways and to examine 
particular issues that are at the core of what it means to live a flourishing life. Analytic 
approaches to judgment that ignore the benefits wrought from literature fail to understand the 
human being qua human being. Much like Posner’s rhetorical use of balance to illustrate the 
importance of balance, so too does Nussbaum both talk the talk and walk the walk. In order to 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 53. 
32 Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, 
2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 186. 
33 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 149. 
34 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 2, emphasis added. 
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strengthen her points and illustrate the power of literary narratives, she continuously weaves 
them throughout her work. 
In many ways, Nussbaum’s literary judge is employing a creative rhetorical invention 
that follows the sophistic tradition. Drawing from John Poulakos’ analysis of dissoi logoi and 
sophistic rhetoric, Nathan Crick argues for the importance of examining the “process by which 
novelty arises from the clash of competing perspectives.”35 Invention thrives when one has a 
“wealth of available knowledge to produce desirable results.”36 Good judicial judgment requires 
a wealth of knowledge, too; nobody can honestly deny that fact. But when such knowledge is 
only derived from historic precedent, legal statutes, and an economic worldview, the prospect of 
robust invention becomes impotent. Crick claims, “The sophistical attitude thus approaches the 
arts and sciences as resources for rhetorical invention to master contingencies and reduce 
uncertainty in the midst of conflict and turmoil.”37 Although Nussbaum would no doubt oppose 
being characterized as a sophist,38 her approach to literature and its influence on judgment 
nonetheless reinforces the sophistic invention Crick and Poulakos articulate. Literature serves as 
a means of cultivating an ability to imagine the position of another and to genuinely consider 
their motivations and arguments. The literary judge is not a flatterer, as Plato derided the 
sophists. She acknowledges that another’s experiences can be very different than her own and 
understanding that others’ experiences must be taken into account before good judgment is 
possible.  
                                                 
35 Nathan Crick, “The Sophistical Attitude and the Invention of Rhetoric,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 
96.1 (Feb. 2010), 36. See also John Poulakos, Sophistical Rhetoric in Classical Greece (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1995). 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 39. 
38 See, for example, Martha C. Nussbaum, “Sophistry about Conventions,” New Literary History 17.1 
(Autumn, 1985), 129-139. 
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If invention is so important to good judgment, why has Nussbaum’s literary judge faced 
so much resistance amongst legal scholars and acting judges? One reason may be its inherently 
humanistic approach that remains highly resistant to systematic, quantitative assessment. James 
Crosswhite hails invention as the most valuable element of rhetoric, “the one that historically 
dignifies rhetoric and lifts it from the occasional declines to which it has been subject,” but he’s 
also quick to note its “resistance to modeling.” 39 In other words, invention – especially the type 
of invention that is inspired by literature – lacks the standards that the economic judge values so 
much. But should it be standardized? Can it be standardized? Herein lies the problem. Society 
demands that judges be well prepared for their duties and be able to perform said duties with a 
certain degree of uniformity lest we have the unpredictable “wildcard” judge. Crosswhite 
attempts to articulate a model of invention by utilizing The New Rhetoric, but struggles to pin 
down a definition that which would satisfy an economist or analytic philosopher. He notes that 
invention cannot be inspired “from isolated facts or values”40 because “worlds are not inert 
systems.”41 Although the economic judge may not conceive of legal issues operating in an inert 
world, he or she relies upon a number of fixed assumptions about human motivation; namely, a 
rational self interest that strives for wealth maximization.  
An imaginative invention, however, can be sporadic and ephemeral. Even within literary 
experiences, two well read individuals can read from two very different libraries. Given the 
immeasurable amount of literature available, even the best read individual likely will have but a 
few books in common with my own library. Judges have no doubt read a common repository of 
cases, but outside of such reading how much overlap can we expect? Is there a way to train a 
                                                 
39 James Crosswhite, “Awakening the Topoi: Sources of Invention in The New Rhetoric’s Argument 
Model,” Argumentation and Advocacy 44 (Spring 2008), 169. 
40 Ibid., 172. 
41 Ibid., 173. 
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literary imagination capable of adequate creative invention? As Crosswhite notes, invention, on 
its own, cannot be trained. In the same regard, one cannot simply take a class to learn how to be 
funny. Teaching one to be inventive or humorous by distributing a list of attributes that constitute 
invention or humor will fail miserably. Yet, both invention and humor can be cultivated. 
Crosswhite notes three particular capabilities necessary for invention: an awareness of one’s 
surroundings, a sense of the actions and motivations taking place, and the ability to organize this 
knowledge and put it toward the most appropriate course of action. “These are capabilities that 
are acquired in a broad education that involves both knowledge of the world and repeated 
practical experience with arguments that arise in real situations.”42 Like any art, whether it’s 
painting, acting, composition, or motorcycle maintenance, rhetorical invention is not learned 
through a set of formulae. There is no one way to paint or act or write or tend to your boss hog. 
There are better and worse ways of approaching these arts, but they all depend on one’s 
experience, the contextual nuances of the situation, and the desired result. Thus, the call for a 
broad education becomes all the more important, which is similarly at the heart of Nussbaum’s 
project.  
Nussbaum’s defense of the liberal arts and her legitimate worry about the decline of the 
humanities in American schools and universities is well documented.43 For our present purposes, 
the literary education of the law-student-turned-judge is of the utmost importance. In Poetic 
Justice, Nussbaum recounts a number of experiences she has had while teaching at the notably 
conservative University of Chicago School of Law. Highly critical of rational-choice theory and 
the economic judge (which was conceived, in large part, at the University of Chicago through the 
                                                 
42 Crosswhite, 173, emphasis added. 
43 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998) and Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
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work of Posner and Becker), Nussbaum focuses most of her attention on Charles Dickens’ Hard 
Times. The novel satirically illuminates the blindness Nussbaum argues is inherent to the 
economic way of seeing. As Nussbaum and the students navigate through the text, the 
deficiencies of the economic mindset become apparent. Noting the criticisms cast against 
literature as a form of argument – that it is “unscientific and subversive of scientific social 
thought,” that it is “irrational in its commitment to the emotions,” and that it “has nothing to do 
with the impartiality and universality that we associate with law and public judgment”44 – 
Nussbaum responds by highlighting good literature’s ability to disrupt and disturb misguided 
conventions,45 especially those instantiated by economic thinking. 
 Nussbaum’s aspirational account of literature’s contribution to legal judgment faces an 
early challenge when pressured to define what constitutes “good” literature. Nussbuam regularly 
turns to the works of Charles Dickens and Henry James, with Marcel Proust and Samuel Beckett 
making steady appearances as well. A common theme connecting these authors is the density 
and length of their works. Unless one is vacationing on the hard, uncomfortable beaches of 
Maine, these are not summer beach reads, but rich explorations into the lives of complex 
characters. Although these writers and the others that Nussbaum incorporates in her scholarship 
have been widely celebrated, she nonetheless selects novels that align with her liberal 
worldview, predisposing the reader toward her political ideology and philosophical aims. 
Dickens’ Hard Times is intended to disrupt the reader’s faith in utilitarianism. James’ The 
Golden Bowl is intended to illuminate the complexity and importance of human emotions, 
especially within intimate and familial relationships. These novels have been lauded for their 
perspicuity and are often considered part of the general canon of great western literature along 
                                                 
44 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 4. 
45 Ibid., 5. 
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with other mainstays like Chaucer, Shakespeare, Melville, and Joyce. Yet, popular novels such 
as Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged and The Fountainhead or Stephen Crane’s The Red Badge of 
Courage challenge her preconceived notions about what a good society and what a good life 
entail. Crane’s work, for example, downplays the role that compassion plays in acts of courage, 
starkly contrasting Nussbaum’s position. Although one cannot fault Nussbaum for selecting texts 
that support her argument – we all do this – her characterization of good literature may operate 
as a self-serving bias, edifying readers on her conception of the flourishing life while ignoring or 
downplaying others.  
Her constant return to Dickens and James places her in an interesting rhetorical bind. On 
the one hand, such choices reflect an academic elitism wherein good literature is almost 
inaccessible to the casual reader, reinforcing Posner’s common sense argument that “calls down” 
academics from their lofty perch. Anyone who has read (or attempted to read) James’ The 
Golden Bowl will understand. At over 400 dense pages, even the most stout of heart no doubt 
will struggle through the labyrinth of words as James waxes literary. Dickens is little different, 
although slightly more accessible. And this says nothing about excavating and understanding the 
deeply important meanings Nussbaum finds in these texts. Must these epic tomes constitute good 
literature? Is there no room for something more approachable yet nonetheless profound? Kurt 
Vonnegut prided himself on such a writing style and his works have been equally celebrated. 
On the other hand, Nussbaum is also susceptible to attacks from feminist and critical 
theorists for supporting traditional social norms through the selection of patriarchal literature.46 
                                                 
46 For example, see bell hooks, “Postmodern Blackness,” Postmodern Culture 1.1 (Sept. 1990); Judith 
Butler, “Imitation and Gender Insubordination,” in Inside/Out: Lesbian Theories, Gay Theories, ed. Diana 
Fuss (New York: Routledge, 1991); Anne Babeau Gardiner, “Feminist Literary Criticism: From Anti-
Patriarchy to the Celebration of Decadence,” Modern Age 49.4 (Fall 2007), 393-9; and Mary Eagleton, 
Feminist Literary Criticism (London: Longman, 1991). 
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After all, Dickens, James, and her other favorites are a collection of dead white men writing 
about dead white issues. Steeped in analytic philosophy and the liberal political tradition, 
Nussbaum is particularly resistant to postmodernism, as her longstanding intellectual feud with 
Judith Butler indicates.47 In Cultivating Humanity, Nussbaum asserts that postmodernists “do not 
justify their more extreme conclusions with compelling arguments” and she goes on to 
characterize Derrida’s commentary on truth as “simply not worth studying” if one has had even 
limited exposure to academic philosophy.48 Describing Foucault’s work as “the only truly 
important work to have entered philosophy under the banner of ‘postmodernism,’ she 
nonetheless addresses the problems with his scholarship, “from its historical incompleteness to 
its lack of conceptual clarity.”49 In her fervent defense Aristotle, J.S. Mill, and other traditional 
philosophical mainstays, an underlying criticism of her work echoes Audre Lorde’s famous 
statement that one cannot dismantle the master’s house with the master’s tools.  
 For her part, Nussbaum is aware of such criticisms but does not find them very 
convincing. She accepts the fact that the literary canon is dominated by dead white men who 
mainly wrote about other dead white men, but that does not mean their works lack significant 
value. Nussbaum notes that a “central role of art is to challenge conventional wisdom and 
values,”50 which closely aligns with the project of philosophy’s patron “saint,” Socrates. The 
divide between Nussbaum and her critics is less about which books ought to be read for 
edification (although she certainly has her favorites) and more about the teleological objectives 
she finds part and parcel with reading “good” literature. Why do we read? In short, we read to 
become better people and better citizens. We read to expose ourselves to people that we would 
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never encounter in our day-to-day lives. We read to explore complicated situations and imagine 
ourselves trying to work through them. Her wariness of postmodernism and deconstructionism is 
rooted in a fear that they are abandoning the moral and civic dimensions of cosmopolitan human 
living. This is one of her starting premises, which she asserts sets her at odds with many of her 
critics. 
 At its best, argues Nussbaum, literature has the ability to ignite our imaginations, granting 
us an opportunity to experience a life quite unlike our own with a depth and nuance that only 
well crafted narratives can produce. Literature allows an individual “the ability to imagine what 
it is like to live the life of another person who might, given changes in circumstance, be oneself 
or one of one’s loved ones.”51 Paralleling a theme in sophistic rhetoric, she continues, claiming, 
“Literature focuses on the possible, inviting its readers to wonder about themselves… 
[L]iterature works typically invite their readers to put themselves in the place of people of many 
different kinds and to take on their experiences.”52 Such consciousness-raising may be possible 
through philosophical discourse, but the impact of a novel is often much more profound. Good 
novels have a rhetorical force with which few philosophical treatises can compete. Progress, 
argues Nussbaum, is not taught; rather, one is led to it “by a word, by a story, by an image – to 
see some new aspect of the concrete case at hand.”53 If law is a progressive and moralizing force 
in society, which Nussbaum heartily defends, then literature serves as a vital resource for guiding 
judges, who in turn guide society. 
For a sitting judge, this ability to imagine the lives of others is not just important; it is 
necessary for good judgment. Judges have an immense responsibility in and to our society. As 
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the final arbiters and interpreters of law, they hold the fates of our country’s most vulnerable 
denizens in their decisions. As Robert Cover stresses, they can quite literally author a life or 
death decision, a constant reminder of the violence undergirding justice.54 As the gatekeepers of 
the Constitution, their decisions also shape and reshape our shared democratic culture. At its 
best, the literary imagination can inspire “identification and sympathy in the reader,”55 traits that 
Nussbaum finds essential for good judgment. The narratives found in good literature cultivate 
habits that make a strange “other” an object of unselfish intrigue and genuine concern, rather 
than fear, paranoia, disinterest, or disgust. Nussbaum asserts that the literary imagination also 
reflects a “public imagination” in its ability to “steer judges in their judging.”56 Reading 
literature makes one better prepared to author better decisions and recent research in psychology 
bears out this point.57 
Important to note, Nussbaum’s turn to imagination should not be construed as a flight of 
fancy one often associates with the term. Rather than an imagination that conceives of that which 
is unbelievable, erroneous, or delusional, Nussbaum suggests that an attuned imagination that 
remains contained in the strictures of reality does quite the opposite; it has the ability to expand 
one’s perspective in order to see more of the realities that surround us. In one of her more recent 
works, From Disgust to Humanity, Nussbaum argues that it is only through imagination that one 
could ever “become able to see another as human… Only by imagining how the world looks 
through that person’s eyes does one get to the point of seeing the other person as a someone and 
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not a something.”58 She continuously claims that one’s imagination can bring others into view 
and allow us to perceive them more readily and more fully.59 By embodying an attuned 
imagination that has expanded her perception, the literary judge is better situated to employ good 
legal judgment, which Nussbaum characterizes as “the wise supplementing of the generalities of 
written law by a judge who imagines what a person of practical wisdom would say in the 
situation, bringing in the business of judging the resources of a rich and responsive 
personality.”60 When deployed effectively, the literary imagination illuminates those paths of 
persuasion that tend to be blocked or obfuscated by rigid standards. 
Nussbaum is certainly not the first advocate of law and literature to acknowledge the 
importance of imagination. James Boyd White’s The Legal Imagination tackles the issue head-
on, although his approach differs from Nussbaum’s. Reflecting an approach focused on law as 
literature more than literature for law, White argues that the legal style of argumentation and 
persuasion is intricately connected to that of literary writing. He describes his project as “a study 
of what lawyers and judges do with words,” which includes “counseling, arguing, brief-writing, 
[and] negotiating.”61 Like literature, legal language is confined by an inherited tradition that 
guides its meaning and unites users under a shared history. Words and their meanings, however, 
are not fixed, and altering them requires a different set of rhetorical appeals, a different way of 
employing one’s legal imagination. 
White highlights legal education as training students to think and, more importantly, to 
speak like a lawyer. Such training includes the law’s unique history and a technical, often 
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idiosyncratic discourse. Yet, as White notes, legal language operates within a broader social 
world. As such, it is “a sort of social literature… a way of talking about people and their 
relationships.”62 He turns to the legal imagination as a way to illustrate this important connection 
and to reinforce its vital place within law. Lawyers and judges, poets and novelists – they all 
construct and reconstruct their communities through rhetoric and persuasion. White argues that 
the law has the ability to create, maintain, undermine, and recreate different worlds with different 
possibilities, much like a great work of literature. Even though the parameters of legal 
argumentation may be narrower than that of a literary work, they nonetheless share a common 
interest in a community of readers.  
 In subsequent work, White has clarified and built upon his conception of the literary 
imagination. In Heracles’ Bow, White claims that “the law is a language, a set of resources for 
expression and social action, and that, accordingly, the life of the lawyer is at its heart a literary 
one – a life both of reading the compositions of others (especially those authoritative 
compositions that declare law) and of making compositions of one’s own.”63 Legal writing is but 
the other side of the same literary coin. Both involve an author attempting to convey a particular 
message while still aware of the challenges inherent to interpretation. Both use a shared language 
to give ideas weight and significance, imbuing them with a power to move the mind and the will 
of others. Both adopt particular words and phrases that “acquire their meaning from their gradual 
redefinition.”64 And unlike the ephemerality of private conversation, both “speak to a range of 
readers, not just one, and…operate across a spectrum of contexts. They seek to establish the 
meaning of terms not merely for one conversation, for the present moment, but for a class of 
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conversations across time. Every legal and literary text implies a reader who will use it in 
circumstances that cannot now be known.”65 Unlike Roland Barthes’ assertion that the “author is 
dead,” White asserts that the author and the audience are vibrantly alive and matter greatly both 
for law and for literature.  
Interestingly, White’s scholarship on law and literature is all but absent in Martha 
Nussbaum’s work. Save an exceptionally brief footnote citing The Legal Imagination, Nussbaum 
almost entirely ignores his important contribution.66 Her omission aside, the two share a few key 
points in common. Much like James Boyd White’s conception of legal interpretation, Nussbaum 
argues that one must read legal doctrines in a similar way as one would read literature. Although 
the subject matter and desired effect may be different, law and literature involve assessing and 
passing judgment on individuals. Viewing law as the creation and recreation of communities, 
White claims that “a purely conceptual and logical language. Like that of modern analytic 
philosophy, will always be incomplete or defective.”67 Like Icarus flying toward the sun, the 
more that analytic legal theorists attempt to create a systematic, (pseudo-)scientific language of 
law, the more quickly they will fall from their heights. Rather than turning solely to science and 
logic for inspiration and influence, White argues that literature provides a more fitting example 
of what law is and does for a community.  
Nussbaum and White part ways in the role that imagination plays in judgment. White 
hopes the turn to imagination would remove the blinders placed on law students (and, 
subsequently, lawyers and judges) to think, write, and speak about law within the confines of the 
technical tradition. Actual literature – Dickens, James, Joyce, and the like - only plays a 
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tangential role within this scheme; it serves as an example, albeit a profound one. Throughout his 
work, White draws from literature – usually classical works – in order to illustrate how legal 
argumentation parallels the rhetorical situation of literary characters. White’s interpretation of 
the legal imagination strives to make this connection lucid. Nussbaum would certainly agree, but 
takes a more panoramic view of the legal system. Whereas White’s legal imagination is narrow, 
focused on a select group of people, Nussbaum expands the idea of the legal imagination and its 
connection with literature. Her arguments are not specifically intended for judges, although they 
are a group of individuals who could most benefit from the literary imagination.  
 Clearly, the literary judge must be sensitive to the moral function of law, something many 
legal scholars resist. As Nussbaum argues, the moral imagination is part and parcel with the 
literary imagination, both of which ought to function in legal judgment. Lawrence v. Texas 
exhibits this function well: 
Lawrence's great achievement, then, was not conceptual clarity or sharp practical 
guidance, but a cast of mind, a judicial approach to liberty interests. In essence, it consists 
in a rejection of the politics of disgust so amply evident in Bowers, together with the 
Devlinesque conception of society dominated by tradition and solidarity, in favor of a 
politics of humanity that is the heir of John Stuart Mill both in its zealous protection of 
individual liberty and in its reliance on the ability to imagine a variety of human 
purposes... That's the achievement of the moral imagination. Because law is inseparably 
bound up with the moral imagination, it is also an achievement of law.68 
Her characterization of the literary imagination and its embodiment in the literary judge serve as 
an important counterargument to Posner’s economic judge. Drawing heavily from Aristotle, 
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Nussbaum believes that practical reason and, consequently, good judgment are derived from 
human perception, which recognizes a certain degree of incommensurability that the economic 
judge lacks. If rhetoric is a “way of looking at things” as Thomas Farrell suggests, then the 
economic model is blinded by its adherence to economic rationality and the discursive confines 
therein. According to Nussbaum, “Frequently a reliance on the powers of the intellect can 
actually become an impediment to true ethical perception, by impeding or undermining these 
responses.”69 The economic judge, for all of his vast intelligence, does not miss the forest for the 
trees, but rather the trees for the forest.  
 Nussbaum stresses the importance of imagination and the contribution that literature 
plays therein by stressing the narrow perception and altogether lack of imagination employed by 
the economic judge. She notes that the economic judge wants to eschew the humanistic elements 
of their “science” in favor of an ephemeral neutral position, but at what cost? Ideally, the 
transition would be seamless. In reality, however, the economic model attempts to quantify the 
unquantifiable. Noting the “economist’s way of thinking,” Nussbaum is wary of economizing the 
non-economic. Citing Posner’s economic cost-benefit analysis of different types of sexual 
intercourse as a prime example,70 she questions not only the ability to distill something as 
intimate as sex into such terms, but also wonders what happens to the situation and individuals 
involved when an economic discourse is adopted. Where does emotional involvement come into 
play (and is that a cost or a benefit)? What about the history of the individual? Does it matter if 
someone was raised in a strict, conservative religious tradition that stigmatizes sex? What about 
individuals who were molested as children or raped at any point in their lives; ought we consider 
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such traumatic experiences in our cost-benefit analysis? If so, how could we measure it? More 
importantly, should we measure it?  
 Describing the economic approach as an “as if” model in that it only works if people are 
acting as if they are rational wealth maximizers,71 Nussbaum fears the many ways in which 
economics has seeped into all manner of discourse. Creating an allure via its “elegant 
simplicity,” economic rational-choice theory boils down individual decisions to (overly) simple 
economic terminology. Characterizing the economic judge as “extreme,” she worries about an 
“across the board” application of economic rational-choice theory because it leaves out important 
elements of our humanity. “First,” Nussbaum argues, “it reduces qualitative differences to 
quantitative differences…by a process of abstraction from all in people that is not easily funneled 
into mathematical formulae.”72 It involves the whole range the humanistic, unquantifiable, 
incommensurable experiences that give normative character to a person and her community. 
Whereas Posner’s economic judge forms equations to maximize “correct” decisions, 
Nussbaum’s literary judge asks questions to elicit narratives that better illuminate the situation.  
 Nussbaum’s second critique of the economic judge is a variation on the same theme: “The 
[economic] mind, bent on calculation, is determined to aggregate the data gained about and from 
individual lives, arriving at a picture of total or average utility that effaces personal separateness 
as well as qualitative difference.”73 Under the auspices of fairness, a person becomes a list of 
statistics. Quantitative assessment requires us to speak as if our lives fit the economic model. 
Yet, in order to function properly it must neglect or manipulate the qualitative, humanistic pegs 
to fit in the smaller economic holes. Even Ronald Coase doubted that his now-famous Coase 
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Theorem, which undergirds much of Posner’s jurisprudence, could adequately assess the 
qualitative, contextually-based nuances of real-life scenarios. Nussbaum wants to reverse the 
process. Instead of sanding down the pegs to a smaller size (losing a lot of peg in the process), 
she wants to expand the hole and preserve the true pegginess of the peg. 
Part of Nussbaum’s rhetorical strategy is to highlight the ways in which economics 
reaches too far its attempt to justify judicial decisions or public policies on economic grounds, 
which reminds me of a good joke I heard the other day. A mathematician, an statistician, and an 
economist apply for the same job. The interviewer calls in the mathematician and asks, "What do 
two plus two equal?" The mathematician replies, "Four." The interviewer asks, "Four, exactly?" 
The mathematician looks at the interviewer incredulously and says, "Yes, four, exactly." Then 
the interviewer calls in the statistician and asks the same question, "What do two plus two 
equal?" The statistician says, "On average, four - give or take ten percent, but on average, 
four." Then the interviewer calls in the economist and poses the same question, "What do two 
plus two equal?" The economist gets up, locks the door, closes the shade, sits down next to the 
interviewer and says, "What do you want it to equal?" All joking aside, Nussbaum worries about 
the economic judge’s eagerness to decide cases based on a pseudo-scientific process that 
eschews humanistic perception and the imaginative ability to understand others. “The intellect is 
not only not all-sufficient, it is a dangerous master. Because of its overreaching, knowledge can 
be ‘dragged around like a slave.’”74 One can rationalize all manner of sins. The literary judge 
must possess extensive knowledge and articulate well-reasoned arguments, but she must also be 
able to place that knowledge in conversation with an imaginative invention in order to reach a 
sound judgment.  
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One of Nussbaum’s favorite examples of the literary imagination’s role in judicial 
decision-making is the 1967 antimiscegenation case, Loving v. Virginia. The landmark Supreme 
Court case examined the legality of marriage prohibitions between races. In 1958, Richard 
Loving, a white man, married Mildred Jeter, a black woman, in Washington, D.C. The couple 
moved to Virginia, which was one of sixteen states with laws that prohibited interracial marriage, 
and they were indicted by a grand jury. After pleading guilty, they turned to the state trial court 
to vacate the judgment and set aside the sentence on the grounds that it violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Failing to persuade the state court and the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, 
the Lovings appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court. In the unanimous decision authored by Chief 
Justice Earl Warren, the court held that the state had no legitimate interests in racial 
classifications that were “independent of invidious racial discrimination.” Consequently, the 
opinion found Virginia in violation of the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Nussbaum’s interest in this case not only concerns the significant step taken by the 
Supreme Court in expanding equality, a democratic virtue she sees as a ramification of a 
conscientious imagination.75 The case also serves as a judicial response to Herbert Wechsler’s 
“Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,” a landmark essay in jurisprudence authored 
in 1959. Wechsler, who served as an Assistant Attorney General during the infamous Korematsu 
v. United States case and argued for the New York Times in the Times v. Sullivan, asserted that 
judicial decisions should be based on “neutral principles,” or principles that “transcend any 
immediate result that is involved.”76 Wechsler cited Brown v. Board of Education as a case the 
flouted the idea of neutral principles in favor of political opportunism, later arguing that the case 
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"extended far beyond its rationale."77 Although highly contested, the reliance on neutral 
principles continues to hold sway in the American judiciary, especially with constitutional 
originalists. 
Nussbaum introduces Wechsler’s idea of neutral principles because it highlights the 
insidious nature of a judge devoid of imagination. “From Wechsler’s lofty distance from the 
human experience of discrimination,” argues Nussbaum, “he fails to notice perfectly articulable 
and universalizeable principles that do include the asymmetrical meaning of segregation and the 
history of segregation as stigma.”78 Consequently, his “failure of imagination” leads him to 
specious conclusions; namely, that “any law framed in a verbally neutral manner…cannot 
possibly be discriminatory.”79 The literary minded literary judge, however, has a panoramic view 
of citizenship and humanity, enabling her “to imagine situations of hierarchy and to appreciate 
their human meaning.”80 In Loving v. Virginia and Brown v. Board of Education, the literary 
judge would claim that the judges issuing the opinion were able to see through the purportedly 
neutral language. Their perceptions had been opened to include a greater swath of human 
experience. Law, as a normative process created by humans for the guidance and control of 
humans, can never be entirely neutral. Thus, our imaginations serve an important rhetorical 
function by opening up more paths of argumentation and cultivating a keen sense of rhetorical 
invention. 
Critics may assert that Nussbaum’s literary judge is more of an antagonist than a 
balanced judiciary figure, a figure at the margins who utilizes her literary imagination in order to 
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admonish established precedent without reflecting on the reasoning and restraints of the original 
decision. On the contrary, Nussbaum asserts that imagination plays a vital role in understanding 
both (or multiple) sides of an issue, even those an individual may find uncomfortable: 
The idea that constitutional adjudication requires imagination does not turn the law into a 
soft morality of “tout comprendre, c’est tout pardonner.” Indeed, notice that imagination 
was exercised, in the cases I have discussed, on both sides of the matter. Judges had to 
identify the purpose animating the antimiscegenation laws, and that required them to see 
into the ideas of contamination and taint that constituted “white supremacy,” before they 
could articulate what that legal regime was all about.81 
Although Nussbaum focuses on the literary imagination’s ability to vicariously experience the 
disenfranchised, emphasizing cases concerning African-Americans (Loving and Brown), women 
(Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey), and the LGBTQ community (Bowers v. 
Hardwick), the literary judge must imaginatively engage the histories, traditions, motives, social 
pressures, and expectations of the opposition as well. What sorts of experiences shape a white 
supremacist or an anti-LGBTQ bigot? What rhetorical appeals do they make? How do they 
frame their position? Much like the impetus driving Kenneth Burke to examine Hitler’s rhetoric 
in “The Rhetoric of Hitler’s Battle,” the literary judge must attempt to grasp those positions she 
finds abhorrent. To disregard them out of hand would be a failure to address their narratives, a 
failure to imagine the web of experiences and relationships that create narrow-mindedness, a 
failure to understand the situation before issuing a judgment.  
 Robert Pirsig’s analogy of reason and experience chugging along as a freight train 
captures this sentiment well. In Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, Pirsig likens 
                                                 
81 Nussbaum, From Disgust to Humanity, 49-50. 
 
 - 175 - 
humans to mile long freight trains filled with all of the concepts that we have inherited from the 
past – from language, culture, and experience. These concepts and experiences fill the boxcars 
being pulled along. The older we get, the more experiences we have, the heavier the freight 
becomes. Consequently, it has a lot of momentum, a lot of weight behind it, but the front of the 
train is constantly breaking into new, unexplored territory. This “pre-intellectual” experience is 
well funded by not only one’s own experience, but also the collective cultural experience in 
which we learn to think and to speak. We all have a mile long train full of weight that comes to 
bear on our experiences. In order to do something well, we need to have a lot of experience in 
our boxcars such that the front of the train is prepared for new horizons. In essence, this is what 
it means to be an artist. Even a seemingly mundane task such as repairing a motorcycle takes a 
lot of experience. And this experience informs judgment.  
For a judge, the boxcars are filled with some expected cargo: knowledge of the legal 
system and how it operates, the role of the judiciary within our democratic republic, historic 
precedent, the facts of the case, and so on. But the judge’s personal and cultural experiences also 
come into play, whether conscious of them or not. One of Nussbaum’s greatest concerns is the 
blind devotion to legal and intellectual experience accompanied by a narrow set of personal and 
cultural experiences that remain within the confines of a judge’s lived life. Most likely, these 
experiences will not adequately represent the broad swath of the American public, many of 
whom have a set of experiences markedly different than those of the judges. Yet, law constantly 
affects these people and their experiences. Most judges come from privileged backgrounds. 
Holmes, one of the most celebrated judges in American history, was part of the so-called 
“Boston Brahmin.” And he was no exception. Even contemporary judges who come from 
meager beginnings attain privilege in their adult lives. Just look at the schools that most federal 
 
 - 176 - 
judges have attended: Harvard, Stanford, Yale, Columbia, Berkeley. Yes, they had to work 
incredibly hard, but their hard work is markedly different than the hard work of the single mother 
cleaning hotel rooms or the coalminer going into the depths of the earth. If they were not 
privileged in their youth, judges are certainly privileged once they enter school and begin their 
profession. As a senior judge in the British legal system recently asserted, most of her colleagues 
live “sheltered lives” that negatively influence their capacity for good legal judgment.82 
Good judges must be attentive to the whole of the citizenry, which includes people 
remarkably different than them. Alas, they cannot go out and experience their lives so easily. 
They have limited time and resources. And their mere presence may alter how others act and 
react to them (also known as the Hawthorne Effect). Literature, however, offers judges a rich set 
of experiences that they may not otherwise have. Literature grants access into the highly 
emotional and deeply nuanced inner dialogue of characters, an experience anyone rarely, if ever, 
enjoys in their day-to-day interactions. The literary judge is an artist because she must take all of 
this knowledge and experience and put it to good use. Anyone can fill in a formula and get an 
answer, as the economic judge proposes. But only the attentive, sensitive, compassionate person 
who strives to understand the defining characteristics, histories, and experiences of those 
different from her will become a good judge. 
 
3.2 CULTIVATING INTELLIGENT EMOTIONS 
The literary imagination’s ability to stretch a judge’s perspective and to enhance her perceptive 
powers of invention comes to fruition through emotional intelligence. For Nussbaum, the literary 
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imagination and a nuanced emotional engagement are inseparably linked. All emotions, 
however, are not created equal. While she acknowledges great promise in a compassionate 
literary judge, Nussbaum is ever wary of the role that emotions like disgust and shame play in 
shaping practical judgment. Her call for an “intelligence of emotions” responds to the 
longstanding criticism against rhetorical appeals to pathos and challenges the ubiquitous 
“reasonable person” legal trope. As Nussbaum notes throughout numerous works, emotions are 
always there, always playing a role, always shaping judgment. To ignore them or place them at 
the tertiary of legal decision-making throws the baby out with the bathwater. Recognizing this, 
Nussbaum presents the literary judge as possessing a rich and nuanced view of emotions and 
their intimate relationship with legal judgment.  
 Nussbaum claims that competing theories of law can be dangerously reductionist or ignore 
the necessary role that emotions play in judgment. Her attacks against the economic judge 
illustrate one such reductionist approach. The economic judge utilizes a grammar that argues “in 
terms of” economic rationality, a position that eschews emotions as a valuable element of the 
decision-making process. Echoing Plato’s longstanding criticism of rhetoric and emotion, 
numerous approaches to law and justice position reason and the passions at odds with one 
another.  
 Nussbaum’s criticisms are not reserved for conservative leaning theorists. John Rawls’ 
egalitarian opus, A Theory of Justice, similarly maligns emotion as an inept guide for rational 
decision-making. Even though Nussbaum appreciates Rawls’ egalitarian bend and his 
appropriation of Kantian dignity, the veil of ignorance distances emotions from deliberation. So, 
too, does Jürgen Habermas’ ideal speech situation. Both theorists advocate for liberal approaches 
to law and justice, but resist integrating emotion into their grand schemes. Nussbaum argues that 
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competing legal philosophies are too focused on one narrow and limited perspective, ultimately 
missing the ubiquity of emotions in the formation of judgment. By framing competing models of 
judgment as naively reductionist, Nussbaum attempts to position the literary judge as possessing 
an adequately panoramic view of human life, a judge who considers the whole of human 
flourishing, including (and especially) the affective dimension.  
 Although emotion has enjoyed a handful of defenders throughout the history of 
philosophy, opponents of emotion have been greater in number and louder in protest. The Stoics, 
intellectual heirs of Plato, were staunchly opposed to emotions as a guide save a handful of later 
Stoics like Cicero and Seneca. The Age of Reason and the Enlightenment were similarly wary of 
emotions, promoting reason as the best guide for human action. Interestingly, Adam Smith, the 
father of modern economics, wrote extensively on “moral sentiments,” but contemporary 
economists often forget that legacy. The “invisible hand” is not described as being attached to an 
“invisible heart.” The scientization of philosophy and its dedication to logic throughout the 20th 
century has continued to resist the insights that emotions may introduce. Again, philosophers 
throughout the long history of Western thought do not argue that emotions are bad (save a few), 
but they nonetheless remain wary of emotions as what Nussbaum describes as “intelligent 
responses to the perception of value.”83 Emotions are troublesome, they get in the way; thus, the 
majority of philosophy (and, consequently, jurisprudence) focuses on a cleaner, tidier view of 
reason. This is not to say that emotion has been ignored in philosophy. In fact, there has been a 
swelling interest in the topic within the last 30 years.84 Although this scholarship has been 
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growing, emotions nonetheless remain at the tertiary of philosophical scholarship and, in many 
ways, law has followed philosophy’s lead.85 
 Nussbaum finds such resistance to emotional perception problematic because it is detached 
from how individuals actually live their lives. Taking a page from Posner’s rhetorical playbook 
described in the previous chapter, she criticizes competing theories for their aloofness: “an 
account of human reasoning based only upon abstract texts such as are conventional in moral 
philosophy is likely to prove too simple to offer us the type of self-understanding we need.”86 
Importantly, the predominantly rational approaches to law that spurn emotion suffer from a 
limited vocabulary. Following legal theorist William Miller, “Emotions are feelings linked to 
ways of talking about those feelings, to social and cultural paradigms that make sense of those 
feelings by giving us a basis for knowing when they are properly felt and displayed.”87 Akin to 
Nussbaum’s criticism of the economist’s restrictive “way of thinking,” practical legal judgment 
requires a vocabulary - a way of looking at and speaking about the world - that reflects human 
flourishing, which necessarily includes emotions. As Hegel reminds us, “To him who looks upon 
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the world rationally, the world in its turn presents a rational aspect.”88 In other words, if you are 
touting around a rational hammer, everything looks like a rational nail. The challenge, then, is to 
provide judges with more tools in their toolboxes with which to take apart cases and assemble 
judgments.  
 According to Nussbaum, emotions are not mercurial and can provide a reliable guide for 
practical judgment, especially on issues pertaining to justice and morality. Describing her view 
as “cognitive-evaluative,” she notes four important elements that distinguish her approach to and 
use of emotions as an integral element of judgment. 1) “They are about something: they have an 
object.” 2) “The object is an intentional object: that is, it figures in the emotion as it is seen or 
interpreted by the person whose emotion it is.” 3) They “embody no simple ways of seeing an 
object, but beliefs – often very complex – about the object.” 4) “They are concerned with value, 
they see their object as invested with value or importance.”89 Logic and reasoning are certainly 
important, but they fail to see the entire picture of human life and human judgment. Emotions are 
a value added way of seeing; a lantern on the path to the good life that rescues us from our 
darkest moments and shines a light on that which we hold dear. As Robert Solomon notes, “the 
passions do not fall beyond the domain of philosophy, but rather provide it with a subject 
matter.”90 The guiding ideals of American democracy such as liberty and equality certainly have 
well reasoned, logical elements to them. But these arguments alone do not win the day, even in 
law. Reason, argues legal scholar Anthony Kronman, “lacks the power to compel us to embrace 
and follow its own prescriptive norms. Reason is needed to guide us, but is incapable of inducing 
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us to follow.”91  
 For the sitting judge, to ignore or restrict the place of emotions in the act of judgment 
overlooks the fragility and vulnerability that our emotional lives necessarily possess. The 
economic judge, for example, attempts to steel himself with a universal standard of judgment 
that serves as protective armor against the volatility of emotion. Consequently, there is always a 
correct decision if one adheres to the economic principles guiding the judge toward wealth 
maximization. Tragedy does not exist in the economic world because there is always a right 
decision.92 Well read in the Ancient Greek tragedies and the contemporary stories that place 
characters in impossible positions, the literary judge recognizes the sad truth that some decisions 
will never be “right.”93  
  Although a number of legal theories attempt to insulate the law from the unpredictability 
of emotion, which Nussbaum describes as the “No-Emotion proposal,”94 courtrooms have long 
recognized the mitigating factor that they play. We expect certain emotions in certain situations. 
A convicted murderer who shows remorse is often given a more lenient sentence than another 
who remains unrepentant. Judges allow gruesome photographs into evidence. One would be hard 
pressed to argue that such photos do not have (and are not intended to have) an emotional impact 
on judges and juries. We can also understand a powerful emotional response in an extreme 
situation. The father who walks in on his young daughter being raped by an intruder is not 
expected to remain calm and composed. We would think something was wrong with him if he 
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did. The literary judge believes that reason detached from emotion is not healthy, is not 
altogether human, and actively inhibits the cultivation of the flourishing life. By being aware of 
and a participant in our shared emotional lives, the literary judge is better able to promote 
emotional health, which, in turn, promotes legal and civic health, which, in turn, helps to 
cultivate eudaimonia.  
 Reason, however, should not be viewed with suspicion; it is merely incomplete without the 
contribution that emotions play in practical judgment. Nussbaum remains strongly opposed to 
theories that attempt to upend reason as a legacy of philosophical essentialism and patriarchy.95 
Noting how essentialism has become a “dirty word in the academy,” Nussbaum defends “a 
historically grounded empirical essentialism” that is rooted in human experience.96 This 
“internalist essentialism” responds to the postmodern debunking of reason by providing an 
account of human flourishing that focuses on identification through compassion and respect. 
Much like her criticisms of law and economics, social contract theory, and originalism, 
Nussbaum’s argument against anti-essentialism calls for an expanded perspective, not a 
revolutionary upheaval. In order to respond to the anti-essentialist position and criticisms 
associated with relativism, Nussbaum argues for a particular type of essentialism that is stable 
enough to ground judgments yet flexible enough to respond to change. 
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 Nussbaum distinguishes between two major forms of essentialism and notes that we must 
not confuse the two. The first, metaphysical-realist essentialism, is characterized by “[s]ome 
mind or other” that is “able to grasp [the] real structure [of reality] as it is in itself.” “On such a 
view,” Nussbaum continues, “the way the human being essentially is will be a part of the 
independent furniture of the universe.”97 Criticisms of this type of essentialism are not new, 
which Nussbaum acknowledges by citing Aristotle’s anti-Platonist arguments, but have gained 
popularity by postmodern “nonphilosophers” influenced by Jacques Derrida.98 She more-or-less 
agrees that metaphysical realism is more confusing than helpful: “To cling to it as a goal is to 
pretend that it is possible for us to be told from outside what to be and what to do, when in reality 
the only answers we can ever hope to have must come, in some manner, from ourselves.”99  
 While Nussbaum disagrees with metaphysical realism – or, at the very least, questions any 
conclusions that one would arrive upon through such argument – she holds onto an essentialism 
that relies upon universal human capabilities necessary to live a robust and truly human life. 
Nussbaum argues that internalist essentialism considers history and cultural differences as 
important elements of human development, allows for human freedom and autonomy, and avoids 
prejudicial application by allowing for negotiation within the capabilities. She recognizes the 
danger of relativism and the ease with which one can fall into a relativist view of judgment. 
Citing Stanley Fish as a representative example, Nussbaum laments the impact that relativism 
has had on judgment: 
Fish says that all judgment is a matter of power – no good and bad reasons. This implies 
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that one can never give a morally good reason for criticizing the verdicts of established 
authority: when one does so one is by definition just playing for power and is thus no 
better, morally, than one’s opponent. Where the game is power, weakness is always worse. 
The poor are losers, and that’s that. A more lighthearted deconstructionist says it is all a 
matter of free play. So, if I want to play around with torture and slavery and you want to 
stop me, nothing can be said about the moral superiority of you to me. You have your way 
of playing, I have mine.100 
Judgment, especially on matters of justice, is no game for Nussbaum’s literary judge.101 
Emotions may be internal and subjectively felt, but they are not altogether relative. Humans 
share similar emotional experiences, especially individuals in the same culture. As such, the 
literary judge must understand how these emotions provide a normative function within their 
society and make judgments that promote human flourishing.   
  Yet, not all emotions benefit the judicial process. Nussbaum argues that some emotions 
infect the decision-making process and render professional and lay judges unduly and adversely 
influenced. In Hiding from Humanity, Nussbaum advocates against shame and disgust as useful 
emotions in legal judgment. Concerning the former, judges across the country have implemented 
shaming punishments and the trend is growing. For example, a recent case in Utah involved a 
13-year-old girl cutting a 3-year-old’s hair. The judge offered to reduce the girl’s community 
service if the mother cut off her ponytail right then and there in the courtroom. In 2009, a Texas 
judge gave an abusive father an ultimatum: either spend 30 days in jail or sleep in a doghouse for 
30 days. “In an Ohio case, a municipal judge sentenced two teens found guilty of breaking into a 
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church on Christmas Eve to march through town with a donkey and a sign reading, ‘Sorry for the 
Jackass Offense.’ The same judge later ordered a woman to be taken to a remote location to sleep 
outside for abandoning kittens in parks.”102 Such punishments have gained praise for the reduced 
cost they require from taxpayers and the arguably cathartic feeling of revenge they evoke.  
 The literary judge is ill at ease with shaming punishments because they tend to exploit 
emotional vulnerabilities and promote unhealthy emotional cultivation. Unlike Posner’s 
economic judge, who may find such punishments reinforce a “wealth maximization” model of 
judgment, the literary judge believes that law provides a “dynamic and educative role.”103 Law is 
normative. It reinforces the values of a society and helps to shape and reshape cultural norms. As 
such, some uses of shame may have a “positive ethical value,” but judges must avoid harmful, 
“primitive” shame.104 In short: dignity must be preserved. 
 Drawing from developmental psychology, Nussbaum characterizes such negative shame as 
that which makes an individual view his or her whole self as weak or inadequate.105 These 
individuals then internalize the shame and reconstruct their entire identities around their failures. 
Karen Horney’s germane contribution to psychological development, Neurosis and Human 
Growth, illustrates the gravity of this problem. Shame attacks the internal thought processes of 
individuals by greatly magnifying any failure and finding fault in any success.106 The goal of 
shaming penalties is to humiliate, not simply to embarrass. As a result, individuals may 
internalize a penetrating vulnerability that leads to a “‘broken spirit’ – a long-term inability to 
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recover self-respect and a sense of one’s own worth.”107  
 Brené Brown’s recent scholarship on shame and self-worth reinforces this notion. If we are 
shamed by an outside person, group, or institution for a limited time, the internalized shame 
carries forward indefinitely. Who among us can honestly claim that shameful moments in our 
pasts do not continue to haunt us? As a result, individuals – ourselves included – often attempt to 
numb themselves from such feelings rather than recover from them. After a while, such 
individuals begin to feel badly. To clarify, they do not feel bad; rather, their capacity to feel is 
greatly impaired or incapacitated. In order to avoid feeling constant shame, they stop feeling 
altogether. The shamed become inured to love, gratitude, and healthy pride in an attempt to 
escape the crushing pain and anxiety that are associated with shame.108 If the law is normative 
and habituating – and the literary judge believes that it is - penalties that rely on shame 
undermine the dignity of the shamed and cultivate a citizenry that believes such attacks on 
dignity are good. 
 For Nussbaum, judgment that results in shame fails to acknowledge the law’s respect for 
and obligation to human dignity. Claiming that shame punishments “are ways of marking a 
person, often for life, with a degraded identity,”109 Nussbaum finds the state’s involvement in 
such actions “indecent.” By participating in the humiliation of its citizens, the state is articulating 
a set of values “through its public system of law,” which is “profoundly subversive of the ideas 
of equality and dignity on which liberal society is based.”110 The danger lies in the connection 
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between the person and the person’s act. By responding to illegal actions with shaming penalties, 
an individual is more likely to believe that he is a shameful person who is unworthy of respect or 
self-worth. Rehabilitation and redemption, paramount goals of our legal system, become less and 
less likely. Guilt, as Nussbaum notes, does not carry the same baggage because it is “fully 
compatible with respect for the dignity of the person.”111 The literary judge embraces this 
position and offers criminals a path toward reparation and reintegration. By figuring the 
objective of law as the protection, maintenance, and, if necessary, restoration of human dignity, 
the cost/benefit concerns articulated by the economic judge become moot.  
 Disgust is even more complicated because it plays a more formative role in the act of 
judgment, rather than a consequence of judgment as with shame. According to Nussbaum, 
disgust limits one’s ability to judge effectively. Disgust repels against conscientious thought and 
compassionate engagement, creating distance between the judge and the person being judged. 
Distinct from anger or fear, argues Nussbaum, disgust is “typically unreasonable, embodying 
magical ideas of contamination, and impossible aspirations to purity, immortality, and 
nonanimality” and, as a result, “should make us skeptical about relying on it as a basis for 
law.”112 Anger and indignation are certainly expected responses in situations that violate an 
individual’s expectations, but they differ from disgust in that they are less likely to be 
“normatively distorted”33 and are centrally concerned with “the idea of a wrong or a harm.”113 
Instead of conscientiously engaging an issue and working to resolve it, disgust obfuscates one’s 
view of a situation and serves as a “distraction from the serious moral issues that ought to be 
considered.”114 By turning to disgust, the broadened perspective that Nussbaum believes a 
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literary imagination can cultivate becomes narrowed and detaches from those involved.  
For scholars of rhetoric and discourse, disgust understood in this way is particularly 
problematic because it cultivates an attitude of intolerance and disengagement. One does not 
seek to expose oneself to the disgusting for fear it will contaminate them, both literally and 
figuratively. Objects of disgust are distorted and, as a result, not worthy of the same rational 
discourse. When one comes upon an object of disgust – fecal matter, for example – the 
immediate reaction is to get away from it. Even when occupies a place you wish to or must also 
occupy, such as your home (bad dog!), the offending material merits no investigation beyond the 
desire to eliminate it. When it comes to poop, this is all well and good. But when the same 
attitude of disgust is cultivated toward particular groups or persons, the rhetorical fallout is the 
same. The disgusted individual does not want to engage the issue or, worse yet, the object of 
disgust. They become toxic, worthy of derision and ridicule rather than human dignity and 
rhetorical exchange. For understanding the other, “disgust is thus likely to pose a particular threat 
to compassion, or at least to any form of it that extends it to human beings generally, without 
hierarchy or discrimination.”38 Rather than fostering an environment wherein citizens want to 
understand one another and reach consensus, a rhetoric of disgust creates an unsurpassable 
distance between oneself and the object of disgust.115  
 Consider for example the legislative and arguments surrounding immigration, which has 
long occupied American public discourse, functioning as a double-edged sword in law and 
public policy. Politicians seeking election are often quick to appeal to their immigrant roots, 
usually calling attention to a distant great grandparent’s struggle to come to the United States 
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with only a few dollars and a strong sense of determination. Through hard work and willpower, 
they were able to cobble together a decent life, which then benefited their future progeny. The 
American Dream wrapped up in a nice little package. Although such narratives define many 
rags-to-riches stories, a strong resistance to immigration is equally prominent. Stereotypical fear 
and resentment characterize each new generation of immigrants. Irish, Italian, and Jewish 
immigrants faced pronounced animosity throughout the 1800s and early 1900s. Presently, such 
animosity is directed toward Hispanic and Muslim immigrants as immigration policy continues 
to be a central concern in politics and public discourse. The most fervent objectors utilize a 
rhetoric of disgust that the literary judge finds uncivil and dangerous. By rhetorically framing 
immigrants as animalistic or as a dangerous infection that is spreading throughout the United 
States, judgment (be it by a judge or the public writ large) is negatively skewed. 
The recent statements by Steve King, a Republican Representative from Iowa, illustrate 
this rhetorical turn well. In May of 2012, King stated, 
You want a good bird dog? You want one that’s going to be aggressive? Pick the one 
that’s the friskiest … not the one that’s over there sleeping in the corner…You get the 
pick of the litter and you got yourself a pretty good bird dog. Well, we’ve got the pick of 
every donor civilization on the planet. We’ve got the vigor from the planet to come to 
America.116  
More recently, King likened the children of Mexican immigrants to drug mules with “calves the 
size of cantaloupes” they developed from smuggling drugs into the United States.117 He has also 
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compared illegal immigrants passing over fences in the southern United States to livestock that 
deserved to be shocked. When pressed by Democratic challenger Christie Vilsack, King was 
brazen enough to claim his comments were intended to be a compliment. Although King has 
made a number of outlandish comments in the past, including remarks defending the notion that 
a woman cannot get pregnant from incest or rape, he is nonetheless a mainstream political figure 
and his words are echoed throughout the media.  
 Such rhetorical tactics are precisely what Nussbaum’s literary judge finds so problematic 
with disgust. Drawing from an array of researchers in psychology and sociology, including 
Andras Angyal, William Miller, and Paul Rozin, Nussbaum asserts that “disgust pertains to our 
problematic relationship with our own animality.”118 She notes that framing a group as 
essentially animals was a prominent rhetorical tactic for Hitler’s anti-Semitic propaganda, a point 
that was not lost on Kenneth Burke in “The Rhetoric of Hitler’s ‘Battle.’”119 By likening 
immigrants to animals, King simultaneously relegates them to the status of creatures incapable of 
dignified human experience while also elevating himself and those like him to a higher moral 
plain.  
 Representative King’s comments do not reflect an isolated incident or lone fringe 
political figure. Comparing immigrants to animals is a prominent rhetorical strategy primarily 
utilized by conservative groups. In 2011, Representative Jeff Duncan of South Carolina likened 
current immigration law to “taking the door off the hinges and allowing any kind of vagrant, or 
animal, or just somebody that’s hungry, or somebody that wants to do your dishes for you, to 
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come in.”120 By comparing immigrants – or any group – to animals, Nussbaum argues that it 
represents an attempt to cultivate a sense of disgust at the maligned group. Rather than accepting 
our shared animality, a rhetoric of disgust deflects one’s animality onto others and reinforces a 
social hierarchy wherein one’s in-group, however defined, is morally and culturally superior to 
animalistic groups.  
 Sadly, the trend of likening immigrants to animals has a long history. Analyzing print 
media text surrounding the 1994 political debates concerning an anti-immigration referendum, 
Otto Santa Ana argues that “immigrants as animals” was a dominant metaphor used in attacks 
against the referendum. “Immigrants are seen as animals to be lured, pitied or baited,” argues 
Santa Ana.121 20.6% of all metaphorical descriptions published during the political campaign 
likened immigrants to animals.122 Drawing from Lakoff and Johnson’s work on metaphor and 
public judgment, Santa Ana claims that such metaphors frame the public’s perspective to view 
an issue one way rather than another. Consequently, the “immigrants as animals” metaphor 
“belittles immigrants as it separates non-citizens and citizens, since it assigns them a less-than-
human standing.”123 Santa Ana asserts, and Nussbaum agrees, such “categorization of people 
[creates] a false hierarchy.”124 By categorizing immigrants as animalistic “others” and creating a 
hierarchy that differentiates “us” from “them,” then “those quasi-animals stand between us and 
our own animality, then we are one step further away fro being animal and mortal ourselves.”125 
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Underneath the thinly veiled racism of the metaphor is a sense of disgust toward immigrants that 
“pose a threat to the idea of the equal worth and dignity of persons that is a very important part 
of any morality that most of us would favor.”126 
 Comparing immigrants to animals is only one of two ways in which the group is 
maligned as disgusting. Another prominent metaphor in contemporary public argument centers 
on “immigrants as infections.” This metaphor functions in two ways. The first suggests that 
immigrants are more likely to carry infectious diseases, thus more likely to infect a healthy 
population. The second suggests that an immigrant’s culture can infect the country to which they 
are immigrating and negatively affect or undermine the host culture. Both rhetorical strategies 
contribute to an overall sense of disgust.  
 The first proposal – immigrants as medically diseased – has an air of scientific 
legitimacy, as poorer countries struggle to contain infectious disease due to a lack of resources, 
inadequate methods of detection, poor health education, and a disparate population without the 
means to receive treatment if it is available.127 Additionally, Big Pharma has urged the United 
States to put sanctions on countries struggling with infectious diseases that attempt to develop 
generic and far less expensive drugs. Nonetheless, the idea that all or even most immigrants from 
developing countries are infected and will spread disease throughout the United States is a 
prominent response against immigration. The rhetoric of disgust normalizes the idea that “those 
people” will bring death and disease in their wake. 
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 In 2007, the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act was introduced but never voted on 
after heated debate. The bill contained a number of provisions, including increased border 
enforcement (Mexico, not Canada), a central database containing immigrant information, and the 
DREAM Act, which would grant illegal immigrants the possibility of citizenship if they met a 
set of requirements. As the bill was being debated, conservative-leaning FOX News warned of a 
flood of previously eradicated diseases being reintroduced into the American population 
“because of these 12 million illegals who come across the border,”128 including tuberculosis and 
leprosy. Lou Dobbs claimed that 7,000 new cases of leprosy had been diagnosed within the last 
three years, when, in fact, they had been diagnosed within the last thirty years.129  
Moreover, there is little, if any, hard data that links immigrants to the spread of infections 
disease. In a recent article by the Texas Tribune, Reeve Hamilton criticizes comments made by 
Representative Leo Berman who repeated the claim that “illegal immigrants are bringing in 
tuberculosis, malaria, polio, leprosy — even the plague.”130 As Hamilton notes, “For most of the 
diseases on the list, it’s impossible to determine precisely how many people that have contracted 
them are in the country illegally.” The data does not track the number of illegal immigrants who 
have contracted the various diseases, nor does it account for the natural-born citizens who 
contracted the diseases through travel to foreign countries. The specious claims amount to scare 
tactics intended to characterize all immigrants as dangerously diseased, a rhetorical turn that uses 
paranoia to distinguish “us” from “them.” 
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The racist undertones become overt when considering the second manifestation of 
“immigrants as infections,” which concerns their cultural influence. Most immigrants retain 
strong ties to their ancestral home and bring their cultural traditions to their new homes. 
Assimilation with American cultural norms certainly occurs, but such shifts take generations. 
Moreover, the result is rarely a complete “Americanization,” but an amalgamation of cultures. 
Italian, Jewish, and Irish immigrants in the 19th and early 20th centuries offer clear historic 
examples, as these cultures continue to remain vibrant and have fused with mainstream 
American culture. But much like the animosity directed at the Jewish and Irish immigrants 100 
years ago, cultural shifts are hard fought battles. Moreover, earlier European immigrants had an 
entire ocean and slower means of travel separating them from their home cultures.  
To staunch nationalists, changes to the social, cultural, economic, and political status quo 
reflect a contagion that is going to spread. If left unencumbered, the cultural habits maintained 
by foreign immigrants such as the prominent Hispanic population or the growing Hmong 
population will increase exponentially. In their germane booklength examination of California’s 
“Proposition 187,” Shifting Borders, Kent Ono and John Sloop note the pervasive nationalism 
and xenophobia in the public debates on immigration the proposition sparked. Taking a critical 
approach to vernacular rhetorics, Ono and Sloop argue that immigrants are most often 
association with biological invasion. Disease, infection, and infestation are some of the most 
frequently used characterizations of contemporary immigrants.131 As David Cisneros notes, other 
scholars have acknowledged similar characterizations: immigrants as a danger to American 
                                                 
131 See Kent A. Ono and John M. Sloop, Shifting Borders: Rhetoric, Immigration, and California’s 
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“purity,” immigrants as “invaders,” and immigrants as “pollutants” are all different ways of 
saying the same thing.132  
Portraying immigrant cultures as contagions attaches a powerful stigma to the groups and 
it becomes increasingly challenging for individuals exposed to these messages (but not the 
immigrants themselves) to identify with them. Not only are measures put into place that prevent 
their immigration - the ongoing calls for a country-long border fence and stricter immigration 
regulations come to mind - but they are actively avoided. As Lynn Fujiwara notes, one of the 
main challenges facing organized movements calling for more human rights in immigration is 
the persistent view that immigration is an epidemic invasion of an external parasite.133 One of the 
most significant ramifications of the rhetoric of disgust surrounding immigration is its ability to 
make an issue anti-rhetorical. The very idea of deliberating the issue and acknowledging the 
shared humanity of immigrants seems ludicrous because it is beyond argument. As a result, 
characterizing immigrants as infections or pollutants is still at home in many pockets of 
contemporary public discourse. A “balanced approach,” as suggested by Jason Edwards and 
Richard Herner, is doomed to fail, even when a conservative president such as George W. Bush 
promotes it.134 
 As this example indicates, rhetorics of disgust that are cultivated and utilized in public 
discourse pose a significant problem because they attempt to circumvent an engaged, civic 
discourse. This is the rhetorical situation wherein the literary judge finds herself. She is not only 
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surrounded by this rhetoric as the deliberation of various laws and policies are being discussed in 
legislatures and the public sphere, but she must also respond to these appeals when cases 
concerning immigration (or prisoners’ rights or LGTBQ initiatives or abortion) when they make 
it to her bench. The underlying danger is that a rhetoric of disgust necessarily narrows one’s 
perspective when it goes unchecked and relies upon ungrounded assumptions based on 
misinformation. Such misinformation tends to be overlooked, however, because disgust 
circumvents the rational, “intelligent” aspect of emotion engagement. The emotional response 
that is created in an audience divides individuals rather than establishing any common ground for 
deliberation. As a result, stasis becomes nearly impossible.  
 As one would expect, Nussbaum’s position has met a number of criticisms. Leon Kass 
asserts that there is a “wisdom” to the feeling of disgust, arguing that it actually does the exact 
opposite of what Nussbaum claims: we feel disgust when our dignity is being undermined.135 
Even Judith Butler agrees that there is some value to disgust, suggesting that it calls attention to 
and questions socio-culture norms.136 Justin Smith questions the relationship between disgust and 
“moral obtuseness” and notes that both Nussbaum and Kass fail to give due attention to cross-
cultural value systems.137 Although sympathetic to Nussbaum’s overall goal of “putting emotions 
back into jurisprudence,” David Archard nonetheless highlights the enduring challenge of liberal 
societies to demarcate a standard “reasonableness” (or “intelligence”) of emotion, especially 
when issues like blasphemy/free speech are concerned.138 Given the vast, multi-disciplinary 
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scholarship on disgust, these arguments are but a small sample. Yet they capture the two main 
threads: 1) disgust is not as bad as Nussbaum suggests, and even has some positive benefits, and 
2) even if disgust were as bad as Nussbaum suggests, it is nearly impossible to regulate and 
prevent, especially in purportedly neutral liberal societies. 
In Nussbaum’s defense, she is not demanding that shame and disgust become expunged 
from our emotional repertoire. Instead, she wants to critically question why and how an impulse 
toward shame or disgust is produced and toward what end does a judgment rendered under the 
auspices of shame or disgust aspire. Nussbaum continuously notes the complicated roles that 
shame and disgust play in our personal lives in addition to the influence they play on our 
judgments and expectations of others. They each contain important evolutionary elements that 
cannot be willed away, which raises an important challenge for the literary judge. Much like love 
or anger or pity or compassion, disgust happens; it is an unavoidable part of the emotional 
spectrum. Although they may be unavoidable, Nussbaum believes these emotions are incomplete 
and, as they are often promoted in public discourse, immature. Continuing her call for an 
expanded perspective, one that stretches the scope of law to consider the emotional components 
of judgment, Nussbaum asks that we step back in order to reflect upon our tendencies to shame 
and the moments (and objects) that induce disgust. The literary judge, charged with deciding 
complicated cases that implicate cultural norms, must remain diligently aware of her own 
emotional state while simultaneously trying to grapple with the emotional states of the involved 
parties. When national issues are at stake – for example, the ongoing debates over public funding 
for controversial art and the increased calls for stricter immigration laws – entire swaths of the 
American public may be involved.  
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 Nussbaum, however, faces a rhetorical challenge that remains unaddressed; namely, the 
examples she utilizes to illustrate the dangers of disgust tend to evoke a sense of disgust toward 
those who had acted on the basis of disgust. For example, she often turns to Commonwealth v. 
Carr,139 a 1990 case wherein the defendant, Stephen Carr, shot two lesbian women (one of 
whom died) who were having sex in the woods near the Appalachian Trail because their 
homosexuality so disgusted him. As she describes the horrific details of the case and the 
unreasonableness of Carr’s legal justification for his actions, LGBTQ readers and those 
sympathetic to their case are likely not only to gain sympathy for the victims, but also feel a 
sense of disgust with Carr. Although Nussbaum does not specifically label Carr as an object of 
disgust, her descriptive narrative elicits the very disgust she hopes to quell.  
The same goes for her invocation of State of North Carolina v. Norman.140 In this 1989 
case, Judy Norman was on trial for murdering her husband. Describing the events leading up to 
her husband’s murder, Nussbaum notes how she had been “physically and mentally abused by 
her husband for years. He forced her to engage in prostitution and he frequently threatened to kill 
her. One evening her husband beat her with unusual severity, called her a ‘dog,’ and made here 
lie on the floor while he lay on the bed.”141 Granted, this is merely a description of the events 
that took place, but one would be hard pressed not to feel a sense of disgust toward her husband, 
thus justifying her actions.  
 Sadly, the news is riddled with similar stories of heinous crimes. In May of 2013, Ariel 
Castro was revealed to have held three women hostage for a decade as he subjected them to 
horrific physical and sexual abuse. Is disgust at such atrocity not expected? On February 27, 
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2012, T.J. Lane assaulted his Ohio high school with a .22 handgun, murdering three students, 
paralyzing another, and terrorizing the entire community. At his sentencing hearing, an 
unrepentant Lane wore a t-shirt with the word “Killer” written across the chest. After he was 
sentenced, he turned to his victims’ families and said, “This hand that pulled the trigger that 
killed your sons now masturbates to the memory. Fuck all of you.” Is not the appropriate 
emotion disgust? Do anger and indignation go far enough in describing such an abhorrent 
display? Less than a year and a half ago, not four blocks from where I lived in Davis, CA, an 
attorney and his wife were tortured and murdered in their home. Their 16-year old neighbor, who 
had been lauded as a hero four years earlier for saving his father from a near fatal heart attack, 
stands trial for the crime even. There was no discernable reason for the crime other than thrill 
and pleasure. Am I not expected to feel not only outrage, but disgust at these events? No doubt, 
these are extreme examples, but sadly they are not rare. Mind-bogglingly atrocious crimes are 
perpetrated with alarming regularity. Can we be expected to squelch our feelings of disgust? 
 Herein lies yet another of Nussbaum’s rhetorical challenges and another potential source 
of hypocritical critique: does she ask the impossible? Nussbaum is highly attentive to the 
practical element of philosophy and believes that it should be a resource to improve our day-to-
day lives. The examples she uses to underscore the dangers of disgust are powerful and poignant 
as they illustrate how disgust has been used to malign traditionally disenfranchised groups, but 
can we steel ourselves against the perpetrators of abhorrent acts? Should we? In his critique of 
the classic liberal defense of freedom of speech and expression, John Durham Peters labels such 
defenders of shock material as embodying “homeopathic machismo,” which is akin to “the daily 
imbibing of poisons in small doses so that large drafts will not hurt.”142 “[S]ome liberals,” Peters 
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continues, “celebrate provocation as an opportunity to show off the advanced state of their self-
mastery.”143 The more vile and offensive the material, the more the liberal is able to flout a Stoic 
command of emotion.  
 Although we may never be able to rid ourselves of disgust, Nussbaum’s position 
nonetheless highlights the important need to understand – or at least attempt to understand – that 
which disgusts us. In this regard, she shares a close similarity to Burke’s analysis of Hitler. 
Noting how easy it is to disregard the abhorrent out of hand without understanding it, Burke is 
averse to thin analyses that merely serve to provide “a favorable reception among the decent 
members of our population.” Instead, he advocates that we attempt to “discover what kind of 
‘medicine’ this medicine-man has concocted, that we may know, with greater accuracy, exactly 
what to guard against, if we are to forestall the concocting of similar medicine in America.”144 In 
many ways, this is the same task that Nussbaum advances. It is far too easy to label someone 
evil, to feel complete and utter disgust, and then put them out of sight and out of mind. The real 
challenge is unpacking how and why this person came to be, which the literary judge is tasked to 
do. The actions of Ariel Castro and T.J. Lane and Stephen Carr are reprehensible, but if society 
does not attempt to understand the processes and social forces that helped to create them (or, at 
the very least, failed to prevent them), then more Castros and Lanes and Carrs are bound to 
emerge.  
 Responding to the negative influences of shame and disgust, the literary judge 
approaches the decision-making process with compassion and humility. In part a consequence of 
exposure to morally engaging literature and a sensitivity to the ways in which shame and disgust 
shape our perceptions of ourselves and others, compassionate judgment acknowledges the 
                                                 
143 Ibid., 7. 
144 Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form, 191. 
 
 - 201 - 
common humanity shared by everyone and recognizes our inevitable imperfections. For judges, 
this includes an understanding of each defendant’s individual situation, even those they find 
repugnant. What brought this person before the court? No doubt there was some sort of legal 
transgression, but why? Unlike the economic judge, the literary judge finds these narratives vital 
to the judicial process. They offer an explanation, which may be good or poor, effective or 
ineffective, but nonetheless deeper and richer than a list noting the bare-bone facts of the case. 
More importantly, these narratives highlight potential societal problems that may make legal 
transgressions more likely, such as the influence of poverty and squalor on one’s ability to think 
critically and feel intelligently.145 Building on her call for a literary imagination, Nussbaum 
claims “compassion requires the thought that another person is undergoing something seriously 
bad,”146 and the sufferer is “not be fully to blame for his or her plight.”147 Moreover, Nussbaum’s 
theory recognizes the vulnerability that everyone shares. Poor luck may befall even the most 
virtuous and stouthearted, forcing them into a position without any good options. The literary 
judge recognizes the possibility of tragic situations that do not have a “right” or “good” answer, 
yet still require action to be taken. 
 Recently, however, compassionate judgment has been characterized as a dangerous 
element of left-wing judicial activism. In 2009, President Barack Obama was in the process of 
making his first Supreme Court nomination, which eventually went to Justice Sotomayor. Before 
making his selection, he told the press he was looking for “empathy” in his nominee, someone 
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who can identify with “people’s hopes and struggles.” 148 While he was campaigning in 2007, 
Obama asserted, “We need somebody who’s got the heart, the empathy, to recognize what it’s 
like to be a young teenage mom, the empathy to understand what it’s like to be poor or African-
American or gay or disabled or old–and that’s the criterion by which I’ll be selecting my 
judges.”149 Republicans immediately responded, claiming that Obama was advocating for an 
“empathy standard” that created an imbalanced, unfair, and unjust criterion of judgment. 
Empathy, under this understanding, lifts the blindfold over Lady Justice’s eyes and violates the 
virtue of dispassionate judicial restraint. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell argued that 
Obama’s call for empathy was a thinly veiled indication of the President’s support “for certain 
groups or individuals” and would “undermine public faith in the judiciary.”150  
As one would expect, liberals and democrats rose to Obama’s defense. Left-leaning 
articles and editorials noted the importance of empathy throughout the legal system. George 
Lakoff pushed the argument even further by claiming that our entire democratic system was 
based on empathy; to abandon it is to abandon the entire democratic experiment.151 Yet, these 
two positions represent a false dichotomy. As Nussbaum notes, empathy can be used poorly, just 
                                                 
148 Although scholars have noted the difference between empathy, sympathy, and compassion, they 
function in similar ways within this public debate. As a result, a detailed dissection of each term 
contributes little to the public controversy. 
149 Senator Barack Obama, “Campaign Speech to Planned Parenthood” (July 2007). Retrieved from 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/ 014/849oyckg.asp 
150 Peter Slevin, “In Filling Supreme Court Vacancy, Obama Looks for a Jurist with Empathy,” 
Washington Post (May 13, 2009), retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/05/12/AR2009051203515_2.html?sid=ST2009051203561. 
151 Lakoff claimed, "President Obama has argued that empathy is the basis of our democracy. It is because 
we care about others, he has argued, that we have principles like freedom and fairness, not just for 
ourselves but for everyone. I have found, in studies of largely unconscious political conceptual systems, 
that empathy is the basis of progressive political thought, and the basis for the very idea of social, not just 
individual, responsibility. Conservative political thought is otherwise structured, based on authority, 
discipline, and responsibility for oneself but not others. The major moral, social, and political divide in 
America centers around empathy.” Cited in Dan Froomkin, “The Empathy War,” The Washington Post 
(May 13, 2009), retrieved from http://voices.washingtonpost.com/white-house-watch/the-empathy-
war.html. 
 
 - 203 - 
as anger can be used poorly. Compassion may be colored by any number of circumstantial issues 
including proximity, misinformation, errors about fault, and a narrow “circle of concern.”152 
Nussbaum’s literary judge, however, possesses a nuanced view of compassion that 
acknowledges the complicated rhetorical situation. To use compassion well requires that it be 
tethered to the facts of the case and the individuals involved. Reinforcing her argument for an 
intelligence of emotions, Nussbaum claims such compassion is rooted in reasonableness.153  
Nussbaum draws from a wealth of U.S. legal history to illustrate her point, noting the 
failures and the successes of the past. Consider, for example, Woodson v. North Carolina (1976). 
One of five death penalty cases heard in 1975,154 the issue before the court was the legality of 
North Carolina’s mandatory death penalty for all convicted first-degree murders. Under such 
legislation, the facts of the case were irrelevant after conviction, as they all share in common the 
“malice aforethought.” Although the law faced staunch opposition from a number of anti-death 
penalty organizations, there was public support for the law. These were first-degree murderers, 
after all! Beasts of carnage preying on the innocent! There is a long history of maligning felons, 
particularly murderers and rapists, as inhuman.  
 In a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court overturned the decision. Justice Potter 
Stewart, authoring the majority opinion, lamented the fact that the defendant’s history was 
ignored. Given the severity and finality of the penalty, he argued that we must acknowledge “the 
possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of 
humankind.” To ignore such details treats these persons as “members of a faceless, 
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undifferentiated mass,” devoid of humanity and undeserving of sympathy.155 As if channeling 
the literary judge, Justice Stewart bemoaned the damage wrought from judgments that rely on 
reason detached from emotion. As Nussbaum notes, this precedent has a complicated history, 
especially if you take into consideration the “reasonable person” argument that continues to play 
a formative role in legal theory.156  
 For the literary judge, the narratives produced by defendants are essential because they are 
rhetorically situated to offer the “possibility of compassion.”157 These narratives are invaluable 
because they can serve to discursively reclaim dignity from the deprivations of disgust. They 
illuminate the cracks in the humanity of our legal system. Undermining dignity is all too easy, 
especially when the rich, nuanced details of a life are ignored in favor of “just the facts, ma’am.” 
Worse yet are those judges who are guided by a rhetoric of disgust based on ungrounded fear and 
paranoia that often accompanies ignorance. One of the significant dangers looming behind 
arguments from disgust is the way in which decision-making appears easy.  
 
3.3  CONSTITUTING CAPABILITIES 
At the end of the day, possessing a literary imagination and emotional intelligence does not 
necessarily a good judge make. Posner’s longstanding criticism of Nussbaum’s approach is that 
it leaves the actual judge deciding actual cases with little guidance. Responding to the need for 
direction, Nussbaum advances the “capabilities approach.” Developed with Amartya Sen (yet 
distinct from his interpretation), the capabilities approach is an attempt to reframe the essential 
elements that constitute a flourishing life and offer some concrete guidance for a judge. These 
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elements, ten in all, serve as both a means and an end in producing a life reflecting an inherent 
human dignity. The list includes bodily health and integrity, senses, imagination, and thought, 
emotional cultivation, the ability to interact with ones environment including other species, the 
importance of affiliation, and the need for recreational play. 158  
 The list attempts to curb some of the problems Nussbaum finds with other approaches to 
justice, including the “trade-offs” afforded in utilitarian models.159 Needless to say, the ten 
capabilities Nussbaum calls for are ambitious both in their breadth and depth, but still offer a set 
of universal guidelines for the literary judge just as wealth maximization serves as a guide for the 
economic judge. Although it is aspirational, she nonetheless argues, “The aim of the project as a 
whole is to provide the philosophical underpinning for an account of basic constitutional 
principles that should be respected and implemented by the governments of all nations, as a bare 
minimum of what respect for human dignity requires.”160 Ever mindful of the tragic living 
conditions facing so many people, Nussbaum continuously reinforces the idea that her list is 
grounded in “what people are actually able to do and to be”161 and “highly attentive to the goal of 
functioning.”162 The capabilities approach is also a “great practical value for nonphilosophical 
people, giving them a framework in which to view what is happening to them and a set of 
concepts with which to criticize abuses that otherwise might have lurked nameless in the 
background of life.”163 For the literary judge, the capabilities approach serves as the North Star, a 
guide beckoning the judge toward sound judgment, but not necessarily leading her to the exact 
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spot.  
 Judges have a particular obligation to the citizenry. To be a judge is unlike the vast 
majority of other careers in that a judge directly shapes social and political culture through his or 
her decisions. Nussbaum no doubt would agree that her account is aspirational, but she would 
not accept the idea that such ambition means it ought to be discounted. Moreover, even if the 
literary judge is an unattainable ideal that does not mean that working toward (yet not fully 
achieving) such an ideal is a failure. A running theme throughout Nussbaum’s prolific 
scholarship is the notion that we are all vulnerable and imperfect, but that should not prevent us 
from striving for the flourishing life as we accept our human frailties. The literary judge helps to 
make that life appear more and more possible for everyone, especially those groups that have 
been neglected and mistreated. In doing so, the literary judge relies upon the constitutive power 
of legal discourse to cultivate a more virtuous citizenry. 
 Through her legal opinions and public presence, the literary judge is attempting to 
cultivate virtue throughout the citizenry. As such, she serves a vital constitutive function in 
society. Building off of Nussbaum’s work on Hellenistic ethics - particularly Seneca’s 
conception of the wise stoic judge – the literary judge takes the “philosopher as doctor of the 
soul” argument and expands it. Rather than cultivating individual souls one by one, the literary 
judge functions more as a public health advocate who attempts to improve the lives of everyone 
in society through her legal judgments.  
Drawing upon the wealth of medical analogies incorporated throughout Hellenistic 
ethics, Nussbaum argues that the characterization of the philosopher as a doctor of the soul 
reinforces the practical role philosophy ought to play in everyday life. Combining the “critical 
power of Platonism with the worldly immersion of ordinary-belief philosophy,” Hellenistic 
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ethics maintains a deeply rooted “commitment to action.”164 Nussbaum rightly acknowledges the 
inability to completely detach oneself from one’s experiences or culture, but still retain the 
ability to critically reflect on one’s position. The process of argumentation, then, becomes a key 
element of philosophical therapy. “Therapeutic argument is searchingly concrete. It approaches 
the pupil with a keen awareness of the daily fabric of her beliefs. And it holds, as well, that this 
fabric of belief is learned in particular cultural circumstances – so it commits itself to learning 
about and grappling with those circumstances.”165 Through argumentation, one is better able to 
acknowledge her individual position – with all of her tendencies, preferences, strengths, and 
faults – in order to illuminate a path of self-improvement. 
The Stoics, in particular, offer a thorough and compelling view of therapeutic 
philosophical argument. All the major Stoic philosophers drew from and utilized the medical 
analogy to the extent that “Cicero declares he is tired of their ‘excessive attention’ to it.”166 As 
overly employed as the analogy may be, it nonetheless characterizes the Stoic conception of 
philosophy quite well. Critical reflection, practical reason, criticism of conventional beliefs, and 
a vigilant attention to virtue are hallmark traits of “Stoic tonics” - curative elements that help 
constitute the good life, all of which reverberate with Nussbuam’s overarching philosophical 
project. Although the pervasiveness of Stoicism in one’s life might conjure the image of a 
philosophical hypochondriac always seeking intellectual remedies for their diseased souls, the 
end goal is self-care. “The patient must not simply remain a patient,” writes Nussbaum, “she 
must become her own doctor. Philosophy’s medical function is understood as, above all, that of 
toning up the soul – developing its muscles, assisting it to use its own capabilities more 
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effectively.”167 This idea of therapeutic cultivation, which recognizes the slow, difficult, and 
rewarding process of “toning up” one’s capabilities, is an important facet of constitutive rhetoric. 
The constitutive perspective views argumentation more broadly. Instead of a one-on-one trainer 
helping to tone you up, it’s more akin to a group exercise class. You can go at your own pace, 
but others are there to guide and encourage. Constitutive rhetoric is Richard Simmons for the 
soul (as if he wasn’t already!). 
 At the outset, I recognize Nussbaum may be apprehensive to this idea. She notes that 
“therapeutic argument can never be fully or completely given in a treatise intended for public 
consumption. The paradigm of philosophical interaction is the quiet conversation of friends who 
have an intimate knowledge of one another’s character and situation.”168 The turn to constitutive 
rhetoric is not intended to replace intimate interpersonal conversation; it is not advocating a 
public health approach that undermines the doctor-patient relationship. Instead, constitutive 
rhetoric ought to be viewed as an important supplement to philosophical introspection and 
conversation.  
 Drawing from Kenneth Burke and Louis Althusser, Maurice Charland argues that 
constitutive rhetoric is significant because “it positions the reader towards political, social, and 
economic action in the material world and it is in this positioning that its ideological character 
becomes significant.”169 In many ways, the discourse we use defines (and limits) who we are and 
can be. Charland continues, describing the ideological nature of constitutive rhetoric, which is so 
“not merely because they provide individuals with narratives to inhabit as subjects and motives 
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Speech 73.2 (May 1987), 142. 
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to experience, but because they insert ‘narratized’ subjects-as-agents into the world.”170 
Although the ideological, critical theory language is heavy-handed, Charland nonetheless notes 
an important point that is as true today as it was in the Hellenistic period. Namely, the arguments 
we express and defend constitute ourselves and our society. Much like Nussbaum’s conception 
of philosophical therapy, it is the process of argumentation, not only the end result, that serves a 
therapeutic function.  
Subsequent rhetoricians have developed Charland’s concept of constitutive rhetoric in an 
array of ways,171 but Thomas Farrell’s contribution is particularly useful. Broadening Charland’s 
original definition, Farrell argues that constitutive rhetoric not only helps to form collective 
identities, but “may also constitute problems, projects, or even historic conditions.”172 By 
offering a discourse or set of arguments that reframes a situation, constitutive rhetoric has the 
ability to turn potentially high aspirations (like the flourishing life) into manageable, humanistic 
goals. Furthermore, the audience plays an active role by serving as a “co-participant in the 
emergence of such identity.”173 Constitutive rhetoric retains the important element of agency 
while still acknowledging the various guides along the discursive path. 
Constitutive rhetoric becomes complicated, however, when we recognize the plethora of 
arguments and discourses swirling throughout any given community, many of which can be 
antagonistic if not mutually exclusive to one another. How can a community be created and 
                                                 
170 Ibid., 144. 
171 See, for example, “Reflections on the Role of Rhetoric in Public Policy,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 
13.1 (Spring 2010), 121-43; Michael C. Leff and Ebony A. Utley, “Instrumental and Constitutive 
Rhetoric in Martin Luther King Jr.’s ‘Letter from Birmingham Jail,’” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 7.1 
(Spring 2004), 37-51; and Kenneth S. Zagacki, “Constitutive Rhetoric Reconsidered: Constitutive 
Paradoxes in G. W. Bush’s Iraq War Speeches,” Western Journal of Communication 71.4 (Oct. 2007), 
272-93. 
172 Thomas B. Farrell, “Rhetoric in History as Theory and Praxis: A Blast from the Past,” Philosophy and 
Rhetoric 41.4 (2008), 326-7. 
173 Ibid., 327. 
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maintained amidst such confusion? How can the philosophical attention to self-cultivation be 
expanded beyond the self (and is this advisable)? Can there be a social therapy to match the 
individual therapy Nussbaum advocates throughout her work? Enter law. 
Eminent legal scholar James Boyd White responds by arguing that law satisfies these 
demands. Equally drawing from classical and contemporary resources, White argues a common 
thread weaved throughout legal discourse is its constitutive element: 
Social and political institutions are such practices set up on a permanent basis. They are 
not objects, though that is how we often talk about them, but complex sets of 
understandings, relations, and activities. They are ways of talking that can be learned and 
understood, and they play their part in constituting a world… This is, of course, not the 
only way to talk about a collection of people in a place; it is a constitutive fiction, a way 
of talking and acting that creates a public world.174 
Legal and political institutions, whether they are embodied in an Ancient Greek polis, the Roman 
republic, or contemporary judicial bodies, are an important (but not the only) rhetorical lens 
through which we view our community. The essential, yet fragile, role of legislative and judicial 
bodies is to produce a strong foundational discourse that balances between the pragmatic needs 
of a given society while simultaneously illuminating a path for moral and cultural development. 
More importantly, it does so through argumentation and discourse, rather than force, for “only 
persuasion, and persuasion of the sincere and authentic kind by which community is established, 
can work.”175 The literary judge thrives in this role. Utilizing the aforementioned resources of the 
literary imagination and emotional intelligence, in addition to a deep and nuanced knowledge of 
                                                 
174 James Boyd White, When Words Lose their Meaning, 11. 
175 James Boyd White, Heracles’ Bow, 20 
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the law, she possesses both the intellectual resources and broad platform necessary to shape a 
community.  
 Seneca’s De Clementia serves as a useful text to help unite Nussbaum’s belief in the 
therapeutic function of argumentation and the constitutive role it plays, in part because 
Nussbaum continues to find his work significant and influential in her own theorizing and uses it 
to advance her therapeutic argument. Seneca’s wise judicial sage bears several similarities with 
Nussbaum’s literary judge. Unlike many of his Stoic predecessors, Seneca serves as a useful 
focal point because he is less rigid in his philosophy, a flexibility Nussbaum admires. The 
traditional Stoic ideas are certainly present – the need for self-sufficiency, cosmopolitanism as a 
moral/political ideal, the completeness of virtue – but Seneca acknowledges the practical reality 
that achieving the Stoic ideal is rare. For our present purposes, two particular examples are 
useful in De Clementia and leave space for the ideas articulated in the previous sections. First, 
Seneca negotiates between the fool and the Stoic sage, offering the “progressor” as a useful 
middle term. Second, he recognizes the tension between general doctrines and particular rules, 
which are echoed in Nussbaum’s capabilities approach.  
 The idea(l) of the Stoic sage is prominent throughout the Greek and Roman traditions. 
Drawing a stark contrast between a wise man and the more common fool, the former knows what 
is virtuous and acts on it, whereas the fool does not. The good is whole, full, complete. Diogenes 
Laertius defines the good as “the natural perfection of a rational being qua rational,”176 upon 
                                                 
176 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, v. II, trans. R. D. Hicks (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1925), 7.94. 
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which the virtuous sage consistently acts.177 Virtue is an all or nothing characteristic; you either 
have it or you don’t (it’s just so happens that few, if any, happen to have it).  
Although consistent with the ideal student or Stoic sage, the Stoics are not willing to 
completely abandon the foolish to lives of vice. Reinforcing the therapeutic aspect of Stoic 
philosophy, Cicero likens the progress toward virtue to the weak body of an amateur swimmer 
and the blurred vision of a newborn puppy: “By applying a remedy they improve day by day. 
Every day, one gets stronger, the other sees better. It is like this for every keen seeker after 
virtue. Their faults and their errors are gradually cured.”178 The Stoics maintain a stark contrast 
between virtue and vice, but moral progress and redemption are still possible. Brad Inwood notes 
the important distinction between the wise man and the ordinary man, claiming the Stoics, 
particularly Seneca, do not forget about the latter. Rather than offering two separate moralities, 
which would be antagonistic to the entire Stoic project, Inwood suggests Seneca recognizes two 
different relationships to morality.179 Furthermore, just because one is not fully virtuous does not 
mean she cannot be actively working toward virtue.  
Seneca’s differentiation between the stern judge and the wise judge offers a useful point 
of reflection into this topic and illustrates a close connection with Nussbaum’s literary judge. In 
an ill-fated attempt to advise Nero, Seneca’s De Clementia articulates the need for mercy by 
juxtaposing blind rigidity and mindful flexibility. Whereas the stern judge will follow the letter 
of the law, the wise judge acknowledges the inevitability of wrongful acts. "We have all sinned,” 
notes the wise judge, “and not only have we done wrong, but we shall go on doing wrong to the 
                                                 
177 As A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley remind us, the Stoics acknowledged the “unlikelihood of anyone’s 
achieving this utterly secure and faultless character.” See The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), 61 N2 and their commentary on pg. 383. 
178 Cicero, De Finibus, trans. Raphael Woolf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 4.65 
179 Brad Inwood, “Rules and Reasoning in Stoic Ethics” in Topics in Stoic Philosophy, ed. Katerina 
Ierodiakonou (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 109-10. 
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very end of life. Even if there is any one who has so thoroughly cleansed his mind that nothing 
can any more confound him and betray him, yet it is by sinning that he has reached the sinless 
state."180 Unlike the stern judge, who is unlikely to “escape conviction under the very law which 
they cite for the inquisition,”181 the wise judge recognizes the process of moral growth and 
development. Mercy is not required in every occasion, but given the circumstances and 
offending party, “there are a great many people who might be turned back to the path of virtue if 
[they are released from punishment]."182 Instead of rigidity, a common pejorative challenge 
against Stoicism, Seneca urges “wise moderation.” This is far from an exact science with explicit 
rules for when and how to be merciful; instead, it carries an artistic charm. The act of judging 
hard cases requires a keen sensitivity to contextual nuances while still embracing measured 
reason. Judgment in an official capacity not only requires a thorough knowledge of the particular 
case at hand, but also the ramifications the decision will produce. As noted earlier, James Boyd 
White argues such acts of judgment select particular discourses with which a community 
constitutes itself. An especially harsh decision may inspire revolt, whereas a merciful decision 
may encourage cooperation. Both are forms of cultivation via constitutive rhetoric. Seneca’s 
wise judge and Nussbaum’s literary judge, believing in the progressor, make that line of 
argument public and possible. If we are to learn from Nussbaum’s arguments in The Therapy of 
Desire, which pay particular attention to individual cultivation, there must also exist a space for 
the more general public health. Because public officials lack the regular dialectical engagement 
with their constituents, they must play a constitutive role with their public ideas. 
                                                 
180 Seneca, De Clementia, 1.6.3-4. 
181 Ibid., 1.6.3. 
182 Ibid., 1.2.2. 
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Seeing the law and those who wield it as guides, the public actively reflects upon the 
merits of particular laws and the ways in which those laws are used (and abused). Overly strict 
laws and judges dedicated to following law to the letter may inspire dissent, whereas the caring 
hand of mercy is likely to acknowledge the wrongfulness of an act while simultaneously turning 
the transgressor toward the path of virtue. The former treats the foolish as an incurable lot, 
whereas the latter acknowledges the importance of the progressor. Furthermore, the process of 
reflection, argumentation, and action is part and parcel of therapeutic, constitutive 
argumentation.  
This is important in light of the negotiation between strict rules and general guidelines. 
An equilibrium between the two is fragile, but necessary. Too many strict rules and the citizenry 
will feel constrained and oppressed; no guiding ideals will make the rules meaningless. 
Balancing the two provides an argumentative discourse that allows for negotiation (which 
includes mercy), while still oriented toward a virtuous end (dignity). The process of negotiation 
is not simply a precursor to a formal judgment made by a ruler or judicial body; it is omnipresent 
in everyday life. In order to make the process stronger, public arguments need to be put forth that 
best capture the delicate relationship between rules and guidelines. As Seneca illustrates in De 
Clementia, the wise judge can navigate through such problematic terrain and produce an 
argument that justifies their respective positions while providing the public with Stoic arguments 
with which they can use to constitute and reconstitute society. 
Like Seneca’s wise judge, Nussbaum’s literary judge is not the sage tutor educating 
young elites on the life of reason. Rather, the literary judge operates in a broader, public 
capacity. The compassion Nussbaum encourages judges to adopt expresses a social aspiration, 
one that she hopes will encourage a diverse citizenry to take up the arguments and introduce 
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them into their own lives. As I have argued, one of the goals is to provide the capabilities by 
which individuals can better cultivate virtue. Granted, the student-teacher relationship is 
immensely important, but it is not the only resource available. The student-teacher relationship 
approaches philosophical therapy like the doctor aids a patient. Their connection is intimate and 
nuanced. Constitutive rhetoric serves a complimentary function by approaching therapeutic 
argumentation as a public health advocate. After all, a doctor can only tend to a handful of 
patients if she is to perform her job well. Providing the public with good ideas and arguments 
through a more public forum, namely legal judgments, promotes virtue and encourages 
appropriation.  
Overall, Nussbaum believes in the importance of public philosophy and takes to heart the 
vital role to be played by intellectuals in the public arena. She is an active voice for many social 
causes and is noted as one of the world’s leading public intellectuals. Her long list of 
engagements as a public intellectual deserves significant attention, such as her fervent call for 
women’s equality around the globe. Including an active role with the World Institute for 
Development Economics Research alongside Harvard welfare economist Amartya Sen (which 
helped to reconfigure how the United Nations assessed quality of life other than the GDP), 
Nussbaum has been at the forefront of numerous causes. Her scholarship is a direct manifestation 
of these concerns. As such, Nussbaum writes for learned non-philosophers. In Women and 
Human Development, she acknowledges her role as a public philosopher. Chastising “some 
feminist philosophy” for “a type of abstraction that turns the mind away from reality,” Nussbaum 
calls for greater attention to “real cases and…empirical facts” that have been ignored in some 
political theory.183 The literary judge, with her strong presence and insightful ideas, must 
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embrace such a public role that remains rooted in real human experience, lest opposing forces 
constitute a less humane, less compassionate society. 
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
Where, then, does this leave the literary judge? When considering Nussbaum’s call for emotional 
intelligence strengthened by a literary imagination, one might claim that the literary judge is 
better suited for the professoriate than the bench. Unlike Posner’s economic judge and, as we 
will see, Sunstein’s deliberative judge, the literary judge appears effete and impractical. Whether 
one agrees with it or not, economic adjudication can be implemented by a sitting judge with 
relative ease, especially considering the bulk of a judge’s caseload are fairly clear and simple. 
Only those unpredictable moments of complex, nuanced cases where the law is unclear does the 
economic judge struggle to produce the “right” decision. Yet, this is exactly Nussbaum’s point! 
The economic model may be useful for deciding cases with ease, but that is because it ignores 
the complexities of human life. Nussbaum recognizes the ambitious nature of her program, but 
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4.0 CASS SUNSTEIN AND THE DELIBERATIVE JUDGE 
 
“To refuse a hearing to an opinion, because they are sure that it is false, is to assume 
that their certainty is the same thing as absolute certainty. All silencing of discussion is an 
assumption of infallibility. Its condemnation may be allowed to rest on this common argument, 
not the worse for being common.” 
 
- John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 
 
 
In one of his more recent books, Simpler: The Future of Government, legal scholar and 
constitutional theorist Cass Sunstein recalls a first date ice-breaker with his future wife: “If you 
could have any job in the world, other than law professor, what would it be?” asked Samantha 
Power. Shooting for the stars, Sunstein replied, “Ohhhh, OIRO.”1 That’s right: the glitz, the 
glam, the Office of Information and Regulation Oversight. Nothing makes a potential paramour 
swoon more than government bureaucracy. And from 2009-2012, Sunstein’s dream was his 
reality. Simpler recounts Sunstein’s tenure as the “regulatory czar” in President Obama’s White 
House administration. Although his time within the administration was markedly different than 
his role as professor and scholar, it is particularly notable because the position afforded him an 
opportunity to put his theories into practice on a grand scale. Unlike so many academics, 
Sunstein’s prominent role as a public intellectual was catapulted to greater heights as his ideas 
could directly impact public policy. Moreover, Sunstein’s theories of governmental regulation 
and oversight echo his theories of law. While Sunstein notes the vast difference between 
academia and public service, both require one vital element: good judgment. Throughout his 
expansive publications, Sunstein has crafted a model of judgment rooted in the Madisonian 
                                                 
1 Cass R. Sunstein, Simpler: The Future of Government (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013), 1. 
 
 - 218 - 
tradition and embodied in the attentive civic sensibility of the judge. I believe that the best way 
to personify this civically minded model is to advance the notion of the “deliberative judge.” 
 Based on Sunstein’s extensive writings, I contend that the defining features of the 
deliberative judge are the deep trust placed in open deliberation and dissent, a keenly attuned 
sense of kairos, and a dedication to rhetorical citizenship that permeates the judicial decision-
making process. In what follows these features are explored and scrutinized, particularly with 
respect to how they differentiate Sunstein’s approach from that of Posner or Nussbaum. 
Sunstein’s embodied model of judgment, the deliberative judge, is not in outright conflict with 
Posner’s economic approach or with Nussbaum’s literary approach. In fact, the ideal deliberative 
judge forges many of the same rhetorical alignments, including the economic judge’s application 
of cost-benefit analysis to constitutional law, and the literary judge’s understanding of emotion 
as a vital element of judgment. Yet, the deliberative judge is wary of any single perspective 
dominating the decision-making process, because civic discourse embraces many perspectives.  
Whereas the economic judge is informed by economics and the literary judge is informed 
by literature and moral philosophy, the deliberative judge draws inspiration from social 
psychology to render sound judgment. Judges, juries, congress, and even public discourse are all 
deliberators that share certain characteristics. Recognizing the dangers associated with isolated 
thought and deliberation without opposing viewpoints, Sunstein articulates a “constitution of 
many minds” that embraces the tensions between judges and judicial theories. Echoing the spirit 
of Lincoln’s “team of rivals,”2 he paints a foreboding picture of judges unwittingly succumbing 
to such psychological pitfalls as conformity and group polarization. A deeply embedded culture 
of free speech in tandem with a “many-minded” approach to judicial decision-making serve as a 
                                                 
2 See Doris Kearns Goodwin, A Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2006). 
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bulwark against ideological pressures and subconscious inclinations. Encouraging frank speech 
and open dissent, Sunstein’s deliberative judge responds to the dangers of groupthink, and this 
resistance is an essential element of sound judgment. 
Dedicated to the notions of citizenship and civic engagement, the deliberative judge must 
also recognize the many ways in which legal decisions echo beyond the courtroom and impact 
public discourse. In this model, the judge does not play a passive role by sitting on the sidelines 
of public discourse. Instead, there is an obligation to reflect upon the many ways in which a 
decision impacts that discourse and to produce judgments with that in mind. Given the 
fluctuations of policy, law, and public opinion, the deliberative judge must know when to nudge. 
Good decisions are not issued in a vacuum, but reflect careful consideration of where the legal 
system and the country are headed. Judges adopting this model function, to use Ronald 
Dworkin’s phrase, as “seers and prophets”3 as they render their decisions. Such sensitivity to 
timeliness and appropriateness illustrates the finely attuned sense of kairos needed to be an 
effective deliberative judge.  
Finally, we must ask, “To what end?” What is the deliberative judge trying to create 
through his judgments? Whereas Nussbaum pursues the flourishing life and Posner pursues the 
efficient life, Sunstein’s telos is the communal, civic life; a life lived for and with others. 
Accordingly, the deliberative judge strives to promote, maintain, and facilitate citizenship. This 
broad goal is central to Sunstein’s approach. Although the term “citizenship” carries with it 
broad rhetorical resonances, the focal citizenship role of the, deliberative judge is to encourage 
civic deliberation and promotes communal goods. The citizenry has an obligation to deliberate 
and the law has a responsibility to create and maintain healthy discursive communities. In 
                                                 
3 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 407. 
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keeping with this intellectual commitment, Sunstein has advanced proposals for new 
instrumentalities, including a second Bill of Rights and a “New Deal” for the First Amendment.4 
The institution of law and the decisions that emanate from it must not only be mindful of 
citizenship, but ought to actively encourage deliberative democracy. The changes he suggests 
work toward an engaged public discourse, particularly political speech. In essence, he is 
following the steps of Isocrates by attempting to produce “equipment for civic living.” 
 
4.1 DELIBERATION AND DISSENT 
Although American society tends to wrap judges in a mythos of special capacities of keen 
wisdom and sage judgment (perhaps due to the secrecy shrouding the “least dangerous branch”), 
judges can be petty, vindictive, short-sided, vain, obtuse, and downright mean. Additionally, they 
are influenced by ideology. In fact, ever since the left-leaning Warren Court, a judge’s 
ideological orientation has emerged as a significant point of contention both for sitting judges 
and those hoping to be appointed. In addition, emerging technologies are affecting public 
discourse, which, in turn, influences judicial decisions (and vice versa). Recognizing the 
challenges to good judgment posed by such factors, Sunstein has been at the forefront of 
behavioral research on judges and the public discourse that surrounds them. In particular, he is 
concerned with the roles played by conformity and group polarization, which he argues impact 
judges’ decision-making processes and the conclusions they reach. In view of these 
considerations, Sunstein’s deliberative judge embraces dissent as a key feature of sound 
judgment. Acknowledging a certain degree of inevitability when it comes to such socio-
                                                 
4 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s Unfinished Revolution—And Why We Need It 
More Than Ever (New York: Basic Books, 2004), Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), and Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (New York: 
The Free Press, 1993), particularly Chapter 2. 
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psychological pressures, the deliberative judge accepts his own fallibility and encourages dissent 
and “many-minded” judgment.  
Dissent has a longstanding role within the rhetorical tradition. Perhaps the earliest and 
most formative defense of dissent is found in the anonymously authored “Dissoi Logoi.” The 
Ancient Greek text from around 400 BCE5 cites the subjective nature of such abstract notions as 
goodness, shamefulness, and truth by positing competing arguments rooted in different 
perspectives. For example, regarding the good and the bad, the author asserts an array of actions 
that may represent “goodness” in one situation and “badness” in another. A victory for the 
Greeks in a battle would be bad for the Persians, and vice versa.6 Even legal situations are 
present within the dissoi logoi text: “And someone who knows how to plead a case in court must 
understand justice correctly; for this is what trials are about. And if he knows this, he will also 
know its opposite and things different from these. He must also know all the laws; and yet if he 
does not understand the facts, he will not understand the laws either.”7 The goal of this approach 
is not to argue an entirely subjectivist morality, nor does it fall into nihilism. As Susan Jarratt 
argues, dissoi logoi advances “a means of discovering a truth rather than the expression of 
a…single Truth.”8 As John Poulakos notes, prominent sophistic educators such as Protagoras 
used dissoi logoi as a pedagogical tool, encouraging students to take apart an idea and find the 
                                                 
5 In a footnote, editors Michael Gagarin and Paul Woodruff cite the likely nearness to the Peloponnesian 
War, which would place the work around 400 BCE. See note 321 of “Dissoi Logoi,” in Early Greek 
Political Thought from Homer to the Sophists (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) for their 
justification. 
6 Ibid., 297. 
7 Ibid., 308. 
8 Susan C. Jarratt, Rereading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric Refigured (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1991), 49, as cited in Karen A. Hodges, “Unfolding Sophistic and Humanistic Practice 
through Ingenium,” Rhetoric Review 15.1 (Autumn 1996), 88. 
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two (or more) competing perspectives interacting with one another.9 At its worst, the process 
could be seen as uselessly eristic. At its best, however, the process cultivates “political 
wisdom”10 and stronger arguments that can withstand intense scrutiny.  
Dissent is closely affiliated with dissoi logoi in that both engage opposing arguments and 
the process of argumentation that emerges from the confrontation. Whereas dissoi logoi lends 
itself to pedagogy, dissent carries stronger social, political, and legal connotations. Founding 
documents, not the least of which being the United States Constitution, were produced amidst 
intense dissent. Publius and Cato posed contrasting arguments in the pages of newspapers across 
the country for the fate of federalism. Essays such as Thomas Paine’s Common Sense, Henry 
David Thoreau’s “Civil Disobedience,” Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “Letter from Birmingham 
Jail,” and many others have been woven into a narrative of American civic religion that places 
dissent as a central virtue.11 Prominent social movements, from the abolitionists to civil rights 
advocates to feminists and the LGBTQ movement, rally around expressions of dissent. Writing 
in reference to the influence of the abolitionist movement, legal scholar Akhil Reed Amar 
captures the hopeful potential of dissent as he writes,  
But the key lesson of the abolitionist experiences is that today’s unpopular minority (like 
abolitionists in the 1830s) may legitimately become tomorrow’s mainstream (like 
Lincoln’s Republic Party in the 1860s) – but for this to happen, we must allow the group 
                                                 
9 John Poulakos, “Rhetoric and Civic Education: From the Sophists to Isocrates,” in Isocrates and Civic 
Education, ed. Takis Poulakos and David J. Depew (Austin: University of Teas Press, 2004), 81-82, as 
cited in Gordon R. Mitchell, “Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science, Rhetoric 
& Public Affairs, 13.1 (2010), 108. 
10 Arthur E. Walzer, “Teaching ‘Political Wisdom’: Isocrates and the Tradition of Dissoi Logoi,” in The 
Viability of the Rhetorical Tradition, ed. Arthur E. Walzer, Janet M. Atwill, and Richard Graff (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2005), 113-124. 
11 See, for example, Ralph F. Young, ed. Dissent in America: The Voices That Shaped a Nation (New 
York: Pearson Longman, 2009). 
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to speak and print in an effort to peacefully change the minds of fellow citizens. To 
safeguard popular self-government (in the long term), we must protect even (currently) 
unpopular expression.12 
In many ways, we are a nation of dissenters hearkening back to the early founders. As Steven 
Hartnett argues in Democratic Dissent and the Cultural Fictions of Antebellum America, 
“Democracy is nothing more than the institutionalization of a culture that cherishes dissent.”13 
In his extensive work on rhetoric and dissent, Robert Ivie argues that dissent can cultivate 
a “humanizing aesthetic” wherein “discourses of reflective perspective-taking build toward a 
positive peace based on non-violent struggle over competing versions of social justices. Dissent 
of this kind serves the democratic purpose of tactically resisting and strategically transforming 
the demonizing discourse of war culture.”14 “Otherwise,” argues Ivie elsewhere, “the failure to 
cultivate a democratizing style of peace-building dissent with which to resist demonizing 
propaganda will only serve to increase the likelihood of succumbing further to advancing 
techniques of governance, surveillance, containment, and control.”15 Dissent may divide a 
people, as Ivie suggests of “demonizing” dissent, but it may also unite them. This accords with 
the vision of Kenneth Burke, whose epigraph at the beginning of A Grammar of Motives “ad 
bellum purificandum,” signals an aspiration to make conflict meaningful rather than warlike. 
                                                 
12 Akhil Reed Amar, “The Bill of Rights and Our Posterity,” Cleveland State Law Review 42 (1994), 577. 
Amar builds on this argument in two book-length works: America’s Constitution: A Biography (New 
York: Random House, 2006) and The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1998). 
13 Stephen Hartnett, Democratic Dissent and the Cultural Fictions of Antebellum America (Urbana, IL: 
University of Illinois, 2002), 176. 
14 Robert L. Ivie, “Finessing the Demonology of War: Toward a Practical Aesthetic of Humanising 
Dissent,” Javnost – The Public 14.4 (2007), 52.  
15 Robert L. Ivie, “Toward a Humanizing Style of Democratic Dissent,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 11.3 
(Fall 2008), 457. See also, Robert L. Ivie, Dissent from War (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2007). 
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Perhaps more than any other institution, the judicial system prides itself on the 
independence of the judiciary and the dissenting opinions it produces. Justices are celebrated for 
their scathing dissents if for no other reason than they help produce stronger opinions. Certainly, 
one may disagree with a dissent and the ideas it entails – perhaps virulently so – but at the very 
least it is reassuring to know that justices are formidable opponents. Sometimes these dissents 
are lost in time, but every once in a while a prophetic dissent is vindicated and later becomes the 
reigning majority opinion. Yet, dissent is not an end in itself, especially in a juridical setting that 
demands a modicum of consensus. Akin to the literary judge’s use of the literary imagination as 
a resource for invention, Sunstein invests the deliberative judge with a diplomatic appreciation 
for dissent that serves as a remedy for numerous deliberative ills. But, as I argue below, Sunstein 
is overly concerned with a paucity of dissent and forgets that there can be too much of a good 
thing. Just as the body responds negatively when there is a deficiency and toxicity of vitamins 
and minerals, so too does the body politic respond negatively when there is a dearth and surfeit 
of dissent. In order to understand how Sunstein rhetorically positions dissent in his legal theory 
and prioritizes it in his model of judgment, we must first examine the major problems to which 
dissent responds: conformity and group polarization.  
Pressure to conform is part of the human condition and there is little reason to think that 
judges are immune. Psychological studies abound illustrating just how prevalent and pervasive 
conformity exists throughout human interaction. The 1950s A experiments of Solomon Asch, for 
example, show how easily an individual second guesses their own judgment and succumbs to 
social pressure.16 Asch’s experiment focused on an innocuous question, “Which line is longer?,” 
yet more disturbing acts of conformity have appeared in such tests. The most famous example, 
                                                 
16 Solomon E. Asch, “Effects of Group Pressure on the Modification and Distortion of Judgments.” In H. 
Guetzkow (Ed.), Groups, Leadership, and Men (Pittsburgh: Carnegie Press, 1951), 177–190.  
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the experiments of Stanley Milgram, dramatically demonstrated how behavior that would 
normally be thought unethical can be produced by conforming to perceived authority. In short, 
conformity is a hard fact of the human condition – we have a general tendency conform both to 
authority and to social pressure. As Sunstein documents in numerous works, judges are 
influenced to go with a majority on a court, even though this puts them at odds with their own 
ideological commitments. A judge’s wealth of knowledge and experience certainly factor into 
decisions and serve as a buttress against blind conformity. But, as Sunstein notes, the ideological 
composition of multi-judge panels contributes to conformity and group polarization. When the 
ideological composition of a multi-judge panel (i.e. federal appellate courts) is divided along 
ideological lines, then the minority judge is more likely to conform to a position that runs 
counter to their ideological viewpoint. For example, an ideologically liberal judge sitting on a 
three-judge panel with two ideologically conservative judges is more likely to vote with the 
conservatives than stand alone in a minority dissent.17  
                                                 
17 In Are Judges Political?: An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2006), Sunstein and his co-authors highlight fifteen separate issues that traditionally 
divide judges on ideological lines, including affirmative action, obscenity, and the Environmental 
Protection Agency. Examining 6,408 published three-panel decisions and the 19,224 associated votes of 
individual judges, Sunstein utilizes empirical data to illustrate three phenomena: ideological voting, 
ideological dampening, and ideological amplification. Ideological voting refers to judges voting in line 
with their political ideology (or, if their ideology is particularly difficult to pin down, the political 
ideology of the Presidents who appointed them). Ideological dampening is a species of conformity and 
occurs on split courts when a one judge holds a different ideological position than the other two; for 
example, a court composed of two Democrats and one Republican. Ideological amplification refers to an 
entire panel of like-minded judges pushing one another to a more extreme position than they previously 
held (Sunstein also uses the term “group polarization” when discussing ideological amplification, which 
will be addressed in greater detail). In Why Societies Need Dissent, he asserts that in cases concerning 
affirmative action, for example, a Democratic judge (one appointed by a Democrat) is 13% more likely to 
invalidate a statute or policy that promotes affirmative action when issuing a judgment with two 
Republicans. Likewise, a Republic judge is 17% less likely to invalidate when isolated with two 
Democrats. Sex discrimination and sexual harassment cases follow a similar pattern. Both Republicans 
and Democrats voted in favor of plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases 42% of the time when they are the 
sole voice from their ideological position. For Republicans, this is a 7% increase over their average voting 
patterns, whereas Democrats decreased such votes by 9%. In sexual harassment cases, Republicans 
increased their support of plaintiffs by 5% when with two Democrats, and Democrats decreased their 
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Similar to Posner’s rhetorical strategy, Sunstein inundates the reader with an array of 
“hard data” to illustrate his point. Sunstein clothes his argument in pseudo-scientific statistics, 
but the numbers do not necessarily add up. He calls attention to the purported problem of 
conformity throughout many books and journal articles, but many examples rely upon a thin 
understanding of what conformity is and why it takes place. He sets up the reader to perceive the 
dangers of judicial conformity as comparable to the Milgram experiments that legitimized 
Arendt’s idea of the banality of evil. Yet, the reasons for a judge perceived conformity are much 
more complex and diverse than their ideological commitments. Sunstein assumes that conformity 
is usually the result of lazy, doubt-ridden judgment or a conceited view of a conforming judges 
self-image. His evidence, however, is thin. He conflates cases that fall within a similar category, 
but does not articulate the various ways in which the unique facts and circumstances of 
individual cases may have led judges to “conform.” For example, cases involving sex 
discrimination are pooled together without distinguishing them in any way. He then generalizes 
the differences in voting habits for all cases falling under the same category, noting even the 
slightest changes to “average” voting patterns, some of which are not statistically significant. 
Any number of reasons may lead a judge to “conform” with his or her fellow judges that have 
                                                 
support by 6% when with two Republicans. Similar trends occur within the Supreme Court, although less 
pronounced given the selectivity of the court’s docket. Nonetheless, when the issue before the court is 
“ideologically relevant,” such as the heated topics mentioned by Sunstein, the justices “are more resistant 
to social influence.” Paralleling Sunstein’s research on appellate court conformity, one of the major 
reasons for vote shifting (also known as “fluidity”) is a desire to be in the majority, not the minority. 
Historically, “justices are 12 times more likely to shift from the minority to the majority than to reflect a 
counter-conformity shift.” Regarding conformity on multi-judge courts, see also Lawrence S. 
Wrightsman, The Psychology of the Supreme Court (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Saul 
Brenner’s work is particularly illuminating on the topic of Supreme Court fluidity. See “Fluidity on the 
United States Supreme Court: The Judicial Ideology of Sandra Day O’Connor,” American Journal of 
Political Science 24 (1980), 526-35; “Fluidity on the Supreme Court: 1956-1967,” American Journal of 
Political Science 26 (1982), 388-90; “Fluidity on the United States Supreme Court: A Comparison of the 
Original Vote on the Merits with the Final Vote,” Jurimetrics Journal 22 (1982), 287-92. See also, Saul 
Brenner and Robert H. Dorff, “The Attitudinal Model and Fluidity Voting on the United States Supreme 
Court: A Theoretical Perspective,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 4 (1992), 195-205. 
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nothing to do with their ideology or self-image. A new statute or a precedent established by the 
Supreme Court may lead a judge to go against their ideological commitment, which is not 
accounted for in Sunstein’s data, and is stronger evidence that the legal system is not as 
ideologically driven as Sunstein fears it is.  
Following Sunstein’s narrative of the court, non-conformity is worn as a badge of honor 
and a sign of healthy deliberation. But the potential problems associated with a non-conformist 
position are ignored. Under Sunstein’s characterization, the non-conformist deliberative judge 
speaks truth to power for the good of the legal system and society writ large. This idealized 
notion of the non-conformist assumes that there is always something dangerous lurking behind 
an act of conformity, but that is not always the case. A judge who encounters and is persuaded by 
a good argument from their colleagues on the court who happen to share a different political 
ideology exhibits strength, not weakness. Taking a step back, such an act of conformity at the 
small scale of individual cases may be an act of non-conformity at the national level. If a 
conservative judge on a panel with two liberal judges votes in favor of same-sex marriage, 
Sunstein would count that as conformity. But that same conservative judge is being a non-
conformist compared to his fellow conservative judges across the country. Sunstein’s rhetorical 
strategy relies upon a narrow scope, assessing conformity on a binary (a judge is a conformist or 
a non-conformist) in relation to each individual court, rather than a broader position that would 
place conformity on a spectrum and consider regional or national factors that may influence a 
decision. Like the economic judge, the deliberative judge may miss the trees for the forest. 
Conformity nonetheless remains a dangerous threat to good legal judgment in Sunstein’s 
jurisprudence, but it is arguably less insidious than group polarization, which “occurs when 
group members, engaged in deliberation with one another, end up taking a more extreme position 
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in line with their predeliberation tendencies.”18 In other words, when like-minded people get 
together and discussion an issue, they will push one away from a moderate position and toward 
the margin. Juries, Sunstein notes, are notorious for group polarization; real life rarely plays out 
like Twelve Angry Men. Independent groups organized around a polarizing social issue are also 
more likely to adopt a more extreme view than they began with. The “Southern strategy” and the 
increased use of wedge politics rely on group polarization as a key part of their persuasive 
power. PETA activists do the same thing. Hate groups such as those listed by the Southern 
Poverty Law Center offer paradigmatic examples of the power and prevalence of group 
polarization. It is easy and reassuring to preach to the choir and validate one’s own beliefs in the 
process. 
Sunstein argues that the public becomes fragmented and detached from one another as a 
result of the “limited argument pools,” which constitute “the central factor behind group 
polarization.”19 Argument pools, or the array of different arguments and perspectives that are 
involved in deliberation, remain undiluted when group polarization is in effect. In like-minded 
groups, the likelihood that a voice of opposition will be made (let alone heard) over the din of 
agreement diminishes greatly. As a result, the group falls into a pattern of “yes, and” that 
reinforces the already solid ground of agreement. Even the sharpest minds may succumb to 
group polarization when the group moves in a certain direction. Although Damien Pfister 
reminds us that such “enclave deliberation” can prove useful, particularly in the blogosphere’s 
ability to “[increase] the sophistication of reasoning,”20 the dangers of group polarization are 
                                                 
18 Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent, 11. See also James N. Druckman and Kjersten R. Nelson, 
“Framing and Deliberation: How Citizens' Conversations Limit Elite Influence,” American Journal of 
Political Science 47.4 (Oct. 2003), 729-745. 
19 Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0, 65. 
20 Damien Smith Pfister, “The Logos of the Blogosphere: Flooding the Zone, Invention, and Attention in 
the Lott Imbroglio,” Argumentation and Advocacy 47 (Winter 2011): 141-162. 
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always looming. As argumentation scholarship reflects, decisions reached under the influence of 
such enclave effects are weaker given the limited quality and quantity of arguments and 
perspectives. 21 
As Sunstein uses the term, group polarization is more about identification than division. 
Unlike instances of conformity, which include competing ideologies but unbalanced 
representation (e.g. two conservatives and one liberal on a three-judge panel), group polarization 
begins with ideological unity (e.g. a three-judge panel with all conservatives or all liberals). In 
that sense, there is no act of division within the group at hand– everyone is on more-or-less the 
same page. Polarization takes place when like-minded individuals push one another toward a 
more extreme (perhaps radical) position that they did not (and perhaps would not) adopt before 
deliberation. A group of left-leaning environmentalists is likely to move even further left after 
they get together and discuss environmental issues. If division exists, it does not happen in the 
process of such enclave deliberations, but rather when considering their new, more extreme 
position in relation to broader national opinion. The environmental advocacy group Earth First! 
serves as a useful example. Known for their radical, subversive tactics and anarchist political 
philosophy, the group has been attached to chemical attacks and bombings. Most 
environmentalists do not agree with their tactics, but these more moderate voices are not present 
within the organization. Sunstein would argue that group polarization is present within 
                                                 
21 For example, see Steven M. Alderton, “Locus of Control-Based Argumentation as a Predictor of Group 
Polarization,” Communication Quarterly 30.4 (Fall 1982), 381-387; Damien Smith Pfister, “Introduction 
to Special Issue: Public Argument/Digital Media,” Argumentation & Advocacy 47.2 (Fall 2010), 63-66; 
Charles Pavitt, “Another View of Group Polarizing: The ‘Reason For’ One-Sided Oral Argumentation,” 
Communication Research 21.5 (Oct. 1994), 625-642; Deanna Kuhn, et. al., “Developing Norms of 
Argumentation: Metacognitive, Epistemological, and Social Dimensions of Developing Argumentative 
Competence,” Cognition and Instruction 31.4 (Oct. 2013), 456-496; Douglas Ehninger, “Argument as 
Method: Its Nature, Its Limitations and Its Uses,” Speech Monographs 37.2 (June 1970), 101-110; and 
Barbara Warnick, “The Rational and the Reasonable in the AIG Bonus Controversy,” Argumentation & 
Advocacy 46.2 (Fall 2009), 98-109. 
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deliberations between Earth First! members and makes it more likely for them to adopt an 
extreme position that is not in line with the majority of environmentalists. They identify with one 
another in the group, but they are divided from the broader majority outside of the group.  
According to Sunstein, one of the primary reasons group polarization takes place is the 
lack of dissent in deliberation. The Bay of Pigs invasion, one of his favorite examples, illustrates 
the phenomenon. Echoing the work of Irving Janis, who coined the term “groupthink,”22 
Sunstein asserts that the ill-conceived plan continued to move forward due to the lack of a 
dissenting argument. President Kennedy was surrounded by “yes men,” largely a product of his 
own doing. Potential dissenters fell in line while the most vocal supporters amplified the position 
of the group. In this example, conformity and group polarization contribute to one another. The 
individuals who might have wanted to voice their dissent conformed to the group because they 
did not want to be ostracized. As a result, group polarization was allowed to continue unabated.  
As with conformity, judges are also vulnerable to the law of group polarization. Whereas 
conformity takes place on divided panels, Sunstein explains how group polarization takes place 
on appellate courts when all three judges hold the same ideological position, which makes them 
more likely to push one another further right or further left, depending on the composition of the 
court. The problem is not that judges tend to vote along ideological expectations, but rather they 
are pushing each other toward more extreme positions that they would not otherwise adopt.23 
Although Sunstein relies on a wealth of statistical data, his conclusions may fall prey to the post 
hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy. Pressures toward polarization and conformity occur within the 
context of multiple considerations and therefore cannot be accounted the cause of such decisions. 
                                                 
22 See Irving Janis, Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982). 
23 Only three areas remain resistant to this force: abortion, capital punishment, and national security. See 
Cass R. Sunstein, Going to Extremes: How Like Minds Unite and Divide (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 11. 
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If Sunstein’s characterization is correct, the judiciary succumbing to group polarization 
rather than finding common ground not only compromises the independence of judgment, but 
presents a judicial failure to serve as a bulwark against group polarization in broader public 
discussions. Sunstein notes the potential for a “chilling effect” on public dissent. Those who 
disagree with particular policies or government actions, or at least have some reservations, 
remain silent for fear that their peers may shame them.24 Invoking Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann’s 
“spiral of silence” phenomenon wherein individuals with minority opinions silence themselves, 
Sunstein fears that these opinions will become completely removed from society over time.25 
Sunstein argues that self-censorship and conformity based on perceived or expected 
stigmatization can be detrimental to a deliberative, democratic group, including the judiciary. 
Without prominent and active voices of dissent from respected institutions, the likelihood of 
group polarization increases because there are fewer competing arguments to disrupt or counter 
the dominant perspective. As a result, the argument pools become greatly imbalanced. As 
Michael Billig reminds us, incorporating an array of different arguments and perspectives is not 
only important for interpersonal deliberation but dissent (or “anti-logos”) is also vital at the 
intrapersonal level.26 
One of the important rhetorical turns Sunstein utilizes as he crafts the deliberative judge 
is the reliance upon social psychological data to justify his central tenets of good judgment, such 
as the role and power of dissent. While the mountain of data he and other like-minded legal 
                                                 
24 Sunstein notes the potential stigma attached to dissent and the affect it may have on one’s reputation He 
addresses this trend throughout Why Societies Need Dissent, but focuses exclusively on stigma and 
reputation in chapter four, “What Will the Neighbors Think?” 
25 Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0, 65. 
26 See Michael Billig, Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987). Of particular note is his treatment of “anti-logos” throughout the 
book. 
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scholars utilize is impressive, Sunstein uses an overly simplistic method of determining a judge’s 
political ideology by turning to the political party of the president who appointed them. In 
contrast to many approaches to and analyses of ideology, most notably the critical-cultural 
tradition that emerged out of Marxist theory and the Frankfurt school, Sunstein’s approach 
merely descriptive and is used primarily as a method of categorization. Such an approach carries 
at least five problems in varying degrees of significance. First, it neglects the many instances 
wherein a judge or justice has bucked the ideology of their appointee. Prominent examples 
include President Eisenhower appointing Chief Justice Earl Warren (a decision Eisenhower later 
claimed was “[T]he biggest damn fool thing I ever did”27) and Justice William Brennan; 
President Nixon appointing Justice John Paul Stevens; and President George H. W. Bush 
appointing Justice David Souter.28 Second, it perpetuates a false dichotomy by positing only two 
ideological positions, liberal and conservative. Not only does such a framework tend to 
undermine complex, nuanced approaches to important legal issues, the dichotomy also fails to 
acknowledge that judges and justices may adopt traditionally liberal positions regarding some 
issues and traditionally conservative positions regarding others (the classic social liberal, 
economic conservative). And let us not forget the plurality of ideologies that challenge the binary 
such as anarchism and libertarianism. Third, Sunstein’s dichotomy also ignores the fact that 
many judges, especially those with aspirations for a Supreme Court appointment, are extremely 
cautious about showing their ideological hand. Some do so as a career strategy whereas others 
truly believe that the legal system is (or at least ought to be) apolitical. Fourth, one is hard 
                                                 
27 Ed Cray, Chief Justice: A Biography of Earl Warren (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 10. In his 
biography of Eisenhower, Stephen E. Ambrose also notes, “[I]n the sixties, Eisenhower frequently 
remarked that his biggest mistake was the appointment of that dumb son of a bitch Earl Warren.” See 
Eisenhower: The President (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 190. 
28 Interestingly, Republican presidents have had a more difficult time appointing justices that fall in line 
with the reigning party ideology.  
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pressed to know with any degree of certainty where the conformist pressure emerges. The 
relatively slight differences following party lines might be taken as indicating a broad tendency 
to conform. But it could also be interpreted as discernible patterns of political conformity, based 
on party—again, though, the differences seem too slight to give much support to that point. The 
gradual shift in public opinion may also be a contributing factor, a point not lost on Sunstein and 
the deliberative judge. Finally, as mentioned earlier, there may be any number of extraneous 
circumstances that encourage a judge to conform to the dominant opinion of the court.  
Sunstein is not unaware of these problems, but they nonetheless complicate his socio-
psychological approach to law. Yet he makes a reasonable case that conformity and group 
polarization exist within the judiciary and challenges the implicit belief that the judicial system is 
not significantly shaped by group affiliation. He also acknowledges the various ways in which 
judicial dissent is more difficult than one might expect. According to Sunstein, these difficulties 
have three general sources. The first is that votes of one’s colleagues carry information that may 
tempt one to defer to others rather than be a lone dissenter.”29 If a judge is not confident with his 
knowledge, the easier path is the one of least resistance. Few relish being on the losing side 
(although Justice Scalia seems to relish being the exception to the rule).  
The second pressure against dissent is the “burdensome and time-consuming” process of 
producing dissent knowing that “they might well be ineffectual.”30 This point, however, might be 
countered by reference to the impact that dissenting opinions may have in future cases. Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., known colloquially as “The Great Dissenter,” had a number of 
dissents vindicated by history, such as his famous dissents in Lochner v. United States and 
                                                 
29 Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent, 182. 
30 Ibid., 183. 
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Abrams v. United States. However, the likelihood that a dissenting opinion will be endorsed in 
time is highly unlikely.  
The third factor militating against dissent, according to Sunstein, is that “dissenting 
opinions can cause tension among judges, a particular problem in light of the fact that judges 
must work together for many years.”31 Not only do judges care about their public reputations, 
they are also concerned about their reputations and relationships amongst their colleagues. 
Heated disagreements, even if they are done in good faith, can sour the most hearty of 
relationships. In addition to the general discomfort that would persist until death or retirement, 
they may also want to maintain convivial relationships with their peers in order to gain their 
support when the tables are turned. A judicial “you scratch my tort, I’ll scratch yours,” so to 
speak.  
Even when a judge or justice wants to dissent, the more prudent path may involve biting 
their tongue. In the next section on kairos, it will be important to consider that judges must know 
when to dissent and know when to hold back. Justice Louis Brandeis was known to write, yet not 
to publish, an assemblage of dissenting opinions,32 restraining himself “if he thought the Court’s 
opinion was of limited application and unlikely to cause real harm in future cases.”33 In doing so, 
Brandeis was able to navigate through the issue of collegiality that Sunstein notes by voicing his 
concern amongst his colleagues, but keeping his criticisms from the public eye (at least on what 
he deemed less important decisions). This is a difficult line to toe and judges are always in 
danger of succumbing to conformity or violating judicial decorum.34 In landmark decisions, 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 These unpublished opinions have since been published: See Alexander M. Bickel, The Unpublished 
Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1957). 
33 Ginsburg, “The Role of Dissenting Opinions,” 4. 
34 According to Stephen A. Newman, Justice Scalia is a paradigm example of the latter – violating judicial 
decorum – as he has want to engage in “judge bashing” since is first dissenting opinion. See Stephen A 
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argues Christine Langford, dissents tend to abandon collegiality in favor of a rhetorical 
juxtaposition between good and evil.35 Moreover, there exists a tendency to remember the 
dissents that have been vindicated by history while ignoring those that have not. 
Dissent can produce needed reflection, even when not changing the immediate outcome. 
At their best, vocal non-conformists force others to reflect upon their judgments and 
justifications, cultivating and refining arguments in the process. Even if one disagrees, they must 
(or at the very least should) actively defend their position. Was Bush v. Gore poorly decided? 
What justifications are advanced? Unlike Justice Scalia’s demand that the American citizenry 
“get over it,” a moment of pause and reflection by Justice O’Connor may have yielded a 
different decision.36 After all, she was long considered the “swing vote” of the court, a role that 
has since passed to Justice Kennedy. Such a position is powerful not only because it may prove 
to be the deciding vote, but also because their arguments are more appealing to others with 
reservations. When put in conversation with the other models of judgment, Sunstein’s 
deliberative judge productively antagonizes his peers to reflect upon previously unaddressed 
                                                 
Newman, “Political Advocacy on the Supreme Court: The Damaging Rhetoric of Antonin Scalia,” New 
York Law School Law Review 57 (2006), 907-926.  
35 See Catherine L. Langford, “Appealing to the Brooding Spirit of the Law: Good and Evil in Landmark 
Judicial Dissents,” Argumentation & Advocacy 44.3 (Winter 2008), 119-129. 
36 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s public misgivings over Bush v. Gore, a decision that has done more to 
stain the Supreme Court’s reputation than any other in recent memory, illustrate this point. Reflecting on 
the case, O’Connor now claims, “It took the case and decided it at a time when it was still a big election 
issue. Maybe the court should have said, ‘We’re not going to take it, goodbye.’ Obviously the court did 
reach a decision and thought it had to reach a decision. It turned out the election authorities in Florida 
hadn’t done a real good job there and kind of messed it up. And probably the Supreme Court added to the 
problem at the end of the day.”36 Referring to the court as a disembodied “it,” a sign she is distancing 
herself from her role on the court, Justice O’Connor’s revelation comes at a time when public opinion of 
the court is nearly at its lowest. Although we can never know if O’Connor succumbed to the type of 
conformity articulated by Sunstein, her admission suggests either a certain degree of conformity or a flat-
out misguided decision, neither of which bode well for a non-partisan, independent judiciary. For the full 
interview, see Dahleen Glanton, “O’Connor Questions Court’s Decision to Take Bush v. Gore,” The 
Chicago Tribune (April 27, 2013), retrieved from http://articles.chicagotribune.com/ 2013-04-27/news/ct-
met-sandra-day-oconnor-edit-board-20130427_1_o-connor-bush-v-high-court. 
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arguments. Even if none of the judges change their respective opinions, they all benefit from 
expanded argument pool. It provides deliberative situations with more information, thus 
benefiting both dissenters and conformists.37  
 This process of oppositional interaction underscores Sunstein’s call for many-minded 
judgment that incorporates an array of jurisprudential viewpoints as the best resource for good 
legal judgment. In A Constitution of Many Minds, he argues that the genius of the Constitution is 
in the fact that it was produced through a bevy of competing arguments and that spirit should 
pervade the judiciary.38 Sunstein’s deliberative judge finds immense value in the different 
perspectives articulated by other judges. Whereas the economic judge and the literary judge 
heavily rely upon intrapersonal deliberation to arrive upon good judgment, the deliberative judge 
believes interpersonal interaction with an array of viewpoints is more vital. Moreover, the 
tensions that exist between these competing perspectives are beneficial; good judgment exists 
because of these tensions, not despite them.  
In order to elucidate these tensions, Sunstein juxtaposes different approaches to 
judgment. These include minimalism (his personal disposition), majoritarianism, perfectionism, 
and fundamentalism. Each of the approaches offers something valuable for deliberation. For 
example, he appreciates aspects of majoritarianism, a judicial outlook he attributes to Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., particularly its respect for community social norms. Briefly, judicial 
majoritarianism echoes its political counterpart: democratic majorities can decide for themselves. 
“I always say,” writes Holmes in a letter to Harold Laski, “that if my fellow citizens want to go 
                                                 
37 Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent, 6. 
38 Cass R. Sunstein, A Constitution of Many Minds: Why the Founding Document Doesn’t Mean What It 
Meant Before (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 3. 
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to Hell I will help them. It’s my job.”39 The protection and promotion of community, from the 
local to the national, is a recurring theme throughout Sunstein’s work. As his lamentations 
against conformity and group polarization attest - there are better and worse communities. Rather 
than discounting majoritarianism, the deliberative judge wants to place it in conversation with 
others. For example, a minimalist judge would be highly resistant to large, sweeping changes at 
the behest of majorities. If change is going to take place, the minimalist advocates for 
incremental steps. Similarly, if majoritarians demand no change at all and wish to cling to 
outdated traditions, a perfectionist judge – that is, a judge who interprets cases in relation to the 
Constitution “in a way that both ‘fits’ with [the Constitution] and makes it best, and in that sense 
perfects it”40 – may interpret such stagnancy as antithetical to the “best” interpretation of the 
Constitution.  
The important point to note is that none of these approaches offers a complete, all-
encompassing view of the law. Every approach has its blind spots and to make judgments 
without deliberating with competing perspectives makes poor decisions more likely. The 
different approaches need each other as a set of inter-judicial checks and balances in order to 
ensure that important ideas are brought to the fore. In a way, the deliberative judge acts as a 
(Kenneth) Burkean critic by suggesting that judges utilize everything at their disposal, especially 
when difficult cases are on the line. In this regard, the deliberative judge needs Posner’s 
economic judge and Nussbaum’s literary judge, in addition to the myriad of other perspectives, 
lest he succumb to his own criticisms. Through the tensions manifested throughout deliberation 
and dissent, the deliberative judge believes that better ideas emerge. Sunstein claims that in order 
                                                 
39 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in a letter to Harold J. Laski, March 4, 1920. See Howe (ed.), Holmes-Laski 
Letters, 249.  
40 Sunstein, A Constitution of Many Minds 22. 
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to cultivate a stronger, more intellectually robust and respectful democratic nation, conscientious 
deliberation must play a key role. At its best, it can curb the distorting effects conformity and 
group polarization and help to facilitate tolerance. It also has significant rhetorical weight, as it 
connects well with the notion of citizenship and self-governance (which will be elaborated upon 
in a later section). In a healthy democratic community, the best deliberation will result in some 
sort of consensus about the better path to be taken at any given moment but consider as many 
ideas and options as possible in order to discern which path is the most appropriate.  
The deliberative judge is willing, when necessary, to practice mindful dissent that 
appropriately challenges the reigning opinion, be it in the judicial system or the court of public 
opinion. Clearly, dissent is not required in every court decision, but the exploration of dissenting 
viewpoints should nonetheless be a part of every deliberative process. Even if a decision is 
unanimous, the opinion is strengthened when counterarguments are entertained. John Stuart Mill 
heralded this idea as one of the primary reasons to value the liberty of thought and discussion in 
a democratic society. While “[t]here is no guarantee” that a group – the judiciary included – will 
not fall prey to conformity or group polarization, “at least it can be said that a society which 
permits dissent and does not impose conformity is in a far better position to be aware of, and to 
correct, serious social problems.”41 In addition, dissents help to underscore the “incompleteness” 
of the “incompletely theorized agreements” as they provoke continued deliberation. 
Underscoring his rhetorical strategy, Sunstein’s celebration of dissent as a remedy for 
poor judgment tends to amplify its positive benefits while minimizing potential problems. 
Looking at the picture of dissenting opinions Sunstein paints, they appear quite phenomenal – 
more phenomenal, in fact, than the majority opinions to which they respond. For a handful of 
                                                 
41 Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent, 149.  
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dissents this is true: they have crystalized ideas and catalyzed important and necessary 
movements in our shared democratic culture. Yet, upon closer inspection, Sunstein’s portrait 
blurs some important lines. Although he recognizes some of the dangers in dissent, Sunstein 
nonetheless imbues dissent with near magical properties. Dissent becomes a near panacea to cure 
all manner of social ills and illustrates what I call Sunstein’s “if only” approach. If only there had 
been a voice of dissent within Kennedy’s administration during the Bay of Pigs invasion. If only 
there were vocal dissidents during times of war. If only judges and justices were more persistent 
with their opposition to poor decisions and bad judgments. If only a voice of reasoned opposition 
were present amidst group polarization. If only conformists met a dissenting opinion. Sunstein 
places a lot of faith – arguably too much so – in the power of dissent and the ensuing deliberation 
to quell some of the most longstanding and divisive problems in American society. But in order 
for a dissent (or an opinion) to have the most significant impact, the deliberative judge 
acknowledges that their arguments must strike at the right time and in the right way in order to 
be effective.  
 
4.2 KNOWING WHEN TO NUDGE 
One of Sunstein’s most interesting rhetorical contributions to jurisprudence is the idea of timely 
judgment, which builds on his more expansive work on the “nudge.” Along with co-author and 
behavioral economist Richard Thaler, Sunstein authored Nudge: Improving Decisions About 
Health, Wealth, and Happiness, wherein they make a case for “libertarian paternalism” (also 
known as “soft paternalism”). “A nudge,” according to Sunstein and Thaler, “is any aspect of the 
choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any 
options or significantly changing their economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the 
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intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid.”42 They argue that through an array of policy 
initiatives, legal statutes, government programs, and subtle social pressures, citizens will begin to 
make healthier, more communal, and overall better choices. A nudge directs the attention of an 
individual. A nudge entices another to adopt a particular perspective and make a particular 
judgment. A nudge respects the agency of individuals while still helping them along the way. A 
nudge, in other words, is rhetoric in action. As this section will articulate, the deliberative 
judge’s ability to nudge underscores a rhetorical sensitivity to kairos, knowing how and when to 
issue a judgment. Moreover, the deliberative judge who knows when to nudge falls in line with 
Sunstein’s aforementioned judicial minimalism. Given Sunstein’s advocacy for the “expressive” 
function of law and the role that “commitments” play therein, the judge serves as a complement 
to legislative “choice architect” in shaping public conceptions of law. 
 Briefly, choice architecture is practice of “organizing the context in which people make 
decisions.”43 Drawing on behavioral psychology, Sunstein argues that the simple, noninvasive, 
and seemingly innocuous construction of frameworks by which individuals make decisions can 
help them make better decisions. For example, something as easy as where a school cafeteria 
places fruits and vegetables in the lunch line can nudge unwitting students to opt for healthier 
options. The other, unhealthy food is not removed from the menu; rather, discrete organization 
and placement produce better judgments, hence the term “soft paternalism.”44 The legislature 
                                                 
42 Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and 
Happiness (New York: Penguin, 2008), 6. 
43 Ibid., 2. 
44 In “Choice Architecture,” written by Sunstein, Thaler, and John Balz, the authors introduce a number of 
examples wherein the mere framing of a situation alters behavior in positive and predictable ways. See 
Richard H. Thaler, Cass R. Sunstein, and John P. Balz, “Choice Architecture,” in The Behavioral 
Foundations of Public Policy, Eldar Shafir, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 428-439. 
“Better” judgments are a sticky wicket and rely largely on a preconceived notion about what is better or 
worse in decision-making, which are highly debatable. This challenge to Sunstein’s argument will be 
addressed later in this section. 
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certainly plays a more active role as choice architects in their ability to construct and implement 
policies that nudge the public one way or another, but judges play their part, too. Not only are 
judges invested with the power to assess the legality of legislative policies that are brought 
before the bench, they also have the power to create precedents that will be followed indefinitely. 
In other words, judges are the “choice contractors” to the legislative “choice architects.” If a 
piece of legislation has created negative, perhaps unforeseen ramifications or if legislation 
becomes out of date and a stagnant Congress is unwilling or unable to amend it, judges are 
afforded discretion to alter or eliminate said legislation so long as they stay tethered to the 
Constitution. Occasional cries of “judicial activism” notwithstanding, judges and justices make 
these decisions on a daily basis, often concerning cases that draw little if any attention from 
politicians, pundits, or the public. At there best, their decisions (and even dissents) serve as 
nudges working toward incremental change rather than complete upheaval.  
The ability to know what is best (or, at the very least, to know what is better), but also to 
know how to nudge people along the way is an invaluable resource for the deliberative judge. 
Drawing on Sunstein’s overarching jurisprudence, nudging is prevalent in two distinct yet 
interconnected ways: good laws nudge people in the right direction and good judges, mindful of 
legal history and public opinion, nudge law in the right direction. The first underscores 
Sunstein’s belief in the “expressive” function of law whereas the second underscores his belief in 
“judicial minimalism.” Describing the expressive function of law, Sunstein asserts that “actions 
are expressive; they carry meanings.”45 This applies to something as seemingly innocuous as 
                                                 
45 Cass R. Sunstein, “On the Expressive Function of Law,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 144.5 
(May, 1996), 2021. According to Sunstein, these commitments precede constitutional rights; the latter is a 
subset of the former. Only in moments of immense national crisis – what Bruce Ackerman characterizes 
as “constitutional moments” – are these commitments illuminated and tested. Thus, explicit statutes and 
judicial precedents are not the only important documents used to understand the public’s constitutive 
commitments, but popular culture also becomes significantly influential. Both formal jurisprudence and 
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clothing choices to “the statements made by law.”46 Such actions reflect the reigning social 
norms, but the added power of law is its ability to shape and reshape social norms in significant 
ways, whether it is the creation of law by the legislature or the evaluation and alteration of law 
by the judiciary. Advancing the expressive function of law, Sunstein negotiates the tensions 
between the pragmatic and expressive tasks, responding both the letter and the spirit of law - 
what law is and what law can be. While Sunstein resists the urge for judges to act as a “moral 
compass,” he nonetheless argues that they have an obligation to help cultivate and maintain a 
healthy democratic culture. Through the power wielded by the deliberative judge, law serves as a 
vital social signal, a nationwide beacon, nudging citizens along the better path.  
For the deliberative judge, constitutive commitments are an essential component of any 
sound judgment, a violation of which “would amount to a kind of breach – a violation of trust.”47 
The judge wants commitments to nudge the citizenry toward more democratic, more communal, 
and more deliberative perspectives while still being corralled by the specific laws and statutes. 
“We might think of the underlying laws as exercises in norm management,” claims Sunstein.48 In 
a society as large as the United States, with more than 315 million citizens, covering nearly four 
million square miles of land, the judicial system is one of the most ubiquitous shapers of social 
                                                 
popular representations of law and the Constitution socialize law into public consciousness, creating a 
“public constitution” or “public law” similar to, but distinct from, technical interpretations. Public 
discourse has its own way of talking about “liberty” and “equality,” which may be influenced by anything 
from a television show like Law and Order to journalism coverage of legal issues. Rituals, such as the 
celebrations surrounding the Fourth of July, also act to highlight the importance of the Constitution as a 
binding document to be upheld in all situations. The individuals resisting participation and refusing to 
ascribe devotion to the sacrosanct document may be ostracized and their patriotism questioned. As a 
result, public knowledge becomes affected, guiding individuals to see constitutional wishes as universally 
good. As Kenneth Burke aptly notes in Permanence and Change, explanation leads to socialization. 
46 Ibid., 2022. 
47 Sunstein, The Second Bill of Rights, 62. 
48 Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent, 44. 
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norms. By virtue of the near omnipresence of law, Sunstein believes that judges have an 
obligation to nudge citizens in the right direction. 
Whereas the expressive function of law illustrates how law nudges the citizenry, Sunstein 
also believes that judges (along with public opinion) nudge the law. As Sunstein argues in Why 
Societies Need Dissent, “Law is most effective when it goes somewhat, but not too far, beyond 
people’s current values.”49 Thus the deliberative judge who knows when and how to nudge is a 
judicial minimalist – a position that asks courts (especially the Supreme Court) to focus on the 
specific case at hand without overreaching in their decisions. One of the important rhetorical 
qualities of the deliberative judge is a keen sensitivity to public opinion and the direction that it 
is headed. If the deliberative judge knows what is better (a problematic position to begin with, 
but for argument’s sake let’s give him the benefit of the doubt), he must also know when and 
how to deploy an argument such that it has the greatest impact. But unlike Ronald Dworkin’s 
mythic judge “Hercules,” Sunstein’s deliberative judge does not subscribe to the “right answer” 
thesis. Sunstein is less interested in social engineering at the judicial level and more interested in 
social refining. A nudge works better than a shove. 
 In order to rhetorically frame his position as more salient, more effective, and more 
democratic, Sunstein juxtaposes his preferred method of minimalist judicial restraint against 
overzealous judicial activism. Sunstein describes the minimalist court as one that  
settles the case before it, but it leaves many things undecided. It is alert to the existence 
of reasonable disagreement in a heterogeneous society. It knows that there is much that it 
does not know; it is intensely aware of its own limitations. It seeks to decide cases on 
narrow grounds. It avoids clear rules and final resolutions. Alert to the problem of 
                                                 
49 Ibid., 44. 
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unanticipated consequences, it sees itself as part of a system of democratic deliberation; 
it attempts to promote the democratic ideals of participation, deliberation, and 
responsiveness. It allows continued space for democratic reflection from Congress and 
the states. It wants to accommodate new judgments about facts and values. To the extent 
that it can, it seeks to provide rulings that can attract support from people with diverse 
theoretical communities.50 
The minimalist position has significant rhetorical appeal. It evokes notions of modesty and 
prudence, acknowledging the unpredictability of future developments while still responding to 
the present moment.51  
 Perhaps most importantly, judicial minimalism encourages the public debate to continue 
while still satisfying the need for timely judgment. For the deliberative judge, a good decision 
provides a nuanced perspective on the case at hand and facilitates further deliberation. Justice 
Robert Jackson famously said of the Supreme Court: “We are not final because we are infallible; 
we are infallible because we are final.”52 Adopting a minimalist perspective, the deliberative 
judge suggests they are neither infallible nor final. “Above all,” writes Sunstein in Radicals in 
Robes, “minimalists attempt to reach incompletely theorized agreements in which the most 
fundamental questions are left undecided.”53 A judicial decision marks a significant moment in 
an ongoing public discussion; yet rather than closing off deliberation, a good decision facilitates 
more and better deliberation. Remember: it’s a nudge, not a shove.  
                                                 
50 Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2001), ix-x, emphasis added. See also A Constitution of Many Minds and 
Radicals in Robes wherein Sunstein juxtaposes the minimalist with other, less desirable approaches.  
51 The subsequent section on “many-minded judgment” will elaborate upon judicial minimalism and its 
relationships with “fundamentalism,” “perfectionism,” and “majoritarians.” 
52 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) 
53 Sunstein, Radicals in Robes, 28. 
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Yet, as Sunstein notes throughout various works, any nudge must be done at the right 
time and in the right way; it must be timely and appropriate. In other words, it must be kairotic. 
John Poulakos argues that “if what is said is timely, its timeliness renders it more sensible, more 
rightful, and ultimately more persuasive.” “In short,” he continues, “kairos dictates that what is 
said must be said at the right time.”54 Kairos, the ancient Greek term that (roughly) translates to 
“timeliness,” is a key rhetorical faculty for the deliberative judge. In her introduction to a 
collection of essays examining the relationship between kairos and rhetoric, Carolyn Miller notes 
the importance of kairos to “invent, within a set of unfolding and unprecedented circumstances, 
an action (rhetorical or otherwise) that will be understood as uniquely meaningful within those 
circumstances.”55 Attention to kairos within rhetorical scholarship continues to grow and expand 
the scope of the term to encompass seemingly disparate discourses including Lyndon Johnson’s 
push for civil rights,56 the New Testament,57 the nature of philosophy,58 and just about 
everything in between.59 
 Justice has always had a close relationship with time and timeliness. In his juxtaposition 
between kairos and chronos, John E. Smith notes, “In the ethical domain kairos appears as 
                                                 
54 Poulakos, “Toward a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric,” 40-1. See also John Poulakos, “Rhetoric, the 
Sophists, and the Possible,” Communication Monographs 51 (1984): 215-26. 
55 Carolyn R. Miller, “Foreword,” Rhetoric and Kairos, xiii. 
56 Garth E. Pauley, “Rhetoric and Timeliness: An Analysis of Lyndon B. Johnson’s Voting Rights 
Address,” Western Journal of Communication 62.1 (Winter 1998): 26-53. 
57 See Dale L. Sullivan, “Kairos and the Rhetoric of Belief,” 78 (1992): 317-32. 
58 See Melissa Shew, “The Kairos of Philosophy,” Journal of Speculative Philosophy 27.1 (2013): 47-66. 
Unsurprisingly, this essay cites but one essay produce by a scholar of rhetoric.  
59 There is a wealth of good scholarship on kairos and it continues to grow. In addition to the 
aforementioned essays, see also Edward Berry, “Doing Time: King’s ‘Letter from a Birmingham Jail,’” 
Rhetoric & Public Affairs 8.1 (2005): 109-32; Amos Kiewe, “Time in Rhetoric: An Investigation into 
Temporal Probabilities in Vatican II’s Nostra Aetate,” Journal of Communication and Religion 34.2 
(Nov. 2011): 144-57; James L. Kinneavy and Catherine R. Eskin, “Kairos in Aristotle’s Rhetoric,” 
Written Communication 17.3 (July 2000): 432-40; Carol Mejia LaPerle, “Rhetorical Situationality: Alice 
Arden’s Kairotic Effect in The Tragedy of Mater Arden of Faversham,” Women’s Studies 39 (2010): 175-
93; and J. Blake Scott, “Kairos as Indeterminate Risk Management: The Pharmaceutical Industry’s 
Response to Bioterrorism,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 92.2 (May 2006): 115-43. 
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justice or the proper measure according to merit or what is ‘due’ to an individual in an order of 
equality.” As a result, “kairos signals the need to bring universal ideas and principles to bear in 
historical time and situations and, thus, calls for decisions about values, means, and ends that 
cannot be a matter of law alone but requires wisdom and critical judgment.”60 James Kinneavy 
also acknowledges the role that kairos plays in law, claiming it “has a clear relation to the legal 
concept of equity,” which has migrated through Greek to Roman law, “thence, into the major 
legal systems of Europe and America.”61 One need not look far to see kairos in action throughout 
the United States legal system. If prosecuted, citizens are guaranteed a speedy trial in the United 
States. The state cannot hold a defendant indefinitely. The suspension of habeas corpus and the 
enduring problem of the Guantanamo Bay prisons highlight an imperfect system. But the 
American judicial process is – on the whole – fairly quick and efficient, which may help to 
explain the staggeringly high prison population. As the saying goes, justice delayed is justice 
denied, and any judge worth his weight in statutes recognizes the importance of expeditious 
decision-making.  
 The deliberative judge’s sense of kairos, however, goes beyond the day-to-day minutiae 
that constitute the bulk of the legal system. As it concerns the law, kairotic judgment involves at 
least three important elements: 1) shifting public opinion, 2) the particular case and the 
individuals involved, and 3) the composition of a court. Concerning the first issue, shifts in 
public opinion, consider three landmark cases that exhibit the Supreme Court capitalizing on a 
kairotic moment: Griswold v. Connecticut, Brown v. Board of Education, and Lawrence v. 
Texas. Griswold examines the concept of “marital privacy” in relation to the First, Third, Fourth, 
                                                 
60 John E. Smith, “Time and Qualitative Time,”  
61 James L. Kinneavy, “Kairos in Classical and Modern Rhetorical Theory,” in Rhetoric and Kairos: 
Essays in History, Theory, and Praxis, ed. Phillip Sipiora and James S. Baumlin, 68. 
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Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. In the early 1960s, the executive director of Planned 
Parenthood League of Connecticut, Estelle Griswold, and the director of the Yale Medical 
School, C. Lee Buxton, were charged with violating two state statutes. One prohibited the use of 
contraception and the other penalized anyone who “assists, abets, causes, hires, or commands 
another to commit any offense,” punishing the provocateur “as if he were the principal offender.” 
Joining Justice Douglas in the majority opinion, Justice Potter Stewart etched an important space 
for “marital privacy” that he stitched together from an array of amendments and precedents.62 
Although Griswold was an “aggressive ruling,” Sunstein notes, “Connecticut was the only state 
that banned married people from using contraceptives.” As a result, “the court was vindicating, 
not opposing, widely held commitments within the nation as a whole.”63  
Similarly, Brown fell in line with the growing national sentiment against segregation. 
Following the Civil War and its accompanying “Civil War Amendments” (13-15), Jim Crow 
laws dominated the Reconstruction period. By 1900, they had effectively denied African-
Americans equality under the law. After the fallout from Plessy v. Ferguson’s devastating 8-1 
decision supporting segregation (as well as the lesser known but equally disheartening 1908 
decision in Berea College v. Kentucky, which upheld a state law that required private educational 
institutions to remain segregated64), groups determined to eliminate segregation began to emerge. 
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) formed in 1909, 
only one year after Berea. By 1938, the Court ordered Missouri to admit a black applicant to the 
state-supported law school because Missouri had not established a segregated alternative.65 In a 
concerted effort to highlight the inherent inequality, the NAACP sought timely cases that would 
                                                 
62 Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
63 Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent, 191. 
64 Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) 
65 See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) 
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make it before the Supreme Court during the early 1950s. By 1954, five separate cases were 
combined into the landmark Brown v. Board decision.66 Moreover, national public opinion was 
firmly against segregation. “Some of the earliest public-opinion polls in the 1940s found that an 
overwhelming majority (about two-thirds) of whites were willing to support segregated 
schools.”67 Again, the decision was forceful and it marked a monumental moment in the history 
of the Supreme Court, but the idea that the justices broke away from prevailing public opinion is 
simply incorrect. Chief Justice Earl Warren recognized and capitalized on a kairotic opportunity, 
nudging the public along the path they were already on. 
Finally, the majority decision in Lawrence, which overturned the somewhat recent 
Bowers v. Hardwick, expanded LGBTQ rights as the citizenry increasingly opened to such 
changes.68 Similar to Griswold in its focus on privacy, Lawrence v. Texas examined the legality 
of the Texas “Homosexual Conduct” statute. The law was used against the defendants, John 
Lawrence and Tyron Garner, who had been engaging in private, consensual, adult same-sex 
relations and were discovered by police officers responding to a reported weapon disturbance. 
Utilizing the Due Process Clause, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority decision 
overturning the statute. Upon first glance, the case appears to be a stark contrast to prior 
legislation and precedent. Only 17 years prior in Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court decided that a 
Georgia statute banning sodomy did not infringe upon a fundamental right. Penning the majority 
opinion, Justice Byron White worried that to decide any differently would amount to “judge-
                                                 
66 In addition to Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Court also examined 
Briggs v. Elliott, Gebhart v. Belton, Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, Virginia et 
al., and Bolling v. Sharp. 
67 Taeku Lee, “Polling Prejudice,” The American Prospect (March 9, 2011), retrieved from. 
http://prospect.org/article/polling-prejudice. Alarmingly, “By the mid-1990s (the last time questions on 
school segregation were asked), only one out of every 25 whites held on to the same view.” 
68 Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent, 193. 
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made constitutional law” (the judicial activism bogeyman strikes again!). Ten years later, 
congress implemented the Defense of Marriage Act when only 25% of the U.S. population 
supporting gay marriage. But by 2003, public opinion concerning the LGBTQ community had 
changed drastically. When Bowers was decided in 1986, nearly 75% of the country deemed 
homosexual acts “Always Wrong.”69 When Lawrence was decided, public opinion was more-or-
less split. Acknowledging the kairotic nature of the situation, Justice Anthony Kennedy could 
see the direction the country was headed. The decision he authored nudged them further and 
created a space for more choice, codifying Sunstein’s “libertarian paternalism.”  
Pushing aside the political ideologies of judicial appointees, Sunstein claims that the 
Supreme Court is “unmistakably influenced by changes in public opinion over time, and for 
reasons that should now be familiar. If most people think that sex discrimination is morally 
unacceptable and akin to racial discrimination, some justices will listen.”70 Legal ideas are 
constituted and reconstituted as public discourse changes. Rhetorical shifts in public discourse 
make new ways of knowing and new social perspectives possible. Recognizing this fact, the 
deliberative judge is mindful of public opinion and knows just when to nudge them along with a 
timely decided and appropriately argued judgment.  
Sadly, history has just as many examples of judges falling prey to a misguided public 
opinion. Undermining the Missouri Compromise and reinforcing the expansion of slavery in 
Dred Scott v. Sandford;71 corralling thousands of Japanese-Americans into WWII internment 
                                                 
69 See Tom W. Smith, “Public Attitudes toward Homosexuality,” NORC/University of Chicago 
(September, 2011), retrieved from http://www.norc.org/PDFs/2011%20GSS% 
20Reports/GSS_Public%20Attitudes%20Toward%20Homosexuality_Sept2011.pdf. 
70 Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent, 192. 
71 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) 
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camps in Korematsu v. U.S.;72 praising the merits of segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson73 – these 
cases do not reflect a stark contrast from the reigning public opinion. Quite the opposite; these 
landmark cases, now considered some of the most morally horrendous decisions in Supreme 
Court history, were more-or-less in line with the public opinion at the time. Only now, decades 
later, do we look back at these decisions with pity and shame, which leaves one to wonder: what 
will we regret next?  
But kairos in law is more than a judge knowing current trends; the deliberative judge 
must also choose the right case and argue it in the right way. Good timing with public opinion 
loses its rhetorical force when it utilizes unfit material. With the right case, the rhetorically savvy 
judge can help to create an opportune moment. The criminal rights revolution ignited by Mapp v. 
Ohio exemplifies the marriage between timely public opinion and a fitting case.74 The case 
originally concerned an obscenity charge from lewd books discovered during a warrantless 
search. The Supreme Court, however, brushed aside the obscenity charge and focused on the 
warrantless search, evidence from which was still legally admissible in Ohio (and about half of 
the other states). The Supreme Court utilized the case to extend the “fruit from the poisonous 
tree” doctrine that was already in place at the federal level.  
The kairotic moment emerged due to the circumstances surrounding the case. Mapp v. 
Ohio moved through the judicial system as a violation of obscenity law based on an Ohio statute. 
While there was some legal grounding for this charge, the reigning Supreme Court precedent, 
Roth v. United States, concerned the sale or transfer of obscene materials via post.75 Social norms 
were shifting, however, and lewd material was gaining legal protection. After all, Playboy had 
                                                 
72 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) 
73 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) 
74 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) 
75 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) 
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already been around for eight years. Moreover, the issue of possession was also complicated as 
Mapp claimed the books were left by a man renting out a room who had absconded without 
them. Without a warrant and with an entirely different reason for searching her home, Mapp’s 
seven year conviction seemed extreme. The circumstances were ripe for a court looking for the 
chance to apply federal search and seizure regulations at the state level. Only seven years earlier, 
in Wolf v. Colorado, the court upheld a state’s right to admit evidence derived from a warrantless 
search.76 But in that case, the warrantless search involved an abortion clinic, so it was generally 
accepted that the ends justified the means. Overturning precedent is significant, but to overturn a 
precedent established only seven years prior while the authoring justice was still a member of the 
court was unheard of. Mapp provided the opportune moment because the ends seemed 
insignificant and the means extreme. If a murder weapon had been discovered, the likelihood that 
Wolf would have been overturned would be improbable if not impossible.  
Whereas some cases like Mapp v. Ohio are chosen because of the contextual facts that 
bear on the issue before the court, other cases are chosen because of the compelling narratives 
provided by the defendants or respondents. Decisions that break from precedent are easier to 
justify when they involve sympathetic figures. We can see this occur in the recent landmark 
decision in United States v. Windsor.77 The opinion of the court upended the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA) and has led to a tidal wave of lower courts recognizing the Constitutional 
validity of same-sex marriage. While many challenges had been issued since DOMA’s inception 
in 1996, such efforts were ineffective. Roberta Kaplan, the lawyer who argued before the court in 
favor of Windsor and against DOMA, claims that she latched on to the case in large part because 
of Windsor and her narrative. In an interview with Dahlia Lithwick, Kaplan describes her interest 
                                                 
76 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1954) 
77 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. ____ (2013) 
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in Windsor as the most effective vehicle to dismantle DOMA. Kaplan notes how “charming,” 
“bright,” “charismatic,” and “beautiful” Windsor is,   
and on top of all that, think about her marriage. This is two women who lived together for 
44 years, many of those years one of them was essentially paralyzed, she was a 
quadriplegic. And when you think about the marriage oath, the traditional marriage oath, 
it says, ‘In sickness and in health, ‘til death do us part.’ There’s a couple who really lived 
those words and took them seriously. It’s hard to imagine any married couple who took 
them more seriously than Thea and Edie. So, I personally was very moved by those facts, 
and I thought Americans would be moved by those facts, and I even thought the justices 
would be moved by those facts.78 
The narrative surrounding Edie and Thea was not mired in scandal or controversy. They were a 
loving couple and Edie, upon the death of Thea, was beset with a heavy burden of estate taxes, 
which would not have happened had Windsor been married to a man. Commenting on the 
strategic choice of Windsor’s case over other potential options, Justice Ginsburg claims, “The 
reaction to Windsor I think has been positive from the public. She was such a well-chosen 
plaintiff. People could understand the injustice of the way she was treated. I haven’t seen a social 
change that rapid in – ever. It’s just great that people who for years have been disguising what 
they were are now free to be what they are.”79 A different plaintiff and a different set of 
circumstances may have yielded a similar decision, but the moment was made more opportune 
with Windsor. 
                                                 
78 Dahlia Lithwick, “Amicus: Revenge of the Octogenarians,” Slate (October 25, 2014), retrieved from 
http://www.slate.com/articles/podcasts/amicus/2014/10/slate_ 
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The final and most obvious factor contributing to the timeliness of a decision is the 
composition of the court. Again, the Warren Court serves as a prime example. With the 
appointment of Chief Justice Earl Warren in 1954 and Justice William Brennan in 1956, in 
addition to the final retirement of the old-guard conservatives with Justice Felix Frankfurter in 
1962, the court had a lasting impact on racial segregation, cruel and unusual punishment, voting, 
privacy, criminal procedure, the establishment clause, and free speech. With the appointment of 
Justice Thurgood Marshall in 1967, the liberal wing of the Court had a stable and reliable bloc.  
But there is an ebb and flow when it comes to Supreme Court ideology. The Warren 
Court was a response to the more conservative court of the previous generation. In response to 
the Warren Court, a more conservative tide rolled in. Addressing the growing interest in and 
attention to minimal welfare guarantees in the 1960s, Sunstein rests its ultimate failure on the 
sharp judicial turn instigated by President Richard Nixon and his four Supreme Court appointees  
who promptly reversed the emerging trend, insisting that the Constitution does not 
include social and economic guarantees… As a practical matter, the Constitution means 
what the Supreme Court says that it means. With a modest shift in personnel, the 
Constitution would have been understood to create social and the economic rights of the 
sort recognized in many modern constitutions.80 
In this example, the President and his appointees recognized the kairotic moment presented 
before their opposition and acted quickly to squash it. Kairos and public opinion swing both 
ways. 
 The trend continued in the 1980s with the appointment of Justice Antonin Scalia and 
Justice Clarence Thomas. With the latter replacing Justice Thurgood Marshall, the court took a 
                                                 
80 Sunstein, The Second Bill of Rights, 108. 
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significant conservative turn. (Aware of his failing health during the Reagan presidency, 
Marshall is said to have remarked, “If I die while that man is in office, prop me up and keep 
voting!”) Present-day court nomination hearings are often thinly veiled quests to ascertain which 
camp the potential judge will join since numerous landmark decisions have hinged on a single 
swing vote. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor held the swing vote for a number of years and Justice 
Anthony Kennedy took her place, a role he relishes.  
 As significant a role as new appointees can play, the composition of the court can also 
move given ideological shifts by the sitting justices. The most famous instance is Justice Owen 
Roberts and his “switch in time that saved nine.” Throughout much of President Franklin 
Roosevelt’s New Deal, the Supreme Court proved to be a constant thorn in his side by 
invalidating 11 out of 13 initiatives. In response, Roosevelt proposed monumental court reform 
that would add upwards of six justices to the Supreme Court. Only a few weeks later, the court 
issued their decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937) and upheld the statewide 
minimum wage enacted by Washington state. While this judicial about-face was quick and 
severe, other shifts have been more gradual. Justice John Paul Stevens, for example, was 
appointed by President Gerald Ford and originally considered a stable conservative vote. Over 
the years, however, he inched more and more to the left, ultimately becoming the leader of the 
left-wing of the court.81 
 All of the aforementioned appointments and ideological shifts indicate the role that the 
composition of the court plays in making particular decisions possible. Kairos is no doubt an 
element in legal judgment. Not every judgment, to be sure, but some of the most monumental 
                                                 
81 Justice Stevens maintains that he is a judicial conservative, claiming that the court has become 
increasingly conservative since 1975, thus making him appear more liberal. See Jeffrey Rosen, “The 
Dissenter, Justice John Paul Stevens,” The New York Times (Sept. 23, 2007), retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/magazine/23stevens-t.html 
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decisions in Supreme Court history resonate with kairos. Given the deliberative judge’s interest 
in the expressive function of law and the rhetorical nudges such an approach requires, a finely 
tuned sense of kairos is a necessity. Nonetheless, these examples highlight a paradoxical 
problem when grounding a theory, especially a legal theory, in kairos: only time will tell. And if 
history is written by the winners, as it usually is, then the deliberative judge is left with little 
more than a hunch, crossing his fingers that the future unfolds as planned. Yes, the landmark 
decisions in Brown, Griswold, Lawrence, and Mapp have been vindicated (Windsor is still fresh, 
but the tide seems to be turning in its direction) and the country will likely continue along the 
same trajectory. But what about decisions like Citizens United, which opened the floodgates for 
unlimited corporate campaign contributions and reinforced the idea of corporate personhood?82 
Or the 2012 ruling on “Obamacare”? Will we look back on these decisions as key moments in 
the debates over campaign finance and health care, respectively? We don’t know. We can’t 
know, not until history unfolds. The wonderfully infuriating and infuriatingly wonderful 
characteristic of U.S. jurisprudence is that the sun never sets. For an idealist like the literary 
judge, this waiting game illustrates one of the weaknesses of the legal system, or at least a failure 
of Sunstein’s approach. Law should not be a gamble, she may say, which is why an approach 
that gives voice to the voiceless is of the utmost concern for law. Even Posner’s economic judge 
may be more proactive, given Posner’s reluctance to consider and respond to public opinion (or 
at least incorporate public opinion into his legal formulae).  
Although recognizing the merits of their respective counterarguments, Sunstein’s 
deliberative judge would categorize them as naïve and ignorant to the lessons of behavioral 
                                                 
82 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. _____ (2014) continued to solidify corporate personhood by 
recognizing the right of for-profit companies to assert religious freedom so long as the government does 
not have a compelling interest.  
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psychology. Moreover, the public does not tend to respond positively when they are forced into 
something too soon. Instead of shoving them with the full force of the judicial system, the 
deliberative judge would suggest that judges nudge the public along such that they think they 
adopted a position of their own accord. The most skilled rhetor gets his audience to accept his 
point but lets them think it was their idea all along. If “the legal system is pervasively in the 
business of constructing procedures, descriptions, and contexts for choice,”83 as Sunstein argues, 
then the near omnipresence of law in U.S. society together with a judiciary intent on nudging the 
public along should achieve incremental social good that the economic and literary models make 
unlikely.  
When deployed kairotically, choice architecture and nudging serve as key rhetorical 
concepts that not only promote Sunstein’s deliberative model of judgment, but they also 
encapsulate Sunstein’s response to Richard Posner’s economic judge. Unlike the literary judge, 
the deliberative judge embraces the insights that economics can provide for law. Sunstein’s 
defense of the nudge relies on cost-benefit analysis, but a form of cost-benefit analysis that is 
markedly different than Richard Posner’s wealth maximization. We are not unencumbered, 
rationally detached creatures with the ability to objectively survey our options and choose that 
which will yield the “best” result, whatever that may be. And, importantly, neither are judges. 
Moreover, the distinction between the two approaches to economics reflects the separate 
rhetorical faculties embodied by their respective models.. 
Sunstein, writing with Richard Thaler and Christine Jolls, break from Posner’s use of 
classic economic theory, arguing that it is not a realistic articulation of how humans behave. 
                                                 
83 Cass R. Sunstein, “Introduction,” in Behavioral Law & Economics, ed. Cass R. Sunstein (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 2. 
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Differentiating homo economicus from “real people,”84 they draw attention to the boundedness 
of human decision-making. Whereas homo economicus is guided by reason, real people “have 
limited computational skills and seriously flawed memories.”85 We have “bounded rationality.” 
Whereas homo economicus is able to resist temptation in order to acquire something more 
worthwhile, real people “often take actions that they know to be in conflict with their own long-
term interests.”86 Walk around any hospital and you will inevitably find a gaggle of doctors and 
nurses on a smoke break. More than any others, these people know of the dangers caused by 
smoking. They also see the horrible effects of smoking in their professional lives. Yet they 
continue to act on their impulses. We have “bounded willpower.” Whereas homo economicus 
maintains self-interest in association with wealth maximization, real people are “both nicer and 
(when they are not treated fairly) more spiteful than the agents postulated by neoclassical 
theory.”87 Such niceness or spitefulness can lead to decisions that are not in one’s best self-
interest. We have “bounded self-interest.” “If you look at economics textbooks,” write Sunstein 
and Thaler in Nudge, “you will learn that homo economicus can think like Albert Einstein, store 
as much memory as IBM’s Big Blue, and exercise the willpower of Mahatma Gandhi.”88 To the 
contrary, for Sunstein and Thaler, we are a weak-willed species that lacks foresight and has a 
propensity for pettiness. 
 Responding to the growing swell of economic research challenging longstanding 
assumptions in classic economic theory, Sunstein and his coauthors advocate for a behavioral 
                                                 
84 In his introduction to the edited collection, Sunstein juxtaposes homo economicus with homo 
reciprocans (those who “sacrifice their own self-interest in order to be, or to appear, fair”), however, he 
does not reiterate this concept at any other point in the book nor addresses it in his unwieldy corpus of 
books and articles (8-9). 
85 Ibid., 14. 
86 Ibid., 15. 
87 Ibid., 16. 
88 Thaler and Sunstein, 6. 
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approach to economics, law, and public policy. Introducing a collection of essays on the 
emerging subset of legal theory, he asks a seemingly simple question: “How does law actually 
affect people?”89 Although Posner’s economic judge may ask insightful questions and contribute 
an interesting argument, his conclusions are based on an incomplete view of human social 
psychology. Turning one of Posner’s biggest challenges to competing legal theories against him, 
Sunstein asks what good is a theory if it is not aligned with reality and produces questionable 
results. Rather than adopting hard and strict economic interpretation of law as in Posner’s 
economic judge, Sunstein’s deliberative judge leans on a longstanding figure in rhetoric: 
heuristics.  
Akin to the rhetorical topoi, heuristics function as “rules of thumb,” guidelines for 
judgment and action. “[F]rom a practical perspective,” argues Gabor Tahin, “the method of 
rhetorical heuristics can be employed as a device to discover the (presumably) most persuasive 
argumentative strategy among possible alternatives in a particular legal or political case.”90 
Different rhetorical strategies work in different rhetorical situations and several factors, such as 
audience composition, can significantly change the receptiveness to persuasion. A lawyer, for 
example, will utilize different rhetorical appeals depending on whether she is trying to convince 
a lay jury versus a knowledgeable judge (or panel of judges). As the previous section on 
conformity and group polarization can attest, judges are also tugged by their ideological 
inclinations and will be more susceptible to a set of arguments that caters to their preconceived 
notions if the situation is right. Instead of explicating a scientific method for achieving 
                                                 
89 Sunstein, Behavioral Law & Economics, 1, emphasis added. 
90 Gabor Tahin, “Rhetorical Heuristics: Probabilistic Strategies in Complex Oratorical Arguments,” 
Argumentation 25.1 (2011), 2 
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persuasion, rhetorical heuristics are more probabilistic in nature and point to what, generally, 
might work best in a given situation.  
Drawing on the classical rhetorical tradition, particularly Cicero, Tahin argues that 
heuristics “often represent logically faulty or legally inadmissible forms of probable reasoning 
which nevertheless appear highly persuasive.”91 Because individuals do not possess the 
rationality, foresight, and willpower of homo economicus, they are susceptible to imperfect, yet 
highly effective appeals. These are, in effect, rhetorical nudges, using existing propensities and 
predilections to push people toward thinking and judging in one way rather than another. The 
skilled student of rhetoric, according to Barry Brummett, will have an array of heuristics 
available as a means “to experience their rhetorical environments more richly. The more dance 
steps one knows in the abstract, the better able one will be to dance no matter the 
circumstances.”92 Like knowing the special and general topoi or a wide array of tropes, having a 
strong command of heuristics provides the rhetor with a larger and more versatile rhetorical 
armory. Judgment is a tricky business and audiences can be a fickle, unpredictable lot. Although 
heuristics do not offer the rhetor any guarantees (not even sound logic can do that), they 
nonetheless offer a “best practices” approach given general human psychological dispositions.  
Whereas Tahin lists seventeen different heuristic appeals he derives from ancient 
rhetoric,93 Sunstein focuses on three prominent heuristics that have become increasingly popular 
in cognitive psychology: anchoring, availability, and representativeness.94 Anchoring centers on 
                                                 
91 Ibid., 8. 
92 Barry Brummett, “Rhetorical Theory as Heuristic and Moral: A Pedagogical Justification,” 
Communication Education (Apr. 1984), 103. 
93 See Gabor Tahin, Heuristic Strategies in the Speeches of Cicero (Radstock, UK: Springer, 2014). 
94 Sunstein and Thaler ground their work Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman’s germane contributions 
to psychology, particularly “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” Science 185 (1974), 
1124-1131.  
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the ways in which people ground judgments from an initial starting point. For example, highly 
priced merchandise that is “60% off” anchor the customer’s mind to the original price, whereby 
the sale makes it appear that they are almost making money. The initial starting point may be 
completely arbitrary and anchoring still takes effect.95 Once we get an idea in our head, it begins 
to influence our decisions whether we recognize its role or not. Within the judiciary this may be 
as simple as a prosecutor’s sentencing request, a number that then anchors a judge’s decision. 
“[A]nchors serve as nudges,” according to Sunstein and Thaler. One still retains a complete 
ability to choose, but that choice is tethered to a starting point and it is difficult to shake loose. 
Availability is similar in that it offers a starting point of sorts, but focuses on the 
readiness with which one can produce examples. Following the debut of the movie Jaws, a panic 
swept through the nation and beachgoers heeded the ominous words printed on the movie 
posters: don’t go into the water.96 After 9/11, fear of flying rose sharply. George Gerbner’s 
“mean world syndrome” illustrates that watching television increases viewer fear and cultivates 
the idea that crime is waiting outside their door. Watching the news makes it appear as if young 
black men perpetrate most crimes. The availability heuristic is shaped by what comes to mind, 
rather than what is actually true. Rhetorically speaking, this heuristic echoes the idea of depleted 
argument pools referenced in the previous section on dissent and contributes to conformity and 
group polarization. Dissent may help to disrupt the bias created, but it is nearly impossible to 
shed in one fell swoop. Instead, Sunstein wants to put it to good use. “When ‘availability bias’ is 
at work, both private and public decisions may be improved if judgments can be nudged back in 
the directions of true probabilities.”97  
                                                 
95 Thaler and Sunstein, 23-24. 
96 Attesting to the film’s impact, 40 years after its debut my mother still refuses to put so much as a toe 
into a body of water.  
97 Thaler and Sunstein, 26. 
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Finally, representativeness concerns the similarity (or dissimilarity) between two objects 
or phenomena. Stereotyping is the most well known example; sometimes stereotypes are spot on 
while oftentimes stereotypes perpetuate harmful, misguided myths. We go through much of our 
lives making judgments based on their perceived representativeness for good and for ill. Kenneth 
Burke’s characterization of rhetoric as primarily concerned with identification and division 
reinforces this point. If a rhetor can identify herself with an audience or an idea held favorably by 
an audience, she has already gone a long way in persuading her audience. Like the other 
heuristics, the representativeness heuristic does not guarantee the type of judgment one seeks, 
but it is useful to have it on your side.  
As the refrain in this chapter goes: judges are no different than the rest of us. In many 
ways, stare decisis serves as an institution-wide anchor throughout the judiciary. Decisions are 
tethered to precedent, even if the connection is weak or the precedent is misguided. Moreover, 
which precedents come to mind are also important, reflecting the availability heuristic. In many 
cases, one could find existing cases that offer competing arguments on the case at hand. If only 
one comes to mind, then the decision will likely flow from that precedent. And to think that 
judges do not stereotype is almost laughable.98 Importantly, a judge still retains the ability to 
choose and a number of extraneous factors and other psychological nudges are always in effect. 
These heuristics, however, push judges in various directions and make them more likely to 
decide cases in predicable ways. The great challenge for the deliberative judge is then twofold: 
1) How can he avoid the harmful elements of heuristics? 2) How can he utilize the beneficial 
elements of heuristics in order to nudge others in the right direction?  
                                                 
98 See Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Judicial Decision Making: Is Psychology Relevant? (New York: Kluwer 
Academic, 1999). 
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Alas, there is no quick or easy answer for either issue, especially considering these 
challenges deal with that which is probable in any given case. An openness to competing ideas as 
addressed in the preceding section on dissent and many-minded judgment is a useful starting 
point. Doing so helps to minimize depleted argument pools and, hopefully, reduces the negative 
aspects associated with conformity and group polarization. Simply being aware of heuristics is 
also useful, although individuals have a nasty habit of seeing them operate on others while being 
blind to the ways they influence themselves. Perhaps this is an important point at which the 
literary judge’s argument supporting the role of literature for law can take root in Sunstein’s 
deliberative model. As far as the use of heuristics toward (hopefully) noble ends is concerned, 
knowledge of the heuristics is again useful. Reiterating Brummet, “The more dance steps one 
knows in the abstract, the better able one will be to dance no matter the circumstances.” Yet, 
scholarly knowledge is no substitute for experience, especially when heuristics must be 
kairotically deployed. Good timing can be studied and analyzed from every angle, but the 
performance is entirely different than the rehearsal. A comedian does not learn good timing in 
solitude, but rather working and reworking her act. It is found, not created. So, too, must the 
deliberative judge-as-rhetor cultivate his sense of kairos. Sometimes the moment will be lost, 
sometimes the wrong heuristic will be deployed or lack the impact expected, but with experience 
one gains a keener, more refined sense of kairos. And as Justice Holmes famously asserted, law 
is about experience. With time, the deliberative judge is increasingly capable of fulfilling his 
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4.3  LEGAL JUDGMENT AS EQUIPMENT FOR CIVIC LIVING  
The deliberative judge may hold a privileged position in society, but he is first and foremost a 
citizen. For the deliberative judge, citizenship is the guiding telos of American law. Whereas the 
Posner’s economic judge works toward an efficient legal system, as an economic mindset is want 
to do, and Nussbaum’s literary judge works toward cultivating the flourishing life in her 
decisions, Sunstein’s deliberative judge is primarily concerned with what democratic citizenship 
means, what responsibilities it entails, and how good judgments can yield increased deliberative 
engagement within the citizenry. The following section articulates the rhetorical underpinnings 
of deliberative democracy and argues that Sunstein’s argument parallels the Isocratic tradition by 
advancing legal judgment as a key feature in producing equipment for civic living. 
The deliberative judge advocates on behalf of and justifies his decisions in the value of 
citizenship, which plays a central role in two parallel movements in political philosophy: 
“deliberative democracy” and “civic republicanism.” 99 Both argue that judges and the lay public 
alike have an obligation to society and, at best, ought to contribute to a thoughtful and thought 
provoking public discourse. Citizenship is more than casting a ballot, the secular equivalent of 
Christmas and Easter Catholicism. For the deliberative judge, citizenship is a constant state of 
being, whether citizens realize it or not. But there are many forces acting against citizenship, 
such as the increasing challenges surrounding protest, corporate media focused on profits and 
increased viewership over an informed citizenry, and an increasingly polarized public. Although 
                                                 
99 Some label the burgeoning interest in civic republicanism as “communitarianism,” a label eschewed by 
earlier theorists including Michael Sandel, Alastair MacIntyre, Michael Walzer, and Charles Taylor. The 
label communitarian was not originally self imposed, but rather given to these scholars and others of a 
similar philosophical bent by their critics, yet the negative connotation has subsequently waned and 
scholars have adopted the label as a positive reinforcement of their core theoretical values. See, for 
example, Amitai Etzioni, New Common Ground: A New America, A New World (Dulles, VA: Potomac 
Books, 2009), the most recent book of his embracing and supporting the ideals of communitarianism. 
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he cannot wave his gavel and fix all of the problems that trouble American democracy, the 
deliberative judge can play a vital role when such problems cross his bench.  
Deliberative democracy is a relatively recent concept in political philosophy, but its 
history is nonetheless rich. Democracy’s early manifestation in Ancient Greece was heavily 
deliberative, albeit limited in its definition of “citizen.” Their robust (yet sometimes petty100) 
political deliberations are significant for the historic relationship between public deliberation and 
democracy. Another consequential development of this time bears on our focus on the 
underpinnings of a public philosophy of law; namely, the debate surrounding the aforementioned 
term philosophia. As Plato was writing his great dialogues on justice, beauty, truth, and the 
divide between appearances and reality, philosophia was still ambiguous and highly contested. 
Although similarly oriented toward virtue and justice as Plato,101 Isocrates claims that a Platonic 
approach, which has subsequently become more-or-less synonymous with “philosophy,” is 
simply training for an Isocratic education: “I do not, however, think it proper to apply the term 
‘philosophy’ to a training which is not help to us in the present either in our speech or in our 
actions, but rather I would call it a gymnastic of the mind and a preparation for philosophy.”102 
By focusing on the idealistic world of the forms, Plato’s philosophy eschews what Isocrates 
considers the more challenging problems embedded in practical affairs. Isocrates continues, “I 
hold that men who want to do some good in the world must banish utterly from their interests all 
vain speculations and all activities which have on bearing on our lives.”103 Isocrates is concerned 
with the contingent, not the eternal, the conditional, not the absolute. His philosophia regards the 
                                                 
100 Aristophanes’ The Clouds, for example, offers a comedic jab at the potential lunacy of untethered, 
unprincipled deliberation. 
101 Isocrates, Antidosis, in Isocrates. 3 vols. trans. George Norlin (vols. 1-2) and LaRue Van Hook (vol. 3) 
(London: William Heinemann, 1928), 47. 
102 Ibid., 266. 
103 Ibid., 269. 
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ideal forms as inaccessible and, as a result, not something to consume the philosopher’s life or 
the life of a polis. Instead, Isocrates encourages attention to civic life and the cultivation of good 
character.104 In doing so, he pays particular attention to contextually nuanced and temporally 
restrained concepts such as education, practicality, kairos, community, and speech, all of which 
Sunstein’s deliberative judge would adopt millennia later. Isocrates’ paideia offers the 
“equipment for civic life” necessary to nudge the demos toward the best course of action. These 
broad concepts do not capture the full depth of Isocratic philosophia, but they nonetheless reflect 
some of the important ways in which Isocrates differentiates himself from his contemporary 
rival, Plato, and provide a conception of philosophia that more closely aligns to Sunstein’s 
conception of deliberative democracy and the demands such a perspective requires of the 
deliberative judge.105  
Given deliberative democracy’s attention to civic engagement and public reason, its 
theoretical development has been particularly popular with American scholars, even if popular 
public discourse has not adopted their recommendations and remedies. John Dryzek, for 
example, develops a thread of deliberative democracy that is intertwined with critical theory and 
advocates the extension of franchise (number of capable participants), scope (diversity of issues), 
                                                 
104 For an array of essays supporting this claim, see Takis Poulakos and David Depew, eds., Isocrates and 
Civic Education (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004). 
105 Other historic moments and figures certainly contribute to the prototypical development of deliberative 
democracy, but a detailed analysis goes beyond the scope of this project. For historic analyses of 
deliberative democracy, see Jon Elster, “Introduction,” in Deliberative Democracy, Jon Elster, ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1-18, and James Bohman and William Rehg, 
“Introduction,” in Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, James Bohman and William 
Rehg, ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997). For a brief overview of the late twentieth century emergence of 
the term “deliberative democracy” and its early proponents see the introduction to John S. Dryzek, 
Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, and Contestations (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000). 
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and authenticity of control (“real rather than symbolic” participation).106 He offers a fairly 
succinct overview of the main themes:  
Deliberation as a social process is distinguished from other kinds of communication in 
that deliberators are amenable to changing their judgements (sic), preferences, and views 
during the course of their interactions, which involve persuasion rather than coercion, 
manipulations, or deception. The essence of democracy itself is now widely taken to be 
deliberation, as opposed to voting, interest aggregation, constitutional rights, or even self-
government. The deliberative turn represents a renewed concern with the authenticity of 
democracy: the degree to which democratic control is substantive rather than symbolic, 
and engaged by component citizens.107 
Unwilling to concede that democracy’s representative anecdote is the voter booth, Dryzek and 
his fellow deliberative democrats’ main goal is the cultivation of thoughtful public discussion on 
issues of social and political importance.108  
                                                 
106 See Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, 29. Dryzek’s definition of “authenticity of the 
control” is certainly problematic considering is condescending treatment of the symbolic. A charitable 
read would treat his definition of inauthentic symbolism as discursive practices that are never intended to 
affect practical change, as in meeting with another to “discuss” with no intention of giving up one’s 
position.  
107 Ibid., 1.  
108 An in-depth analysis of the contemporary arguments for deliberative democracy is a monumental 
project in and of itself. For germane arguments on deliberative democracy, its possibilities, and its social 
role(s), see Seyla Benhabib, “Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy,” in Democracy 
and Difference: Contesting Boundaries of the Political, Seyla Benhabib, ed. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), 67-94; James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity and 
Democracy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996); Joshua Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,” in 
The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State, Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit, ed. (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1989), 17-34; Bernard Manin, “On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation,” Political Theory 15 
(1987), 338-368; and the collection of essays in Jon Elster, ed. Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998). To consider some of the challenges facing deliberative democracy, 
see Matthew C. Flamm, “The Demanding Community: Politicization of the Individual after Dewey,” 
Education and Culture 22.1 (2006), 35-54. 
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Civic republicanism is similarly interested in civic engagement and the discursive unity 
of a public. Emerging, in part, as a response to John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, civic republican 
moral and political philosophy continues to expand. Rawls’ seminal work, which revitalized 
political philosophy in the United States, is guided by a seemingly simply thought experiment: 
What if citizens assembled and had to choose the fairest society, but didn’t know anything of 
their own position and status in society? Gender, race, income, skills – the traits that often 
determine one’s social and political standing – what if these were shrouded by a veil of 
ignorance? What social arrangement would we then choose? With these guiding questions in 
mind and a Kantian notion of dignity in tow, Rawls’ carefully constructed a new liberal 
conception of the social contract that balanced idealism and practicality.109 
 Challenging Rawlsian liberalism, civic republicans argue his project ignores or 
obfuscates vital aspects necessary to live a good life and places too much faith in the ideal of 
“unencumbered selves.” In his sharp critique of contemporary political philosophy and civic 
discourse, Michael Sandel argues for a revival of the American republican tradition. Disputing 
liberalism’s moral relativity, Sandel calls for a revitalization of Aristotelian virtue amidst a 
pluralist society.110 Sandel’s conception of public philosophy sees the need for a community 
                                                 
109 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). See also John Rawls, 
Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) and Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2001). For extensive treatment of Rawls’ work, 
see Samuel Freeman, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003); Norman Daniels, ed., Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls’ “A Theory of Justice (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1989); Jon Mandle, Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’: An Introduction (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Samuel Freeman, Rawls (New York: Routledge, 2007). 
110 Michael J. Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1996). See also Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd 
ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981). Elsewhere, Sandel claims, “Self-government 
today, however, requires a politics that plays itself out in a multiplicity of settings, from neighborhoods to 
nations to the world as a whole. Such a politics requires citizens who can abide the ambiguity associated 
with divided sovereignty, who can think and act as multiply situated selves. The civic virtue distinctive to 
our time is the capacity to negotiate our way among the sometimes overlapping and sometimes 
conflicting obligations that claim us, and to live with the tension to which multiple loyalties give rise.” 
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rooted in a common ethic that emerges from conscientious discursive engagement. The challenge 
then becomes how a society educates and cultivates a citizenry capable of looking beyond their 
unencumbered selves and focuses their attention on commonality rather than difference.111  
 Utilizing Cicero as his paradigmatic example, Robert Hariman argues there is a distinct 
“republican style” that is imbued within civic republican political theory, using both Alistair 
McIntyre and Michael Sandel as contemporary examples. Concerned with consensus, civility, 
voice, performance, self-control, and effectiveness, the republican style embraces a “verbal 
artistry” that must be embraced by orators. He argues, 
[T]he republican style seems to be particularly imbued with a set of ideas about human 
nature and good government. This conception of political life celebrates self-government 
as the highest moral calling, insists that citizens’ political activities should be motivated 
and guided by civic virtues, and cautions against the influences of private, especially 
commercial, interests. These precepts in turn requires that public institutions (such as the 
legislature), public practices (such as the practice of oratory), and public figures (such as 
the president) cultivate a moral sense in the citizenry that would result in decisions being 
made primarily with regard to the common good. The achievement of good government 
at any time requires active participation by individuals successfully striving to overcome 
their private interests through common deliberation, and the stability of the republic 
                                                 
See Michael J. Sandel, Public Philosophy: Essays on Morality in Politics (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), 34. 
111 Sandel is by no means the only contemporary scholar to make such an argument, nor the first. See also 
William M. Sullivan, Reconstructing Public Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 
E. J. Dionne, ed. Community Works: The Revival of Civil Society in America (Washington, D. C.: The 
Brookings Institute, 1998); Robert N. Bellah, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in 
American Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). For an astute collection of essays 
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Milton C. Regan, Jr., Debating Democracy’s Discontent: Essays on American Politics, Law, and Public 
Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).  
 
 - 269 - 
through time depends on its ability to cultivate individuals possessing this virtuous 
character.112  
The rhetorical character of civic republicanism (and deliberative democracy) acknowledges the 
power of discourse to shape and be shaped by the social, political, and legal landscape. The 
commonality Sandel hopes to discover is not an external trait, an outward characteristic that can 
be pointed to, quantified, and scientifically dissected. As Hariman aptly notes, the republican 
style, which both civic republicanism and deliberative democracy adopt in one way or another, 
creates a community by adopting an intellectual and rhetorical position that allows such 
engagement to happen.  
 The work of sociologist Amitai Etzioni draws heavily upon this desire to create and 
sustain strong communities. The founder of the “Communitarian” movement – a species of 
deliberative democracy and civic republicanism – Etzioni argues for a revived “spirit of 
community” that demands active democratic participation at every level. Describing 
Communitarianism as, “Part change of heart, part renewal of social bonds, part reform of public 
life,”113 Etzioni calls for a revitalized attention to “the moral foundations of our society,” 
including “family,” “schools,” “neighborhoods,” and the subscription to “a set of overarching 
values: specifically the democratic process, the Constitution and its Bill of Rights, and the 
commitment to be more respectful to others.”114 Like deliberative democracy and civic 
republicanism, at the core of Etzioni’s ambitious (some would say naïve) project is the idea that 
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citizenship is both a right and a responsibility.115 Herein lies the challenge for the deliberative 
judge: how can his decisions create spaces for public deliberation? How can he provide 
“equipment for civic living?” 
Sunstein weaves deliberative democracy through the majority of his work. An early 
adopter of the theory, he introduces the idea in one of his earliest works, Democracy and the 
Problem of Free Speech. Published in 1993, Sunstein praises the “distinctive feature of 
American republicanism” in its “extraordinary hospitality toward disagreement and 
heterogeneity, rather than fear of it,” making the prospect of deliberative democracy a viable 
option.116 But rather than seeing it as something to work toward, Sunstein argues that 
deliberative democracy has been a cornerstone of American law all along. It’s what our 
Constitution does; it’s what it was designed to do.117 Sunstein asserts, “The framers’ greatest 
innovation consisted not in their emphasis on deliberation, which was uncontested at the time, 
but in their skepticism about homogeneity, their enthusiasm for disagreement and diversity, and 
their effort to accommodate and to structure that diversity.”118 This “republic of reasons” serves 
as the crux of the system of checks and balances immortalized in the Constitution.119 Not only 
must the deliberative judge operate within such a constitutional framework, he must also actively 
promote the type citizenship entailed in deliberative democracy in his decisions.  
One is left wondering what traits the deliberative democrat judge must possess in order to 
achieve such ambitious ends. In Designing Democracy, Sunstein enumerates several traits that 
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characterize the deliberative democrat. Deliberative democrats resist “majority rule” as “a 
caricature of the democratic aspiration.” Instead, “democratic government is based on reasons 
and arguments, not just votes and power. Deliberative democrats believe that people tend to 
overstate the tensions between democracy, properly understood, and individual rights.”120 
Deliberative democrats seek a “genuine republic, not a direct democracy”121 Deliberative 
democrats “create institutions to ensure that people will be exposed to many topics and ideas, 
including ideas that they reject, and topics in which they have, as yet, expressed little interest.”122 
Deliberative democrats are keenly aware of “the problems, even the pathologies, associated with 
deliberation among like-minded people.”123 Deliberative democrats “fear that what has happened 
[in regard to the statewide referendum on homosexual marriage] is parody of democratic 
aspirations.”124 Deliberative democrats are “nervous about judicial entanglement in managerial 
issues – but also stresses that people in desperate conditions cannot have the independence and 
security that citizens require.”125 With such attributes, Sunstein hopes to encourage increased 
deliberative engagement within the citizenry. The genius of the Constitution, Sunstein argues 
elsewhere, is that it serves as a “republic of reasons – a system of checks and balances that 
would increase the likelihood of reflective judgments.”126 Such reflective judgments are not just 
the domain of official institutions like the judiciary or legislature; the public also has a vested 
interest in the ongoing legal and political issues surrounding them. Drawing attention to the 
Madisonian tradition, Sunstein argues that the Constitution and Bill of Rights are embedded 
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within the national culture and produce a pervading sense of community under the “unifying 
theme” of citizenship.127 One of the critical requirements of such citizenship is the rhetorical 
exchanges it facilitates.  
While this may be the ideal, the reality is far less inspiring. The quality of public 
deliberation has been a source of ill repute for just about as long as we have had a unifying 
theme of citizenship. Tocqueville saw it throughout his travels in antebellum America. Walter 
Lippmann found the public to be a “phantom,” a “deaf spectator in the back row.” Harold Bloom 
lamented the closing of the American mind. Every year a slew of articles and op-eds inveigh 
against the perceived loss of civility in all corners of public discourse. Whether or not one agrees 
with these tales of woe, most would agree that there is always room for improvement. While it is 
impossible to compel a respect for citizenship and the obligations it entails, the deliberative 
judge nonetheless uses citizenship as his North Star guiding judgment.  
A number of areas of law bear on such an ambitious project, but Sunstein’s focus on the 
freedom of speech – its problems and its possibilities – offers a representative anecdote for his 
broader approach to citizenship. Throughout Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech, 
Sunstein draws inspiration from the Madisonian and Brandeisean traditions in his approach to 
the First Amendment. Sunstein laments the growing protections for individualism and corporate 
speech, arguing that such trends negate the discursive sense of community on which the 
Constitution was built and charged to maintain. Calling for a “New Deal” for speech, Sunstein 
wants to draw on “Madison’s conception of sovereignty and on Justice Brandeis’ insistence on 
the role of free speech in promoting political deliberation and citizenship.”128 He claims that the 
“marketplace of ideas” metaphor advanced by Justice Holmes and others has failed to live up to 
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the constitutional commitment to citizenship that prioritizes engaged and diverse deliberation. 
Although legislation must be enacted to combat the threats he articulates, judges must also play a 
formative role by deciding cases that work toward citizenship rather than against it.  
In order to position his argument, Sunstein crafts a two-tiered approach to free speech 
issues. The first tier is the most protected speech: expressions and words that are political in 
nature. He notes the long history of free speech as being inherently tied to politics and argues 
that we must rekindle this long held ideal in order to derive the best we can out of the First 
Amendment. He offers several arguments supporting his claim, such as the need for a people to 
keep their government in check and the vested interest a government has in suppressing speech 
with which it disagrees. Just look at the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, the first major attack on 
free speech issued less than a decade after the ink on the First Amendment had dried. The 
Sedition Act made criticisms against the leading party (the Federalists) and president illegal 
(although vice-president Thomas Jefferson, a Democratic-Republican, was fair game). As a 
result, the first person imprisoned was a senator who disagreed with the administration. Because 
a government may try to suppress seditious speech, Sunstein argues that it must be protected for 
a flourishing democracy to truly exist. 
 The second tier, however, involves such speech as obscenity and libel, both of which 
tread the line between acceptable and unacceptable and challenge what it means to be a good 
citizen. Regarding obscenity, Sunstein appears content with the current standards set forth by 
Miller v. California and supports the value-based judgments expressed by the Supreme Court.129 
Thus, pornography remains protected, although Sunstein argues that limitations are warranted 
and acceptable, even if the material is produced and consumed by consenting adults. Concerning 
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libel, Sunstein suggests New York Times v. Sullivan has been expanded too far and encapsulates 
more than it should, making celebrity privy to attack, rather than centering on speech of a 
political nature. He argues that libel laws should not leave people open for attack solely based on 
whether or not they are well known. For example, in Hustler v. Falwell, Hustler magazine was 
sued for publishing a satirical story wherein Rev. Jerry Falwell was described as having sex with 
his mother in an outhouse. Seeking damages, Falwell sued Hustler on the basis of libel, arguing 
it had created emotional and image-related damage. The Supreme Court eventually decided in 
favor of Hustler and the opinion left celebrities and other figures in the public eye open to a wide 
range of non-political parody and satire. Not only did the case require “public figures” to prove 
“actual malice,” in cases of libel, it also left a lingering question: what about Falwell’s mother? 
 The two-tier system Sunstein advances serves as a guide for judges, not the lay public. It 
offers a way to approach challenging First Amendment cases and provides a useful yet 
incomplete resource for the deliberative judge. Interpreted through the lens of citizenship, recent 
decisions like Citizens United would likely produce different opinions. While the case is directly 
concerned political speech, the creation of Super PACs and the near endless resources they 
posses are antithetical to citizenship not only because they cater to the extremely wealthy, but 
they also actively contribute to group polarization. I contend the recently argued but yet-to-be-
decided case Elonis v. United States would also face a new set of challenges. The case concerns 
an amateur rapper posting extremely violent, potentially threatening lyrics about his ex-wife to 
his Facebook page, which she was likely to see. The legal question centers on what constitutes a 
“true threat” and the judicial standard for proof of intent to threaten. While numerous rap songs 
are political in nature, this is not one of them. As a result, the deliberative judge would be more 
likely to lean on values-based arguments like those Sunstein allows in obscenity and libel 
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decision-making. Even if the lyrics were simply a misunderstood avenue for cathartic expression, 
there is no doubt they had a chilling effect on his ex-wife, stifling healthier and more beneficial 
methods of discursive interaction. Moreover, if this incident is an example from a much larger 
trend that suggests an imbalance of gender equality, the deliberative judge would be encouraged 
to right that wrong on the grounds that it produces a more robust public. 
 The First Amendment is certainly not the only legal space wherein citizenship should 
play an active role for the deliberative judge. The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment 
is also heavily vested in citizenship, as the denial of equal rights and opportunities undermines 
the very possibility of a healthy deliberative democracy. As Sunstein notes, “The distribution of 
benefits or the imposition of burdens must reflect a conception of the public good. Benefits and 
burdens may not be based solely on political power or on a naked preference for one group over 
another.”130 When the judiciary is charged with promoting the public good by maintaining an 
active and interactive citizenry, discriminatory laws constitute a violation the constitutional 
commitment to citizenship. A deliberative democracy cannot succeed if the process of judgment 
precludes a respect for and appreciation of a diverse citizenship.  
Not only is there a moral ground for this argument, which Sunstein is willing to 
incorporate so long as it follows the strictures of judicial minimalism by being “incompletely 
theorized,” but there is also a practical rhetorical argument that emerges from his interest in 
dissent. Limiting or excluding a group’s rhetorical capability and accessibility ignores the wider 
array of perspectives and arguments that a more diverse population is likely to produce. 
Argument pools are depleted, individuals are exposed to ideas that cater to their established 
ideological perspective, and the quality public discourse drops significantly. When citizenship is 
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set as the guiding telos of legal judgment, the deliberative must not only embrace a multitude of 
perspectives throughout his own decision-making process, he must also defend the citizen’s need 
for such diversity in order to fulfill their civic obligations. The broad implications of the 14th 
Amendment bring an array of issues under the purview of citizenship. Economic and 
environmental policy, privacy, immigration, education – all of these issues contain elements that 
deal with equality and due process. Following the deliberative judge, one must examine them 
through the lens of citizenship. 
Granted, every case that comes before the court is not intimately connected to citizenship. 
Much of the court’s work, especially at the lower levels of the judiciary, are rote decisions that 
bear little on a citizen’s discursive responsibilities to the community. But the infrequency of 
cases that deal with core aspects of citizenship does not negate their significance. They are key 
opportunities to reinforce a foundational value that is embedded in the interstices and penumbras 
of the Constitution. The deliberative judge also must be mindful to the potential implications of a 
decision and how it might impact the rhetorical interaction of future citizens. At the higher levels 
of the judiciary, the opportunity to create reinforce, and alter precedent is an immense 
responsibility. Such decisions serve as a powerful representation of institutionalized national 
values. “In fact it is possible that moral judgments,” argues Sunstein, “including the distinctive 
kinds that result in constitutional law, are best described not as emanation of a broad theory but 
instead as a reflection of prototypical cases, or ‘precedent,’ from which moral thinkers – ordinary 
citizens and experts – work.”131 Law functions as a site of and resource for public deliberations 
about our shared moral convictions.  
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 However, a problem that continually arises from Sunstein’s position is its idealism, a 
continuation of his “if only” approach. He thinks that if only American society can create room 
for political discussion that it will happen (a judicial “If you build it, they will come,” so to 
speak). Time and time again we see the apathy of the United States citizens seemingly destroy 
this argument. To a certain extent, there exists a situation akin to the “tragedy of the commons” 
in that many citizens believe that there is no direct benefit to be had by deliberation about and 
active interest in politics, especially considering all the time and energy it takes to be truly 
engaged. Walter Lippmann noted this problem nearly 100 years ago in his sharp critiques of the 
American public.132 What makes Sunstein so confident that the judiciary, arguably the branch of 
government most detached from the public, could significantly impact public deliberation 
through their decisions? On this point, Posner’s economic judge serves as a foil to Sunstein’s 
deliberative judge, especially in light of the former’s unique common sense. Many citizens are 
uninterested and/or incapable of participating in democratic citizenship to the extent Sunstein 
and other deliberative democrats desire. In addition, there are also a multitude of definitions of 
citizenship, some of which are antithetical to one another. How does one know the “right” 
definition of citizenship? If this is part of Sunstein’s call for “incompletely theorized 
agreements,” how does that help the deliberative judge decide cases that require a commitment 
one way or the other?  
 For his part, Sunstein is aware of the potential limitations of his approach but maintains 
that it is nonetheless the responsibility of the judiciary to cultivate a more interactive citizenry 
while still remaining true to the spirit of the Constitution. The incompleteness of citizenship 
should be seen as a strength, not a weakness, as it remains flexible to unforeseeable social and 
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technological changes. Moreover, the deliberative judge looks forward to debates about the role 
and value of citizenship in challenging cases – doing so helps to refine yet not settle the idea of 
citizenship and reap the benefits of many-minded judgment. According to Sunstein, such an 
approach has worked well for other vague constitutional commitments like the equal protection 
clause.133 By working through practical examples and arguing through analogy rather than 
abstract theories, the deliberative judge is able to maintain a commitment to citizenship while 
still embracing the minimalist judicial mindset. Citing Brown v. Board as an example, Sunstein 
argues that Brown “inaugurated a kind of legal revolution, not because the Court adopted a 
general theory but because subsequent courts used that incompletely theorized decision as a basis 
for other incompletely theorized decisions, most of them highly critical of longstanding 
practices.”134 
While an incompletely theorized yet generally understood notion of citizenship and an 
appreciation for the deliberation that surrounds complex, nuanced cases is vital for the 
deliberative judge, the judiciary can only do so much. The deliberative judge must provide the 
space, but a cultural shift is needed. If we are to “cultivate our garden,” as Voltaire suggests, the 
most that the judiciary can do is ensure that the ground is tilled and the soil is as rich as it can be. 
It is the citizen’s responsibility to sow the seeds and care for them as they grow. To that end, the 
deliberative judge has an important role in ensuring the law does not create an undue burden on 
citizens and their ability to deliberate with one another. But the deliberative judge cannot force 
deliberation just as the economic judge cannot force rationality just as the literary judge cannot 
force emotional intelligence. At his best, the deliberative judge provides and protects the 
“equipment for civic living” celebrated by Isocrates, but the decision to utilize such equipment 
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rests on the shoulders of the public. The deliberative judge can only nudge them in the right 
direction at opportune moments. 
 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
Where then does this leave the deliberative judge? Sunstein’s model of judgment operates as 
both counter and complement to Posner’s economic judge and Nussbaum’s literary judge. As a 
counter, Sunstein’s interest in social psychology and behavioral economics undermine Posner’s 
classic approach to economics and its usefulness in judicial decision-making. Nussbaum’s 
aspirational literary approach and the abstract philosophical ground on which it is built contrasts 
with Sunstein’s disinterest in abstract theory and his focus on incremental, minimalist judicial 
decision-making. But unlike the competing models of judgment, Sunstein’s approach actively 
embraces an array of perspectives and rests faith in the beneficial results that occur when they 
interact with one another. Perhaps the best decisions are arrived upon not by a panel of 
deliberative judges, but a panel with all three different approaches (and more, if possible). So 
long as these other judges participate in rigorous deliberation and do not pursue ends antithetical 
to citizenship, the deliberative judge would welcome them as worthy interlocutors.  
This approach is not without its weaknesses. Dissent is not always productive and does 
not always come from a position of concern for the public. It can just as easily serve as an 
unnecessary wedge driving individuals or ideas apart. Kairotic judgment is problematic because 
its pragmatism (a point shared with Posner’s economic adjudication) can be at odds with its 
idealism (a point shared with Nussbaum’s literary judge). Inching toward a more just society 
favors those who already have power and social standing. Although the changes may be 
beneficial, they may also be extremely slow to the detriment of an already marginalized group. 
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Sometimes society needs a shove rather than a nudge. Both rhetorical qualities, dissent and 
kairos, share the problem of hindsight. We can only know a dissent was effective or a decision 
was issued in a timely fashion after the fact. Knowledge, experience, and intuition are certainly 
useful, but the deliberative judge has no guarantee that he will hit the mark. Moreover, there is 
also the danger of falling prey to the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy. Sunstein borders on an 
“if only” longing for dissent and kairotic judgment, but we can never know how history would 
have unfolded had a dissent been issued (or held back) or a decision issued at a more timely (or 
untimely) moment. Herein lies an inherent challenge for rhetoric and its focus on the contingent 
rather than the eternal.  
Despite these issues, one would be hard pressed to deny the importance of the 
deliberative judge’s rhetorical faculties. As a rhetorical figure, the deliberative judge echoes 
many of the virtues celebrated by Isocrates and his characterization of rhetoric as equipment for 
civic living. Many of the same rhetorical problems have plagued democracies for millennia 
continue and the contemporary context has produced an array of new challenges that exacerbate 
these problems, including conformity and group polarization. Ever mindful of these challenges, 
the deliberate judge remains hopeful of the power conscientious deliberation and dissent as an 
effective buttress against such hazards. With citizenship as a guiding light and a keen sense of 
kairos, the deliberative judge learns when and how to nudge the public while always remaining 
tethered to the constitutional commitments of our judicial system. 
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5.0  CONCLUSION 
 
“What is law?...Law is not exhausted by any catalogue of rules or principles, each with its own 
dominion over some discrete theater of behavior. Nor by any roster of officials and their powers 
each over part of our lives. Law’s empire is defined by attitude, not territory or power or 
process.” 
 
- Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 
 
 
On January 21, 2010, the United States Supreme Court issued their much-anticipated 
decision on Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.1 The case emerged from a legal 
dispute over the ability of the conservative nonprofit organization, Citizens United, to air its film, 
Hillary: The Movie, a partisan depiction of then-senator Hillary Clinton intended to hinder her 
presidential aspirations. The case challenged both policy (Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 
2002) and precedent (Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and McConnell v. FEC). The 
greatest challenge before the court was to assess whether the First Amendment protects 
corporations and organizations as much as it does individual citizens and whether or not partisan 
political media can be recognized as campaign contributions.  
In a lengthy opinion, Justice Anthony Kennedy, with Justices Thomas, Scalia, Alito, and 
Roberts concurring, supported the First Amendment right of Citizens United to produce, 
promote, and air their politically charged film. A key finding by the Court was that First 
Amendment rights pertain to “association[s] in the corporate form.” Thus, General Electric 
would have the same legal protection for political speech as does the American Civil Liberties 
Union (and other non-profits) as does the individual citizen. In response, Justice John Paul 
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Stevens authored a furious 90-page dissent, joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsberg, and Sotomayor, 
wherein he attacks the majority for its “rejection of the common sense of the American people, 
who have recognized a need to prevent corporations from undermining self government since the 
founding, and who have fought against the distinctive corrupting potential of corporate 
electioneering since the days of Theodore Roosevelt.” As a self-styled judicial umpire who “calls 
them as they are,” Chief Justice John Roberts sided with the opinion of the court, tipping the 
scales in the 5-4 decision. In his concurring opinion, Roberts wrote that “there is a difference 
between judicial restraint and judicial abdication.” Roberts has vehemently clung to his call-
them-as-they-are model of judgment, despite decisions such as Citizens United.  
Roberts is not alone in showing the difficulty of embodying an idealized model of 
judgment, as it is virtually impossible given the complex, nuanced, and unforeseeable issues that 
make their way through the judicial system. A model is essentially aspirational—it is not a 
formula. Despite their limitations, model judges are useful in that they underscore the most 
important attributes of good legal judgment as understood by a school of thought or individual 
legal philosopher. Just because an ideal is impossible to attain does not mean that the pursuit of 
such perfection is done in vain. 
Citizens United was the case that spurred this entire dissertation project, the core issue 
being “what constitutes good legal judgment?” This question has plagued me ever since I began 
the odyssey that is this dissertation. Upon reflection, however, that question presupposed things 
at my starting point that fell away as my inquiry proceeded. As I have come to realize, legal 
judgment – even good legal judgment – comes in an array of types and depends largely on the 
teleological orientation of the judge and individuals assessing the quality of judgment. The 
preceding pages have not been an attempt to articulate a guiding legal theory, but rather to 
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highlight the rhetorical tropes that undergird some of the most prominent legal philosophies. 
Importantly, these philosophies are targeted to a diverse audience of legal scholars, judges, 
lawyers, and the lay public, all of which have a vested interest in law in one way or another.  
Given the contingency at the heart of law – the ebb and flow of public policy, legal 
doctrine, and the philosophies that attempt to crystalize particular legal values – the rhetorical 
focus is particularly advantageous for evaluating legal judgment as it recognizes the importance 
of viewing judgments on a relative spectrum of better or worse, contingent upon shifting 
circumstances and competing perspectives rather than upon a simple dichotomy of right or 
wrong. Philosophical or ideological commitments contribute to discounting particular 
approaches to law and jurisprudence rather than viewing each theory as a means to help 
audiences render good judgment. In effect, these theories uniquely attempt to imbue their 
audiences with a certain kind of phronésis. As Thomas Farrell argues, “If phronésis is not to be 
reduced to wise guessing on the one hand or technical reason on the other, we must find some 
grounds for affiliating logos with the normative tendencies of modern critical reflection. Rhetoric 
may then be conceived as a kind of creative reasoning.”2 Balance, common sense, literary 
imagination, emotional intelligence, kairos, civic virtue – these are neither scientific terms 
dictating a taxonomy of what law is nor are they mere opinions based on a flight of fancy. These 
resources of legal judgment are rhetorical considerations displayed for the reader in an attempt to 
illustrate the usefulness of particular modes of creative reasoning. As Farrell later notes, “If 
judgment is treated only as a faculty, it is unlikely that audiences will ever be lucky enough to 
share in the privilege. By contrast, if judgment is treated as an acquired competence, 
sophisticated through practice, the prospect for its democratization is considerably more 
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promising.”3 Each model of judgment is an attempt to advocate and cultivate a more attuned, 
nuanced sense of legal judgment. Rather than listing the necessary attributes of good judgment, 
my approach to jurisprudence recognizes the variable ways in which such attributes are 
performed in context. The contextual and temporal restraints on legal processes press 
philosophical commitments toward practical adaptation. Rhetoric, as the art that “adjusts ideas to 
people and people to ideas,”4 provides ways of understanding this adaptation. 
Herein lies the contribution I have aspired to make to the rhetoric of law: showing how 
the models of legal judgment articulated by prominent contemporary philosophers of law are 
rhetorical enactments of philosophical commitments. The use of the model judge is by no means 
new. In De Clementia, Seneca wrote about the wise stoic judge juxtaposed against the stern 
judge. The former knew that it was better to remain flexible with law rather than to follow it to 
the letter. Following Seneca’s model, mercy and compassion are just as important to the law as 
punishment if moral guidance is the end goal. Walt Whitman advocated for the poet judge, a 
figure Nussbaum draws upon as she constructs her own literary model. Like the literary judge, 
the poet judge resists the urge to view law through a scientific lens. As Kenneth Burke would 
later echo in his analysis of semantic and poetic meanings, the poet judge acknowledges and 
embraces seemingly incongruous ideas as possibilities rather than problems. Such models open 
new ways of understanding, new ways of knowing, to which the semantic/scientific mind is 
blind.  
Perhaps the most famous contemporary model judge is Ronald Dworkin’s “Hercules.” 
Deployed to decide the 1983 English case McLoughlin v. O’Brian5 (amongst others), Dworkin 
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describes Hercules as “an imaginary judge of superhuman intellectual power and patience who 
accepts law as integrity.”6 Like the model judges described in the preceding chapters, Dworkin’s 
judge embodies the ideals of his legal philosophy, such as the oft-debated “right answer” 
approach to law, and operates under the guiding telos of integrity, which Dworkin describes as 
an “interpretive ideal.”7 Reflecting on how Hercules would decide landmark cases like Plessy v. 
Ferguson and Brown v. Board, Dworkin asserts that his avatar “interprets each one so as to make 
its history, all things considered, the best it can be.”8 We can inject Hercules into historic 
moments where we see the “right answer,” imagining how the heroic judge would decide 
contemporary cases based upon principle and not immediate practicality. “We use Hercules,” 
Dworkin writes,” to abstract from these practical issues, as any sound analysis must, so that we 
can see the compromises actual justices think necessary as compromises with the law.”9 At his 
best, Hercules is a lens through which to examine law as it is and imagine law as it should be. 
The decisions of such a judge may point toward the superhuman, but, according to Dworkin, that 
does not mean a judge should not aspire to such Olympic heights. 
Model judges may not be new, but they also are not passé. Close attention to 
contemporary models may be as important now as ever, in part because they are so little 
recognized and their role so underestimated. In their respective works, Seneca, Whitman, and 
Dworkin use their model judges rhetorically. These writers use idealized judges to direct 
attention toward a particular perspective on law and judgment, foregrounding it while pushing 
other perspectives and considerations to the background, if not off the stage entirely. Whereas 
these thinkers are explicit with their avatars, the legal philosophers analyzed throughout this 
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dissertation are subtler. Yet, amidst their prolific writings Posner, Nussbaum, and Sunstein each 
center on the attributes that they believe produce good judgment within their philosophical 
worldviews. As I have argued, these attributes are steeped in rhetoric even if the philosophers are 
reluctant to agree. Rather than supporting a particular jurisprudence over others, I have argued 
that these legal philosophies are in constant dialogue with each other (and the public), vying for 
influence and adaptation.  
By addressing the paragons of good judgment crafted by Richard Posner, Martha 
Nussbaum, and Cass Sunstein, I have attempted to cast light on some of the ways that 
jurisprudence is undergirded by rhetoric, and to show how these particular rhetorical inventions 
work in the service of differing philosophical and social perspectives. In order to see what 
possibilities are at play in the context of judgment one must be aware of the implicit dialogues 
opened up by the competing perspectives. Previous scholarship by rhetoricians, philosophers, 
and legal scholars has yet to address how the different conceptions of law and jurisprudence bear 
on the framing of competing claims about specific cases. There have been studies of the 
rhetorical elements of a legal theory, as examined, for example, in analyses of Richard Posner’s 
“Law and Economics,” and rhetorical case studies of such judicial landmark cases as Brown v. 
Board of Education; but there is little, if any, research that examines attempts to negotiate among 
multiple philosophies of law, or to understand their aggregate impact on public discourse about 
the nature and purposes of the law. My contribution is to situate juridical expertise as 
participation in perspective-taking and in voicing aspirations. 
Four considerations commend the “models of judgment” approach: 1) It turns attention to 
the rhetoric of jurisprudence, where there is a dearth of scholarship; 2) It responds to a need for 
new theoretical tools for understanding law as a site for the intersection of rhetoric and 
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philosophy; 3) It opens a relatively clear path for extending the approach to understanding other 
legal philosophers; and 4) It underscores the importance of examining public philosophies of law 
in ways that are accessible to both academics and the general public.  
Concerning the first point, there are surprisingly few rhetoricians focusing on the rhetoric 
of law. Compared to the surfeit of scholarship in public address, political rhetoric, history of 
rhetoric, critical/cultural rhetoric, feminism and LGBTQ studies, rhetorical criticism, and 
rhetorical theory, the rhetoric of law is a guppy trying to keep up with the big fish. There are 
certainly moments when these areas intersect, but there are few rhetoric scholars dedicated to 
law qua law rather than law as a vehicle to talk about something else. Of these scholars, fewer 
still train their attention on jurisprudence. Most scholarship focuses on landmark judicial 
opinions, from Marbury v. Madison to Citizens United. Others examine a single legal issue as it 
moves through time, such as equality, privacy, or personhood. These are important and 
admirable works, but they nonetheless have a blind spot when it comes to the legal theories 
guiding the judgments they examine. Precious little attention has been given to the philosophy of 
law as understood through a rhetorical framework, even though such scholarship is ripe with 
rhetorical possibility. By taking a step back and examining the theories and theorists contributing 
to the ongoing dialogue about legal judgment, rhetoric scholars will be in a better position to 
critique the idea of judgment as well as the judgments themselves.  
The second important contribution I hope to have made focuses on the intersection of 
rhetorical theory and jurisprudence. Each of the chapters teases out a model of judgment that taps 
into recognizable rhetorical strategies. Richard Posner’s economic judge draws on common 
sense and the rhetoric of balance to illustrate his effectiveness. Martha Nussbaum’s literary judge 
relies upon the power of narrative as a means of cultivating a nuanced rhetorical invention that is 
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better able to understand, respond to, and empathize with a diverse citizenry. The emotional 
intelligence that (hopefully) ensues avoids the dangers of disgust while embracing the law’s 
ability to protect and uphold dignity. Cass Sunstein’s deliberative judge has a keenly attuned 
sense of kairos and capitalizes on psychological heuristics so as to issue judgments at the right 
time and in the right way in order to produce a healthy, deliberative democracy. Ever wary of the 
dangers of group polarization and other pitfalls that emerge when groupthink takes hold, the 
deliberative judge encourages a form of dissent akin to dissoi logoi and the good that can come 
from “many-minded” judgment. I have introduced and built upon this wide array of rhetorical 
staples and illustrated how they are inseparable from the broader legal philosophy in which they 
are used. 
Third, the approach I have taken is not exclusive to the three philosophers addressed. 
Given the breadth of legal philosophy and the wide array of theories that populate the discipline, 
one could approach any prominent philosopher of law (or even several scholars contributing to a 
single theory) by examining their ideal model of judgment and the rhetorical faculties therein. 
My original intent was to include Ronald Dworkin and Antonin Scalia in these pages, but I opted 
to set these chapters aside for another time. However, both offer their own models of judgment 
that merit further rhetorical examination. Dworkin is quite explicit with this avatar, the 
aforementioned Hercules, but the rhetorical dimensions of “law as integrity” have yet to be 
explored. Scalia’s non-judicial writings are far sparser than those of his academic 
contemporaries, but he nonetheless espouses an ideal model of judgment that embraces textual 
originalism (perhaps the “historian judge”). Other prominent legal theories and theorists merit 
attention as well, such as Andrea Dworkin and the “feminist judge” or Richard Delgado and the 
“critical judge,” both of whom have written for academic and lay audiences and have been 
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particularly influential outside of legal studies. One may also consider juxtaposing judicial 
avatars within a single legal theory. Posner is certainly not the only philosopher writing on law 
and economics, just as Nussbaum and Sunstein are not the only philosophers writing within their 
respective legal theories. Yet, their approaches differ from their fellow theorists. Future 
scholarship could examine the competing avatars produced within a single theory, be they 
contemporaries or historic figures. 
Finally, I hope to have contributed to the relationship between legal philosophy and the 
ways in which the public views the role of law and legal judgment. Law is the most promising 
site for public philosophies to be constructed and deployed, as it gives the public intellectual and 
the citizen a common locus for considering a wide array of philosophical issues. Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr. captured the connection between law and philosophy well in a letter to Ralph Waldo 
Emerson: “I have learned, after a laborious and somewhat painful period of probation, that the 
law opens a way to philosophy as well as anything else.”10 As the vast expanse of judicial 
decisions, legal and political philosophies, constitutional theories, and public commentaries have 
increased exponentially, Holmes’ statement holds true today. But unlike so many other 
philosophical endeavors, law actively and immediately engages every citizen. It wrestles with 
everything from mundane issues of zoning permits and contracts to moral and political beliefs 
that serve as a cornerstone for civic living. Debates on epistemology, metaphysics, and the 
philosophy of the mind rarely grace the pages of newspapers and magazines, and are often 
relegated to academic journals and conferences that remain isolated from the public eye. Law, on 
the other hand, is constantly under public scrutiny, and yet it still engages profound philosophical 
                                                 
10 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Ralph Waldo Emerson, April 16, 1876, Harvard Archives, quoted in G. 
Edward White, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: Law and the Inner Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993), 112. 
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questions. What constitutes a person? What is dignity and how ought it factor into legal disputes? 
What is the relationship between liberty and equality? What are the limits of reason? These are 
far-reaching problems with which philosophers have been struggling for millennia, but which 
nonetheless bear on quick decisions by a time-constrained judicial system. 
The approach explored here is offered as lens that may allow legal philosophers, 
rhetorical theorists and critics, and the lay public a robust, nuanced way in which to see and 
engage the idea of law. Law is arguably the most prominent way in which the public and 
philosophers engage one another. Complex legal cases beget complex philosophical problems, 
which affect and are affected by public discourse. Their rhetorical constructions and discursive 
turns are not born of immaculate conception, but emerge from, respond to, and transform a long, 
ongoing tradition of philosophical explication and negotiation. The public philosophers 
addressed offer distinct argumentative discourses that help to shape how readers understand good 
legal judgment; but to isolate one and label it our fixed star ignores the many ways in which it is 
situated in a greater constellation. By addressing the ways in which these philosophers use 
rhetorical strategies to situate and promote their philosophies, particularly the ways in which they 
construct rhetorical tropes to direct attention one way rather than other, the constellation comes 
into better view. 
To that end, I have stayed true to the original metaphor articulated as constellational 
jurisprudence. That is to say, these voices and the positions they represent form a constellation 
within the civic culture. Just as one star, while perhaps interesting in itself, also occurs within a 
constellation, so it is with the “stars” of the public philosophy of law. These theorists offer robust 
legal philosophies, but to understand their place within the public star system one must address 
them in relation to one another. In particular, the respective philosophies of Posner, Nussbaum, 
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and Sunstein are highly interactive. As longtime colleagues at the University of Chicago, these 
scholars have worked together (and against one another) to construct their legal theories. To 
view them in isolation is to take in only part of the picture.  
As prominent public intellectuals whose reach goes far beyond classrooms, conferences, 
and academic journals, the legal philosophers addressed throughout this dissertation are utilizing 
rhetorical strategies that situate them not only as experts with a useful intellectual background, 
but also as citizen scholars contributing to an ongoing discourse. Working amidst theoretical 
principles and contextual intricacies, their craft requires phronésis - a sage balance between 
episteme and doxa. Whereas most attention given to the practical wisdom of public intellectuals 
(especially those interested in law) focuses on their ability to explain, my analysis underscores 
the ways in which they show via their ideal models of judgment. In so doing, they are able to 
reinforce a particular process that leads to a good judgment such that others can adopt it and 
apply it elsewhere. As I argued in the chapters on Posner, Nussbaum, and Sunstein, the processes 
they articulate are imbued with rhetorical faculties that guide judgment toward their respective 
teloi of law. To remove the rhetorical characteristics of their models of judgment would be to 
upend them entirely.  
In many ways, the aforementioned philosophers are just as invested in the act of creation 
as they are the act of explanation. All of them attempt to construct an idea of legal judgment that 
can be adopted by academics, judges, and the public alike. Given the malleability of meaning 
and the evolution of social norms, law serves as a philosophical touchstone rooted in the 
Constitution. The Constitution has served as a vital, often deified, document that has been 
constantly returned to and reimagined, particularly in moments of crisis. It has become more than 
simply a legal document. Following James Boyd White:  
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It is the purpose of the instrument known as the “Constitution of the United States of 
America” to do what the Declaration neither attempted nor achieved; to establish and 
organize a national community not merely at a transcendent moment of crisis but in its 
ordinary existence and over time. It is not a battle-cry but a charter for collective life – for 
the life we have earned when the Declaration has done its work – and our questions 
accordingly are: What kind of life does it make possible? What roles does it establish? 
What relations does it define among them? What opportunities for speech and thought 
does it create? This Constitution means to establish the conditions on which, and many of 
the materials with which, life will actually be led by a people no longer claiming to be 
united in a splendid moment of common sentiment but now engaged in, and divided by, 
their ordinary activities and moved by their ordinary motives. 
The Constitution is a text that calls for interpretation. The immense beauty and insufferable 
challenge of the Constitution is that it has given its interpreters the same material, but that 
material is not yet fully formed and never will be. As a result, different philosophers are giving 
shape to the material of law, sculpting it with the hope that they are creating something more 
beautiful and more practical. The end results are different sculptures, imagining life and law in 
varying ways. These visions, however, emerge from a common material. The public 
philosophers addressed are, in large part, artists creating through discourse.  
 This is not to suggest that rhetoric is superior to or replaces the array of other productive 
lenses through which to examine the philosophy of law, such as those approaches offered by 
sociology, legal studies, political science, cultural studies, or philosophy. Yet rhetoric’s 
contribution is nonetheless unique, given the different issues apropos of the rhetorical tradition. 
For example, philosophy often attempts to find the correct or best jurisprudence, which is evident 
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in the numerous works arguing for a particular legal worldview. A rhetorical approach, however, 
acknowledges the tensions present as these philosophies negotiate with each other in an attempt 
to gain greater recognition, support, and, ultimately, influence. This view is well articulated by 
Michael Leff:  
Rhetorical discourse occurs in the contexts where judgments must be rendered about 
specific matters of communal interest. Such judgments normally invoke the general 
principles that categorize and direct our response to public events. Yet the application of 
these principles is open to question, and, in their abstract state, they are insufficient to 
allow for an adequate decision in any given case. Moreover, these principles themselves 
are subject to revision in light of our concrete experiences.11  
As a prominent site of judgments that bear upon important communal issues, law is situated 
within a robust, complex, and nuanced rhetorical setting. Philosophers of law play a significant 
role therein as they help to shape and reshape the principles that constrain legal judgment. 
Overall, this project does not advocate a particular philosophical worldview, even though I may 
be partial to particular interpretations of the Constitution and the legal philosophies underlying 
such arguments. Rather, my goal has been to unearth and elucidate the rhetorical qualities 
inherent to the aforementioned philosophers of law and to argue that they can be best understood 
as embodied models of judgment imbued with particular rhetorical faculties. If law is the writing 
of an “epic” chain novel, as Ronald Dworkin contends, then we must examine the heroes of the 
story if we have any hope of understanding the breadth and depth of the tale. 
                                                 
11 Michael Leff, “The Habitation of Rhetoric,” in Contemporary Rhetorical Theory: A Reader, ed. John 
Luis Lucaites, Celeste Michelle Condit, and Sally Caudill (New York: Guilford Press, 1999), 61. 
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APPENDIX: A MODEL COURT IN ACTION 
 
 A good model of judgment is useless if it cannot be put into practice. This is a point of 
agreement between Posner, Nussbaum, and Sunstein. Their agreement, however, is short lived. 
The economic judge views a case through the lens of wealth maximization, seeks balance amidst 
competing legal interests, and utilizes a common sense notion of economic adjudication. 
Antagonistic to the economic judge, the literary judge finds the translation of incommensurable 
ideas a dangerous practice. Instead, literary judges draw upon their literary imagination to refine 
the process of rhetorical invention by offering an opportunity to experience the “other.” 
Exposure to literature also expands the literary judge’s capacity for emotional sensitivity and 
works toward minimizing the influence of dangerous emotions, a central concern for the literary 
judge but of little interest to her economically minded counterpart. Civic republican judges 
acknowledge the benefits to be gained from open deliberation and dissent with their peers. Not 
only does good judgment require sound legal arguments, it must also be issued at the right time 
and contribute to the production of a healthy, engaged citizenry. 
Each chapter thus far has offered various examples illustrating how the model judges 
approach and decide cases, but there has been little overlap save a handful of landmark 
decisions. Given their different orientations to law, each scholar focuses on different types of 
cases in order to frame their respective positions in the best light. In order to avoid imbalanced 
attention in their scholarship and yet another analysis of Brown v. Board or Roe v. Wade, this 
chapter will apply the different models of judgment to a fictitious, yet not unlikely case: 
Concerned Citizens v. National Security Agency. As the American public grows increasingly 
concerned over the ongoing wiretapping and data mining by the NSA, a three-member appellate 
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court agrees to a hear the case. Composing the panel, the economic judge, the literary judge, and 
the civic republican judge must decide whether or not the expansive NSA wiretapping unveiled 
in 2013 violates the Fourth or Fifth Amendments. The judges draw from the same legal resources 
– the amendments, legal precedent, statutes like the Patriot Act, the checks and balances outlined 
in the Constitution – but their rhetorical faculties bring forth markedly different concerns, 
arguments, and conclusions. What follows is 1) a brief history of privacy law and an overview of 
the current NSA controversy; 2) a fictional exchange between the petitioner and respondent 
counsel and the appellate court composed of the model judges; and 3) the decision of the court. 
 
LEGAL, PUBLIC, AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND 
In order to set up a robust analysis, one must first understand the legal and extralegal 
issues surrounding wiretapping and the role of privacy in American law. Since the invention of 
the electric telegraph in the early 1800s and its commercialization shortly after, lawmakers and 
law enforcement agencies have had an interest in intercepting real-time messages in order to 
prevent crimes or implicate individuals in a crime that has already been committed. As the 
telegraph made way for the telephone, legislators across the country established provisions 
protecting citizens from unlawful surveillance. Although telegraph and telephone technology 
was widespread at the turn of the 19th century,1 the judicial branch had not addressed the issue 
until Olmstead v. U.S. (1928). Issuing the opinion of the court, Chief Justice William Taft denied 
an appeal to the Fourth Amendment by narrowly construing the scope of the exclusionary clause 
(i.e. “unreasonable search and seizure”) and relying upon a literal reading of the text. Chief 
                                                 
1 For a detailed analysis of the rise and spread of the telephone (as well as other communication 
technologies), see Tim Wu, The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires (New York: 
Knopf, 2010). 
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Justice Taft wrote, one “can not justify enlargement of the language employed beyond the 
possible practical meaning of houses, persons, papers, and effects, or so to apply the words 
search and seizure as to forbid hearing or sight.”2 With this characterization of the Fourth 
Amendment, Taft argued that there cannot be a challenge to the Fifth Amendment: “There is no 
room in the present case for applying the Fifth Amendment, unless the Fourth Amendment was 
first violated. There was no evidence of compulsion to induce the petitioners to talk over their 
many telephones.”3  
Justice Louse Brandeis issued a now-famous dissent calling for the Constitutional 
protection of privacy. Although he had publicly advocated for a right to privacy as far back as 
1890 when he coauthored “The Right to Privacy” with Samuel Warren,4 Brandeis did not have 
the opportunity to adjudicate a case of this nature until nearly forty years later. According to 
Brandeis,  
[The amendments] sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their 
emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be 
let alone – the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. 
To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of 
the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Brandeis constructed a legal justification for the right to privacy from what Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr. described as the “penumbras of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,” a turn 
                                                 
2 Olmstead v. U.S. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) 
3 Ibid. 
4 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review 4.5 (Dec. 
1890), 193-220. 
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of phrase that would be adopted in Justice William O. Douglas’s defense of privacy in Griswold 
v. Connecticut (1965), albeit a privacy issue that did not entail wiretapping surveillance. 
Despite the fact that Brandeis’ dissent failed to swing the court in his direction, his 
dissent became vindicated with the expansion of privacy rights throughout the 1960s and ‘70s. In 
addition to Griswold v. Connecticut, which etched a place for privacy from “all government 
invasions ‘of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacy of life,’”5 Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 
defended a citizen’s right to privacy against warrantless searches four years earlier.6 By the time 
wiretapping again found itself under the scrutiny of the Supreme Court in Katz v. U.S. (1967), 
the Constitutional protection of privacy had a strong foothold. Katz questioned the legality of 
wiretapping a public telephone to record a private conversation. In the majority opinion, Justice 
Potter Stewart argued that such investigative pursuits “violated the privacy upon which he 
justifiably relied while using the telephone booth.”7 As a result, the FBI had conducted an illegal 
search and seizure and “ignored ‘the procedure of antecedent justification…that is central to the 
Fourth Amendment,’ a procedure that we hold to be a constitutional precondition of the kind of 
electronic surveillance involved in this case.”8 Authoring a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan 
suggested the “reasonable expectation” standard for determining the legitimacy of legal appeals 
to privacy. In short, if someone expects privacy in a given situation (making a call on a public 
telephone, for example) and said expectation is “one that society is prepared to recognize as 
                                                 
5 Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
6 Mapp v. Ohio (1961). Until Mapp, the idea that evidence procured from a warrantless search constituted 
“fruit from the poisonous tree” and thus could not be included in building a case was applicable to federal 
law enforcement agencies, but it was not applicable to state and local law enforcement. 
7 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) 
8 Ibid. See also Edmund W. Kitch, “Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth Amendment,” 
Supreme Court Review (1968), 133-152; and Mark Rahdert, “Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy and the 
Fourth Amendment,” Yale Law Journal 86 (1977), 1461-1508. 
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‘reasonable,’”9 then government surveillance of the conversation is unconstitutional. Five years 
later the court would again defend privacy against warrantless electronic surveillance in United 
States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan Southern Division 
(1972) and limited an expanding executive authority.10   
Whereas the judicial branch expanded the Constitutional protection of privacy and 
continued to rule against the legality of warrantless searches, 11 the executive and legislative 
branches were expanding the scope of their surveillance initiatives. In response to revelations 
that President Nixon used the NSA to engage in the illegal surveillance of activist groups (also 
known as the “Church Committee” controversy), congress passed the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978. Notably, the Act created the FISA Court, which continues to 
convene and decide (in secret) whether or not to grant surveillance warrants. Although imperfect, 
the balance between the different branches was more-or-less at equilibrium for many years until 
the signing of the Patriot Act in 2001. “Title II: Enhanced Surveillance Procedures” greatly 
expanded the scope of government surveillance programs and limited the transparency legally 
required by authorities. The Patriot Act amends FISA and the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act of 1986 in its pursuit to “obtain foreign intelligence information.”12 “Foreign 
intelligence” pertains not only to the surveillance of non-citizens and foreign communication, but 
also applies to domestic communication and United States citizens who are affiliated with 
                                                 
9 Katz v. U.S., Justice Harlan concurring. 
10 United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan Southern Division, 
407 U.S. 297 (1972) 
11 In addition to the aforementioned cases, the illegality of warrantless searches was further solidified in 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), and Payton v. New York 445 
U.S. 573 (1980).  
12 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
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suspected terrorist organizations.13 Warrant-sanctioned surveillance became less of an obstacle 
and the secret FISA Court made external review more difficult. In 2008, FISA was amended 
which further loosed its restrictions even further. Three years later, President Obama signed an 
extension of the surveillance provisions in the Patriot Act (which are temporary, whereas the rest 
of the Patriot Act is permanent), which added four more years to authorize for roving wiretaps 
and the ability to gather data on “lone wolf” suspects who are not connected with a larger 
organization. 
Opponents of the Patriot Act’s surveillance provisions compose an array of unlikely 
allies, including politicians Senator Rand Paul and Senator Dick Durbin, and non-profit 
organizations the Patriots to Restore Checks and Balances and the American Civil Liberties 
Union. The vague language of the Enhanced Surveillance Procedures grants governmental 
agencies sweeping powers to secretly gather data on those parties it deems of interest. In media-
grabbing act of politicking, Paul unsuccessfully attempted to use a legislative procedural tactic to 
delay the 2011 extension. Conservative critics – primarily from the vocal libertarian wing – tend 
to focus on domestic privacy issues and violations of citizen’s rights. Liberal critics share these 
concerns, while expanding their concern to include questions of racial profiling and Internet 
freedom. In one way or another, all of the critics worry about the potential overreach by 
government agencies. Defenders of the surveillance provisions counter the claims of overreach 
by highlighting the oversight and regulations embedded within the legislation, suggesting 
                                                 
13 Much debate surrounds qualifications needed to categorize a group as a “terrorist organization” and the 
degree to which an individual is “affiliated” with such an organization. Although exact numbers are 
unknown due to the classified nature of the list, upwards of one million names are presently on the 
terrorist watch list, which includes an estimated 9,000 U.S. citizens. See Shaun Waterman, “Terror Watch 
List Grows to 875,000,” The Washington Times (May 3, 2013), retrieved from 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/may/3/terror-watch-list-grows-875000/; and American Civil 
Liberties Union, “Terror Watch List Counter: A Million Plus,” American Civil Liberties Union (n.d.), 
retrieved from https://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/terror-watch-list-counter-million-plus.  
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opponents are falling prey to the slippery-slope fallacy. Given the new risks present in the post-
9/11 world, these measurements are necessary to ensure the safety of U.S. citizens. “It’s an 
important tool for us to continue dealing with an ongoing terrorist threat,” claimed President 
Obama after extending the surveillance programs he had criticized in his 2008 presidential 
campaign.  
Public opinion concerning the Patriot Act has been divided. Early polls (June 2002) note 
broad public support, but it slowly waned during President Bush’s first term14 and remained 
more-or-less split through his second term and up to President Obama’s 2011 extension.15 A 
majority of republic presidential candidates voiced support for the Act to agreeing crowds during 
the 2012 primary season. Polls Support for surveillance since the adoption of the Patriot Act is 
more difficult to discern, as polls about it are not only irregular and uncommon, but also ask 
broad questions about the entirety of the act rather than its specific surveillance provisions. As 
Mother Jones reports, there tends to be a small increase in support for surveillance, with 51% 
calling the provisions acceptable in January 2006 to 56% in June 2013.  
The Patriot Act has received a handful of notable legal challenges. Some of which limited 
the scope of its power, including Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), which defended a U.S. citizen’s 
right to due process while detained as an enemy combatant (although this is not a right granted to 
foreign detainees),16 and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), which blocked war-crimes trials for 
Guantanamo detainees and maintained the Supreme Court’s authority to hear their cases. 
Although the Supreme Court checked executive power in a significantly and openly, the bulk of 
                                                 
14 David W. Moore, “Public Little Concerned About Patriot Act,” Gallup (Sept 9, 2003), retrieved from 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/9205/public-little-concerned-about-patriot-act.aspx. 
15 Pew Research Center, “Public Remains Divided Over the Patriot Act,” Pew Research (Feb 15, 2011), 
retrieved from http://www.pewresearch.org/2011/02/15/public-remains-divided-over-the-patriot-act/. 
16 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)  
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the Patriot Act’s power remained and eventually grew with the 2008 amendments to FISA and 
2011 extension of the surveillance provisions. 
Legal challenges to the surveillance provisions have fared less well in court. In Clapper 
v. Amnesty International (2013), the case was dismissed on the ground that the ACLU 
respondents moving the case forward had no legal standing, thus avoiding the legal challenge to 
the NSA’s warrantless wiretapping program. This decision will be of little help for the pending 
case in the Ninth Circuit, Center for Constitutional Rights v. Bush, wherein the respondents 
argue that the NSA’s wiretapping of Guantanamo prisoners and their lawyers that compromises 
their ability to provide the a high standard of legal service and produces a chilling effect on their 
speech. The Ninth Circuit is also waiting to issue a decision on a broader challenge to the NSA 
in Jewel v. National Security Agency. The case may be dismissed, however, due to the 
government’s appeal to state’s secrets privilege. Interestingly, support has shifted from primarily 
Republicans in 2006 to a majority Democratic base in 2013.17 The shift is undoubtedly due to the 
2013 NSA information leaks revealing the Obama administration’s sweeping data collection and 
wiretapping program, which provides the impetus for and rhetorical situation surrounding 
Concerned Citizens v. NSA. 
On June 5, 2013, The Guardian newspaper published the first of several reports by Glenn 
Greenwald that detailed the various ways in which the National Security Agency was engaging 
in a vast program of wiretapping and data mining. The report included a secret court order from 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court was publicized, implicating Verizon Communication 
in the program. The following day, Greenwald reported on another covert surveillance program: 
                                                 
17 Kevin Drum, “New Poll Says American Public is Fine with NSA Surveillance,” Mother Jones (June 
10, 2013), retrieved from http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/06/new-poll-says-american-
public-fine-nsa-surveillance. 
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PRISM. PRISM, or “Planning Tool for Resource Integration, Synchronization, and 
Management,” expands the U.S. surveillance program by including a number of Internet and tech 
companies including Google, Microsoft, and Apple. The public uproar was swift and loud. Major 
newspapers published scathing editorials criticizing the Obama administration for its sweeping 
and secret initiative. Exacerbating the furor was a three-month old testimony by the James 
Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence. Senator Ron Wyden asked a seemingly direct yes-
or-no question: “Does the NSA collect any type of data at all on millions or hundreds of millions 
of Americans?” “No, sir,” replied Clapper. “Not wittingly.” Clapper would go on to apologize 
for his “erroneous,” which he described as the “least untruthful” response he could give. 
The political ramifications have been mixed. Many high-ranking Democrats and 
Republic were quick to defend the programs. Senator Dianne Feinstein, the Senate Intelligence 
Committee Chair, assured the public that NSA surveillance was narrow in scope and limited to 
general data, such as timestamps on telephone calls, but not specific conversation information 
(i.e. what was said during the conversation). The House Intelligence Committee Chair, Mike 
Rogers, voiced a similar defense. “The National Security Agency does not listen to Americans’ 
phone calls and it is not reading Americans’ emails,” asserted Rogers. “None of these programs 
allow for that.”18 For her efforts in defending these issues, Representative Nancy Pelosi was 
booed by her own constituents.19 Citing the demands for security in a post 9/11 world, 
proponents position the surveillance programs as a necessary tool to prevent future attacks. They 
also note the various checks and balances in place, highlighting the different, interacting roles 
                                                 
18 Imtiyaz Delawala, “Intelligence Committee Leaders Defend NSA Surveillance,” ABC News (Jun 9, 
2013), retrieved from http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/06/ intelligence-committee-leaders-
defend-nsa-surveillance/. 
19 Nick Wing, “Nancy Pelosi Booed, Heckled Over Edward Snowden, NSA Comments at Netroots Nation 
2013,” Huffington Post (Jun 22, 2013), retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/22/nancy-
pelosi-booed_n_3484062.html. 
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that the executive, legislative, and judicial branches play, although the secrecy of their 
interactions remains a point of contention.  
Politicians have been equally vocal in their criticisms of the expanded programs. Al Gore 
deplored the tactics as unconstitutional, claiming that “[i]t is not acceptable to have a secret 
interpretation of a law that goes far beyond any reasonable reading of either the law or the 
constitution and then classify as top secret what the actual law is.”20 Senator Rand Paul 
sponsored the “Fourth Amendment Restoration Act of 2013” in an attempt to curb domestic 
surveillance (Paul is more-or-less fine with foreign surveillance). Longtime supporter of 
President Obama, Representative Elijah Cummings reflected, "The president said that I must 
return to my authentic self. And I think the president needs to go back and read his own 
speeches."21 Echoing criticisms cast against President George W. Bush, who initiated the NSA 
wiretapping program, detractors stress the importance of Constitutional protections of liberty and 
privacy, the exaggerated claims of immanent danger, and the need for increased transparency as 
reasonable concerns. 
For their part, the public has been starkly divided. Polling data suggests that a small 
majority (56%) of Americans consider data collection on telephone records an “acceptable” 
means to investigate terrorism and squelch potential threats, whereas a large minority (41%) find 
such means unacceptable. The numbers are even closer for email data collection, with 45% 
indicating the government is within their power to monitor email communications and 52% 
                                                 
20 Ian Millhiser, “Al Gore: NSA Surveillance Programs Violate the Constitution,” Think Progress (Jun 
17, 2013), retrieved from http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/06/17/ 2165371/al-gore-nsa-surveillance-
programs-violate-the-constitution/. 
21 Darren Samuelsohn, “George W. Bush Critics Turn Wrath on President Obama,” Politico (Jun 7, 
2013), retrieved from http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/george-w-bush-haters-turn-wrath-on-
obama-92388.html. 
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claiming it should be beyond the scope of their power.22 As with any poll, the wording of the 
questions matters greatly. For example, polling data varied greatly depending on whether the 
government was tracking “ordinary citizens” or “suspected terrorists.”23 The only point of 
agreement seems to be the support of congressional hearings to examine the NSA surveillance 
programs in greater detail.24  
Since the initial revelation through The Guardian and The Washington Post, a torrent of 
information and accusations has flooded public and political discourse. No matter what position 
one holds, the 2013 NSA controversy brings to light a number of legal, political, and 
philosophical issues that coalesce into a tangled knot for any legal theory. What follows is a 
mock appellate court trial beginning with oral arguments before the court followed by the 
opinion of the court and dissenting opinions. The mock oral arguments draw inspiration from 
previously argued cases dealing with privacy and wiretapping with interjections representative of 
the model judges. The subsequent opinions and dissents will similarly draw from the rhetorical 
qualities of each judge articulated in the previous chapters.  
Regarding the background of the fictitious case at hand, Concerned Citizens v. National 
Security Agency, a few things merit attention before engaging the oral arguments and opinions 
issued by the model judges. The case is fantastic not only because it is being heard by three 
idealized model judges, but also because it is being heard by a panel of three judges as opposed 
to a single judge from a district court or the nine justices on the Supreme Court. The vast 
                                                 
22 Pew Research Center, “Majority Views NSA Phone Tracking as Acceptable Anti-terror Tactic,” Pew 
Research (Jun 10, 2013), retrieved from http://www.people-press.org/2013/06/10/majority-views-nsa-
phone-tracking-as-acceptable-anti-terror-tactic/. 
23 See Emily Ekins, “Public More Wary of NSA Surveillance Than Pundits Claim,” Reason (Jun 18, 
2013), retrieved from http://reason.com/blog/2013/06/18/public-more-wary-of-nsa-surveillance-tha. 
24 Scott Clement and Sean Sullivan, “Poll: Public Wants Congressional Hearings on NSA Surveillance,” 
Washington Post (Jun 19, 2013), retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
fix/wp/2013/06/19/poll-public-wants-congressional-hearings-on-nsa-surveillance/ 
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majority of three-judge panels exist at the appellate level, which would not likely see a case like 
Concerned Citizens v. NSA.25 Consequently, the three-judge model court has more in common 
with the Supreme Court than a federal appellate court. In order to facilitate interaction between 
the model judges, I opted to overlook this detail in favor of efficiency and expediency. As I 
envision Concerned Citizens v. NSA, an ad hoc federal court has been created to hear the case. 
Spurred by the revelations of potential governmental overreach made public by Edward 
Snowden in connection with The Guardian and The Washington Post, the non-profit government 
watchdog group Concerned Citizens charged the NSA with overstepping its bounds and violating 
the Constitution.  
The collection of metadata includes numerous issues that create an intricate web of legal 
questions, which are made more complex when different legal philosophies focus attention on 
different elements of the case. An initial challenge for Concerned Citizens is whether or not they 
have standing in the case. In other words, what harm has come to the organization and how have 
their rights been violated? Why do they have a right to bring the case before the court as opposed 
to those individuals who have been targeted by perceived violations of the NSA? If one accepts 
that they have standing, an intricate knot of issues must be unraveled to ascertain whether or not 
the government has overstepped its bounds. These issues not only include legal statutes and 
precedent, but also the shifting social and technological trends that have emerged in the 
relatively new digital age. Of particular concern for the court are the following:  
                                                 
25 Historically, some issues have merited the creation of a three-judge district court panel including cases 
involving the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, the Interstate Commerce Act, and state legislation blocking 
desegregation. 
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 What information is being accrued and does it qualify as an illegal search and seizure? 
The 4th Amendment states that “persons, houses, papers, and effects” are protected unless 
a warrant is used with probable cause, but metadata falls in a grey area.  
 If metadata falls inside the scope of the 4th Amendment, is the warrant process followed 
by the FISA court constitutional? Although an official judicial body, critics of post-9/11 
intelligence gathering programs cite the highly secretive nature of the court and lack of 
external oversight as a source of concern. 
 Does the type of information being accrued distinguish it from other 4th Amendment 
challenges? Public officials who support the collection of metadata argue that the 
information is generic (e.g. time stamps, call times, phone numbers of inbound and 
outbound calls, email recipients, etc.) and does not constitute a violation of privacy. If the 
NSA wants to investigate content, that is the words said in a telephone call or typed in an 
email, then they must receive a court order to proceed. Again, the secrecy of the FISA 
court issuing such court orders serves as a point of contention. 
 Does is matter who, or rather what, is collecting the data? Given the volume of 
information, human agents see precious little data. The information is collected and 
stored while computer algorithms to filter through the data. Only when the algorithm 
comes across something suspicious is it flagged for investigation by human agents. 
 Is the data secure? Even if there are no violations of the 4th Amendment, can the citizenry 
be assured that the immense amount of data is safe from hackers who may use the 
information for nefarious purposes (e.g. corporate espionage)?  
 How long is the data kept and should there be limits? Presently, data is supposed to be 
held for a maximum of two years barring a court ordered extension, but records indicate 
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data is being stored indefinitely. If there is no harm in collecting this data, what is the 
point of time constraints? At what point is the threat reduced such that the programs may 
be terminated or will they continue indefinitely? 
 Is the 5th Amendment being violated when metadata information is used against a 
witness? 
 Is there a chilling effect to communication? Are political organizations and subversive 
(but wholly legal) groups silencing themselves for fear that they may be targeted in the 
future? 
 Are legal (and public) interpretations of privacy outdated in light of emerging 
technology? Is the idea of public privacy fading away? The digital age has inspired an 
unprecedented amount of self-publication. With the advent of Facebook, MySpace, 
Twitter, Four Square, Instagram, and the endless number of social media apps that 
continue to ask users to divulge information. This is particularly important for younger 
users who developed their sense of privacy as they were embedded in social media.  
 Are particular groups being targeted given their group affiliation and does this violate the 
14th Amendment? Is a Muslim American more likely to be targeted than a Christian 
American for no other reason than their religious affiliations?  
These issues will be addressed throughout the oral arguments delivered by the counsel for the 
respondents and the petitioners, in addition to the opinions issued by the model judges. As you 
will see, the judges will focus their attention on particular elements of the case will pushing aside 
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ORAL ARGUMENTS 
THE DEPUTY CLERK: Appearance for the respondents.    
MR. JONES: Michael Jones for the respondents. 
THE COURT: Good morning. 
THE DEPUTY CLERK: Appearance for the petitioners. 
MS. SHAW: Deborah Shaw from the Justice Department. 
THE COURT: Good morning. This is oral argument, both on the Concerned Citizen’s 
preliminary injunction and the government's motion we propose to conduct the argument in the 
following will hear first from Concerned Citizens and then from the Department of Justice on 
your principal arguments for approximately 20 minutes each. Of course, we will allow some 
flexibility in that, but that's our general intention. So with that in mind, do you want to be heard, 
Mr. Jones?    
 
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS 
MR. JONES: Yes, your Honors. Thank you. As you know, this case involves a challenge to the 
NSA’s wiretapping and mass collection of communication metadata, colloquially known as “big 
data.” It is our contention that the collection of this data and programs such as PRISM violate the 
First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. We will argue that the secretive 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is overextending its reach under the Foreign Surveillance 
Intelligence Act of 1978 and the Patriot Act of 2001. Specifically, Sections 215 and 702 of FISA 
have been misappropriated by the NSA and violates the citizens’ reasonable expectation of 
privacy and the metadata reveals highly personal and sensitive information. As you know, 
Section 215 states that the FBI  
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may make an application for an order requiring the production of any tangible things 
(including books, records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation to 
protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that 
such investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of 
activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.26 
It is our contention that the “tangible things,” particularly the inclusion of “other items,” is 
overly broad and vague. As such,  
ECONOMIC JUDGE: But isn’t there regular judicial oversight? After all, Section 215 also 
stipulates that monthly reports are to be filed. And every 90 days the FISA court is reviewed by 
the Department of Justice and National Security Agency, and the court must also reauthorize 
programs within the same time frame.  
MR. JONES: That is correct, your Honor. Part of the problem is that such oversight is secretive 
and the reports about the NSA are created by that very institution. There is precious little 
external oversight of these programs by parties without a vested interest. 
ECONOMIC JUDGE: So these reports ought to be public? Wouldn’t that defeat the purpose? 
MR. JONES: We are not contending that they should be made public, your Honor; merely 
pointing out the inadequacies of the current model. We agree that the NSA requires secrecy in 
order to be effective, but the depth and breadth of that secrecy is much too expansive. From the 
documents divulged by Edward Snowden, it is now public knowledge that NSA analysts 
collected and maintained possession of information they deemed useless. These documents 
included “stories of love and heartbreak, illicit sexual liaisons, mental-health crises, political and 
                                                 
26 “The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978,” Pub.L. 95–511, 92 Stat. 1783, 50 U.S.C. ch. 36, 
Section 215, emphasis added. 
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religious conversations, financial anxieties and disappointed hopes.”27 90% of account holders 
were not on any watch list or affiliated in any way with a terrorist organization. Nonetheless, the 
NSA, with permission of the FISA court, stored files like these from as far back as 2009.  
ECONOMIC JUDGE: Are these individuals being actively pursued by law enforcement? Are 
their ideas or activities being exposed to their families, friends, employers, or anyone else? 
MR. JONES: Not to our knowledge, your honor, but with all due respect, that is beside the point. 
ECONOMIC JUDGE: How so? If their private information stays private, isn’t their expectation 
of privacy being respected? 
MR. JONES: No, your Honor. By the rights and privileges granted by the 4th Amendment and 
the precedent established in Griswold v. Connecticut, Mapp v. Ohio, and Katz v. United States, 
citizens’ right to privacy extends beyond the sharing of their information; there is also the 
expectation that said information will not be pursued, collected, and stored indefinitely without 
just cause. 
CIVIC REPUBLICAN JUDGE: Is not just cause addressed through the warrant process 
established through FISA and granted by the judicial court that oversees the program? 
MR. JONES: Yes and no, your Honor. Yes, the programs established by the NSA have some 
oversight by the judicial branch, but the secretive nature of the court makes it markedly different 
than any other court established in the United States. As I mentioned before, we agree that some 
secrecy is warranted, but the NSA cannot and should not be given carte blanche to collect and 
store metadata. Moreover, we contend that the ease with which an individual may be targeted for 
surveillance is far too great. Presently, the criteria by which an individual may be blacklisted 
                                                 
27 Barton Gellman, Julie Tate, and Ashkan Soltani, “In NSA-Intercepted Data, Those Not Targeted Far 
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include such national security threats as the destruction of government property – any 
government property – and damaging the computers used by financial institutions. “Terrorism” 
is defined quite loosely, as any act deemed dangerous to property with the intent to intimidate 
qualifies. As a result, some forms of protest could now be considered terrorism. We argue that 
the NSA can adequately fulfill its obligations without such expansive breadth. Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor argues in a concurring opinion in United States v. Jones that aggregated metadata 
“generates a precise, comprehensive record” of people’s daily lives, which in turn “reflects a 
wealth of detail about [their] familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations.”28 Even if the government can obtain call records under Section 215, the scale at 
which such records have been obtained far exceeds the law as it was written and intended.29  
 Ideally, the oversight by the FISA court that the Deliberative Judge referenced may be 
adequate and constitutional, but it is being abused and the government has used the veil of 
secrecy to obscure these abuses. Presently, the NSA is able to collect and store upwards of 20 
billion “record events” every day.30 More than call log data, warrants have been extended to 
cover personal financial information.31 So, at the judicial level there has been overreach. The 
legislative branch has done little better. The Congressional Oversight Committees tasked with 
ensuring the NSA stayed within their legal bounds were largely unaware of the activities under 
their domain. Many representatives were denied basic information when they requested it, 
                                                 
28 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
29 American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, No. 13-3994 (S.D. New York Dec. 28, 2013), 
 oral arguments. 
30 James Risen and Laura Poitras, “N.S.A. Gathers Data on Social Connections of U.S. Citizens,” New 
York Times (Sep. 28, 2013), retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/ 2013/09/29/us/nsa-examines-social-
networks-of-us- citizens.html. 
31 Siobhan Gorman, Devlin Barrett, and Jennifer Valentino-Devres, “CIA’s Financial Spying Bags Data 
on Americans,” Wall Street Journal (Jan. 25, 2014), retrieved from 
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230355950457919837011316353. 
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making oversight of the Agency antithetical to democratic and constitutional values. The 
government has touted the fact that Congress has renewed the surveillance programs on an 
annual basis, but as Judge Robert Sack has queried, “I wonder how valid that ratification 
argument is when you're dealing with what is essentially secret law. I thought the ratification 
notion is you're dealing with something that's public and that by ratifying it again and again 
you're somehow reflecting the public will because they know about it.’”32 The minimal oversight 
and degree of discretion afforded the NSA undermines the democratic process of checks and 
balances. The utter lack of transparency has allowed the NSA to move forward without 
providing an adequate justification for their reasons. Unchecked surveillance threatens the core 
values of democracy and is justified by a false choice between privacy and security. Knowing the 
government is collecting and storing so much data profoundly alters the relationship between 
citizens and their government. People should know what tactics are at the NSA’s disposal, who 
has access to the data, the record keeping guidelines and limitations, and the various protections 
in place to safeguard their information. Moreover, the increased breadth of the programs has 
proven largely ineffective, as scant evidenced has been produced showing that metadata 
collection has been used to thwart terrorist activity.  
ECONOMIC JUDGE: If these cases were made public, would that undermine the future 
effectiveness of the same tactic, essentially showing your hand to your opponent?  
MR. JONES: Again, your Honor, we are not advocating for complete transparency on these 
cases. We are arguing, however, that the near complete veil of secrecy covering these cases and 
the programs utilized by the NSA goes well beyond the authority granted to that agency. When 
                                                 
32 Josh Gerstein, “Appeals Court Chilly to Feds’ Arguments for NSA Surveillance Program,” Politico 
(Sept. 2, 2014), retrieved from http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2014/09/appeals-court-
chilly-to-feds-arguments-for-nsa-surveillance-194760.html. 
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the democratically elected members of Congress charged with overseeing the NSA are denied 
information about their programs, there is a significant break from healthy governance. Even the 
specific committees have been misled and even outright lied to. In a Senate Intelligence 
Committee meeting on March 12, 2013, Senator Ron Wyden asked National Intelligence 
Director James Clapper, “Does the NSA collect any type of data at all on millions, or hundreds 
of millions of Americans?” Clapper responded, “No, sir… Not wittingly.” Let me stress that this 
response, which Clapper later described as “clearly erroneous,” was delivered under oath to a 
member of the Senate Intelligence Committee. When even the select group of representatives is 
denied access to the information they need to perform their job adequately and in good faith to 
the American public, oversight and checks and balances no longer exist. 
DELIBERATIVE JUDGE: Remind me, was this committee meeting public or private? 
MR. JONES: It was public, your Honor. 
DELIBERATIVE JUDGE: Doesn’t that change the situation drastically? Isn’t a public 
intelligence hearing an oxymoron? 
MR. JONES: We respect Sen. Wyden’s discretion in this matter. As a member of the senate 
committee, he knew the hearing was public and chose to ask the question nonetheless. The 
brazen defiance by Director Clapper is indicative of our worst fears regarding powerful 
intelligence agencies: when given an inch they take a mile. Ideally, the NSA and affiliated 
agencies would remain within the legal strictures established by the legislative branch to prevent 
overreach. The latitude of secrecy maintained by the NSA has prevented adequate oversight and 
has led to a number of questionable if not illegal actions. At a certain point we must ask, “Who 
watches the watchers?” 
 
 - 314 - 
ECONOMIC JUDGE: Are these so-called illegal actions documented or are you postulating 
hypotheticals? 
MR. JONES: At the behest of an ACLU request for documents filed under the Freedom of 
Information Act, it has recently come to light that the NSA has overstepped its bounds on 
numerous occasions. These actions include but are not limited to storing information on 
unsecured computers, keeping information after it was supposed to be deleted, and emailing data 
on Americans to unauthorized individuals. Some of these prohibited actions were the result of 
unintentional human error, but others were quite willful and egregious, such as the NSA analyst 
who searched her husband’s personal telephone. Given the significant amount of information 
redacted from the released documents, not to mention the numerous documents that remain 
wholly classified, these violations may be the tip of the iceberg.  
DELIBERATIVE JUDGE: If these allegations were true, then wouldn’t the most appropriate 
response be to fix these problems rather than uproot the entire system that we have in place? 
MR. JONES: That depends, your Honor. If “fixing” the NSA is limited to the proper handling 
and storage of five zettabytes of data, which is the equivalent of roughly 1.25 trillion DVDs, then 
no. We certainly believe that personnel who abuse the power granted to them by their positions 
must be removed and punished accordingly, but our intent is not to make the system run more 
smoothly. Rather, the immense amount of data collected and stored is problematic in and of 
itself. The violations I noted indicate the significant amount of problems associated with an 
intelligence agency that is barely tethered to the legal system. 
We would also like to call attention to the problematic position that communication-
based Internet companies have been placed. Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, Facebook, Twitter, and a 
slew of others are in a catch-22: either they can protect their customers’ information, which is 
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one of the reasons individuals utilize their services, and face fines/penalties from the legal 
system or they can divulge customer information, potentially losing said customers, and give the 
government what it wants. They are being asked to violate their stated principles because the 
government presents an omnipresent threat of terrorism.  
ECONOMIC JUDGE: In your view, is privacy a fundamental right or an instrumental right? 
That is, do Americans enjoy a right to privacy akin to their right to liberty, which is inalienable 
and inherent to the idea of democratic living? Or is the right to privacy a means to achieved 
desirable ends? 
MR. JONES: Following the Supreme Court’s interpretation of privacy and its roots in the Bill of 
Rights, we argue that it is fundamental right to be enjoyed by all citizens of the United States. 
That being said, it does not give the citizenry carte blanche to do as they wish. Just as with 
liberty, one’s right to privacy is not absolute. When the state has a clear and justified interest in 
accessing a particular citizen’s private information, whether it is a wiretap on their telephone, 
their email correspondence, or the metadata attached to their communication, then the 
government should have the ability to access that information so long as they have a warrant. But 
the blanket collection of metadata and the secrecy with which it has been accessed fall beyond 
the pale of reasonable search and seizure. Such a context demands citizens to prove the value and 
necessity of their privacy rather than demanding the government to prove the value and necessity 
of encroaching upon the public’s privacy. The burden of proof lands on the people, and that is 
not how our legal system was established. 
 I see that my time is running out, so I would like to end with one final point. The main 
justification at the heart of FISA and the Patriot Act is to protect the American citizens and 
investigate terrorist threats and their perpetrators. What tangible good has come of these 
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programs? In what ways has it been more useful than other, less invasive means acquiring 
information and creating a strong case? The NSA has offered precious little evidence that their 
blind, wholesale accumulation of data has amounted to much of anything, ultimately justifying 
the storage of massive amounts of information on the basis of a universal skepticism of all 
citizens. President Obama and his top aides suggest that as many as 50 potential terrorist attacks 
have been prevented across the globe as the result of the NSA’s programs. But these numbers are 
deceptive. Not only are they issued with extraordinary redactions, but they are also created by 
the very organization under question. An independent examination of their cases suggests that 
less that 1.8% of cases were initiated based on information acquired through Section 215 of the 
Patriot Act.33 The vast majority of cases utilized non-invasive and more reliable methods 
including undercover agents and informants.  
 In short, the Sections 215 and 702 of FISA constitute and illegal search and seizure 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment and reinforced by the precedent established by the 
Supreme Court. The unprecedented lack of transparency highlights a stark break from previous 
legal doctrine and highlights the significant overreach of the NSA. These tactics have been 
proven to be largely ineffective and ripe for abuse. On these grounds, we ask this court to nullify 
the surveillance provisions in Sections 215 and 702. Thank you for your time. 
THE COURT: Thank you Mr. Jones. Now we will hear from the petitioners. Ms. Shaw, would 
you like to be heard? 
 
 
                                                 
33 Peter Bergen, David Sterman, Emily Schneider, and Bailey Cahall, “Do NSA’s Bulk Surveillance 
Programs Stop Terrorists?” New America Foundation (Jan. 13, 2014), retrieved from 
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/do_nsas_bulk_ surveillance_programs_stop_terrorists) 
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PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS 
MS. SHAW: Yes, thank you your Honors. May it please the Court, although there has been a 
large amount of public discussion about the alleged actions of the NSA, this case is narrowly 
focused on the powers granted to the executive and judicial powers granted by the PATRIOT 
Act and the extent to which abides by the Constitution. We contend that Sections 215 and 702 of 
the PATRIOT Act, which were democratically enacted and receive annual renewal by Congress, 
have legally granted the surveillance strategies utilized by the NSA. We argue that new and 
emerging technologies have required new responses, which have already proved successful for 
other governmental agencies like the FBI. It is our opinion that the information collected does 
not violate a citizen’s reasonable right to privacy as the data in nondescript and remains 
unanalyzed unless several red flags are raised. Ultimately, the FISA court provides adequate 
oversight and the security interests of the NSA supersede the type of public disclosure demanded 
by the respondents.  
 The technological landscape has changed drastically since the original implementation of 
FISA in 1978. The Internet and wireless communication has opened whole new avenues by 
which illegal activities. The state cannot govern and successfully protect the citizenry with dated 
tactics. The expansion to surveillance instigated by the PATRIOT Act of 2001 illustrates a 
logical and legal evolution of NSA strategy in order to sufficiently respond to a similarly evolved 
criminal element. To date, there have been no terrorist attacks on the United States since 
congress expanded the scope of FISA had been expanded.  
ECONOMIC JUDGE: Where is the data proving that the absence of an attack was a result of the 
new surveillance tactics? Doesn’t this tread dangerously close to the post hoc ergo propter hoc 
fallacy? 
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MS. SHAW: Not so, your honor. NSA officials have cited dozens of cases where their 
surveillance tools helped to disrupt terrorist plots or identify suspects. They cite e-mails as a 
particularly effective resource. The cases cited by MR. JONES represent only a small, select 
portion of the total number of cases pursued by the NSA. If any fallacy is being used, it is the 
MR. JONES and the sharpshooter fallacy. The cases brought about by the PRISM program and 
others do not materialize overnight. It takes many months, sometimes years for terrorists and 
those who wish to harm American interests are ferreted out. One of the significant benefits from 
the collection of metadata under Sections 215 and 702 is the NSA’s ability to examine a 
suspect’s entire network of interaction over time. Only when the agency is actively pursuing a 
suspect do they utilize the array of data at their disposal at which point it is immensely useful to 
know who they have been contacting and when such contact is made.  
LITERARY JUDGE: What sorts of checks or standards are in place such that the suspects being 
actively pursued merit the additional surveillance? How are abuses curbed? 
MS. SHAW: In addition to the standard intelligence protocols used by the NSA and affiliated 
agencies, the FISA court reviews requests for warrants. 
LITERARY JUDGE: If I am not mistaken, the FISA court has denied a mere 11 warrants in the 
last 33 years. With some 34,000 requests, their rejection rate is an astonishing 0.03%. Are we to 
believe that all of these requests were necessary and none of them unnecessarily targeted 
innocent citizens? 
MS. SHAW: We defer to the discretion and expertise of the FISA court and the judges reviewing 
the cases. The process and the programs, which are renewed by Congress annually, are entirely 
constitutional. Only a single district court judge has taken issue with the program and ruled 
against it. Several other lower court judges have dismissed similar lawsuits and they continue to 
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approve of applications to continue the surveillance. The legislative branch has approved of these 
initiatives; the executive branch has approved of these initiatives; and the judicial branch has 
approved these of these initiatives. Any amendments and alterations should be enacted through 
the legislative branch, not this court. We argue that the respondent does not have standing on this 
issue. The harms articulated by the respondents are merely speculative. The issues cited by the 
MR. JONES on behalf of the respondents are no doubt undesirable, but they are not problems 
with the FISA programs and warrant process. They are rare issues with employees and should be 
dealt with at that level. The kinds of harm that are at the heart of the case before the court are 
based on hypothetical conjecture. They are building on an argument on would could happen. If 
cases are to be decided based on this standard, virtually any statute could be deemed 
unconstitutional. As Clapper v. Amnesty International (2013) articulates, speculative harm is 
insufficient in proving standing. Concerned Citizens has not made an argument about how they 
have been harmed, nor have they given any solid evidence that the potential harms have 
manifested into real-world harms.  
 We acknowledge that Section 215 expands the scope of intelligence gathering, but 
surveillance programs have always evolved to reflect the contextual nuances and limitations of 
their time. Early “pen registers” recorded telegraph signals, but the scope of their surveillance 
was expanded to include a wider array of technological devices.  
LITERARY JUDGE: And what about the Electronic Communications Privacy Act? Doesn’t that 
limit the reach of these pen registers? 
MS. SHAW: Not exactly, your Honor. While the Act does characterize pen registers as a 
resource for telephone surveillance, its scope was widened by Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act 
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to include devices and programs that provide a similar function via Internet communication. 
Presently, pen registers are defined as  
a device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling 
information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic 
communication is transmitted, provided, however, that such information shall not include 
the contents of any communication, but such term does not include any device or process 
used by a provider or customer of a wire or electronic communication service for billing, 
or recording as an incident to billing, for communications services provided by such 
provider or any device or process used by a provider or customer of a wire 
communication service for cost accounting or other like purposes in the ordinary course 
of its business.34 
LITERARY JUDGE: And this does not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy? 
MS. SHAW: No, your Honor. As the Supreme Court decided in Smith v. Maryland (1979), use 
of a pen register does not constitute a search. Only the content of a conversation constitutes a 
search under the precedent they established. The metadata under question in this case includes 
message times and the sending and receiving sources. The content of these messages remains 
private unless an additional, more specific warrant is approved.  
LITERARY JUDGE: To what extent is the content important? Can’t we piece together a fairly 
detailed story based on the data collected, even if no content is included? 
MS. SHAW: That is precisely the point, your Honor. The data collected is noninvasive, yet 
provides the NSA with enough information to notice patterns that indicate terrorist activity. 
                                                 
34 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) 
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LITERARY JUDGE: Won’t other patterns unrelated to terrorist activities also be available to the 
NSA? Might calls to a certain doctor’s office indicate an individual has cancer? Or emails with a 
certain lawyer suggest an immanent divorce? Or messages with a certain psychiatrist point to 
marital trouble? Why should we trust the NSA to focus attention and not wander into other 
personal information? 
MS. SHAW: Although the data is collected and stored, the information cannot be accessed and 
analyzed unless the NSA articulates a reasonable suspicion that it will serve their 
counterterrorism purposes. We already invest a lot of trust in our law enforcement and national 
security agencies, your Honor. If NSA employees or contractors are going outside of their 
jurisdiction, that is a personnel matter and should be dealt with accordingly. As the law stands, it 
is entirely constitutional to collect data via pen register and the FISA court has implemented 
other controls for the program.  
Programs similar to NSA surveillance have already been around for years and have been 
used to great effect by the FBI, DEA, and local police forces.35 Even before the PATRIOT Act, 
law enforcement agencies have included the collection of raw data as an important investigative 
tactic utilized before a direct wiretap. Responding to the rise of drug trafficking in the 1980s and 
‘90s and the use of public pay phones and pages to conduct illegal business, law enforcement 
agencies began culling call data from public telephones. After a judge approved a warrant, just 
like the NSA is required to acquire in the case before the court today, local police collected the 
call data from any of the public phones they believed to be used by drug dealers. The vast 
majority of the call logs were innocent citizens unaware of and unaffected by the drug trade. The 
detectives were waiting for those precious few calls made by targeted drug deals and traffickers, 
                                                 
35 David Simon, “We are Shocked, Shocked…” The Audacity of Despair (June 7, 2013), retrieved from 
http://davidsimon.com/we-are-shocked-shocked/. 
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but they had to cast a very wide net in order to catch the fish they wanted. Not only were these 
tactics were successful and wholly legal, but citizens did not bat an eye at any purported invasion 
of privacy because these blanket warrants did not allow detectives to listen to conversations. 
Another warrant was needed and there needed to be probable cause for a judge to grant such a 
warrant. The current practices of the NSA are no different; the only thing that has changed is the 
scale on which surveillance is taking place. I must stress that these practices are entirely legal 
and regularly scrutinized for their legitimacy and effectiveness. 
DELIBERATIVE JUDGE: How closely are these programs scrutinized? After all, in 2011 the 
classified documents describing the program were not made available to the House of 
Representatives and several members of Congress have openly stated that they had no idea what 
Section 215 was being used to justify. 
MS. SHAW: Since 2011, only the intelligence committees have been granted access to the 
classified documents that address the NSA surveillance programs. Prior to that, all members of 
congress were allowed to view the documents. The documents were in a secure place on Capitol 
Hill, but they could still be accessed if the congressperson took the time to view them. 
DELIBERATIVE JUDGE: How can we maintain a republican democracy when representatives 
are unable to make informed decisions on behalf of their constituents?  
MS. SHAW: Intelligence committees have long been granted special privileges when it comes to 
information access. These are sensitive and critical issues and the wide dissemination of such 
information would compromise the program and ongoing investigations. If the intelligence 
committees believe certain information ought to be more widely distributed, they may take the 
proper steps to ensure it is. If, on the other hand, they feel it reasonable to keep the information 
within the committee, we defer to their discretion. I must stress, however, that Congress 
 
 - 323 - 
regularly reauthorizes the programs whether they are involved in the committees or not. If they 
wanted to halt or alter them in any way, they have the power to do so. They recognize that the 
technological landscape is changing and they need to respond to those changes. Citizens already 
divulge a large amount of private information throughout the Internet and to an array of 
corporations. This information is often much more detailed and invasive than the data collected 
by the NSA. 
DELIBERATIVE JUDGE: But this is done willingly and with full consent of the individual.  
MS. SHAW: That is correct, your Honor. I was simply trying to illustrate how much more open 
the population has become with their information.  
LITERARY JUDGE: Should that be the standard by which we judge the limits of privacy – the 
general trend of openness instigated by social media and corporate advertising? Doesn’t this 
remind you of the old adage about the frog boiling in water? 
MS. SHAW: I disagree, your honor. The quickly changing landscape of privacy as a result of the 
Internet and mobile devices is not inherently harmful as your boiling water analogy suggests. 
The data is out there. If we continue on the trend of increased use of and reliance upon networks 
and mobile technology – and there is no reason to believe we won’t – then this data will only 
increase, likely exponentially so. As a result, citizens are becoming increasingly comfortable 
with noninvasive information being made available. What the respondents are arguing is that the 
NSA ought to ignore this vast sea of data at their disposal even when this data is acquired in the 
legal pursuit of investigating criminal activity. And for what? As I argued earlier, the dangers 
articulated by Concerned Citizens are speculative. Following your analogy, it is more accurate to 
say that the frog is in water and the stove isn’t on, but the stove could be turned on. 
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LITERARY JUDGE: To what extent has the NSA and other affiliated agencies pursued other 
methods for gathering information that don’t involve collecting data on every citizen? 
MS. SHAW: The NSA uses every legal means possible to develop intelligence, pursue leads, and 
capture criminals meaning to or having done harm to the United States. When an individual 
merits specific attention, warrants are requested to investigate each particular case. This may 
include bank records, credit card information, international travel, or wiretaps on their 
communication lines. Such methods are standard protocol for any agency gathering information 
and building cases but require warrants that go beyond the metadata collection presently under 
question. The meta-data serves a vital function in the investigatory process by providing agents a 
pattern of past communication accessible after a suspect merits further attention. Without this 
data collection, years of communication information is lost and those affiliated with a suspect 
remain unknown. The tactics utilized by the NSA are intended to discover, investigate, and 
undermine terrorist plots. These plots require a wealth of organization and a large network of 
operatives. Abandoning the metadata means the NSA must be willfully blind to all the 
correspondence prior to a warrant issued for a particular individual. Accomplices who have gone 
dark remain undiscovered live threats. The data mining programs that indiscriminately gather 
information are the least invasive way in which past communication can be collected and stored 
for later use. Presently, they only way to accomplish the tasks set before the NSA with the 
minimal degree of invasiveness is to utilized the data collection programs under question. 
With the little remaining time I have, I would like to highlight the key points of our 
argument. First, the programs used by the NSA have been and continue to be approved by 
Congress. They are wholly legal. Second, the programs used by the NSA are noninvasive. The 
harms articulated by the respondents are merely speculative, thus they have no standing in this 
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court. Finally, the tactics employed by the NSA are necessary and effective. Necessary in that the 
telecommunications have evolved significantly in the past 20 years and our agencies need to 
evolve with them. Effective in that they have a proven track record of success and are presently 
used for ongoing investigations. For these reasons, we argue that this case be ruled in favor of 
the respondent.  
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
THE ECONOMIC JUDGE delivered the opinion of the court.  
 Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act of 2001 amended 50 U. S. C. §1861 and Section 702 of 
the FISA Amendment Act of 2008 amended 50 U. S. C. §1881a. These amendments to the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) grant the Attorney General and Director of 
National Intelligence additional latitude “to protect against international terrorism or clandestine 
intelligence activities.” The case brought against the National Intelligence Agency by the 
organization Concerned Citizens specifically targets the collection and storage of large amounts 
communication information, or “metadata,” including timestamps and recipients from telephone 
calls and emails. The issues before the court are threefold: first, do the respondents have standing 
in this case with respect to Article III of the U.S. Constitution? Second, if the respondents have 
standing, are the alterations to the original FISA in Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act and 702 of 
the FISA Amendment Act constitutional? Third, as presently written, are Sections 215 and 702 
over broad or over vague, such that this court would remand the legislative body to further 
specify the breadth of powers afforded to intelligence gathering agencies? It is the opinion of this 
Court that the respondents indeed have standing in this case. However, the complaint issued by 
Concerned Citizens against Sections 215 and 702 do not hold; they are wholly legal and 
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conducive to the agenda of the National Security Agency pursuant to the investigation and 
deterrence of terrorist threats at home and abroad. 
 Regarding the first issue, the petitioner’s standing, the argument delivered by the 
respondent relies heavily on Clapper v. Amnesty International USA (2013) wherein the Supreme 
Court ruled that Amnesty International did not have standing under Article III of the Constitution 
because no injury occurred. Clapper argued that the prospect of abusing the intelligence 
gathering resources and the potential harm that would ensue was not sufficient. Whereas 
Amnesty International issued their challenge on the day the Section 702 amended FISA, thus no 
abuses could have taken place as the affiliated programs were not active, the complaint issued by 
Concerned Citizens follows years of use and, according to their complaint, abuse. The case 
before this court differs in that Concerned Citizens have indicated specific abuses that have taken 
place such as storing information beyond its scheduled deletion without proper authorization, 
sending data to unauthorized individuals, and searching an individual with whom an analyst had 
a personal connection without authorization. These harms are not speculative, but rather quite 
real and troubling.  
 Given the respondent has standing in this case, the primary concern becomes the extent to 
which the intelligence gathering strategies initiated by Sections 215 and 702 are constitutional 
and whether or not they are over broad and over vague as presently written. The respondents 
argue that the collection of metadata violates the reasonable expectation of privacy granted by 
the 4th and 5th Amendments and supported by Griswold v. Connecticut, Mapp v. Ohio, and Katz 
v. U.S. Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged and maintained such a standard, it is not 
absolute. The government must always balance between the interests of the state and the interests 
of the citizenry. Given that the type of information gathered is a modest intrusion of privacy, at 
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most, this court does not agree with the respondent’s complaints. They are using an expansive 
notion of privacy that amplifies its importance within democratic culture and ignores the many 
dangers privacy fosters. Legal scholars have attempted to situate privacy as a core moral 
principle embedded within the Constitution and sustained in the everyday lives of the citizens. 
The notion that privacy is a core principle of democratic governance and that actually behave as 
such is a farce. Privacy is overvalued and used as a trump card by academic legal theorists and 
criminals alike. Whereas academics cite a personal intimacy and view of selfhood that is 
connected with privacy, they tend to ignore the most common reason that people turn to privacy: 
they want to conceal the unsavory if not villainous parts of their conduct. Privacy serves as a 
rhetorical guise used to hide one’s bad behavior in order to improve one’s social, political, or 
economic opportunities.36  
 In many ways, privacy is antagonistic to the ideals and aspirations of law. If, following 
Justice Holmes’, laws should be written with the “bad man” in mind, then privacy offers 
extensive and unnecessary protections for nefarious activity. The bad man, according to Holmes, 
is “[a] man who cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and practiced by his 
neighbors is likely nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid being made to pay money, and will 
want to keep out of jail if he can.”37 Dominated by self-interest, yet possessing enough foresight 
and judgment to acknowledge the potential retribution his actions may elicit, the bad man seeks 
to maximize personal advancement within the confines of a legal system. It is from this 
perspective, Holmes argues, that law must be examined and created: “If you want to know the 
                                                 
36 Richard Posner continues to assert this point. For example, see Richard A. Posner, “The Right of 
Privacy,” Georgia Law Review 12.3 (Spring 1978), 393-422; and Nick Gillespie, “Richard Posner: 
Privacy is ‘Mainly’ About Concealing Guilty Behavior,” Reason (Dec. 8, 2014), retrieved from 
http://reason.com/blog/2014/12/08/richard-posner-privacy-is-mainly-about-c. 
37 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “The Path of Law,” Harvard Law Review 10.8 (1897), 459. 
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law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material 
consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his 
reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vague sanctions of 
conscience.”38 Who benefits from privacy – the upstanding citizens who go about their business 
honorably and without malicious intent or the criminals attempting to hide their illicit and 
unlawful activities from their communities and law enforcement? Much has been made of 
privacy in the landmark cases issued by the Warren Court and the academic articles that have 
spun out of these cases. While citizens should no doubt expect a modicum of privacy, especially 
in their bedrooms as articulated in Griswold v. Connecticut and Bowers v. Hardwick, the reality 
of the situation is that privacy has been overextended and people engaging in criminal activity 
are able to use it as a pretense to carry out their unlawful acts. The case before the court is not 
one of police officers intruding on a bedroom or reading the diary of a citizen without just cause. 
The information acquired by the NSA through the programs initiated by Sections 215 and 702 is 
nominally invasive, at most. The comparison of cell phone call logs and email sender/receive 
lists to warrantless searches on an innocent citizen’s private home is absurd. Yes, abuses have 
taken place, but they must be dealt with on an individual basis rather than undermining the entire 
programs wherein they occurred. The idealistic notion of privacy advocated by the respondents 
and the legal theorists who support them lacks common sense and neglects the reality of the 
situation in favor of naïveté. Their view of privacy is simply unsustainable in the current socio-
political climate. 
 The new frontiers opened by the Internet and mobile technologies have left many 
clinging to old traditions that are no longer useful, viable options for law enforcement. 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
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Traditional wiretaps on telephones worked for its age, but crime has evolved alongside 
technology. When the government and its agencies refuse to evolve along with them, then they 
will be left at a significant disadvantage. Perhaps the most unsettling aspect is that this 
disadvantage will be self-imposed in the name of a notion of privacy that is fairly recent in the 
history of law. The blanket statement that privacy is valuable in and of itself – a point that 
privacy advocates are often quick to make – is a misguided fiction. It is instead an “intermediate 
good,” a means to an end rather than an end in itself.39 Each generation has faced a similar 
dilemma as new technologies have emerged. What worked for one will not necessarily work for 
another. If evolutionary biology has taught us anything, it is that cheaters – those trying to co-opt 
social order to for their own benefit without getting caught – will always try to game the system. 
If nothing is done about their actions, they will continue to work society to their personal benefit 
while the rest of society pretends to see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil. We must learn and 
benefit from our past, not have it weigh us down. As a legal court, we defer to precedent but we 
are not bound to it. As the social, cultural, political, and religious climates change, we must 
acclimate lest we run the risk of being left out in the cold. 
The full-throated defense of privacy by advocates on the left and the right skews the costs 
and benefits of these forms of investigation. Privacy represents a cultural artifact, not a human 
need.40 Justifications for the latter tend to creep in on substantiated Constitutional rights such as 
liberty. Griswold, for example, arrived upon the right conclusion, but took the wrong legal path 
to get there. At issue was not privacy, but rather “an undue limitation of freedom of action.”41 
One of the problems associated with privacy is that the public tends to view it as a moral good 
                                                 
39 Posner, “The Right to Privacy,” 394. 
40 Posner, The Economics of Justice, 274. 
41 Ibid., 327. 
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and increasingly inflate its value. As a result, privacy is vociferously upheld to the detriment of 
competing interests. The result is inefficiency. But what the public believes and how the public 
behaves are two very different things. With the advent of the digital age and the meteoric rise of 
social media, people are increasingly likely to divulge vast amounts of information about 
themselves. A majority of the so-called “millennial” generation has not lived their lives off-line. 
The rapid expanse of blogging, the advent of MySpace, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, and 
the exponential growth in mobile technology make living off-line nearly impossible lest you 
want to be a social pariah. Not all citizens wish to be so open with their personal lives and the 
law must respect that, but to conflate metadata to these much more personal exhibitions is 
disingenuous.  
Prophetic as always, Justice Holmes was able to address the crux of the issue in Olmstead 
v. United States (1928): 
We must consider the two objects of desire, both of which we cannot have, and 
make up our minds which to choose. It is desirable that criminals should be 
detected, and, to that end, that all available evidence should be used. It also is 
desirable that the Government should not itself foster and pay for other crime, 
when they are the means by which the evidence is to be obtained.42 
The legal system must not cater wholly to the government or the citizenry; the former would be 
brutish authoritarianism and the latter would be naïve populism. Holmes aptly argues that a 
balance must be struck between competing interests. This process is at the heart of our system of 
law. Tip too far in one direction and the law becomes less effective and less efficient. The tactics 
employed by the NSA and similar intelligence-gathering organizations serves this purpose well. 
                                                 
42 Olmstead v. U.S. (1928), Holmes dissenting. 
 
 - 331 - 
The tactics are noninvasive in that they do not disrupt the regular activities of citizens and they 
prove useful in responding to networked criminal organizations.  
The petitioner, Concerned Citizens, asserts that the government is perpetrating grave 
harms as they collected metadata, but what are these harms? How are they being experienced by 
the average American citizen? They noted a handful of examples, but these were due to 
individual negligence or misconduct and not indicative of a broader systemic problem with the 
information-gather tactics. Consider who is doing the bulk of the data assessment. If reports are 
accurate, more than a trillion data points have been collected thus far. If one thousand agents 
spent a mere one second examining each piece of data, it would take them nearly 32 years of 
non-stop analysis to work through everything, presuming no additional information is gathered. 
The idea of a human agent examining the lives of all Americans is an egotistical farce. The use 
of computer algorithms removes the invasive human element such that only those records 
flagged by the algorithm are investigated further. The vast majority of information remains 
unexamined by human eyes. Rather than upend the entire project, these instances should be 
treated as such – single moments that merit individual remedy. Concerned Citizens is calling for 
an axe when a scalpel will do just fine.  
Most importantly, the programs are regularly approved by Congress, reviewed by 
intelligence committees and the Attorney General, and must face constitutional scrutiny with the 
FISA court as dictated by Section 215 and Section 702. Year after year, the programs are 
renewed. Moreover, one must not ignore the type of information being accrued. The information 
is limited to such generic information as time stamps, call times, phone numbers of inbound and 
outbound calls, and email recipients. The NSA must receive a court order to proceed further. 
Yet, given the secrecy of the programs and the equally secretive court that oversees them, 
 
 - 332 - 
opponents question whether or not these limitations are actually followed. Unless a vast 
conspiracy has been underway for several years, these programs are wholly legal and useful in 
pursing threats to the United States and its citizens. The critics who note that the programs are 
highly secretive ignore the fact that a degree of secrecy goes with any law enforcement strategy 
attempting to ferret out the criminal element. We have always invested a significant amount of 
breathing room for our law enforcement agencies to do their jobs effectively and this is no 
different.  
One these grounds, this court finds in favor of the respondent. 
 
THE DELIBERATIVE JUDGE concurring in part, dissenting in part. 
 The case before the court is not new; rather, it is the newest manifestation of a series of 
concerns over the relationship between privacy, technology, and the government’s need to 
pursue threats to the United States and its citizens. On one hand, Concerned Citizens raise 
important questions regarding the scope, longevity, and targets of the government surveillance 
programs authorized by Sections 215 and 702. Noting particular breaches of protocol and 
security, I concur my colleague, the Deliberative Judge, in not recognizing the respondent’s 
claim that Concerned Citizens does not have standing on grounds that they have not been harmed 
directly. Even if they had not, however, they would nonetheless have standing as the live 
possibility of abuse and harm merits juridical attention. The court cannot abide a government 
stance that seeks forgiveness rather than asking permission. On the other hand, the government 
and its intelligence-gathering agencies have a vested interest in pursuing potential threats to the 
health and well being of the United States and its citizens. The safety and security of citizens is a 
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paramount concern for any government; to interfere with or otherwise disrupt this process 
requires intense scrutiny as lives are at risk.  
 In order to adequately assess the legal issues before the court, one must step back and 
understand the legislative impetus that created these surveillance powers in the first place. In 
response to the attacks on the World Trade Centers on September 11, 2001, the government took 
swift action in order to 1) search for and bring to justice those who had organized the attacks, 
and 2) prevent future attacks from taking place. As a result, the PATRIOT Act was produced and 
allotted far-reaching power to the executive branch in its pursuit of these goals. Passing the 
House and Senate with remarkably high numbers while receive wide public support, the 
government had an abundance of resources now at its disposal. Admittedly, this law was born, in 
part, out of fear, a fear that gripped a nation still struggling to understand what had happened and 
how best to respond. History tells a sad tale when decisions are made out of fear. If Korematsu v. 
United States has taught us anything, it is that we have a habit of becoming consumed with a 
misplaced fear. The end goal of a secure nation may be noble and worthwhile, but the trappings 
of the process by which this goal is achieved are often blinded when a fear plays a determining 
factor.  
 One of the great dangers of laws that emerge out of fear is the polarization that results. 
Fear serves as a trump card that either undercuts a compelling argument when it is presented or 
discourages someone from contributing an argument for fear of stigmatization. The result is a 
pool filled with thin arguments, none of which can hold much water but nevertheless remain 
because they have not been popped. The polarized discourse pushes individuals to extremes they 
may have never considered let alone adopted if a healthier deliberative atmosphere surrounded 
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them. Over time, more and better arguments finally make their way to the pool, but they are 
already at an immediate disadvantage as laws have already been passed and policies initiated.  
 The core issue at the heart of this case is the tension between privacy and security, which 
constitutes a feud that has been around ever since Justice Brandeis proposed the “right to 
privacy” in his landmark essay over 100 years ago. While I do not completely agree with the 
Economic Judge’s claim that privacy is overblown and mostly used as a shroud covering 
criminal behavior, one cannot deny that the criminal element uses privacy to their advantage 
(just as they use any laws to their advantage if and when possible). The tactics used by the NSA 
and other intelligence-gathering organizations are not without their benefit. Terrorist 
organizations are alive and well at home and abroad. While most of the attention is given to 
international groups such as Al Qaeda and ISIS, the Southern Poverty Law Center lists a myriad 
of locally grown associations that merit the title “hate group.” As they apply to local groups, the 
intelligence-gathering tactics utilized by the NSA can be invaluable. Not only do they help to get 
a better understanding of the interconnected networks spread throughout the country, but also the 
information collected helps law enforcement an opportunity to smartly infiltrate and ultimately 
undermine these organizations without the use of force. Extremist groups pose a unique threat 
given their isolationist disposition and the dedication their members have toward the 
organization. Force is only one way to oppose them – a particularly vulgar one at that. However, 
such tactics are often used as a means for recruitment rather than a deterrent. Save complete 
annihilation, force, whether it is in the form of military attacks or severe economic embargo, will 
never be able to undermine extremist groups at home and abroad. Such groups are best 
dismantled from the inside out by way of cognitive infiltration.43 The collection of metadata 
                                                 
43 See Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, “Conspiracy Theories: Causes and Cures,” The Journal of 
Political Philosophy, 17.2 (2009), 202-227.  
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serves as a minimally intrusive yet exceedingly effective method by which government agencies 
can work to undermine terrorist organizations without the unnecessary shedding of blood. As the 
Economic Judge aptly notes, to ignore the resources at the government’s disposal is to 
unnecessarily handicap it. 
 As Concerned Citizens notes, the net cast in pursuit of terrorist activities can trap those 
do not belong. A growing concern is whether or not the NSA goes beyond computer algorithms 
and metadata analysis to target those who do not meet the standards of just cause. The long 
history of sedition in times of war indicates a trend of the government investigating and 
suppressing political speech.44 While privacy is not an absolute right, it must always serve as a 
bulwark against government intrusions when political speech is at stake. Understood as a two-
tiered system,45 Concerned Citizens is right to express unease at the potential for the NSA to 
abuse their powers in pursuit of political opposition. I agree with the Literary Judge that this is 
not a fictitious problem, but one that has existed with every new generation of political activists. 
If these government initiatives are labeling groups or individuals as terrorists solely because of 
the political threat they pose, then it is our constitutional responsibility to stop them. There is a 
spectrum of invasion of privacy. As the programs are supposed to run, this does not meet the 
standard of an invasion of privacy to the same degree as listening in on telephone conversations 
or reading emails. There must be just cause that passes the oversight of the FISA court. There 
must be just cause to pursue any citizen beyond the collection of metadata. Yet, no evidence has 
been produced to indicate such violations have taken place. Given the various levels of oversight 
by all three branches of government, there is no good reason to believe the programs are being 
systematically abused.  
                                                 
44 See Geoffrey Stone, Perilous Times. 
45 Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech.  
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If at some point evidence emerges implicating the government in the targeting of political 
organizations or social activists not affiliated with extremist groups or terrorist organizations, 
then this court would have good cause to restrict the programs. I agree with the Literary Judge in 
being on guard to such potential abuses, especially when they target speech that is political in 
nature. Information gathering tactics that produce on undue burden on political organizations and 
have a chilling effect must be curtailed. Although the NSA has overstepped its boundaries in the 
past, there is no solid evidence to suggest it is doing so presently. 
I concur with the Economic Judge and the opinion of the court in that it follows a minimalist 
path and remains tethered to the facts of the case, not cynical speculation. It is not the duty of 
this court to muse about probabilities, but rather to assess the legality of actualities. Nonetheless, 
the executive and legislative bodies have done a poor job in articulating the need and scope of 
these programs. Although it is not within the jurisdiction of this court to dictate the practices of 
the other branches of government, I encourage them to reflect upon the ways in which faith in 
the programs can be strengthened and the deliberative nature of our democracy embraced. The 
government must be ever vigilant that the NSA and affiliated organizations draw within the lines 
they are given. In order to do so, the legislative body must be more deliberative and explicit 
about the programs they have created. Furthermore, they must keep the public as informed as 
they can be without undermining the programs, rather than sneaking in amendments to the 
PATRIOT Act without public knowledge. Our democracy thrives when the government 
cultivates and maintains an engaged, balanced public discussion on important issues such as the 
scope of power given to intelligence-gathering organizations. The public and representatives 
must play active role in deliberating about and issuing judgments on these decisions. The 
Snowden leaks ignited this conversation, which is good, but a more concerted effort is required. 
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Considering the potential for abuse, appropriate avenues and protections must be in place to 
bring to light such abuses. 
 Concerned Citizens has the best of intentions, but their request is misplaced. Now is not 
the time for compromising the NSA by judicial fiat. A decision in favor of Concerned Citizens 
would overstep the boundaries of this court and throw the entire intelligence gathering programs 
in disarray. The pen-register tactics have been around for nearly 100 years without much concern 
and the collection of metadata is different only in volume. The technologies are still young and, 
more problematic, constantly evolving. To issue a judgment impeding present and future acts of 
intelligence gathering, effectively tying the hands of the government.  
 
THE LITERARY JUDGE dissenting. 
 The arguments advanced in the opinion of the court illustrate a gross misunderstanding of 
the role of privacy in contemporary U.S. culture and the extent to which powers granted to law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies are continually abused. As my colleague, the Deliberative 
Judge, aptly notes, these laws were born out of a misguided fear that benefited from crisis and 
confusion in order to expand the scope of military and surveillance powers. The fear of an 
external threat turned inward, viewing every citizen as a potential threat. The result is a 
collection of data larger than this world has ever seen. So vast is the amount of information that 
an immense data center is being constructed in order to store the information indefinitely.  
My colleague, the Economic Judge, claims that the right to privacy is overblown and 
primarily benefits the illicit elements of our community. While that may be the case, they 
similarly benefit from all laws protecting citizens. If we are to follow his line of argument, must 
we also revert to a “bad tendency” understanding of the First Amendment, preventing or 
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punishing speech when the government believes it has a propensity to spur illegal action? Must 
we abandon the idea of “fruit from the poisonous tree” as it applies to the Fourth Amendment, 
allowing warrantless searches free reign so long as they produce some form of evidence? Must 
we abandon the right to bear arms, even knives and hunting rifles, for fear they may be used to 
aid illegal acts? The Economic Judge believes we can throw out the bathwater and keep the 
baby, but that is not possible in a democratic society. Yes, criminals will find ways to benefit 
from the protections afforded to all citizens, but that is no reason to intrude upon the rights 
everyone enjoy, including the right to privacy. We must not cater to the lowest common 
denominator in our culture; to do so would abandon the common civic ties that unite all citizens 
and turn our society into a paranoid surveillance state.  
My colleague employs Holmes’ Bad Man Theory to justify the tactics employed by the 
NSA, arguing that the collection of metadata is a minimally invasive way to investigate threats to 
U.S. citizens. What if we were to turn the Bad Man Theory around and use it to examine the 
government? If law is to be crafted with the bad man in mind, should it not also be written with 
the bad government in mind? During the Nuremburg Trials, Hermann Goering provided a 
haunting truth: 
It is the leaders of the country who determine the policy and it is always a simple matter 
to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy, or a fascist dictatorship, or a 
parliament, or a communist dictatorship. Voice or no voice, the people can always be 
brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are 
being attacked, and denounce the peacemakers for lack of patriotism and exposing the 
country to danger. It works the same in any country.46 
                                                 
46 G. M. Gilbert, Nuremberg Diary (New York: Farrar, Straus, & Co., 1947), 278-279. 
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Studies abound with examples of power corrupting even the most passive and peaceful 
individuals. The Milgram Experiments illustrated the ease with which people blindly follow 
authority. The Stanford Prison Experiment illustrated how swiftly power corrupts even the 
seemingly passive and peaceful. The primary justification behind the 1978 Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act was to curb the myriad of domestic intelligence abuses by the Nixon 
administration. Amazingly, the PATRIOT Act and the amendments to FISA have directly 
undercut this primary objective. Under the guise of “national security,” the programs have been 
able to run largely unobstructed save for a few moments of public attention.  
This is perhaps the most alarming aspect about the government’s actions and the 
Economic Judge’s opinion. FISA was not created as part of an initiative to expand intelligence 
gathering, but rather to limit it. In addition to legitimate targets, scores of domestic activist 
groups that were in opposition to the government at its policies were secretly under surveillance. 
Herein lies the biggest danger that Sections 215 and 702 make possible: the secret investigation 
of counter publics that are antagonistic to the government. Participants in Occupy Wall Street, 
Ferguson protesters, LGBTQ advocates, avowed communists and anarchists, atheists, radical 
feminists, former prison inmates, and Muslim activists challenge the status quo regularly and do 
so within the confines of the law. Examples abound from U.S. history: Emma Goldman was 
targeted. Eugene V. Debs was targeted. The FBI voraciously targeted Martin Luther King, Jr. for 
his purported “clandestine” activities. Nelson Mandela was on a terrorist watch list until 2008! 
Reports indicate that the U.S. has millions of names on the watch list, with an acceptance rate of 
nearly 99%. Many of these individuals have no verifiable connection to any known terrorist 
group, but nonetheless may be subject to intense scrutiny. Once on the list, their web of metadata 
may be investigated further. Issues of race, class, gender, sexuality, religious orientation, national 
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origins, and political affiliation of those target must not be ignored, yet the secrecy afforded the 
NSA allows bias to exist unimpeded.  
The opinion of the court illustrates a remarkably unenlightened perspective of and lack of 
sensitivity to the marginalized groups within United States. The majority of the legislative, 
judicial, and executive bodies are composed of those with privilege and affluence. They do not 
understand what it is like to be targeted unjustly because they and those they know have never 
been targeted unjustly. But cases abound with people who have been on the wrong side of the 
law if only because they had the wrong last name, or their skin color did not match that of the 
lawmakers, or their ideas challenged the dominant power structure. Perhaps if the lawmakers and 
judges had an opportunity to experience, or at the very least understand, how these individuals 
live, they would not be so quick to make their lives even more difficult. They value privacy not 
because they are engaging in nefarious activities, but rather because the institution of law has 
been a constant source of pain and frustration. As Robert Cover argued throughout his career, 
law is inherently violent as it legitimates future harm in the form of punishment or validates past 
harm.47 The expectation of privacy provides a respite from the multitude of agencies and 
institutions that have worked against them time and time again. As it stands, there is no way for 
an individual or an organization targeted by these programs to challenge them. Moreover, the 
tactics are indefinite. Once they are legitimized, the government has little incentive to go back if 
the context changes. This will only encourage them to reach for more and more in incremental 
steps. While it may be warming to imagine a benevolent government and legal system, history 
tells a different story. 
                                                 
47 See Martha Minow, Michael Ryan, and Austin Sarat (eds.), Narrative, Violence, and the Law: The 
Essays of Robert Cover (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995). 
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Both the Economic Judge and the Deliberative Judge highlight the various measures in 
place to ensure adequate oversight, yet the petitioner has illustrated several instances when 
information was left vulnerable or the power of analysts abused. Given the immense secrecy 
protecting the programs, it is more than likely that such instances are not few and far between. 
According to the Rules of Procedure for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, records and 
rulings concerning the FISA court may be released only on the authorization of the presiding 
judge.48 Having little incentive to do so, there have been precious view disclosures.49 The 
vastness of the metadata collection suggests that adequate oversight is impossible. As a report 
issued by the Brennan Center for Justice indicates, the various safeguards “still afford the 
government sweeping authority to use, keep and share the data it collects, and in practice have 
been difficult to enforce… The court’s Presiding Judge Reggie Walton recently admitted that the 
court is forced to rely on intelligence agencies to report and correct noncompliance with these 
safeguards.”50 The lack of oversight by the judicial system, even a judicial system shrouded in 
secrecy, and the expectation of the NSA to report its own abuses flies in the face of democracy. 
Even if adequate oversight existed, the programs effectiveness remains highly questionable. 
Once again, we must trust the information issued by the NSA concerning the successes of their 
own program. Consequently, the public is left with a haunting, unanswered question: who 
watches the watchers?  
 
 
                                                 
48 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, “Rules and Procedure for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court,” Rule 62. 
49 All Matters Submitted to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611. (Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court, 2002). 
50 “U.S. Surveillance: Unchecked and Unsupervised,” Brennan Center for Justice (Nov. 6, 2013), 9, 
retrieved from http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/us-surveillance-unchecked-and-unsupervised. 
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